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THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

EDITORIALS FROM
THE NORTH AMERICAN

PHILADELPHIA

JULY, 1914—MARCH, 1915

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VOLUME



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THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

EDITORIALS
FROM
THE NORTH AMERICAN
PHILADELPHIA

JULY, 1914—MARCH, 1915

PRESS OF
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
EAST WASHINGTON SQUARE, PHILADELPHIA

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FOREWORD

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THESE editorials are published in collected form in response to suggestions from many readers, who have found them useful as a survey of the historical backgrounds of the great war, and as an interpretation, from an American point of view, of the issues involved. The articles are presented in chronological order, and cover the first seven months of the conflict, from the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia to the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts by warships of the Allies. They have the faults inseparable from the hasty composition required by daily newspaper work, but it is worth noting that no revision has been deemed necessary in either statements of fact or expressions of opinion.

THE NORTH AMERICAN.

Philadelphia, March 25, 1915.

160302

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THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

EUROPE'S THREATENED WAR

July 29, 1914.

THERE is a lamentable basis of truth in the comment of the New York Sun upon a significant conjunction of events during the last week:

On the very day that diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were broken, on the eve, it may be, of the costliest, the bloodiest and the most general European war since the Napoleonic era, our sapient secretary of state, sublimely confident in his twenty paper peaces, said, "These treaties ought to make war almost impossible."

This is a savage gibe at worthy and not valueless efforts toward the elimination of war. Mr. Bryan's enthusiastic faith in his project is somewhat pitiful; but no humane person will condemn the hope that the aspirations of the numerous peace advocates, official and private, individual and associated, will gradually bring upon the world the blessings of universal concord.

Yet it must be a sublime and unthinking optimism which is not shaken by the astounding spectacle which Europe presents today. Austria and Serbia are on the verge of conflict, and half the continent is smoldering with war fires. Russia, turning the vast bulk of her power with deceptive slowness, seems about to lay her huge bear's paw upon the dual monarchy. This threat has set Germany aflame. Italy and France resound with the drumbeats of preparation; and Great Britain, distracted by political struggles at home, is facing with the gravest apprehension the possibility of being drawn into the "titanic struggle."

This is the scene which confronts the race after nineteen centuries of the gospel of peace—the great Christian nations of the elder world, the exemplars of civilization and advanced humanity, flinging themselves into a devastating war. National rivalries are to be settled by slaughter; half a continent is to be drenched in blood to decide where justice lies as between clashing racial ambitions.

It is idle to charge this condition, well-nigh incredible in its folly and ferocity, to the intrigue of despotic rulers and cold-blooded statesmen for political advantage. The strangest and most significant phenomenon in the whole outburst is the enthusiasm of the peoples for war. The streets of the capitals are filled with shouting throngs. The only hero is the soldier. The nation which yesterday was a friend, or no worse than a rival, today is furiously denounced as “the enemy,” for whose blood it is virtuous to thirst. Millions of armed troops are being mobilized for destruction, amid the cheers of war-mad citizens.

We have heard much of the peace-dream of socialism—a brotherhood that should know no borders and should obliterate militarism—but one blast of “the haggard trumpets” shatters it. The abstract idea of a united humanity is submerged in the rush of passions as crude as those of the primitive savage.

Swift as has seemed the development of this situation of dread, the results of which one can hardly dare to contemplate, its coming has been recognized as inevitable for a generation. Those threadbare phrases, “the balance of power” and “the concert of Europe,” had their source in conditions which now threaten to shake the continent. The immediate causes are simple enough. Austria justly demanded reparation for the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife a month

ago; but the terms of her ultimatum were so harsh and humiliating to Servia that there is no doubt it was framed to compel a refusal and thus furnish a pretext for war. Behind Austria's desire to punish the assassins and exact heavy tribute for the deed of blood are her inveterate hatred of Servia's people and her insatiable ambition to extend her empire to the Aegean sea.

For two centuries the hardy, warlike Serbs have dreamed of the erection of a strong, united nation in the Balkan peninsula. It seemed near to realization in 1878, when Servia wrested her independence from Turkey; but Austrian influence was strong enough to write into the Berlin treaty a provision that she should have suzerainty over Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus forcing a large part of the Serb race under a domination as hateful to them as that of the Moslem. Moreover, the settlement gave Austria her coveted foothold on the Adriatic and, at the same time, shut Servia in from the sea. For thirty-five years Servia has struggled for the outlet which her development demands, but in vain. In 1909 Austria formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all but precipitated then the general war. Germany's power was able to avert the struggle.

But Servia's military triumphs in the two Balkan wars of recent years revived her hopes. In defiance of the alarmed warnings of the great Powers, she fought her way to the coast and raised her flag over Durazzo. At last she had her "window on the sea." But it was not for long. The elder nations held a conference in London and decreed that Servia must retire. Once more she was thrust back; and the Powers resorted to the extraordinary expedient of creating the absurd little kingdom of Albania, with a puppet ruler who is even now fighting to hold his phantom throne, as a buffer state between Servia and the Adriatic.

Nothing but a desperate statesmanship could have hoped that a device so transparently unjust would promote permanent peace. Albania has not known an hour's tranquillity; and the recent denunciation of the whole scheme by George Fred Williams, while it cost him his diplomatic post, was justified by the facts. Meanwhile, Servia's inextinguishable ambition has grown fiercer under repression, and the progress of the Pan-Serb Union, which aims to unite the whole race, has further inflamed Austria's fear and anger, particularly because the southern part of her empire is largely populated by Serbs. It was Austria's peremptory demand for absolute suppression of the Pan-Serb movement that made her ultimatum tantamount to a declaration of war.

If it were certain that the struggle could be localized between these two nations, Europe would be little agitated. But there are possibilities of infinitely greater menace. The clash of interests in the Balkans may drag into the conflict millions of moujiks from the Russian steppes, artisans from German workshops, light-hearted peasants from French vineyards, farm boys from quiet English lanes. It is the threat of such a general conflagration that has set the rulers and statesmen of all Europe frantically searching for a basis of compromise. What does it all mean? What resistless force is it that turns whole peoples into war-crazed mobs in an age when peaceful civilization is, in theory, the animating spirit of the world? Even a casual traveler in Europe is startled by the universal acceptance of the idea that such a general war is inevitable. Territorial ambitions, international intrigue, vast military preparations—these are the unending subjects of discussion and speculation. The very waiters at the continental hotels will surprise the tourist by their familiarity with these tremendous

questions. Everywhere, among all classes, the coming of the gigantic conflict is regarded as a certainty.

For this fatalistic acceptance of a monstrous reversion to savagery there are two underlying causes. First is the economic pressure which increasing populations and lack of natural resources have exerted for generations upon the nations of Central Europe, to be overcome, they believe, only, through expansion. Second is a deep-rooted racial antagonism between Teuton and Slav.

All eastern Europe is overshadowed by the huge bulk of Russia, whose power is literally measureless and steadily growing. Her vast population and illimitable wealth make her invulnerable. Her defeat by Japan on the far-off Pacific left hardly a mark upon her imperial might. She can put five and a half million of stolid fighting men in the field in a few months. And Russia is determined that Teuton expansion toward the south and east shall not take place. Ties of race and religion, as well as considerations of politics, make her the supporter of the Slavic peoples whom Austria threatens. She yielded to Austria and Germany in 1909, when the former absorbed Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that makes it no more likely that she will permit the crushing of Servia.

That which causes Europe to tremble, therefore, is the disturbance of the balance of power. If Russia steps between Austria and Servia, Germany is bound, under the terms of the triple alliance, to take her stand with the dual monarchy. In that case, a like understanding would place France at the side of Russia, not only ready to aid her Muscovite ally, but eager to take revenge on Germany for the humiliations of 1870. Italy would owe a similar obligation to Germany and Austria, and, finally, Great Britain would be put to the test of honoring her agreement to sustain France and Russia in a general

conflict. All these cross currents of racial and political antagonism are as familiar to the peoples of Europe as the simplest facts of existence. From childhood they breathe the atmosphere of international intrigue and look upon the vast preparations of militarism as the most important function of civilization.

The people of this country, fortunate in their "splendid isolation" and the peaceful intermingling of different bloods, look with wonder and almost contempt upon the patient subjection of European nations to the incredible burdens of vast armaments. But the victims have been taught that that is the price they must pay for national existence. To them, there is no middle ground between Teutonic and Slavic supremacy; one race or the other must succumb. To a great extent, therefore, militarism is regarded by them as natural, even admirable. The spirit of national pride and warlike preparedness is kept alive by every possible device and by earnest conviction. Thus, while the huge armaments and universal conscription are, in a sense, promoters of peace, in another aspect they are provocatives of war.

The present crisis, even though Austria has forced hostilities, may be averted. Russia is patient, and may decide that for the present Serbia shall be sacrificed; the German emperor may exert his influence to stay Austria's aggression; England and France may succeed in allaying the ferment. But the struggle can only be postponed, not made impossible. The balance is so delicately adjusted and the racial animosities so inveterate that some day there must be a drastic readjustment. And that this can be brought about only by a cataclysmic struggle is the settled belief of every European statesman and of a large part of the thinking population.

This, then, is the condition which confronts the world in the twentieth century of the Christian era—

an age when civilization boasts its highest development. It seems to make the Palace of Peace at The Hague a monumental jest and such negotiations as those of our optimistic secretary of state childishly futile.

But there could be no greater setback to human progress than general acquiescence in such a view. Universal peace is still an iridescent dream and its realization seemingly remote. Measured by some conditions, Christianity itself is a failure; yet it has been the greatest single force in the development of humanity, for the reason that it has inspired men to strive for impossible perfection. Peace, on the contrary, is attainable; and the struggle toward it is the worthiest employment of the race.

THE WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS

August 1, 1914.

SILENCE, deep, ominous and poignant, has fallen upon the listening world. The crash of battle reported in little Serbia only helps to accentuate the hush of the nations as they wait for the fatal signal which will set a continent afire. The hurried tramp of ten million men is lost in the awesome, expectant quiet with which civilization cowers under the threatened blow of a general war. Nothing but a miracle can prevent a conflict which, if it comes, will make all previous wars seem petty. The home nest of the great white race is to be slashed from the Mediterranean to the Arctic and from the Western Ocean to the Ural mountains. Its scarred remainders are to be drenched in blood.

The civilization which has been built up by slow and painful process for 1500 years is to feed on its own flesh. All that art and science and light and learning have developed through centuries of Christian leading is to be turned into an engine of desolation. The energies of 400,000,000 of people which yesterday were devoted to production are tomorrow to be dedicated to destruction. And another population of 400,000,000 now contributing to the support of peace are to give their energies to the support of war. For a time, the length of which God only knows, human thought and effort are to be bent to their utmost for murder—murder, not of individuals, but murder in the wholesale, murder by hundreds and thousands and tens of thousands, murder

in the total, perhaps, of millions. And these men—the slayers and the slain—have never done wrong one to the other, have never borne personal spite. And when thousands of gray faces shall stare wide eyed at the wondering stars, not one of the dead will have known why he died, not one of the victors will know even the name of the inoffensive foe whose soul he has sped. It is all so horribly futile, so utterly without reason, that it seems to be the dream of a madman. But there is a hushed and waiting world to prove the reality of the crisis and the magnitude of the horrors which are bound to follow a declaration of general war. And the world has almost assumed that the war is certain. Speculation is now based on what will be its outcome, rather than on the possibility of averting the conflict.

Publicists and statesmen profess to see a conflict for supremacy between Teuton and Slav. And yet England, which is ranged on the side of the Slavic power, is Teutonic, not only in its origin, but in its laws, language, religion and civic ideals. The other ally of Russia is France, more remote from Slavic blood than Germany herself and further removed from Slavic thought than any other country in Europe. Here, then, we have the strange spectacle of the two most liberal of European nations—the two great nations of the world whose governments respond most quickly to the popular will—in a blood-sealed alliance with the most despotic of all governments among white peoples. England, France and Russia—it is an odd partnership. It is held together by a single common bond—fear of Germany.

On the other side of the conflict there are the German empire, Italy and Italy's hereditary foe, that strange conglomerate of races and tongues which constitutes Austria-Hungary. This is neither Teuton nor Slav. The dominant race in Austria is German; but the

Germans are a minority of the subjects of Franz Josef. For the Magyars and the Slavs in the dual monarchy greatly outnumber the Teutons. In turn, the Magyars, who rule Hungary and who hate the Germans, are outnumbered by the Slavs and the Germans in that kingdom. This heterogeneous mass is held together by the power of an ancient political system which it has inherited. It is without national aims or common ideals. Its ruling classes have set the objective of a suzerainty over the Balkan states, with an outlet on the Aegean sea. They found the aggressive and ambitious little power of Servia as a barricade in the path. That is the immediate cause of the war between Austria and Servia. Back of this is the ambition of Germany, which now seeks to put a check to Russian expansion to the south. And reacting on this is the French tradition of revenge and the winning back of Alsace and Lorraine. Side by side with this is the English fear of German aggression and the English desire to win back the lost provinces of commercial dominion and monopoly of the sea.

What will be the result when these contrary forces and currents mingle in a general conflict? Will allies be true to allies and the war be fought to a finish on its original line-up? Will the kaiser risk the destruction of the sea power which he has so carefully built up and the crushing of his land power between the forces of Russia and France? The czar and the kaiser stand for the same ideals of government. Is it possible that these two may be forced to an agreement which will render their allies helpless, and out of which the czar will get the Slavic states in the Balkans, while the kaiser will be enriched by the German part of Austria, leaving Hungary as a buffer nation? Or, if the war is fought to exhaustion by the present line-up, may not this division of territory still be the outcome?

On the other hand, a victorious Germany might mean the union of all the Germanic peoples of Europe, including Holland, under the Emperor at Berlin. It would be the victory of 1871 over again and magnified. There are endless possibilities. The eagles of Russia may mount the spire of St. Sophia at Constantinople. France may acquire Belgium, which is more truly Gallic than is Breton. England may sweep the Germans from the sea; and the empire which has been the wonder of the world for a generation may subside as quickly as it arose. And what of Italy? If her government attempts to fulfill her agreement to support Austria, will her people acquiesce? An Italian republic is not an improbable outcome. In the meantime, there is Japan—watchful, alert, suspicious—on the other side of the world. Out of the wreck she will demand her share, which may be that the exhausted nations of Europe withdraw from China and leave that country to the sole exploitation of the Japanese.

More important, however, than all the political changes that the war may effect is the question of its influence on human progress. Will it retard or advance the cause of humanity? If Russia extends the Slav power, will it not itself become so unwieldy that it will fall apart by its own weight? The very autocratic ambition that stirs Russia to action now may find itself defeated by victory. For the Slav is an idealist and a dreamer. The very Slavic societies which Austria has set out to suppress are themselves leavened by liberalism. This war will put the Slav into touch with the western world. His allies are liberals and republicans. Victory over the Germans may strengthen the prestige of the czar, but it will quicken the thought of his people and turn their minds to larger liberty. A group of Slav

republics is not an impossibility as the eventual result of the conflict.

But more important than any political changes may be the social effect of the war, its loosening of the old industrial order and its enlisting of the common people against war itself. By the withdrawing of millions of men from productive industry, the whole world will be made to bear the burden. This will be heaviest on the wage-earners. The sight of their brothers slaughtered and their own children hungry may send them to inquiring why. That there will be a tremendous anti-war movement among the workers of France and Germany, and perhaps of England, is probable. The waste and the futility of war are likely to be borne strongly in on those who have to stand the brunt of it and who benefit the least from it.

The Napoleonic wars were followed by an upheaval of the people for political liberty. That the war which we now face will be followed by an upheaval for industrial democracy is not the least probable outcome, but it is one of which those who are precipitating the struggle take no account. The progress of the human race has been written in blood. It is a pity that after all these years no kindlier way has been found. But if blood is to be spilled, there is a consolation in the belief that it is not to be altogether in vain, and that humanity will reap some good from the pain and travail and anguish that are sown so recklessly for the glory of its accidental and temporary rulers.

EUROPE AT WAR

August 3, 1914.

LIKE a curtain of thick darkness, the secrecy of modern war movements has descended upon Europe, shutting unknown perils and horrors from the world. Through the veil of relentless military censorship only fitful flashes tell of the mighty panorama unfolding its hideous length across the continent. The teeming columns of the newspapers, vivid as they are, can only faintly reveal the tremendous events of the present hour and the staggering possibilities of the next. Even now great armies are converging toward a bloody clash. Even now grim squadrons of the embattled nations are at sea, maneuvering to strike—even now may have met. Literally by millions armed troops are gathering, and behind them come millions more. Five days ago but two nations were involved; today half the civilized world is plunging into strife. Europe, for a generation past an armed camp, has become overnight potentially one great battlefield.

As striking as the fury of the storm is the swiftness with which it broke. Only a few hours ago it seemed that the great Powers would easily control the conflict that had arisen. The resources of diplomacy and the pressure of a common interest were relied upon to "teach the doubtful battle where to rage." But even while the startled leaders groped for peace the lightnings were loosed and the black cloud of a continental war enveloped them. To talk of bloodless settlement now would seem

the idlest chatter of a dream. The tides of fate have overflowed the barriers set up by men against them. The world can only stand aghast at the mighty forces it has waked and brace itself for the shock of such a cataclysm as history has never recorded.

Strange it is to think that all the thunder of those countless guns on sea and land is the echo of a pistol shot. A month ago an Austrian archduke was assassinated, presumably by a Servian patriot. There were demands for reparation; finally an ultimatum so harsh than it meant war. So far, the spectacle was the common one of a weak nation harried by a stronger—nothing to rouse war fury there! But Russia felt the ties of race and the urge of political ambition, and declared that Servia should be held safe. Austria's defiance was quick, but hardly quicker than Germany's. The kaiser questioned the mobilization of Russia's vast forces—and was told that he might seek the explanation in the field. And the pressure of a button in Berlin started in motion the vast machinery of the German army, while a declaration of war gave notice that the challenge of Slav to Teuton had been accepted.

Elsewhere the moves were as swift. France summoned her millions to the colors. Denmark, Holland, Belgium, even tiny Switzerland, put themselves into war posture. The great British armada melted into the mists of the North sea, its orders known only to Whitehall. Thousands of miles of coastline, a few nights ago hospitable with lights, became bleak and forbidding as the beacons were extinguished. Harbor buoys have been lifted, mines laid; and from every place where an enemy might land, defensive searchlights play across the waters from dusk to dawn.

These are but incidental features in the gigantic spectacle of Europe under arms. More startling than

any of them is the mad enthusiasm of the peoples. Here is a picture from Paris, characteristic of scenes in a score of cities:

Bodies of men formed into regular companies in ranks of ten and paraded the streets, waving the tricolor and cheering and singing the "Marseillaise" and throwing their hats in the air. On the sidewalks were many weeping women and children.

The singing and the cheering will die away, but the weeping will go on.

There is small wonder that the descent of the war cloud seemed sudden to those at a distance, when it overtook the wisest statesmen of Europe unwarned. For half a century they had awaited the coming of the fateful day, and had all but crushed their nations under the burden of preparation; yet in the end it mocked their predictions and flouted their most solemn councils. The hour had struck, and before one blast of the war spirit the pretensions of a humanitarian diplomacy melted away. The beating of a tomtom in the jungle never called forth naked savages to battle more swiftly than did the touching of the race-nerves of these highly civilized peoples. For a generation peace had been talked and dreamed and preached by war lord and worker, by statesman and philanthropist. Peace was proclaimed as the goal of parliaments, the one desire of nations, the justification of monstrous armaments. Yet after a race-history which orthodoxy measures in thousands of centuries and science in millions of years, the works of man at his highest development could not withstand the primitive instinct of tribal jealousy.

For behind this war that threatens to devastate a continent there is just that prehistoric passion. No one has the hardihood to maintain that the nations are flinging themselves into this conflict for the sake of any great principle of justice. Servia alone has a cause that seems

to be founded upon right; but she is already lost in the welter, submerged beneath the warring Powers that fight for greed, for pride, for revenge, for hate, for the inextinguishable lust of national aggrandizement.

What does this mean but that our boasted civilization has broken down? That there has been, at least, a reversion from which it will climb upward again only by slow and painful degrees? For the crime is Europe's, but the penalty will be laid upon the whole world. In this country and elsewhere there will be benefits of temporarily increased trade and prosperity, while within the zone of the war's influence a plague of poverty and suffering must be suffered; but eventually humanity itself will be called upon to pay the appalling account.

At any time during the last thirty years action might conceivably have been taken to avert the disaster. Now there seems but one remedy—violence. Selfish statesmanship has stimulated national antagonisms and race prejudices to fever, and it can be allayed only by the letting of blood. How far this dreadful operation must go none can now foretell. Far-seeing men predict that the coming war will be the bloodiest in history—and the last. If the second part of this prophecy shall prove true, the price will not be too great for the world to pay.

BY WHOSE HAND ?

August 7, 1914.

DRIVEN by the force of racial hate and greed, the swift shuttle of war is now weaving its bloody pattern across the continent of Europe. Before the last grim thread is cut there will be pictured indelibly for future ages the record of the most colossal and most shameful conflict in human history. What will be the verdict of posterity? Where will be placed the burden of responsibility? Upon what name or nation will be loaded the fathomless guilt, the infamy, of having loosed this horror upon humanity?

Already the world is gathering the evidence. Rapid as have been the opening events of the hideous drama, the scrutiny of civilization is following them closely. Stern will be the questioning and heavy the reckoning for this crime against the race. Time was when a war was held to be the sole concern of those engaged in it; when the nations had to be content with the arrogant pretense of royal proclamations, and when the causes and justification of a struggle could be determined only from the perspective of distant years. Science and progress have changed all that. Instantaneous communication flashes to the ends of the earth day by day the utterances and movements of ambitious Powers. The account is made up every twenty-four hours. Diplomacy has its secrets still, but its acts are subjected to the pitiless glare of publicity and its motives to the relentless judgment of contemporaneous civilization. The nation

which unsheathes the sword is put instantly upon the defensive in the court of international opinion.

This is recognized universally. No government is so haughty or so powerful that it dare make war without pretending, at least, to manifest "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." From each of those now engaged has come a manifesto intended to absolve it from blood-guiltiness in the impending slaughter. Thus Serbia calls the world to witness that her answer to Austria was the limit of submission and conciliation. Austria, through her ambassador to the United States, solemnly declares that her assault upon Serbia was a measure of "self-defense." Russia explains her action as "benevolent intervention," and expresses "an humble hope in omnipotent providence" that her hosts will be triumphant. Germany charges France with perfidious attack upon the unarmed border of the fatherland, and proclaims a holy war for "the security of her territory."

France and England, Belgium and Italy deplore the conflict and protest that they are innocent of offense.

Happily, there is a test that will conclusively establish responsibility. Thanks to the rapidity of events and the resources of modern publicity, the nations of the earth have clearly before them the record of the war's beginning, and will be able to point unerringly to the acts which incited it. With five first-class Powers and half a score of lesser nations already involved, the world is witnessing the death-grapple of the greatest forces the human race has produced. A fortnight ago such a stupendous conflict seemed utterly remote—no more, perhaps, than a nightmare of overwrought statesmanship; today civilization reels before the spectacle of Christendom overwhelmed in bloody war. The incredible fact is that twelve days sufficed to change Europe from a family of peaceful nations to a hell of sanguinary

strife. Here is the brief record upon which history will form its judgment and render its verdict:

July 23—Austria serves forty-eight-hour ultimatum upon Serbia, demanding punishment of assassins of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, absolute suppression of the Pan-Serb movement and of newspapers attacking Austrian policy, and the hunting down of Servian agitators by Austrian officers.

July 24—Russia requests Austria to give Serbia further time; Austria refuses.

July 25—Serbia yields all points except the conduct of investigation by Austrians. Austria withdraws her minister.

July 26—Servian minister dismissed from Vienna. Austrian army moves.

July 27—Austria denounces Serbia's answer as "dishonest" and advances her army to enforce the ultimatum. Great Britain urges European conference of mediation. Emperor William arrives in Berlin from Norway and calls council of ministers.

July 28—Austria declares war on Serbia. Mediation fails. Russia protests against Austria's aggression against Serbia, and sends troops to Austrian border.

July 29—Germany warns Russia to stop mobilization, and stations forces along the Russian frontier.

July 30—The kaiser sends ultimatum demanding that Russia cease mobilizing within twenty-four hours.

July 31—Germany begins mobilization under martial law. British fleet sails under sealed orders. Germany demands to know France's attitude in case of war with Russia.

August 1—Germany declares war on Russia.

August 2—France begins mobilization. German forces invade Russia and France simultaneously. Germany seizes Luxemburg, a neutral territory, as a base of operations against France and invades the neutral territory of Belgium. Great Britain, appealed to by Belgium, asks Germany whether Belgian neutrality will be respected. Germany refuses to recede, but agrees not to annex any territory. Great Britain mobilizes her forces.

August 4—Great Britain sends to Germany an ultimatum that she withdraw from neutral territory. Germany declares war 7 o'clock P. M. Great Britain declares war 11 o'clock P. M.

From these facts there is no escape. Leaving aside all questions of justice or political expediency, the aggressor throughout has been Germany. Austria's fury over the assassination of the heir to the throne was natural. But Servia tendered full reparation. So keen and conservative an authority as Rear Admiral Mahan declares that "the aggressive insolence" of Austria's ultimatum and Servia's concession of all demands except those too humiliating for national self-respect show that behind Austria's assault was the instigation of Berlin. He adds:

Knowing how the matter would be viewed in Russia, it is incredible that Austria would have ventured on the ultimatum unless assured beforehand of the consent of Germany. The inference is irresistible that it was the pretext for a war already determined upon as soon as plausible occasion offered.

Circumstantial evidence, at least, places responsibility for the flinging of the first firebrand upon the government of the kaiser. Now, who added fuel to the flames, until the great conflagration was under way? The next move was the czar's. "Fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs" in Servia, he says, led him to order partial mobilization, following Austria's invasion of Servia. Instantly Germany protested, and within forty-eight hours sent an ultimatum demanding that Russia cease her preparations. On the following day Germany mobilized, and twenty-four hours later declared war on Russia. Mobilization in France, necessitated by these events, was anticipated by Germany, which simultaneously flung forces into Russia, France, Luxemburg and Belgium.

It was Germany's historic policy of "blood and iron" that fired Austria to attempt the crushing of Servia. It was Germany that hurled an ultimatum, swiftly followed by an army, at Russia. It was Germany that struck first at the French frontier. It was Germany that

trampled upon solemn treaty engagements by invading the neutral states of Luxemburg and Belgium. And it was Germany that, in answer to England's demand that the neutrality of Belgium be protected, declared war against Great Britain.

Regardless, therefore, of questions of right and wrong, it is undeniable that in each succeeding crisis Germany has taken the aggressive. In so doing she has been inspired by a supreme confidence in her military might. But she has less reason to be proud of her diplomacy. The splendid audacity of her moves cannot obscure the fact that in making the case upon which she will be judged she has been outmaneuvered by the deliberation of Russia, the forbearance of France and the patience of Great Britain. She has assumed the role of international autocrat, while giving her foes the advantage of prosecuting a patriotic war of defense.

Particularly is this true touching the violation of neutral territory. For nearly half a century the duchy of Luxemburg has been considered a "perpetually neutral state," under solemn guarantee of Austria, Great Britain, Germany and Russia. Since 1830, when Belgium seceded from the Netherlands, it, too, has been held "an independent and perpetually neutral state," that status being solemnly declared in a convention signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia. Yet the first war move of Germany was to overrun these countries.

The fact is that treaties are utterly valueless in the face of the grim exigencies of war. There are two ways for Germany to enter France. One is through the bristling fortifications that guard the Franco-German border; the other is through the hapless "neutral" states. She has chosen the latter; and in the face of her relentless purpose a treaty is just as much an obstacle as would

be a blank sheet of parchment. What will be the judgment of the world upon her act of brigandage weighs nothing with her against the supreme object of military advantage. A question of nearer consequence to her is whether that advantage has not been too dearly bought, since it has swung into line against her the tremendous might of the British empire.

For forty years Germany has been the exemplar of a progressive civilization. In spite of her adherence to inflated militarism, she has put the whole world in her debt by her inspiring industrial and scientific achievements. Her people have taught mankind lessons of incalculable value, and her sons have enriched far distant lands with their genius. Not the least of the catastrophes inflicted by this inhuman war is that an unbridled autocracy has laid the great German empire under indictment for arrogant assault upon the peace of nations and the security of human institutions.

BELGIUM

August 8, 1914.

WHATEVER the final judgment of history on the bloody cataclysm of 1914, no one today can doubt that one name at least will be written high in flaming letters. The world may well lay aside for the moment all controversy as to primal causes of the war and the right or wrong of the great powers engaged in the far-flung slaughter. It would be beside the truth to say that a new star has flashed forth in the firmament of heroic nations. For it is many centuries since imperial Julius, himself one of the five greatest soldiers of all time, paid to the Belgians the highest tribute of praise in his gift.

From the time of Caesar to yesterday the history of the Belgians bristled with deeds of glory. The weavers of Flanders were the despair of medieval despots; and against their stubborn defiance armies of mailed knights broke in bootless fury. As modern Europe emerged from the chaos of a decadent feudalism, Flemish soil was traced and retraced in the blood of contending armies. Nearly every great European war in 200 years has pitched decisive battles within what is now the territory of Belgium. Belgium is, therefore, no stranger to fighting. But in recent generations she has been so far outstripped by the growth of her neighbors and her people have been so given to the pursuits of peace that the world seemed to have forgotten Belgium's own traditions.

When stern military policy drove the German armies over the Belgian boundary in their eager attack on France, they expected to find nothing to impede their progress except a treaty and the flimsy pledge of a great nation's honor. The world now knows what happened. The national right and dignity of the Belgians had been ruthlessly trampled upon. And the Belgians rose as from the dust and smote the mightiest military power in the world a staggering blow.

From the mines and looms and lathes of Belgium her sons rushed to the defense of her liberties. A nation which had been regarded as supine was galvanized into a nation of fighting men. The audacity and the courage of Belgium's resistance to the German advance cannot be appreciated without a consideration of the frightful odds which the little kingdom faced. A population equal to that of Pennsylvania, crowded into a space about one-fourth the size of this state, stood up against a power which commands five million soldiers. The most inexorable military machine in the world was rushing over Belgium's borders. Belgium had assurance that if she would submit to the violation of her honor she would be repaid by the protection of the German power. She also had the assurance of grim history that to resist that relentless machine was to invoke all the horrible reprisals which civilization has left in war. She chose honor, amid the derision and laughter of her assailant. And Belgium's weavers and miners and puddlers and bur-nishers took their places behind her historic fortresses.

There they have kept the might of Germany in check through three days of ceaseless fighting. By sheer weight the Germans will probably yet crush the Belgian opposition. But Belgium has already done enough to rewrite her name among the deathless ones. Liege takes its place with Thermopylae. Belgium moves into the

rank with Sparta and Montenegro and all the indomitable little nations which between these two have defied overwhelming odds. The judgment of Caesar is vindicated. And the men who live along the Meuse have shown that, despite the vicissitudes of centuries of war and shifting peoples, the blood which gives courage to their hearts is the same as that which challenged the admiration of the great Roman 1900 years ago.

Belgium has earned from the world the right to a perpetual guarantee of her liberties and her national honor.

GREAT BRITAIN'S POSITION

August 10, 1914.

THE tremendous upheaval in Europe has furnished a supreme test of national sanity and sincerity. Its terrific suddenness left slight chance for pretense. Before the most adroit statesmanship could frame plausible pleas in justification of its course, armies were on the move and the drumming guns had mocked at diplomacy. The curtain rose on the dreadful drama with no time for a rehearsal.

Of all the nations which must answer at the bar of civilization for the events of the last two weeks and their incalculable effects, none will face a more severe ordeal than Great Britain. Her position is of overshadowing importance, from the aspect not only of military and political results, but of international morality. Her policies and her acts will be subjected to merciless scrutiny. Because she has asserted a higher virtue and more unselfish purpose than other nations, because she has been foremost in deploring war and deprecating militarism, a greater circumspection and a more conservative attitude have been demanded from her. How has she met the emergency? What are the issues confronting her and in what manner has she grappled with them? What will history say of her statesmanship and her national spirit in this great world crisis?

It is sixty years since Great Britain was involved in a European war. She has fought in Egypt, in Afghanistan, in India, in Burmah and in South Africa. But

not since the Crimea have her troops battled on the western soil of the vast hemisphere. Now she is one of the chief forces in the gigantic conflict. For good or ill, she has committed her destinies to the test of war. She is to bear her part in settling by the sword the course of civilization in this century. It is quite true to say that the war—hardly six days old!—was the outbreak of irreconcilable antagonism between the Teutonic and Slavic races. But as the circle swiftly widened it took in other issues and awoke even more far-reaching forces. The imperial audacity of Germany's purpose swung the front of battle from the east to the westward. Towering above all other considerations looms the predestined struggle for supremacy between the two great rival empires.

For generations the security of Great Britain has been her geographical isolation, while her peril has been her far-flung world possessions. For both reasons her supreme dependence has been upon her navy. Untold millions she has spent in upbuilding that colossal barrier of steel that rings her coasts and guards the pathways of her commerce to the ends of all the earth. And, since the main course of her trade has lain toward the east, it has been her vital task to keep the Mediterranean open to the keels of her merchantmen—to make it, in effect, an English lake. Gibraltar at the western portal, Malta in midsea and Egypt at the eastern egress have been held by her with grim tenacity. Her patrols are ever alert, and her diplomacy has been as jealous of the great highway as if her national existence depended upon it—as, indeed, it does.

Germany's rapid rise as a maritime power in recent years has been a direct challenge to Great Britain's position. Not content with peaceful conquest in the rivalry for world markets, which she has achieved by industrial

efficiency and an aggressive trade policy, Germany determined to wrest from her competitor the control of the sea. Her naval plans have compelled Great Britain to swell her fleets to gigantic size. To increase German influence in the Mediterranean—represented now by two Austrian ports in the Adriatic—has been one of the chief aims of Berlin's policy. Every move during the last quarter century has brought nearer the clash of British and German interests. To Great Britain, an island kingdom, an open sea is a matter of life and death. To Germany, on the mainland, sea power is a matter of ambition—an incentive equally powerful.

The present question concerns the responsibility for bringing on a settlement by force of arms. Which nation broke the peace of Europe? That both in recent years have worked zealously for peace is not to be denied. The whole world has acknowledged particularly its debt to the kaiser's attitude in menacing crises. More than once it has been made to shiver by his passionate harangues, his restless diplomacy, his fanatical declarations of divine authority for his imperial purposes, his feverish upbuilding of vast armaments. Yet through many years the "war lord" faithfully made good his pacific protestations and gave his tremendous energies to enhancing his empire's industrial prestige. The paradoxical peril of the situation was that this kaiser became the custodian of Europe's peace. He kept faith, but exacted a tremendous price. For his ceaseless preparations for a war which he declared was beyond the limits of possibility laid upon the whole continent a colossal burden of militarism.

These were the conditions underlying the affairs of Europe when the German-inspired assault of Austria upon Servia set the spark to the magazine of clashing interests. That Great Britain was so well prepared for

the shock was due largely to the foresight of Edward VII. The one great act of that sovereign's brief reign was the cementing of a virtual alliance with France in 1904. Three years later British wisdom added Russia to the defensive "entente," and the stage was set for the great drama. When the world examines the brief but stirring scenes it finds in the very first act the exertion of Britain's influence for peace. When Austria's sinister rejection of Servia's conciliatory answer was made known, the Liberal government besought the aggressor to join in a European conference. This was on the day that the kaiser returned to Berlin. Within twenty-four hours Sir Edward Grey's plea had been spurned, and within forty-eight hours Belgrade was under bombardment.

Let us trace further the course of Great Britain, to determine her part in making the war. Throughout the sharp interchanges between Germany and Russia she held aloof, except for earnest counsels of peace. While the kaiser indorsed to the utmost the warlike acts of "my great ally," the emperor and king of Austria, Britain studiously refrained from expressing sympathy with Russia. Still more significant was her restraint when Germany turned on France with a demand that the republic declare its intentions. Nay, German mobilization was under way and German army corps were threatening the French border; and still Britain maintained her neutral poise. A judgment upon the posture of affairs at this point by Rear Admiral Mahan has an authority that many Americans will accept. On August 2 he said:

In my opinion, a right appreciation of the situation should determine Great Britain to declare war at once. Otherwise, her entente engagements, whatever the letter, will be in spirit violated, and she will earn the distrust of all probable

future allies. As the third member of the entente, she finds herself in the position of Prussia in 1805, when she permitted Napoleon to strike down Austria unaided and was herself struck down the following year at Jena; or in the position of France in 1866, when she stood by while Prussia crushed Austria and was herself overwhelmed in 1870.

Yet not even the impulse of self-preservation moved Great Britain to take the offensive. Then came the German rape of Luxemburg and the invasion of Belgium. These ruthless violations of solemnly guaranteed neutrality are vigorously defended as measures of military necessity, and Germany's assurances that no annexation of territory is contemplated may be accepted as sincere. But they constituted an undoubted menace to the safety of Great Britain; and when Belgium, flinging herself into desperate defense of her land, sent out her cry for that British help which she had a right to expect, the end was inevitable. In the face of the most threatening move against her security since Napoleon projected his abortive invasion, the British government and people displayed admirable sobriety and self-command. The best picture of the national attitude is given in the calm presentation of the facts to parliament by Sir Edward Grey:

The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and the northern coasts of France are defenseless. If a foreign fleet should come down and battle against those defenseless coasts, we could not stand aside. France was entitled to know at once whether, in the event of such attack, she could rely on our support. I gave the engagement to the French ambassador that if the German fleet goes into the English channel or into the North sea to attack French shipping or the French coast, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. The answer is subject to the approval of parliament; it is not a declaration of war.

I understand that the German government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France.

That is far too narrow an engagement. * * * We were sounded as to whether, if Belgian neutrality were restored after the war, it would pacify us; and we replied that we could not barter our interests or our obligations. * * * If in a crisis of this kind we ran away from our obligations of honor and interest with regard to the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might possess, at the end it would be of much value in face of the respect we should have lost. * * * We have a long-standing friendship with France. As to how far that friendship entails obligations, let every man look into his own heart and feelings and construe the extent of our obligations.

At this time a final representation had been made that Belgium's neutrality must be respected. It was upon the absolute rejection of this demand that Great Britain declared war upon Germany; and even then her declaration was four hours later than that of the kaiser.

British statesmanship during the last 200 years has not been more free from blustering and aggression than that of other countries; but it must be conceded that in this emergency the leaders of the empire acted with a discretion, a forbearance and a deliberation that will tell powerfully upon the opinion of the world. Their attitude has given a ring of genuineness to their plea that the empire has not sought war, but has had war thrust upon it. Great Britain will rest her case upon that forceful declaration of Premier Asquith to parliament on Thursday:

We were asked to go behind the back of France and leave Germany free in the event of her being successful in war to annex the whole extra-European dominions of France, and in the case of Belgium we were asked to barter away our obligations to keep our plighted word. What would have been Great Britain's position if she had assented to this infamous proposal and what was she to get in return? Nothing but a promise given by a power which at that moment was announcing its intention of violating its own treaty. We should have covered ourselves with dishonor and betrayed the interests of our country if we had accepted it. We are entitled to say for

our country that we have made every effort for peace and that war has been forced upon our country.

The government is confident that the nation is unsheathing the sword in a just cause. We are fighting, first, to fulfill international obligations which, if entered into by private individuals, no self-respecting man could have repudiated, and, secondly, to vindicate the principle that small nations were not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith at the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power. No nation ever entered into a great contest with a cleaner conscience or a stronger conviction. It is striking for the defense of a principle, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world. As we have entered the struggle, let us now make sure that all our resources, not only those of the United Kingdom, but those of the vast empire of which it is the center, are thrown into the scale.

This newspaper holds no brief for any power in the lamentable conflict, and it rejoices that the injunction of Washington against foreign alliances is the inviolable policy of our government. But our judgment is that the plain facts thus far constitute a record that is strikingly honorable to the government and people of Great Britain. She did her utmost to avert the catastrophe of a general war. Her participation is likely to minimize its disastrous effects by hastening its course. And her influence in the final settlement, it is to be hoped, will be exerted toward a solution that will help to stabilize a shaken civilization. In the event of the overwhelming of Germany by her three great antagonists, it will fall to the lot of Great Britain, perhaps, to perform another humane service—in protecting that nation from the rigors of Cossack vengeance.

THE DOOM OF AUTOCRACY

August 11, 1914.

OVERTHROWN by the avenging allies almost a century ago, Napoleon uttered this singular forecast, "In a hundred years all Europe will be Cossack or republican." There is still time for fulfillment—time enough, as events now move. From their better vantage ground the people of today can determine which force will prevail. The facts of the hour declare that Europe will not be Russianized. It is the other alternative that will justify the vision of the great Corsican. From the flaming brand thrust into the face of civilization will be lighted fires that will consume dynasties.

The vital fact is that this is not in its primary issues a war of the peoples. International rivalries and racial enmities have had much to do with it; but these forces are but the weapons of those who hold the power of peace and war, of life and death, over the millions of the warring countries. Monarchism in Europe makes a plaything of the destinies of its subjects. Policies of intrigue, aggression and conquest are formulated in secret councils by powerful cliques, and maintained by flinging masses of armed men one against the other. With these great matters of state the peoples are held to have no concern. It is their duty merely to rise up at the call of "patriotism"; to uphold the burden of colossal armaments; to furnish millions of devoted victims in order that the glory of their divinely appointed rulers may be enhanced.

One of the notable features of this lamentable conflict is the popular enthusiasm. It will not last, but for the present it is astonishingly real. Austrians are furious against the Serbs, Russians enraged against Austrians, Germans filled with loyal ardor against those whom two weeks ago they counted as friends. But this spirit of savage antagonism would never of itself have fomented the war. It is a reflection of dynastic purposes, the deliberate creation of imperial statesmanship. Forty years of constant preaching of racial hatred, forty years of hysterical militarism, forty years of the teaching that the soldier is the highest type of humanity, have distorted patriotism into this pitiable passion for violence. When it suits the aims of those in power they can put a finger upon the quivering nerve of nationalism and galvanize a whole people into righteous fury.

Consider the present upheaval. Loyal Austrians were bitterly incensed by the brutal assassination of the heir to the throne; but is it conceivable that the sober public opinion of that nation would voluntarily have sought vengeance for the crime by plunging into slaughter? When we say that "Russia" strode to the defense of threatened Serbia do we mean that the Russian people demanded instant mobilization? The folly of the suggestion answers it. Nine-tenths of the millions inhabiting the vast spaces between the Baltic and the Pacific knew nothing of the conflict until the summons came that formed the ranks for the onslaught. The issue was decided in the gilded chambers of a palace in St. Petersburg. The voice of "Russia" was the voice of the czar and the ruthless cabal of grand dukes and provincial rulers who exploit half a hemisphere for their dynastic aggrandizement.

Admirable are the loyalty, the courage, the fathomless devotion of the German people to their great empire,

and fierce will be their support of the cause upon which they have embarked. But can the wildest fancy picture a plebiscite of that sane and sensible people inviting the immeasurable horrors of a colossal war in order that the political ambitions of Austria's governing classes might be carried over the ruins of a devastated Servia? No possible interest of the Germans, teachers of mankind in the arts of peace, was imperiled by Servia's resistance to an intolerable invasion of her rights. Yet they are flung into conflict with Russia, with France, with Belgium and with England at a single word from the kaiser and his reactionary ministers. This war, in a word, is the work of autocracy. It is the product of that system which commits the destinies of civilized nations to the keeping of czars and kaisers, emperors and kings, and subjects the liberties of unnumbered millions to the caprices of royal greed and unbalanced ambition.

Fifteen days ago, when the first sinister outbreak awakened premonitory rumblings of a great upheaval, the world refused to give credence to the warning. It could not conceive such a reversion as swiftly took place. "A general European war," said able commentators, "is unthinkable." "Europe cannot afford such a war"—we are quoting verbatim from editorials in the last days of July—"it is beyond the range of possibility." Yet within a few hours the impossible had come to pass, the unthinkable was a hideous reality. How long would it have taken for the people of Austria, of Russia and of Germany to decide to engage in an enterprise so monstrous? Where is there the remotest evidence that they were consulted as to a single step in the infamous proceeding? Once their national honor and interests were committed, they responded with heroic devotion. Obedience to authority and support of the government,

however medieval it may be, are instinctive in the human mind; and the fires of patriotism leaped up instantly at the cry of "War!" But the summons came from the throne, not from the streets or the fields.

If there were no other reason, indeed, the perpetuation of autocracy seemed to demand the desperate expedient of war at this time. In every country the social revolution is threatening more and more the institutions of despotism and monarchical special privilege. Rulers once venerated as the vicegerents of Omnipotence are feeling the pressure of popular restriction. The advancing wave of democracy is washing the very steps of historic thrones. One of the most ancient devices of rule by divine right is to quell such movements by fomenting war. There is no surer way to obscure social wrongs and protect the existing order—for a time—than by an appeal to nationalism and the raising of the specter of a foreign war. Until this gigantic struggle has proceeded well toward settlement there will be national unity in Austro-Hungary, a submissive duma in St. Petersburg and a cessation of Socialistic activity in Germany.

Let those who doubt that this inhuman war is the work of autocracy contrast the manner of its development in countries of lesser and greater liberty. Austria's assault upon Serbia was decreed in the secret councils of Vienna, without even the pretense of popular indorsement. Russia's response—the order of mobilization—was an imperial act in which the people had no part but blindly to obey. Turning to Germany and her thunderbolt entrance upon the scene of conflict, the student will search in vain for any uprising among the people for a war of aggression. The reichstag has no place in the record. The kaiser issued the edicts which doom countless brave men to death, in defense, as he

audaciously asserts, "against the reckless assaults of enemies on all sides of us!"

Compare these operations of autocracy with the procedure of republican France. There the efforts for peace were unflagging, the decision postponed to the limit of safety, the national forbearance exemplary. President and parliament and people were of one mind—that there should be no war save in defense of violated territory and national security. When the issue was met the action represented the will of the republic, and the cause became the cause, not of an ambitious dynasty, but of an endangered people. Italy, too, the most democratic of European monarchies, set herself resolutely against conflict. Even the obligations of the Triple Alliance were so strictly construed by her that she refused to embroil herself in support of aggression. Had Victor Emmanuel attempted to decree war, his throne would have tottered. Public opinion demanded and enforced neutrality.

In Great Britain, where a loyal but resolute democracy has stripped the monarchy of all autocratic power, the world discerns still more clearly the benefits of liberty of thought and institutions. No propaganda of militarism has warped the judgment of the people or distorted their instincts of patriotism; no royal edict could force the nation into strife. The momentous decision was not reached in hidden agreement by the sovereign and a few scheming statesmen; it was delivered in open parliament, by the elected representatives of a free people, after the fullest discussion of the needs and perils of the nation and after the utmost resources of diplomacy had been exhausted. The foreign secretary, in the gravest hour of the crisis, engaged with France that in case of German attack the British fleet would protect her northern coasts. But, said he, "that answer

is subject to the approval of parliament." And when the solemn declaration of war went forth it went from the hearts and consciences of the whole British people.

The lesson that is to be written in blood and fire for the world to read is plain. It is that in the twentieth century autocracy is an intolerable anachronism, a menace to civilization, a burden upon humanity. This war is its death-grapple among enlightened nations. When the awful cost of the shameful conflict is counted, the result will sound the doom of a system which gives to despotic governments control over the peace of nations and inflicts upon the race a war against which the judgment of the whole world revolts.

Democracy is no guarantee of the end of armed strife—1861 and 1898 in this nation tell a different tale. But it is a guarantee that war, when it is waged, shall be waged for liberty, not for territorial greed or lust of conquest; in defense of human rights, not for the glorification of ambitious rulers and a besotted statesmanship. The leaven of the age is working. The mighty convulsion will shake into new alignment the powers of the world and the forces of mankind. Unless all signs fail, it will mean the stern curbing of imperial aggression, perhaps the extinction of imperial systems. Great new republics may arise upon the ruins of despotic institutions. For the tide of democracy will not be stayed, and autocracy will be submerged with the futile barriers it has erected to guard its medieval privileges.

GERMANY AND AMERICA

August 12, 1914.

IT WAS to be expected that the great convulsion in Europe would react profoundly upon the inhabitants of the United States. Not only does instantaneous communication keep the two continents in unbroken touch, but as the great "melting pot" of the nations this country is extremely sensitive to disturbances in the lands whence it has drawn its teeming millions. There is hardly more intense eagerness in following the war in the capitals of Europe than there is in the communities of the new world. There is not a single nation involved in the struggle which has not its representatives here, by thousands or literally by millions. Every move in the terrific game brings joy or woe to countless of our citizens.

This condition is most apparent, of course, among the vast population of German birth or descent. Not less than 8,000,000 persons of that race are in the United States, one-fourth of the number having been born in the empire. Their blood-loyalty and their deep-rooted affection for their fatherland have made them resolute partisans; and they are deeply wounded and angered by the widespread criticism directed against the part played by the German government in bringing on the war. The leading German-American organ, the *New York Staats Zeitung*, goes so far as to charge that the view of a majority of the American public has been distorted through the efforts of an international conspiracy. It

maintains that there is a "great intrigue"—"born in England, fostered in Paris and worked up eagerly in the United States"—to discredit and obstruct Germany and finally to draw the United States into the alliance of England, France and Russia. This extravagant theory refutes itself. The one unchanging policy of this nation since its birth has been to forbid any entanglements with foreign governments. As for the press of the United States, for generations its attitude toward England, at least—the chief foe of Germany—has been one of vigilant distrust; and every suggestion of more than formal friendliness, such as is accorded to every nation, has been universally condemned.

The real basis of the German-American complaint is found in the course of virtually all the newspapers in condemning the war and placing the responsibility for it chiefly upon the kaiser and his ministers. This attitude has been denounced as unfair, even as treacherous. So bitter is the feeling that German-American citizens gravely accuse the newspapers of giving exceptional prominence to news dispatches from London, Paris and Brussels, while suppressing news from Berlin and reports favorable to the German cause. The condition complained of does exist, but it is due to the fact that cable communication with Germany has been severed, and that the censorship is rigid in all the countries at war. But the core of German-American resentment is the fact that almost without exception the newspapers of this country have censured the kaiser and his ministers for precipitating the strife. This unanimity of sentiment is really remarkable. Is it based, as our German friends charge, upon ignorance and prejudice?

Assuredly there is no ignorance in this country regarding Germany's policies, for during the last genera-

tion they have been proclaimed to the world with astonishing vigor and emphasis. And if they did not point unerringly toward aggressive war, then the manner in which they were proclaimed and enforced strangely belied peaceful intentions. Germany led all the world in her armament, her maneuvers, her military preparations of every character. Her ruler, with solemn exaltation, called himself the "war lord" of the empire; and he declared to all mankind that he had been appointed by Omnipotence to expand Germany's dominions and power. "Blood and iron" was the historic phrase used to convey Germany's world policy, and "the mailed fist," it was boasted, always lurked behind her diplomacy. War, by deliberate choice, has been made the business of the men of the nation during the best years of their lives; the government has talked and preached and acted war. Books have been written by high officials declaring explicitly the purpose of the government to justify its policies on the battlefield; virtually every move of the last three weeks is according to the program that again and again was flung defiantly in the face of Europe.

That the kaiser approved, if he did not inspire, the assault of Austria upon Serbia is admitted. "My great ally, the Emperor and King Francis Joseph," he said in his address to the reichstag, "was compelled to resort to arms. * * * While the allies were pursuing their legitimate interests the Russian empire interfered." When it was plain that the influence of Germany would turn the scale for peace or war, it was exerted not in Vienna or Belgrade, but in St. Petersburg and Paris; instead of counsels of peace to Austria and Serbia, there were peremptory demands upon Russia and France. These moves had their effect upon American public opinion; and it was intensified when Germany instantly

turned the war toward the west. It was not Russian despotism, but French republicanism, that was the first object of imperial wrath.

Finally came the ruthless violations of neutrality, the pouring of army corps into Luxemburg and Belgium, states whose independence had been solemnly guaranteed by treaties which Germany had signed. The assurance was given that the neutrality of the invaded countries would be restored after the war. All that was asked was that they peaceably allow their territories to be devastated by a war in which they were not concerned, and to be made the means of forwarding an attack upon a friendly nation!

"Germany has run amuck," said the New York World. "The course of the German government cannot be reconciled with any theory of political sanity. Wantonly and deliberately the kaiser has plunged his sword into the heart of civilization. The whole world is paying the penalty of his madness, neutrals as well as belligerents." It is not necessary to approve a judgment so severe; but the facts are against a government which calls forth such condemnation from a newspaper that assuredly has no reason to attack it unjustly.

Great Britain, while welcoming the friendliness of American opinion in the crisis, wholly misinterprets the cause. The London Times solemnly assured its readers that sentiment here opposed Germany's tactics because Americans now see that Germany's development would menace the position of the United States as a world Power. Nothing could be more false. The American people have welcomed every peaceful triumph of the great empire; far from resenting or fearing Germany's magnificent achievements in commerce, industry, science and education, they have applauded and rejoiced in them. If they have condemned the German course be-

fore and during the early stage of the war, it has been as a protest against ruthless imperialism, an obsessing militarism, a headstrong arrogance in international dealings, and a medieval governmental system that has plunged one of the finest peoples of the earth into a lamentable conflict.

Under all the circumstances, the outspoken criticism by the American press has been an evidence of courage and sincerity. Every important newspaper in this country has thousands of German-American readers, while those readers of the other nations involved are negligible. Yet none has hesitated to denounce this wicked and causeless strife and to place the responsibility where it belongs. The aroused fervor of German-Americans for the fatherland is a sentiment for which all must do them honor; but the hope is that it will permit them to appreciate, if they cannot approve, the attitude of the public of their adopted country. Nowhere on the face of the globe are the virtues of the German character more generously recognized than here. All mankind is the debtor of the German people, for their broad culture, their commanding industrial skill, their immeasurable achievements in science, their high ideals of citizenship. Their involvement in war is a matter of profound regret; and unbounded admiration is accorded to the courage and devotion with which they have met the issue thrust upon them.

What criticism has arisen has been directed not against the German people nor the German nation, but against the outworn system that has imperiled a great civilization and the fruits of forty years of peace by fomenting a needless conflict. Whatever the outcome for her, whether she crushes her embattled foes or is overwhelmed by them, Germany's intellectual and spiritual leadership must suffer; and all humanity will

thereby be the loser. Most Americans will indorse the sober words of the New York Evening Post. Deploring the savagery and suffering and catastrophe of the avoidable conflict, it says:

Is it any wonder that true friends of Germany cry out against all this from the depths of their affection for it? The one consolation in it all is that, if humanity is not to retrograde unspeakably, absolutism must pay for this denial of Christianity.

In place of the kingdoms there must arise the republics of Europe; out of the ashes must come a new Germany, in which pure democracy shall rule, in which no one man and no group of professional man-killers shall have the power to plunge the whole world into mourning. If this be treason to Germany, our readers must make the most of it. To our minds, it is of profound significance that so many Americans are saying today: "We wish that the kaiser might be beaten and the German people win."

THE FIGHTING MEN

August 13, 1914.

AS THE warring nations come to grips in their giant conflict, the attention of the world turns from the intricacies of diplomacy and clashing national ambitions to the naked terrors of actual combat. Czar and kaiser, emperor and king, may make war, but it is the common folk who must fight it. The human aspect of the great struggle lies among the hosts of armed men now converging on a dozen battlefields. The greatest war in history will reveal facts of surpassing interest touching the types and fighting capacities of the human forces engaged. Many factors enter into the problem. Battles are not won wholly by strategy, or weight of numbers, or courage, but by the best combination of all three; and even then other elements may turn the scale to triumph or disaster. God, said Napoleon, is on the side of the heaviest artillery, but from Thermopylae to Spion Kop history records noted exceptions.

The first requisite of an efficient army is, of course, patriotism, an unshakable belief in the justice of its cause. It was the fervid conviction of right on both sides that made our Civil War so terrible. Of the European nations, Austria alone has possibilities of weakness in this regard, in her Slavic conscripts from the southern provinces. No conqueror could ask a finer spirit in his armies than is revealed in the doglike fidelity of the Russian, the zealous resolution of the German, the flaming devotion of the Frenchman, the sober, unemotional

belief of the Britisher in the sanctity of his far-flung empire. Numerical superiority is important, but not vital. The Roman legions conquered the world; mere numbers could not overwhelm Frederick the Great, and Germany is confident in the face of great odds.

In strategy the kaiser's forces have the highest world repute; their magnificent maneuvers and the working out of vast field problems have been the admiration of the world. Preparedness, too, is a German trait; every preliminary move toward the overwhelming of France—up to the unexpected check at Liege—proceeded according to plans that had been worked out to the last detail for years. But the German leaders and their armies have not had the supreme test of actual conflict; the most elaborate imitations of war cannot even approximate the reality. The sending of regiments in massed formation against the bristling slopes of the Liege forts showed audacity rather than intelligence.

The allies, on the contrary, have considerable forces that have been tempered in war. The Russians, leaders and men, must have learned something from the disasters in Manchuria. Frenchmen have tested their theories, their weapons and their soldiers in Morocco. Great Britain's hard-won fight in South Africa provided for her army a nucleus of veterans, while during the last thirty years her commanders have whetted their military knowledge in a score of minor campaigns in Africa and Asia. Experts generally concede the superiority of the French in artillery. They have brought this important arm to a high degree of efficiency; but the relative deadliness of the guns of Creusot and Krupp has not yet been conclusively decided. In 1870 the faith of the French in their wonderful new mitrailleuse was not justified by the events.

In fighting air-craft, again, France leads—at least numerically. These comparatively new engines of war have been developed in Europe to an extent that almost staggers the mind with its possibilities. Germany has seventeen dirigibles—veritable battleships of the air—and 150 aeroplanes, France has fourteen of the war airships; Great Britain, seven; Russia, thirteen. In aeroplanes France has no fewer than 450 in service; Great Britain, 150, and Russia, 250. There are forty in the armies of the Balkan states. Europe has spent \$117,000,000 on its aerial fleets. Whether the swift dirigible, with its rapid-fire guns, or the swifter aeroplane is the more dangerous will soon be known, at the cost of many lives. In no form of warfare is the human factor more vital in the equation. French pilots are credited with more ingenuity and daring than their opponents; but German thoroughness and dogged courage have to be reckoned with. England is still an amateur in the science of air fighting.

But after all these elements of strength and weakness are weighed, the fighting capacity of the vast masses of troops remains the overshadowing consideration. And this is a complex force into which enter far-reaching national characteristics. The warlike ardor of the Balkan peoples has been proved within recent years. How they will align themselves in the great conflict now opening has not been determined; but those forces which go against Servians, Montenegrins or Bulgarians will find worthy foemen. These hardy mountaineers are passionately patriotic, and fighting is their natural employment. In Austria the military code is as rigorous and exacting as in Germany, and has put the spirit of war into the people. The Austrian officers are the dandies of Europe, but they are efficient soldiers, and they command men of a virile race. The outstanding qualities of the Russian

soldier are tractability under orders and a stubbornness in battle that seems akin to fatalism. Knowing nothing throughout his life but the rule of a semidivine absolutism, he gives unquestioning obedience to his officers, representative of that dread power. Directed by trained intelligence—which Russia has not yet conspicuously developed—the czar's armed millions would be overpowering. Bereft of the guidance of superior persons, the Russian soldier is not dangerous against the keener men of the nations to the westward.

The prowess of the Belgians is no longer a theme for speculation; the defenders of Liege have written it in burning letters upon the record of the war. No one in the world, least of all the Germans, looked for more than a perfunctory defense against the invading hosts; but the spirit that wrung praise from Caesar and lent luster to historic battlefields flamed up anew and dared to challenge the progress of the armies of the kaiser. For centuries the people around Liege have been reckoned the most dangerous warriors of Europe—the fighting Walloons. Their daring tactics and furious onslaughts are celebrated in history and legend; the siege of Liege in Scott's "Quentin Durward" is a stirring tribute to their valor. The fallen Napoleon bade farewell to his Walloon troops as "the bravest of my men."

How much of the spirit and virility of the Napoleonic armies remains in the French troops of today it is impossible to know; but that the great republic can put a terrific force into the field has been conceded by Germany's arduous preparations for the conflict. Those travelers who have been prejudiced against the French soldier by his generally diminutive size and his preposterously slovenly uniform forget his historic achievements, and are ignorant of the fiery courage that animates the French people under stress. Trained, dis-

ciplined, sobered by the memories of fatal self-confidence in 1870, and burning with passion for revenge, the troopers of Brittany and Gascony and Paris will be terrible antagonists.

A century after Wellington, two centuries after Marlborough, Great Britain is waging war once more on the continent. Her people have refused to submit to conscription, and her defensive forces will be largely raw levies. But even so, she can send across the channel a trained army of seasoned troops—regulars, who know the fighting game. Utterly alien from the French in character, the English, Scotch and Irish soldiers of the empire will go into battle with less exultation, but with equal courage, and will leave their mark upon the enemy.

In its very first test, the bravery of the German soldier has been signally proved. No finer exhibition of sheer courage is on record than the steady, continued onslaught of the kaiser's regiments upon the forts of Liege. Against the hail of shrapnel and the devastating fire of machine guns and small arms, they fought their way up those death-sown slopes to victory. The frightful losses they suffered may have signified a defect in strategy, but they registered a mighty tribute to German valor. The weakness of the German army, some experts say, is in the training. They argue that because the soldiers are taught to obey in masses, under old, autocratic officers, they will falter when the ranks are broken and individual initiative is demanded. On all these points there is interest in the comment by General von Bernhardi in his remarkable book, "Germany and the Next War," published three years ago. Picturing with prophetic accuracy the course of the conflict, he discusses the efficiency of the expected forces of the enemy:

The tactical value of the French army is very high; but it lacks the subordination under a single commander, the

united spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of the German race and the esprit de corps of the officers. . . . It is questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively acting on the offensive against continental troops. In South Africa the English regiments fought bravely, but they failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations. . . . The Russo-Japanese war proved that Russian troops fight with great stubbornness; the struggle showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion. But the army quite failed on the offensive, owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals.

In this calm and dispassionate manner do the military experts of the world watch the unfolding of the terrible panorama of the European war. The ingenuity and capacity of men for inflicting slaughter is studied with absorbed interest. It takes imagination of a different kind to look past the fascinating maneuvers of the battlefield, and to see behind them unnumbered graves, unnumbered homes made desolate, whole peoples prostrated, civilization itself turned backward.

IN DEFENSE OF THE TEUTON

August 14, 1914.

NO GREATER fallacy was ever born of that mother of error, War, than that the present cataclysmic conflict in Europe is between Teutonic and Slavic civilizations. Ardent German patriots, stung to the soul by what appears to be universal sympathy with the forces allied against the two kaisers, may well be pardoned for a judgment based more on soreness of heart than on historic facts. For those of our fellow-citizens whose roots go deep into the glorious soil of continental Germany we have only a profound tolerance, now that they eagerly seek to rally public opinion in support of the fatherland. We say "continental Germany" because, after all, the empire of William II is only a small part of Germany. It was Hugo, that Frenchman of the encyclopedic mind, who called Germany the "wellspring of nations." "They flow from her as rivers," said he. "She receives them as the sea." And it is this very fact which controverts the assertion that this war is a conflict between Teuton and Slav. Such an assertion dismisses France and England as negligibles, or else classifies them as Slavic.

European civilization is essentially Teutonic. The hordes that came out of the Black Forest and erected a new social order on the decayed structure of the Roman empire did not keep their ideals between the Rhine and the Danube. Teutonic civilization passed into Gaul with the Franks, the conquering tribes who proudly

blazoned their freedom in their name. This they gave to the nation which they built on the substructure of Gallic and Latin blood. Teutonic civilization overflowed northern Italy with the long-bearded warriors whose tribal designation has been corrupted into "Lombardy." Teutonic civilization crossed the channel and laid the foundation of England. There it has been preserved in a purer state than in any other part of the globe, except in Scandinavia. The free ideals which England has spread broadcast throughout the world are her heritage from the Saxon freemen who founded a new Germany in Britain, while military despots did violence to German ideals in central Europe.

There is no civilization worthy the name except Teutonic civilization. It fills Europe and America; it dominates Asia and Africa. Its seat is in London and Paris, and Rome and Brussels, and Copenhagen and Stockholm, and New York and Philadelphia, no less than in Berlin and Vienna. Because we inherit the blood of the Saxons or the Normans or the Franks or the Longobards we are all Germans; but more especially are we Germans because our most priceless heritage is the free ideals of those free men. It is idle, therefore, to talk of prejudice against Germans in this conflict. And it is equally futile to argue that Teutonic civilization is at stake in a war in which the most potent factors on either side are themselves the ripest product of that civilization watered by the most ancient German blood.

A REPRINTED ADDRESS

August 17, 1914.

IN MARCH, 1902, when the people of this nation were extending to the people of Germany most heartfelt and enthusiastic greetings on the occasion of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United States, The North American addressed an open letter to the royal guest. Now, twelve years later, with the situation radically changed, the principles then enunciated seem so peculiarly applicable that we herewith reprint the letter in full:

To Prince Henry of Prussia, Rear Admiral of the German Navy, Major General of the Suite, Colonel of the Foot Guards, Colonel of the Ludwig Fusiliers, Colonel of the Grand Ducal Hessian Field Artillery, Colonel of the Imperial and Royal Infantry, Honorary Colonel of the Imperial Russian Dragoons and LL. D. (Harvard):

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS:

Today you will be in the city where the nation whose guest you are had its birth. If the deeds of men or the effect of their deeds can hallow any spot of earth, you will be standing on the most sacred ground the world possesses except one—the little hill outside Jerusalem, beyond the Damascus gate, where the Man of Sorrows was executed on the cross between two malefactors. That solemn tragedy—the transaction of Calvary—is the event around which all the history of mankind has since revolved. It revolutionized the philosophies of the ages, mitigated and exalted all subsequent civilization and is the most dominant force in the lives of men today.

With this single exception it is probable that the declaration of American independence is the act of the most far-reaching, profound and beneficial consequences

ever deliberately consummated by patriots. It resulted not only in the foundation of the greatest democratic state the world has ever known, but promulgated political and social doctrines which are rapidly permeating all states, molding all societies, and likely ultimately to transform the governments of the civilized world.

As an intelligent student of history, indeed, as an intellectual, well-equipped gentleman, you cannot be ignorant of the political principles solemnly proclaimed by the American revolutionists at Independence Hall while the brazen bell above rang out defiance to kings and nobles and privileged classes the world over. Probably, however, the decorum of international communication has heretofore prevented you from fully grasping the central idea which is the foundation of the American republic, the source of all its prosperity and happiness, and the beacon light which until now it has steadily held up for the guidance and encouragement of all peoples seeking political freedom and equality. That potential idea is that all men are born free and equal and that governments derive their just power only from the consent of the people. As the personal representative of your august sovereign, the emperor of Germany, you have been received in your visit to these shores with an enthusiastic, hearty and demonstrative welcome on the part of our citizens that possibly you or others may misunderstand. It would not be wonderful if at times it has seemed to you a political incongruity that on the soil of this free republic you should be the recipient of honors and distinctions equal in fervor and demonstrativeness to those you are accustomed to receive in a land whence you come and where your family rule. While every one must accord to you the credit of a blameless life and amiable, attractive traits of character, nevertheless in this respect you possess no title to distinction above

many thousands and millions of citizens of this and other lands. It is only when considered as the brother of an hereditary monarch that your coming among this people becomes a notable incident.

When you step into Independence Hall today, as no doubt you will, you will stand where the founders of this government proclaimed the principles which declared all titles to superiority and distinction derived merely from birth as absurd, unjust and tyrannical. The Declaration of Independence sounded for this country, and as we believe ultimately for every land, the death-knell of all rule and government not derived from the free consent of the people. In consequence of that declaration you have, ever since you landed upon these shores, been among a nation of sovereigns and receiving the plaudits of a people each of whom is the political equal of every other, and whose free voices determine the choice of their rulers as absolutely as they whole-heartedly extend to you the welcome of the republic. Those people—those sovereigns—exalt to office and remove from power whom they will and as they will under the operation of laws of their own making. They have in the century and a quarter of their national existence chosen for their chief magistrates men who have risen from the cobbler's bench, from the towpath, from the tailor's table, from the cabin of the prairies. There lives in quiet, dignified retirement in a neighboring university town, less than fifty miles from Independence Hall, a man who was twice elected president of the United States, and who, when he laid down the honors and the duties of office, stepped back into the mass of free citizens whence he came without a single vestige of official power and rank, but respected and admired solely for his fidelity to the great trust of a free people and for the quiet and orderly life of an upright citizen.

The political principles which made these things possible, upon which this great nation is founded, and by virtue of which it has grown great and is growing marvelously greater, are in eternal and irreconcilable war with every principle through which you derive your official and representative distinction. By the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, the house of Hohenzollern is of itself of no more just weight or importance in government than the lowliest hut of the poorest peasant in your august brother's empire. This doctrine the people of these states regard as the ark of the covenant of their political existence. They fought to establish it, they exist to propagate it and they would die to maintain it. They wrote it into a political creed by the hands of the noble men who assembled in the historic hall which you will honor yourself by visiting today. That creed is the greatest political charter ever written—greatest in its unequivocal and all-embracing utterances, greatest in its momentous consequences, past and prospective. Other political deliverances have been partial, local, temporary and tentative merely. They are to be prized for what they in part accomplished and for what they taught and for what they led the way to. Runnymede, Dunbar Field, the long parliament, the execution of Charles the First, the battle of Quebec, the destruction of the bastille and the French revolution were notable and important stages in the progress of the race toward enfranchisement and relief from the cruel tyranny of hereditary rulers. But none of them nor all of them together produced a lasting state or an enduring social condition or announced a consummated universal political creed and definitive principle of government. The Declaration of Independence alone is "the bright consummate flower" of the tears and blood of mankind, shed in the progress toward liberty and equality.

You will not, however, it is to be hoped, misunderstand the impulsive kind-heartedness of the American people as they shout themselves hoarse in evidence of goodwill when you appear before them. They neither forget nor compromise their political faith in their lavish welcome. Their tribute is not to you as the brother of an hereditary monarch and the princely representative of a royal house. It is not even a tribute to your gracious sovereign, but it is a hand stretched across the sea, through you as a German citizen, toward that great people over whom, from the accident of birth, your older brother claims and holds imperial sway. In you we choose to see represented the great German people, the millions who toil and moil and study and think—its scientists wresting her secrets from the breast of nature, its critics illuminating literature of all lands and all times, its musical geniuses stealing the divine harmonies to lift the souls of men to higher and gentler planes of emotion, its artisans and cunning craftsmen, its educators shedding the light of knowledge to all classes—this composite result of German labor and German thought makes your brother's empire probably, as even Americans would admit, the home of the most intelligent people on the globe—it is this we choose to see in you. To this German people which we alone recognize as the state greetings and affectionate messages are conveyed through the enthusiastic welcome voluntarily accorded to you. You will not misunderstand the meaning of that welcome if you will also regard it as a recognition of the great value to this nation of the thousands and thousands of your own people who have left your soil and government to find here a freer land and better opportunities for the development of their characters and talents, and who have enriched this nation to an immeasurable degree.

Your august brother, in the callow days of his early accession to power, gave utterance to thoughts or expressions which disquieted the civilized world. He exalted, or seemed to exalt, the sword as the emblem of his government, and war as the sole function of a ruler. An uneasy shiver ran through the nations as he apotheosized the ancient war lord as his model, and called upon his soldiery to make devotions to this sanguinary ideal. No doubt years and cooler judgment and the lessons of responsibility have modified his views. But we would respectfully suggest to your Royal Highness that in the confidences of familiar communications (of which we fervently trust the ceremonies of imperial rank do not deprive you both), you drop in the royal ear the thought that a people can be attached to a government more by love than by force, that free hearts are the most loyal ones, and that liberty is a better foundation for the stability of the state than arms or warships or imperial edicts.

And your Royal Highness, for yourself, will thus leave a more enduring and grateful name in the history of your country by carrying with you from the sacred environment where you stand today a fuller trust and confidence in the people of whom, after all, you must in your heart know that you are but one, and by teaching that all who rule should remember that God, whose justice and care extend to the poorest as well as to the loftiest, and the Founder of the Christian faith you profess, the Prince of Peace, who as a man chose to be the lowliest that He might become the greatest, who as a moral teacher transformed the world by the humble doctrine of the sermon on the mount, and whose life and death were divinely directed for the promotion of love, liberty and universal equality.

WHY A WAR BETWEEN TEUTON AND SLAV ?

August 19, 1914.

THE main battle line of the nations extends 266 miles. Massed millions of armed men, stretched half way across the continent, are grappling for the mastery of Europe. Five first-class Powers and many lesser ones are involved. From distant seas new forces are hastening to the conflict. The shock of the combat is felt around the globe, and peoples at the uttermost end of Asia are astir for war. The suddenness and the immensity of the struggle have dazed mankind. The wisest of men can give no conclusive reason for this gigantic upheaval, this tremendous reversion to barbarism. It is charged to militarism, to autocracy, to national ambitions, to political jealousies, to economic rivalries, to overpopulation, to the prehistoric instincts of tribal hatred. All of these causes are apparent to some degree; but there are few impartial observers who will select one and discard all the others.

Among some of the chief contestants, however—those whose acts began the war that they say was inevitable—there is no doubt, no uncertainty. This, they declare, is the final battle for supremacy between two great races, foreshadowed from times long past and precipitated by inexorable laws of blood. No sooner had Austria set her foot upon Servia than the whisper ran, “Does it begin?” When Russia turned her vast bulk to come to the aid of her Servian kin and Germany

stiffened to defiance, the whisper became a shout, "This is the great war—the Teuton against the Slav!" With one accord a large school of students and philosophers, historians and statesmen, proclaimed that the appointed hour had struck, and that this mighty conflict was to determine which of the two races should survive. Spokesmen for Germany in America are unanimous in this view. The president of the German-American Chamber of Commerce, of New York, says:

The only Power able to checkmate Russia is Germany, and therefore Germany is fighting the battle of civilization and of progress against reaction. * * * Strike down German military power and German prestige, and nothing but the czar remains in Europe.

Professor Francke, of Harvard, declares that if Germany loses, "her place will be taken by Russia, which, with her teeming millions and inexhaustible resources, will become the arbiter of Europe."

"It is race treachery," says Dr. Ernst Richard, president of the German-American Peace Society, "for England to fight against Germany and for Russia. * * * The real cause of the war is: Shall Europe be ruled by Asiatics or by Europeans, by Slavs or by Teutons?" Dr. Hugo Munsterberg, of Harvard, a personal friend of the kaiser, writes:

All German good will for peace was doomed because the issue between the onrushing Slavic world and the German world had grown to an overpowering force. The struggle between the two civilizations was imminent. * * * At last the chance came to strike the long-delayed blow of the Slavic world against the German. Both Slavs and Germans are willing to sacrifice labor and life for the conservation of their national culture and their very existence.

General von Bernhardt, a noted German military leader, wrote three years ago:

Russia feels herself the leading power of the Slavic races. Pan-Slavism is hard at work. * * * The coming war must be a war for our political and national existence.

In his manifesto to the world the czar proclaimed:

Russia, related by faith and blood to the Slav peoples, and faithful to her historic traditions, has never regarded their fates with indifference. The fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs have been awakened with perfect unanimity and extraordinary force.

The German emperor took up the issue when he charged the strife to Russia's "insatiable nationalism," and exhorted his subjects to "remember, above all, that you are Germans."

That a deep, irreconcilable hostility between the two races exists, therefore, there can be no doubt. As we intend to discuss tomorrow the broader aspects of racial antagonism as the cause of war, we shall present today an historical inquiry into the force which is cited as the basic reason for this struggle.

When Teutonic civilization was already far developed, vast territory on the east of Germany, now under Russian sway, was a savage country. Regarding this as provided by nature for their expansion, the Germans in the Middle Ages overran it by means of war and emigration, and established their own advanced system. Recognizing the value of the western mixture, the more enlightened rulers of Russia encouraged German influence; and until recent years the German element was a power in the administration of Russian affairs. This was particularly true in the Baltic provinces, where German was the official language and German Protestantism the leading religion.

But during the last hundred years Russia has unceasingly labored to free herself from foreign tutelage; and, although German immigration continued until within forty years—the extent of it is illustrated by the fact that there are forty-six German newspapers in the empire—the Russification of the Baltic provinces proceeded inexorably. From the accession of Alexander

III, in 1881, the process has been carried out with unrelenting vigor. Just as the religious and political liberties of the Finns have been destroyed, so have German influence and institutions in the Baltic provinces been rooted up. Foreigners have been forbidden to acquire land in Western Russia; Russian instead of German has become the official language; even the names of towns formerly German have been Russianized.

It had been the hope of Germany that the force of racial gravitation would one day draw these lands to her; and the spectacle of her millions of emigrants being Russianized by force was a ruthless blow to her national ambition. But if Germany is incensed on this score, Russia is no less embittered by the results of her political dealings with her neighbor. She considers that she saved Prussia from being overwhelmed by Napoleon in 1807 and delivered her from the Corsican in 1814; and it was Russian influence that restrained Austria, Italy and Denmark in 1870, so that Prussia might humble France. Bismarck astutely brought about an alliance between Russia, Germany and Austria in 1872, as a defensive move against the revolutionary propaganda which had spread from France to Poland and had also stimulated the activities of German Socialism and Russian Nihilism. But six years later he again shattered Russia's dependence upon German gratitude for past support.

Russia's dream of Constantinople as a seaport of the czar's dominions, long encouraged by Bismarck, was all but realized in 1878, when Great Britain and Austria interposed a threat of war if the Russian armies closed in on the Turkish capital. Russia confidently looked for German aid in this crisis. But the Berlin Congress, where Bismarck presided, gave to Austria the Slavonic countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina—thus pushing

Teutonic influence 200 miles nearer to the Golden Horn—and forced Russia to be content with a part of Roumania. She had sacrificed 200,000 soldiers to reach the Mediterranean, only to be thrust back by Germany, whose co-operation she felt she had earned. And from that time Russia's hatred has been implacable.

At the same time, the clash of interests has stirred up furious anti-Slav sentiment in Germany. As long ago as 1882 German presses were pouring out books and pamphlets inflaming the antagonism. Of one noted work the text was, "The security of Europe demands the annihilation of Russia as a European great power." Another, published in 1888 and enormously distributed, declared:

Between Germany and Russia there exist, not differences of opinion on isolated questions of policy and statesmanship which can be settled in one or the other way, but deep-seated, ineffaceable contrasts of race and culture which irresistibly press toward an open conflict.

With increasing conviction and fervor, the German leaders have preached a race war against the Slav. They find their justification in the remorseless growth of the Russian power; the marvelous facility with which she Russianizes and absorbs other races within her empire and the skill with which she has kept alive and increased Pan-Slavonic feeling in neighboring nations by a propaganda of racial and religious kinship. The rapid growth of Slavic population and influence not only in the Balkan states, but in Austria-Hungary—theoretically a Teutonic country—is cited by Germany as evidence that Slav domination of all southeastern Europe is an immediate menace, to be overcome only by a war that will cripple Russia's ambition. The seriousness of the danger, from the German viewpoint, is apparent. So few as 3,000,000 Poles among her 60,000,000 population have been able to present a formidable obstacle to German unity. But the

dream of a great Teutonic empire or confederation stretching from the North sea to the Aegean becomes almost fantastic when conditions in the allied kingdom are examined.

Indeed, the participation of Austria-Hungary in a war of Teuton against Slav is a self-evident absurdity. Once subject to a preponderance of German population and interests, it is so no longer. The dynasty, the bureaucracy and the officers of the army are German, but political power is rapidly passing into the hands of other races, and only autocracy prevents the complete submergence of the German element. It was in Austria-Hungary, in fact, that the Pan-Slavistic movement had its birth; and a majority of the population is linked more closely, by the ties of blood and religion, to Russia and the Serbs than to the so-called Austrian nation. The population figures and their changes are profoundly significant. In 1910 Austria had 28,324,940 inhabitants, and of these, only 9,950,266 were Germans. There were 6,435,000 Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks, nearly 5,000,000 Poles, 3,500,000 Ruthenians and about 4,000,000 of other non-German races, the Slavic element outnumbering the German by more than 50 per cent. In Hungary, of course, these conditions are emphasized. Out of a population in 1910 of 21,000,000, a little more than 2,000,000 were Germans, a decrease of 100,000 since 1900. In the whole empire, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, hardly more than one-fifth of the population was German.

But the vital fact is that not only have German emigration and colonization failed to create German domination, in spite of the very high German birth rate, but they have been unable to withstand the vigorous race qualities of the alien peoples with whom they have come into contact. Bohemia, once Germanized by force, has

a Slav population of 62 per cent. In Prague, its capital, 16 per cent of the people were Germans in 1890 and only 10 per cent in 1900. The great university, purely German until 1882, is now a Czech institution. The Czech spirit of nationality is so intense that the people refuse to learn German, and disdain to speak it if they do know it. Moreover, the German element is slowly but surely yielding to Slav pressure; while 37 per cent of the population are Germans, only 33 per cent of the school children speak that tongue, indicating that one-tenth of the next generation of Germans will have become Czechs. In Moravia identical conditions prevail—a great Slav majority and a marked recession of German population, language and feeling. In Austrian Silesia the German element still leads, but is losing ground to Czechs and Poles. In Galicia 200,000 Germans are lost among 4,000,000 Poles and 3,000,000 Ruthenians. Since 1890 the German population of Hungary has been almost stationary, while its percentage of the total has fallen. Fifty years ago Budapest was more than half German; today the Germans number less than 14 per cent of the population; and it is the same in every populous center.

The truth is that the German is a failure as a colonizer—that is, from the imperial standpoint. His sanity, his thrift, his industry and his fine qualities of intellect cause the German to enrich any country to which he emigrates. But inevitably he is absorbed by the race which he joins. Other progressive peoples, no matter where they are, preserve their nationality; the Germans have the virtue—or the vice, as German patriots would call it—of cosmopolitanism. In a single generation, sometimes, if they confront a preponderance of another race, they begin to yield to the process of absorption, assimilation, denationalization. Not Austria alone illustrates this characteristic. Two-thirds of the

Swiss are of German blood and language, but almost to a man they are republicans. There are 2,000,000 Germans in Poland and the Baltic provinces of Russia, but they are becoming so completely Russianized that there are now only two German schools in the empire of the czar. In Belgium and Holland, in France and England, the hundreds of thousands of Germans resident have adopted the language and customs of the alien land. There are more than 11,000,000 persons of German blood in the United States; and while at the call of war their German sympathies have been awakened sentimentally, they speak the language of Americans and are among the most loyal citizens of the republic.

The cry of "Teuton against Slav," therefore, is misleading, so far as it is made to apply to Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, which, already preponderantly non-German, is neither a nation nor a union of nations, but an ill-assorted assemblage of peoples alien one to the other in language, religion, race and ideals. It is a geographical expression, little more. Two great facts, then, stand out in regard to the Teutonic-Slavic struggle for supremacy: The Germanization of southeastern Europe has failed, and its Russification proceeds apace. The goal of both races being the same, the collision was inevitable.

RACE WARS, A SURVIVAL OF BARBARISM

August 20, 1914.

FURTHER dispute at this time as to specific responsibility for the war in Europe is futile. The determination can be left to history. For a generation mankind was made to believe that the war of 1870 was due wholly to French arrogance and the mad ambition of Napoleon III; yet Bismarck in his memoirs bluntly told how he had fomented the strife in order to crush Prussia's rival. Soon or late the world is enabled to brush aside specious or irrelevant pleas and apportion glory or infamy as it is deserved. The vast conflagration now raging was the work of no single act. Every student of affairs has known for years that the inflammable materials were being heaped up and that some day a spark would let loose destruction. The underlying causes of the war are many. That which we discussed yesterday—the racial antagonism of Slav and Teuton—is the one most emphasized in recent historical literature and current controversy.

German advocates to a man charge the provocation to Russia. They do not cite any concrete evidence or overt act—aside from the mobilization which followed Austria's assault upon Servia—but they declare that Russia is inspired by an implacable enmity toward Teutonic civilization and by an insatiable ambition to rule all Europe as well as Asia. So ardent are Germans in this accusation that they denounce opposition to or criticism

of German acts and policies, except from Russia, as "race treachery." The influence of racial hostility in bringing this havoc upon the world cannot be denied. It is that which has welded the people of the German empire into a unity of purpose which is far from existing upon questions of internal policy. The interests and aspirations of the kingdoms and duchies comprising the federation clash at a hundred points, but are subordinated at the summons of race loyalty. The same is true of Russia, whose dull millions are fired with zeal for Slavic expansion, and of the Balkan peoples, who respond to the call of blood.

This belief in a Slavic peril is ineradicable in the German mind. No one who has traveled throughout the empire, particularly in Prussia, and talked with the common people, can have failed to be struck by the intensity of the conviction that Germanic civilization must fight for its existence against Slavic barbarism. It has been instilled into them from childhood. They are saturated with it in the schools, in business, in politics. It has been the subject of a vast mass of literature. Scores of books and pamphlets, and reviews without number, have been written around the Slav peril and the coming of a decisive war for survival. Such a propaganda, of course, could not be maintained without reason. And that has been easily found in the undeniable recession of Teutonic influence in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, with a corresponding advance in Slavic power, together with a realization of Russia's vast military strength and inexhaustible resources.

But the contention that the race issue is fundamental in the struggle is maintained chiefly by the German writers, who admit a partisan interest. Observers who pretend to be impartial, on the contrary, hold that it is not a basic cause, but, rather, an excuse—a means

to an end. They see in this titanic conflict a war for conquest; behind the fervid appeals to race instinct a lust of dominion; behind the invocations to patriotism the age-old struggle for territory and power. So far as the German empire is concerned, the real issue is defined in a single term—Pan-Germanism. Back of the racial idea, back of militarism, back of imperial unity and industrial expansion, lies this splendid vision of Teutonic domination of Europe and of the world.

It is the policy of Bismarck developed and adapted to modern conditions. He warred against Austria, against Denmark, against France—always, he declared, for the defense of Teutonic institutions, but always with the result that Prussia's boundaries were extended. Now once more the people are inspired to fight for "racial preservation," but the goal is commercial and political supremacy. The grim old Iron Chancellor caught at the one bond which could link together Prussia and her German neighbors, divided hopelessly upon principles of politics and government. And his successors have been wise enough to follow in his footsteps. Prussia and Prussian autocracy are as hateful today to south Germany as they are to France; but the ingrained belief in Teutonic peril and ultimate Teutonic domination is sufficient to enlist all the peoples of the empire under the standards of the kaiser. Real as is the racial enmity between Teuton and Slav, that is but the vehicle of the greater cause. Pan-Germanism, the mightiest international force of modern times, is not at its heart a movement to preserve a threatened race, but to make it supreme; not to defend Germany, but to subjugate the world. It is the same spirit that made the empires of Persia, of Rome and Great Britain; that has sent every nation in Europe upon the quest of territory and power in distant lands. It is more striking in its present phase

simply because most of mankind has heedlessly believed that civilization had outgrown the rule of force, and because German efficiency has clothed it with a precision and a magnitude that startle the world.

To those unacquainted with the significance of German policies during the last generation these assertions will appear fantastic. But Pan-Germanism is a tremendous reality. Its voice is the hum of German civilization, the roar of German workshops, the thunder of German cannon; its spirit is the indomitable will of a great people; its desire the conquest of the earth. Beside the overshadowing bulk of this idea the inflated cause of race hostility becomes a paltry thing. Let us define as briefly as possible what it means. There has never been any secret about it—except as to “the day” of its consummation. A hundred German works, convincing in their laborious detail, might be cited. We shall merely quote from “Pan-Germanism,” a lucid and scholarly presentation by Dr. Roland G. Usher, associate professor of history at Washington University, St. Louis. The writer is studiously impartial—indeed, he gives German arguments of justification with impressive force—but he finds:

The Germans aim at nothing less than the domination of Europe and the world by the Germanic race. * * * The vital factor in the modern international situation is the aggression of Germany, her determination to expand her territories, to increase her wealth and power. * * * To prevent her absorption by her neighbors, she must grow faster than they; she must rob them instead of waiting for them to rob her. * * * She has reached the boundaries of Germany; further expansion means the acquisition of what other nations now own—either her powerful rivals, France and Russia, or her weaker neighbors, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Sweden. Nor would the accession of such territory solve the difficulty. Germany must find some place suitable for development by her own people which is not

already choked with men and women. But such a promised land, tenanted only by native races, is not to be found. Every available spot is held by England, France or Russia. Germany can, therefore, obtain colonies only at the expense of these last. * * *

To secure a share of the world's trade in some fashion, which will not expose her to the attacks of the English fleet, and which will create an empire less vulnerable in every way than she believes the British empire to be, an overland route to the East must be found. The Germans consider perfectly feasible a great confederation of states, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey, which would control territory from the North sea to the Persian gulf. A railway from Constantinople to Bagdad would establish a shorter route to India than via Suez. Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Persia, India herself, the mother of nations, would fall into German hands.

Pan-Germanism is, therefore, in the first place, a defensive movement of self-preservation, for escaping the pressure of France and Russia, both bent on her destruction. It is, in the second place, an offensive movement directed against England; its object, the conquest of the English possessions in the Mediterranean and in Asia. In reply to the outcries of other nations, denouncing these plans as unprovoked aggression, and lacking in morality, as a reversion to the forcible methods of bygone centuries whose brutalities the world long ago outgrew, the Germans point derisively to the presence of the English in India, of the French in Morocco, of the Russians in Manchuria, of the United States in Panama. They insist that their aims and methods are absolutely identical with those their detractors have so long employed.

This, then, is Pan-Germanism, which the writer reasonably characterizes as "the most audacious attempt yet made consciously to direct through a long term of years the evolution of a nation and the fate of the world." Those who think it too staggering for belief cannot have attempted to measure the might of the force which the German empire is now exerting against Europe.

Let the reader understand clearly here that we do not single out Pan-Germanism as something novel and unusually horrible in its cold-blooded aggression. No one who has studied the history of the British empire, or of the colonization of Africa and Asia by Russia, France, Italy, Holland and Portugal, needs to be reminded that German imperialism is but a belated plagiarism upon the methods of other Christian nations. Pan-Germanism dominates discussion now simply because it is brutally frank in its conceptions and has been mapped out to the last stupendous detail by German genius in full view of the world.

But if we have elaborated upon the German world policy, it is for the purpose of emphasizing a totally different issue. This is the use made of racial antagonism as a device to further the gigantic aspirations of imperialism. Germans are immolating themselves before the cannon of the allies because they believe they are fighting for Teutonic civilization against Slavic reaction. Russia's millions are hurling themselves against German and Austrian bayonets for the sake of Slavic institutions. But the real passion of Germany is for conquest of a highway to the East and of world leadership; the real aim of Russia is to lay hold of Constantinople, open her windows upon the Mediterranean and Russianize all southeastern Europe. Nor are these two battling giants alone in using the appeal of race interest. There are millions in Great Britain and her dependencies who are perfectly convinced that the Anglo-Saxon has been ordained of God to rule the world. So conservative a statesman as Lord Curzon of Kedleston dedicated a recent book "To those who believe that the British empire is under Providence the greatest instrument for good that the world has ever seen."

Race pride, the instinct of race preservation, is used the world over as a justification for conquest. It is an inspiring cry, this of race supremacy, of a "chosen people." But it is strangely disconcerting and depressing to find it powerful even in this advanced age and in this country of equality, where all races mingle in liberty and amity. The conquerors of old had always one sure means of fomenting war—the universal human instinct of religion; they could persuade their peoples that to visit destruction and pillage upon those of different faiths was a service pleasing to Omnipotence. But, thanks to education and enlightenment, that hideous device of conquest no longer serves, except among the hordes of Islam. Racial feeling is the nearest and most effective substitute. There is no other issue to which a nation or a family will so passionately respond. The lamentable thing is that so noble an impulse as blood loyalty should be prostituted to aggrandizement and violence. Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Anglo-Saxonism—all are but the product of national selfishness and ambition.

Worse than that, the final triumph of any one of them would be a catastrophe for humanity. For one and all make race the paramount consideration, and subordinate to it all principles of justice and liberty. The German, the Slav, the Anglo-Saxon, wherever he may be, is summoned to fight for racial domination, regardless of the despotism which his race may represent in one place or the freedom it may have achieved in another. After centuries of bloody trial, the enlightened peoples of the earth flung off the horror of religious warfare. Let it be hoped that after this convulsion has spent itself they will condemn and utterly sweep away the folly and immorality of wholesale murder in the name of race supremacy.

POLAND

August 21, 1914.

OUT of the bloody cataclysm hopes spring; hopes for larger liberty for the struggling masses, hopes for a republican Europe, hopes for an industrial democracy, hopes for the end of rule by "divine right." It seems impossible to believe that the social order can be so shaken to its very foundation without its moving forward in the readjustment. And, in the general hope for freedom, no people have so clear a right of expectancy as have the Poles.

There is a grim and vengeful satisfaction in watching the frantic appeals that are now being made to the Poles by the three governments which for a century and a half have perpetuated the most cowardly and the most brutal national crime in all history. As a cynical, cold-blooded assassination the partition of Poland stands alone. Three autocracies, Prussia, Austria and Russia, ceased their warring, entered into an agreement of international brigandage, fell upon a great, free, enlightened, democratic neighbor and tore it limb from limb, dividing the body among the despoilers. In doing this they committed the most horrible kind of murder—the murder in which the victim, though dismembered, refuses to die. The insistent life in dead Poland has for 150 years been a constant reproach to her assassins.

And now the czar is at war with the two kaisers. And every one of the autocrats in his extremity pleads with the Poles in his domains to help him in the fight.

The specter of murdered Poland rises before the troubled eyes of the tyrant; and he tries to allay the ghost with promises to grant a measure of alleviation for Poland's wounds. Yesterday every suggestion for even the slightest concession to the Polish national spirit was repressed with the iron hand or the knout. Now the robber governments say to their victim, "Help me against the other robbers, and I will give you back a small part of what we three have wrested from you."

The motive which prompted the rape of Poland was not mere cupidity. Poland at that time was the advance guard of the Slavic peoples, with all the Slav's idealism. She was great in arts and great in learning. She had been the bulwark of Europe against the Asiatic hordes and had beaten back the Turk from the very gates of Vienna. But she was greatest in her devotion to the principles of liberty. While all about her nations had bent their necks under the yoke of the mythical divine right of hereditary monarchs, Poland kept alive the principle that a nation has the right to select its own ruler; that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. It was this spirit in Poland that the autocrats feared; and it was this fear that induced them to unite to dismember her.

But she has not been killed. Though shattered in body, her spirit lives. It has never, in Prussia or Russia or Austria, submitted to tyranny. It has never ceased to hold out the hope that some day Poland would rise from her tomb, again to shine before the nations a torchbearer of art and letters and liberty. In the present crisis of civilization this hope is held forth in renewed vigor, and is Poland's answer to the whimpering of the tyrant nations that fear her now, 150 years after they vainly imagined they had stamped the spirit of liberty from her with the iron heel of despotism.

GREAT BRITAIN'S FALSE STEP

August 22, 1914.

THE patient and impartial inquiry of history will be needed to interpret rightly the underlying causes of the war and place the blame for precipitating it. There is one phase, however, which need not await investigation by posterity. Clear and unmistakable is the responsibility for the spreading of the conflict to the Far East—a development which may well be more ominous for civilization than the struggle in Europe. Stupendous as will be the cost of that upheaval, in lives and treasure and the brutalization of mankind, it can hardly fail to produce the great good of a spread of democracy. The Oriental complication, on the other hand, is likely to involve far-reaching consequences of a sinister import.

The threatening condition is due primarily to aggression by Germany several years ago, when she formed a coalition to obstruct the ambitions of Japan; secondly, to Japan's deliberate purpose to force recognition as a world Power and to demand a share in the European settlement; thirdly, and most emphatically, to cold-blooded selfishness on the part of Great Britain, which has led her to endanger the future security of Western civilization in order to serve her immediate interests.

Every loyal American will indorse the wisdom of President Wilson's admonition against needless controversy over international issues which do not concern the

United States as a whole. But this should not bar plain discussion of a situation which has been thrust upon a distracted world by ambitious statesmanship in utter disregard of the duty to limit, and not to extend, the theater of conflict. Least of all is this a time for journalistic idiocy, which prompts a Philadelphia newspaper to warn its readers one day that Japan's "self-assumed overlordship" of the Far East is "ominous," and the next day to denounce comment upon it as "unpatriotic" and "jingoistic." Any serious involvement of the United States is unthinkable; but that is no reason why the people of this country should not understand what interests they have to thank for a deplorable development.

Germany's responsibility dates back to her intrusion in Oriental affairs in 1895. Japan had decisively beaten China, and exulted in the holding of Chinese territory on the Feng Tien peninsula as a prize of war. The German emperor thereupon proclaimed that the white races were menaced by "the yellow peril," and induced France and Russia to join him in "advising" Japan to withdraw. The Japanese yielded with what grace they could, in the interest of "the lasting peace of the Orient"; but they never forgot nor forgave German influence for blocking their plans. Nineteen years later the opportunity for reprisal has come, and Tokio, in turn, offers the "advice" that Germany abandon her holding in China, phrasing the demand, with calculating insolence, upon that made to Japan by Berlin in 1895. It would be hard to find in history an instance of nicer revenge.

But Japanese resentment over being compelled to relinquish territory formally ceded to her by China in the treaty of peace was to be still further inflamed. Within two years Germany herself had seized a slice of

China; and had begun the erection of a strongly fortified naval base within striking distance of Korea and the southern part of Japan. In 1897 two German Catholic missionaries were murdered in the province of Shan-tung. This gave Germany her chance. She made four demands upon China: First, a formal apology; second, indemnity for the families of the victims; third, compensation for the expenses incurred in investigating the outrage, and, fourth, the lease of a naval station. China readily agreed to the first three requirements—and Germany did not wait for an answer as to the fourth. Within ten days of the murder a German squadron was on its way to the coveted territory, and within two weeks Kiao-chau bay was in German hands, controlling a large part of the rich province of Shan-tung. Having no other recourse, China agreed to a ninety-nine-year lease.

There was, of course, no moral justification for this high-handed proceeding. It was simply an adaptation of British policy, plus German efficiency. There was the addition, however, of German exclusiveness. Kiao-chau was in no sense an "open door." Unlike British possessions, it was held for the profit of the government in control; and German influence even prohibited the building of a railway by American capital from Peking through part of Shan-tung. Kiao-chau handles a trade of \$30,000,000 annually. The land and harbor fortifications are believed to be very strong. War between Great Britain and Germany naturally imperiled Germany's hold upon the colony. But a more disturbing factor is the assumption by Japan of the task of ejection, without any request from China.

When this intrusion into the European situation was rumored there was widespread concern over what was considered an act of Japanese aggression. "There

is no reason even to think that it is welcome to the British government," said the New York Tribune, which is extremely sympathetic to England. "Great Britain does not need Japan's help in the Far East." Yet it was announced later that every step leading to and including the ultimatum had been taken after the fullest consultation between London and Tokio, and that the British government really invited the move, which was supposed to have been unsolicited, if not in actual conflict with Great Britain's wishes. This disclosure must be an unpleasant shock to those Americans who agreed with this newspaper that the British government had maintained a position of admirable poise and justice throughout the European crisis and had entered the war with clean hands. As imperialistic as Germany in matters of world commerce, Great Britain pursued consistently a diplomatic course marked by the highest skill and the most scrupulous regard for peace. Even if we were to grant the truth of Germany's charge that English jealousy hoped for an interruption of Germany's success, the facts of record justify the British position. The brutal violation of Belgium's neutrality, in defiance of solemn treaty obligations, made Britain's participation in the war demanded by honor as well as national safety. The position taken by Sir Edward Grey in his telegram to the British ambassador at Berlin offered irrefutable proof of a genuine desire for peace:

I said to the German ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward (concerning the dispute between Austria and Servia) which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go to the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, this government would have nothing further to do with the consequences;

but otherwise, I told the German ambassador, if France became involved we should be drawn in.

This was masterly diplomacy, in view of the effect which it must have upon the opinion of the world. But it was also honorable and obviously sincere. We would not unsay a word of the praise which we gave to Great Britain's course in meeting the gravest crisis in her national life. Now, however, she has marred that record by her inexplicable act in inciting Japan to strike at Germany in behalf of British commercial supremacy. In the first place, she needed no help in the Orient; the combined naval power of Great Britain and France in those waters is far superior to that of Germany. And she is behind an ultimatum just as arrogant and as impossible to meet as that of Austria to Servia, which she denounced. The move is a blunder, in that it goes far to justify the assertion of Germany that she is fighting for Western civilization against Asiatic barbarism. Far worse than that, it extends the area of the war. Great Britain, which had labored earnestly to delimit the hostilities, is the nation responsible for spreading them to the other side of the globe. She has intensified the danger of further complications in Canada and Australia over Japanese immigration, a problem already acute, and has established a precedent for Asiatic influence in settling the affairs of Europe. Still more menacing is the fact that she has implanted in the Oriental mind the ideas that imperial ambition justifies any resort; that might makes right, and that the aid of Asiatic despotism is grateful to one Christian nation fighting against another.

Whether any hurt has been done to the interests of the United States, time alone can show; but Americans were unprepared for an exhibition of such cynical selfishness. It was only a few months ago that the sec-

retary of Sir Edward Grey was whispering honeyed words to President Wilson and Mr. Bryan, persuading them that this country might give an historic lesson in altruism to the nations of the world by surrendering American rights in the Panama Canal and conferring the benefits of the great American enterprise on all peoples alike. This subtle appeal to the higher feelings of statesmanship was successful, and Great Britain's desire for repeal of the free tolls clause was gratified. And now we find her, for the sake of clinching a commercial dominance in the Orient, making use of Asiatic help to strike at a European foe. Because of her lofty pretensions and the power derived from her unimpeachable attitude in the war hitherto, it rested with Great Britain to keep the strife at least within the bounds of Europe. Her partisanship with Japan may serve her immediate purposes, but she is likely to find her needless call for its fulfillment the costliest move she ever made. For she has strengthened the case of her great antagonist, while forfeiting much of the good opinion she had justly earned. And she has let loose upon Europe and America influences which may embarrass them for generations to come.

GERMAN VS. AMERICAN DOCTRINE

August 24, 1914.

NATIONS which go to war nowadays always seek to justify themselves in the opinion of mankind.

Such efforts in the present struggle are exceptionally vigorous and well sustained. They are far more marked than in other conflicts of recent years. The Boers, for example, had the benefit of strong sentiment in this country, but it was due to newspapers like *The North American*, which condemned the imperialistic aggression of Great Britain, rather than to any propaganda by the Boers themselves. Russia, in 1905, had few spokesmen. Japan was better off, with her representatives in many foreign universities; she had the favorable report, too, of missionaries, who were led to believe that she was preparing to become a Christian nation as soon as she had beaten Russia. Every nation involved in the present conflict has its special pleaders, who lay siege to the judgment of the neutral public, particularly in the United States. There are numerous German, French, Slavic, Hungarian and Serb newspaper organs in this country, which unceasingly urge the justice of the positions taken by their respective countries, while Great Britain has access to the thousands of newspapers printed in English, through her control of the news cables.

Each country, moreover, has its literary representatives, able writers who are ardently partisan, well equipped with historical and political knowledge and

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adroit in argument. In this respect Germany leads all the rest. Much of the pro-German matter that has flooded the newspapers during the last three weeks has been more remarkable for its emphasis than logic, but the very quantity is significant, and many of the contributions have been marked by force as well as zeal. One does not have to agree with the views expressed to recognize that even *ex parte* statements of this kind help to illuminate the general understanding of a complex situation. The educated German is wonderfully adept as a controversialist, and his productions are stimulating even when they are not convincing. Conspicuous among these German advocates, by reason of his high repute as a scholar, is Professor Hugo Munsterberg, graduate of the universities of Danzig, Leipsic and Heidelberg, a personal friend and adviser of the kaiser and now a member of the faculty at Harvard. He is easily the leader, in ability and influence, of those who uphold the course of the empire in the existing crisis.

Further debate at this time touching the causes of the war and the responsibility for it would be profitless. But Professor Munsterberg presents a phase which may be considered quite apart from the armed conflict; which is, indeed, a fundamental issue and one which all Americans interested in governmental affairs should study. It would be going too far to say that he speaks for all of the millions of loyal Americans of German blood. But he assuredly represents authoritatively the German imperial system and utters the beliefs of German-American citizens who uphold that institution. This is what he writes:

Germany is not understood by those who fancy that defeat would tear an abyss between the people and the emperor. They think that an emperor is a kind of president

with large constitutional powers, chosen for a lifetime. He is not; and as long as the German nation believes in those ideals which have given to German culture its characteristic meaning in the world, there is no room for a president, whether he be selected for a year or for a life.

The idea of a president is that he draws his power from the will of the millions of individuals. The democracy believes that the state exists for the individuals, and that the individuals, therefore, are above the state. The idea of an emperor is that he is the symbol of the state as a whole, independent from the will of the individuals, and therefore independent of any elections; the bearer of the historic tradition, above the struggle of single men.

For the German, the state is not for the individuals, but the individuals for the state. It is the same contrast which gives to every realm of German civilization its deepest meaning. The American view is that science and art and law, like the state, exist for the good of the individual persons; their whole value is to serve them (the people). The Germans believe that science and art and law and state are valuable in themselves, and that the highest glory of the individual is to serve those eternal values.

We take issue with this, first, upon a statement of fact—that is, if the writer seeks to imply that the view which he calls “German” is held by all of his race in this country. We know that many of them, however strong may be the urge of kinship and the natural sympathy with a fatherland beset by powerful foes, do not subscribe to the doctrine so forcefully presented.

The theory of government set forth by Professor Munsterberg is clothed in terms of modern philosophy, but it is at heart as old as history. Ever since the remote time when mankind divided into clans and tribes it has been maintained, with war club, with spear and battle ax, with cannon and with the scholastic pen. Disguised as it may be with subtle arguments framed to meet modern conditions and ideas, it remains in essence the doctrine of the divine right of kings—the

theory that in each division of mankind there must be a hereditary ruler, a special interest, a specially endowed class, a "state" or some other institution whose interests are superior to the interests and the rights of the mass of men. The anachronism of monarchy is still upheld by several enlightened nations, but its most uncompromising supporters are found among the most powerful leaders of German thought, the professors of the imperial universities. We are well aware that these seats of learning have given to the world some of its mightiest champions of liberty and social revolution; yet it is also true that from them emanate the strongest influence in behalf of autocracy, governmental special privilege and imperialistic institutions.

In a form adapted to republicanism, the philosophy of the Munsterbergs has influential advocates among the newspapers and men of affairs in the United States. It is the doctrine which measures the greatness of a city by the number of its inhabitants rather than by their well-being; which holds that the fame and success of a state rest upon statistics rather than civic welfare—upon the magnitude of its bank clearances, its railroad capitalization, its shipments of pig iron and coal and cement, regardless of the conditions of individual, family and community existence. Believers in democracy may smile at the enthusiasm of the Heidelberg savant for an emperor "independent from the will of the people," for an autocratic state whose highest glory it must be theirs to serve. Have we, then, in this country, no "German professors" in thought who count the welfare of men and women and children as subordinate to trade balances, manufacturing output and the overpowering figures of general "prosperity"? For this is the basic meaning of it all. Whether the cause advocated is the divine right of kings or the supersanctity

of property, vested interests and special privilege, the doctrine is that the interests of the monarchy, the state, the institution of power are paramount to individual and human rights.

We are indebted to these German scholars for expounding their philosophy in such clear and vigorous terms. It requires the absolute subordination of the will and interest of the individual to those of absolutistic state and local authorities. His first duty is obedience, submission to the rigorous discipline of those higher up. Instead of "government of the people by the people," it is government of the people by the government—a distinct institution independent of the popular will. The German citizen has attained the benefit of a wonderful governmental efficiency, but at the price of surrendering his liberty. Supporters of the system point to the amazing progress of the nation as proof that the results are worth the expenditure. But the frightful cost of this war has still to be put into the scale against it. It must not be overlooked that the system delivers to the state, as distinct from the people, the absolute power of initiative. This feature finds its most striking manifestation in the fact that, while in democratic countries nearly all progress and nearly all great reforms are brought about in response to public demand, in Germany they are "granted" upon the initiative of the state, not as matters of justice, but of expediency.

The professors, whose astuteness helped largely to create the system, have a suggestive name for it—"monarchial socialism." The term is illuminated by a blunt comment from Bismarck upon the inspiration of the first industrial insurance laws. "My idea," he said, "was to bribe the working classes—or, shall I say, to win them over—to regard the state as a social institution, existing for their sake and interested in their wel-

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fare"—a manifest absurdity! The fact is, as stated by a recent commentator, that the monarchists have adroitly used "what one of them has called 'the master force of the age' to maintain old sovereignties; that which is still considered destructive socialism in some countries is appropriated by the Crown and called monarchy in Germany." In other words, autocracy strengthens its power and the superstition upon which it rests by appropriating and using social reforms as they became expedient. The vital difference is that socialism, or social reform, aims primarily toward the great ideal of the betterment of man, the elevation of the individual. The German system avowedly aims to exalt the state, regardless of the individual or of mankind. And where "the state" is a monarch, the purpose must be to perpetuate autocracy and the result to extinguish liberty.

The sequence is infallible. In Germany, where the system is seen in full flower, it produces a kaiser and his circle of autocratic advisers; in this country, where it is held in check, it produces special privilege and the widely held doctrine of "government of the people by a representative part of the people," with movements to resist "the whims of the majority." But the difference is only in degree; the root of the system everywhere is an inveterate hostility to democracy. Professor Munsterberg and the other able advocates who are presenting Germany's cause will be vastly more effective if they confine themselves to discussion of her foreign policies and her position in the war. They tread on quaking ground when they attempt to uphold a doctrine of government which is diametrically opposed to the principles of Americanism. And we believe this holds true as regards not only non-German-Americans, but also the vast majority of our Teutonic citizens.

BRIGANDAGE IN WAR

August 25, 1914.

THROUGH all the voluminous writings of those who are supporting the German cause in the newspapers runs an indignant query. Why, ask these advocates, is American public opinion so largely against a nation which has never injured this country; whose sons, on the contrary, have contributed so largely to the growth and security of American institutions? Incensed as they are by Great Britain's unexpected championship of Belgium's treaty and territorial rights, they are more bitterly disappointed and angered by finding the historic favor of the United States averted from Germany in her hour of trial. Nothing could be more suggestive of the gulf that lies between the creed which we call Americanism and the doctrine upon which the German empire is founded and which permeates German thought. Those who find mystery in the general attitude here must regard from a totally different point of view policies and acts of war which are utterly irreconcilable with American conceptions of liberty, justice and the principles of international morality.

The antagonistic opinion complained of has been, in fact, a matter of growth. It is due to no single influence or prejudice, but to a succession of events. If the autocracy of Germany had deliberately planned to defy and alienate American sentiment, it could hardly have chosen means more effective than certain of its military operations. And the most deadly in its results has been an

act committed within three days, at a time when the imperial chancellor was sending out an urgent appeal for the favorable judgment of the world. We can conceive of nothing more fatal to Germany's case in the court of neutral opinion than her astounding demand for \$50,000,000 tribute from Belgian cities she has taken.

Much has been made, and with reason, of the fact that Germany is subjected to British jealousy, the French desire for revenge and Russian ambition. But no such basis of antagonism existed in this country. The American people have held themselves and civilization the debtors of German culture, science and industrial efficiency, and have rejoiced whole-heartedly in the peaceful triumphs of the great Teutonic nation. True, there was here an inherent antipathy to the German theory of government, which is diametrically opposed to the American idea; and there was always a sense of impatience with the saber-rattling truculence of Germany's provocative militarism. But Americans conceded the right of the German people to support these institutions if they found them useful, and even admitted that the tangible results of national growth must be balanced against the suppression of democratic liberty. It was not until Germany flung herself into war that they scrutinized closely the meaning of policies they instinctively opposed; and every move seemed designed to strengthen their conviction. Even then, however, American sentiment was slow to be aroused. Germany's support of Austria's intolerable demands upon Servia was deprecated here, but it occasioned no deep feeling; and, although her acts were obviously making inevitable the horrors of a general war, it was recognized that her aggressions might be justified to some extent as measures of national defense.

The break came with the ruthless violation of the guaranteed neutrality of Luxemburg, and more particularly of Belgium. The great Powers, including Germany, had solemnly covenanted to maintain the territorial rights and integrity of the Belgian kingdom; but Germany's first military move was to trample upon the compact and invade the peaceful land of a people with whom she had no just quarrel. As a mere matter of abstract honor, this act carried its own condemnation, in the judgment of most Americans. But it happened that just now the people of this country are peculiarly sensitive regarding the sanctity of treaties; for it was only a few weeks ago that their government surrendered national rights in the Panama Canal, on the sole ground that a strained interpretation of a treaty required the acknowledgment of a mythical obligation. Moreover, it is a fundamental doctrine of Americanism that such independent countries as Belgium, Holland and Switzerland should be scrupulously protected, and should be permitted to work out their destiny safe from threats of assimilation, however "benevolent." Such free nations, compact and highly developed socially and politically, are the laboratories of civilization; all the world has benefited from the Swiss and Dutch and Belgian achievements, brought about under free nationality.

It must be admitted that the Germans attempt no equivocation concerning the violation of Belgian neutrality. It was, they say, a move of military necessity—deplorable, but vital to the success of the German plan of attack on France. This was somewhat better than the cynical question of the imperial chancellor to the British ambassador, "What, will England go to war over a scrap of paper?" But the general American view was undoubtedly reflected in Premier Asquith's declaration to parliament: "We are fighting to fulfill international

obligations which, if entered into by private individuals, no self-respecting man could have repudiated, and, secondly, to vindicate the principle that small nations are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith at the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power."

It was the savage wrong done to a neutral and brave people, then, that swung much American sentiment against Germany. All the learned arguments about "imperial destiny" and commercial enmity and "a place in the sun" were obscured by the spectacle of the German hosts devastating a country whose neutrality the empire had sworn to preserve. And now comes the monstrous levy upon the stricken cities. Let us consider the circumstances under which it is made.

The people of Belgium had lived in peace with Germany and all other nations. By solemn agreement of the Powers their land had been held sacred from invasion or the uses of war. Suddenly Germany, one of the signatories to the treaty, throws a huge armed force across the border. Admitting that Belgium has given her absolutely no offense, she announces repudiation of the compact and demands the use of Belgian territory as a base of operations against a nation with which Belgium is at peace, the alternative being a devastating and hopeless war. To their everlasting honor, the Belgian people elected to resist, and for nearly four weeks blocked with the bodies of living and dead the progress of the invaders. The bloody torrent of war overflowed the land. Wide stretches of fertile country that had been tilled like one vast garden were laid waste, the crops destroyed, the houses leveled, the peaceful fields scarred with reeking trenches and unnumbered graves, the civilian inhabitants driven from their flaming homes. Finally, overpowering numbers and might had their way.

The patriotic resistance of the army faltered, and the German conquerors strode into Liege over the bodies of its heroic dead. History contains few finer records than the defense they had made; yet the victors held it a crime and ordered that the survivors pay \$10,000,000 for having dared to obstruct a ruthless invasion.

Next, Brussels fell. A defenseless city, it was yielded without a struggle. The army retired, the civil guards were disbanded, the burgomaster formally surrendered authority to the enemy, and not a life was lost in the occupation. But it seemed that submission was to be even more costly than resistance. One of the first decrees of the invaders was that Brussels should pay \$40,000,000 into the German war chest. It will be a singularly adroit advocate of the German cause who will be able to distinguish this act from wholesale brigandage. Experts can extort from the articles of international law an implied legal justification for making a captured community thus contribute to the cost of a war. But the demand upon Liege and Brussels is a reversion, nevertheless, to the ruthless levies of medieval mercenaries. It is impossible to believe that any other civilized nation would revive in this cynical fashion the piratical methods of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. The suggestion that the United States should lay blackmail upon Santiago or Manila would have been unthinkable. Even the Japanese, who soaked the lead-swept hillsides at Port Arthur with their blood, did not offer to penalize the inhabitants of the city, and left the question of national indemnity to the orderly adjudication of the peace conference.

Certainly, the plea of "military necessity," used to defend the treaty violation, cannot be stretched to cover the extortion of \$40,000,000 from a city that offered no resistance. And to find a precedent the invaders must

turn back the pages of history for a full century. Moreover, what relation has the raid upon Brussels to the plea that this is a war of defense against Slav aggression? What does it do to the assertion that Germany's sole purpose is to protect Western civilization from Asiatic barbarism?

But, aside from all these considerations, German advocates ought to understand that the American people hold exceptional views regarding indemnities. It was only a few years ago that China, as reparation for outrages committed during the Boxer rebellion, delivered to the United States \$15,000,000; and the American government, although the payment had been formally awarded as just by an international court, returned the entire sum to China in testimony of peace and friendship. There are a large number of German-Americans who are chagrined and mystified by the alienation of sentiment in this country. We think that they will find the explanation in the events we have described, revealing, as they do, how irreconcilable are the views of the American people and the kaiser's government upon vital questions of policy.

MOLOCH

August 26, 1914.

IT IS not alone in the wild outbursts of nationalism and the spectacles of devoted heroism among the warring peoples that the world may see how intense are their convictions. They invoke a higher inspiration than that of earth. All are persuaded that they are fighting under the particular favor of heaven against the embattled foes of righteousness. Forces engaged in furious conflict with fellow-human beings call upon God to bless their engines of destruction, to endow their murderous weapons for irresistible slaughter.

This deep-rooted faith is not peculiar to our time. It sent the singing Crusaders on their sanguinary quest and fired the fanatic zeal of the hosts who opposed them; it put iron into the souls of the Spanish adventurers, of Cavaliers and Roundheads, of the grim warriors of a hundred conquests. Yet never were the contestants surer of divine guidance than in this great day of wrath; though for nineteen centuries heaven has been silent, each still calls upon the Creator to smite the powers of darkness incarnated in its enemies. Austria, we doubt not, justified the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an act ordained, and regarded the assault upon Serbia as pleasing to Omnipotence; her opponents are just as sure that they serve the Almighty by resisting. German soldiers, we read, paused in great companies on their way to the bloody fields of Belgium to hold open-air religious services at the base of the Bismarck statue—

surely the bronze lips of the ruthless chancellor must have curled in a sardonic smile! These were the words of the kaiser to his parliament, uttering his challenge to deadly war: "We are animated by the stubborn will to keep the place where God has placed us. Let us confide ourselves to the eternal Almighty, to strengthen our defense and lead to a good end."

But while Germany is convinced that the smoke from her victorious cannon ascends as grateful incense to the Power that overrules the world, Russia kneels at the same altar and appeals to the same Omnipotence. A very special and exclusive Providence is this of the Slav empire, its decrees being administered as a government monopoly. An official service of prayer at the imperial palace preceded the declaration of war, and a court pilgrimage to sacred places at Moscow accompanied the mobilization of 5,000,000 armed men. The exhortation from the throne to begin the work of devastation expresses "a humble hope in omnipotent Providence" and calls "God's blessing on Holy Russia and her valiant troops."

The government and people of France, it must be admitted, have not officially asserted any direct inspiration in entering the great combat; but the other member of the Triple Entente pays due deference to the traditional attitude. While British statesmen showed admirable restraint in confining their declarations to earthly issues, the poets of the nation urge on the army and navy as the instruments of the "God of our fathers, known of old; Lord of our far-flung battle line." Just as soon, it may be believed, as Italy decides to join the conflict a like invocation will go up in her behalf. As if these irreconcilable appeals were not bewildering enough, however, a new distraction has appeared. The war has spread to the Far East, and shaven priests of Oriental

faiths are confidently summoning aid from on high. "We," proclaims the mikado, "by the grace of heaven Emperor of Japan, do declare war upon Germany"; and with each shell that hurtles into Tsing-tau ascends a prayer for victory.

Some thousands of years ago, says the record, there really was a nation that was chosen of God to carry out His inscrutable decrees—to "slay and spare not," according to His announced will. But that dispensation, says the same record, came to an end, and for nineteen hundred years there has been no people set aside as the exclusive instrument of divine purposes. In the face of the dreadful affliction that weighs upon mankind, it is perhaps a trivial thing that nations should affront high heaven with pleas so monstrous as now are made. But it is worth while to hope that a day will come when civilization will not seek to shift the burden of its sins; when there will be enough conscience and reverence in the world to forbid such perversions of the religious instinct as now seek to make the Creator a partner in wholesale slaughter.

THE SECRET OF THE GERMANS

August 27, 1914.

SEPARATED 3000 miles in distance and immeasurably in national ideals from the battling hosts of Europe, Americans can study with some detachment the unfolding of the tragic scenes. Aside from considerations of politics and deep sympathy with the suffering, they watch with fascinated interest the workings of human genius applied to scientific destruction. What the German army has done makes military history. There is nothing comparable to it in the record. The much-vaunted triumphs of 1870 were won over incompetence and irresolution. Here the ablest generals and bravest fighting men of France and Great Britain have been checked, almost routed. The war began on August 1. In twenty-five days Germany has mobilized and equipped 4,000,000 men; put four armies, aggregating nearly 1,000,000, into active operations on the western frontier; swept across Belgium, reduced fortified cities, taken the capital, thrust aside an army of daring fighters, and hurled a thunderbolt attack upon the lines which the allies had been preparing for three weeks to receive the shock.

It is obvious that the first success does not win the contest; the allies presumably will have a stronger defense in their new position. But there is nothing more brilliant in the annals of war than the remorseless onward sweep of that torrent of armed men—the questing columns of reckless Uhlans screening the

advance, the hovering airships spying out the enemy, the incredibly swift forward movements of huge masses of infantry, closely followed by the guns; the bewildering evolutions across miles of hostile territory; the lightning change in operations to meet new conditions; the elaborate feint to the northwest, and then the terrific sweep downward against the allies' center and the crashing blow there delivered. Not forgetting the rapacity of imperialism, the savagery of war, the ruthlessness of the German methods, the world still can pay a tribute of admiration to this miracle of masterful warfare.

A miracle? The word comes readily, but never was a term more inapplicable. The staggering successes at Mons and Charleroi and Namur follow a law as simple as that which makes two and two make four. In the old time of small forces and primitive weapons, the chief requisites for a victorious army were skillful commanders and hardy, enthusiastic soldiers. Today, when armies move by the half million, and when all the resources of an advanced civilization are employed to organize slaughter, the art of war must be studied with the daring vision of science and the exactitude of mathematics. Waterloo, said Wellington, was won on the playing fields of Eton. Belgium was conquered years ago, in the military laboratories and councils of Berlin. Three words tell the tale—foresight, preparation, efficiency.

A favorite exercise of inventive writers has been to depict "the next war" as being decided by submarines, by airships, by strange new engines of destruction. This war is by no means decided, but we see now that success depends upon the intelligent direction of the force and momentum of human masses, made possible only by scientific training and minute

attention to the infinite details of absolute preparedness. Germany, in fact, is not playing a game; she is conducting a business. For 250 years Prussia has been proportionately the strongest military nation in Europe. For forty years the people of the empire have seriously practiced war, with a tenacity of purpose and a passion for perfection that have produced their fore-ordained result. Whatever the ultimate condition may be, to this time they have justified their methods. This military machine—it actually seems mechanical, rather than human, in its remorseless operation—is that which crushed Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, France in 1870-71. For forty-three years it had had no real test. It was incredible, said critics, that it should not have become stiff and unwieldy, should not have deteriorated. Curious reading now are the judgments of a few weeks ago. H. G. Wells, the English writer, derided “the German legend, the superstition of flag-wagging, Teutonic Kiplingism, and all that criminal sham efficiency that centers in Berlin.” That it was a “sham” efficiency was clear to him:

The Germans are hampered by bad social and military traditions. The German is not naturally a good soldier. He is orderly and obedient, but not nimble or quick-witted. The conditions of modern warfare have been almost completely revolutionized, in a direction that subordinates massed fighting and unintelligent men to the rapid initiative of individualized soldiers. The German army is taught to obey in masses; its intelligence is concentrated in old, autocratic officers; it is dismayed when it breaks ranks. It is, in fact, an army about twenty years behind the requirements of contemporary conditions.

A French expert compared it to a perfectly adjusted watch—“a wonderful piece of machinery, but likely to fail badly if the smallest cog becomes ungeared. * * * The French will break the main-

spring." If the "mainspring" were merely tactical skill or some fine-spun theory, this would be well enough. But if it be perfect efficiency, what then?

The essence of strategy, we are told, is surprise, and its aim is always to strike the enemy at a selected spot with overwhelming force. To perfect these two principles has been the endeavor of the German experts for forty years. And because the inevitable battle-grounds are cut up with natural obstructions and elaborate fortifications, they have sought to build an army that would obey in masses. There is little room in their plan for individual initiative; what they want is large units capable of irresistible momentum. With every male citizen liable to military service between the ages of 20 and 45 years, and with a code of ceaseless drill and evolution, they have been able to create a tremendous fighting machine and to deliver its crushing weight at will. The system is enormously costly in human lives, but that is a minor consideration.

The German army of today is the creation of Moltke. As Napoleon's aim always was to concentrate hundreds of guns upon a chosen spot in the enemy's position and batter it in, so Moltke concentrated the ablest brains in the empire upon two problems—to achieve an unparalleled celerity in mobilization and to smite the enemy before his defense was ready. The fundamental principles of it all are, of course, preparedness and efficiency; witness this passage in the official German military history of the Franco-Prussian war:

One of the principal duties of the general staff is to work out during peace, in the most minute way, plans for the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view to meet *all* possible eventualities to which war may give rise.
* * * All these arrangements can be considered a long time beforehand, and—assuming the troops are ready for

war and the transport service properly organized—must lead to the exact result which has been contemplated.

An American correspondent has given a vivid picture of the passage of the German troops through Brussels toward the line where a score of battles are now raging. They had been in the field for three weeks, and had fought a dozen engagements. Yet for twenty-six hours, without a moment's halt, without a gap in the solid ranks, that river of armed men flowed through the streets to the front. Let the reader recall the straggling and uncertainty of the best-managed parade he ever witnessed in peaceful Broad street, and conceive the task of moving 300,000 men, with all the equipment of camp and war, with such precision. For all the marks of conflict they showed, they might have been on a practice march out of Berlin. Not a chin-strap was loose, not a button or a buckle missing. The thousands of wagons were not hastily requisitioned vehicles from the countryside; every one bore the army stores' mark. At every horse's side hung an extra set of shoes. As the steel-gray columns flowed smoothly past, smoke rose from the field-stoves on the creaking commissary wagons, so that at the first stop meals were ready for each unit in the marching hosts. Every brigade had its postoffice on wheels, and the sorting of letters to the soldiers went on while the huge force moved to the battle line.

Every modern military organization aims at a like readiness; the Germans excel, that is all. It is difficult for a hundred men to perform a task together; to maneuver 100,000 requires rare ability and sagacity; but when a million are to be equipped, transported, officered, fed and hurled into the complicated evolutions of attack, the problem becomes staggering. It cannot be solved by any kind of genius in the field—by any-

thing short of 100 per cent efficiency, produced by years of preparation and training. Each of the millions of reservists had always possessed written instructions telling him exactly where to report in case of war. Arriving at the place of enrollment, he found his field outfit, complete to the last detail, shoes and clothing having been measured to his person in time of peace. Sealed orders, to be opened only upon notice of mobilization, had long been in the hands of regimental, brigade, corps and division commanders. The railroad, telegraph and telephone systems instantly became military possessions, and the hundreds of troop trains moved according to timetables prepared years before. Thus the arrival of each unit at the front was calculable literally within minutes of the time appointed.

Naturally, the same intelligence was directed toward getting information of the enemy's country. Every railroad switch, crossroad and telegraph wire in Belgium and eastern France has long been mapped and studied by the German tacticians. In 1870 the Prussian general staff knew better than Napoleon the Third what France could and could not do, and a month ago knew at least as much of the battleground as the enemy. Methodic organization won forty-four years ago, and the same force has carried the German eagles once more across the frontier. This system of minute study and the painstaking collection and comparison of countless exact data has made war for Germany no longer a risky, vague encounter with hostile elements of uncertain strength, at an uncertain time and in an uncertain and unknown country, but an encounter with certainties and with clearly defined calculable chances. It goes without saying that every discovery of science has been utilized. Scouting is done from midair. Armored motortrucks provide a mobile light artillery.

Even the field telephone, recently held a wonderful aid to operations, has been discarded because of the delay in stringing wires; the Germans use wireless plants which have a range of from 35 to 180 miles, can be carried by a motorcyclist and set up ready for work in fifteen minutes.

Germany, in a word, prosecutes war with the relentless precision of an exact science. She applies to it the same minute care and foresight as have given her supremacy in industry. She manufactures an army with the same mastery of detail as she makes an ocean liner or a microscope. Add to this exactitude and calculation a clear vision of the great objectives to be gained, and you have a combination that explains Liege and Lorraine. If civilization would permit, if it did not have within itself the power of resistance, such a force would conquer the world. Misguided, it has plunged a continent into woe; with the restoration of a sound peace it can be made to benefit mankind. The present insane perversion of human genius will pass, and humanity will make use of that splendid force now devoted to destruction.

A PLAN TO CONQUER THE U. S.

August 28, 1914.

AMERICANS, as well as Englishmen, should be impressed by the complete conversion of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle upon international affairs. His recent confession of enlightenment should interest particularly those shortsighted idealists who imagine that universal peace can be attained by ignoring plain facts and appealing to the altruism of nations inspired by a ruthless ambition for conquest. The creator of Sherlock Holmes, with his deductive genius, would have seemed to be the last man to be deceived. Like the scientist who can describe an extinct animal from a fragment of shin bone, he is credited with an unusual faculty for clear reasoning. Yet with all his knowledge and acuteness, he had been earnestly supporting the propaganda of his fellow-Britisher, Andrew Carnegie, and denouncing those who warned the world of a looming peril. He writes:

I am one of those who were obstinate in refusing to recognize Germany's intentions. I argued. I wrote. I joined an Anglo-German Friendship Society. I imagined all this German saber-rattling to be a sort of boyish exuberance on the part of a robust young nation, which had a fancy to clank about the world in jackboots. Some of it also came, as it seemed to me, from a perfectly natural jealousy, and some as the result of the preachings of those extraordinary professors whose idiotic diatribes have done so much to poison the minds of young Germans. I could not believe there was a conspiracy hatching for a world war. One imagined that civilization and Christianity did stand for something, and it

was inconceivable that a nation with pretensions to either one or the other could at this date in the world's history lend itself to a cold-blooded, barbarous conspiracy, by which it built up its strength for a number of years, with the intention of falling at the fitting moment upon its neighbors, without any quarrel save a general desire for aggrandizement.

It did not need the brutal invasion of Belgium to awaken Sir Arthur to the grim reality which mocked at his gentle faith. He found Germany's plans set forth explicitly three years ago in an official publication by a member of the kaiser's military staff. He says:

Early last year my views underwent a complete change; I realized that I had been wrong, and that the thing which seemed too crazy, too wicked to be true, actually was true. What brought about my change of view was reading General Bernhardt's book, "Germany and the Next War." Then I could not help believing; and I wrote an article, in the hope that others who had been as blind as myself also might come to see the truth.

Now the truth is no longer a matter of deduction, but of demonstration. Sir Arthur writes:

Bernhardt's program, as outlined in his book, is actually being carried out. The whole weight of attack was to be thrown on France. Russia was to be held back during her slow mobilization; and then victorious German legions from Paris were to thunder across from the western to the eastern firing line. Great Britain was to be cajoled into keeping aloof until her fate was ripe. Then her fleet was to be whittled down by submarines, mines and torpedoboats until the number was more equal, when the main German fleet, coming from under the forts of Wilhelmshaven, should strike for the conquest of the sea.

No wonder the distinguished writer and advocate of peace-at-any-price feels called upon to publish his conversion! Convinced by the explicitness of the Bernhardt war plan, arrogantly announced years in advance by the kaiser's staff, he finds his judgment vindicated

by each step in the German campaign. But he notes that this is not the only feature of the German world policy which has been worked out and published. General von Edelsheim, a fellow-member of Bernhardi on the imperial military staff, supplemented his colleague's arrangement for the subjugation of Europe with an outline of the strategy devised for the conquest of the United States. Following are extracts from this staff officer's work, "Operations Across the Sea":

Operations against the United States would have to be conducted in a different manner from those against England. During recent years political friction with the United States, especially friction arising from commercial causes, has not been lacking; and the differences that have arisen have mostly been settled by our giving way. As this obliging attitude on our part has its limits, we have to ask ourselves what force we can bring to bear in order to meet the attacks of the United States against our interests and to impose our will. Our fleet will probably be able to defeat the naval forces of the United States, which are distributed over two oceans and over long distances. But it would be a mistake to suppose that defeat of their fleet will force the United States, with its immense resources, into concluding peace.

In view of the small number of American merchantmen; the small value of the American colonies; the excellent fortifications of the great American seaports, which cannot be taken except with very heavy losses, and in view of the large number of seaports, all of which we cannot blockade at the same time, our fleet has no means to force that opponent through successful maritime operations to conclude peace on our terms. Therefore, it is clear that naval action alone will not be decisive against the United States, but that the combined action of navy and army will be required. Considering the great extent of the United States, conquest by an army of invasion is not possible. But there is every reason to believe that victorious enterprises on the Atlantic coast and the conquest of the most important arteries through which exports and imports pass will create such an unbearable state of affairs in the whole country that the government will readily offer acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace.

If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our harbors, we may conclude that operations on American soil can begin after about four weeks; and it cannot be doubted that the United States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army equivalent to our own.

Pointing out that the regular army here is small, and dismissing the militia because "its training is even worse than its armament," the kaiser's expert continues:

As an operation by surprise against America is impossible, on account of the length of time during which the transports are on the way, only the landing can be effected by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably facilitate victory over the United States, owing to the absence of methodical preparation for mobilization, the inexperience of the personnel and the weakness of the regular army. In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the United States and to protect our lines of operation so as to enable us to fight successfully against all forces which that country, in the course of time, can oppose to us, considerable forces will be required. However, it seems questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy a great stretch of country for a considerable time. The Americans will not feel inclined to conclude peace because one or two provinces are occupied by an army of invasion, but because of the enormous material losses which the whole country will suffer if the Atlantic harbor cities, in which the threads of the whole prosperity of the United States are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the other.

Therefore, the task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of large landing operations, through which we are able to take several of those important and wealthy towns within a brief space of time. By interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving the state, commerce and the defense; by taking away all material for war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the United States. For such enterprises a smaller military force will suffice. Nevertheless, the American defense will find it dif-

difficult to undertake a successful resistance against that kind of warfare. * * * It should be said that Germany is the only great Power which is able to tackle the United States single handed.

All this sounds like the wild imaginings of a dream. So did the Bernhardt plan, which preceded it, appear to some of the wisest folk in Britain. Of course, any possible application of the German imperial staff's program for the conquest of the United States must lie in the future, after destruction of the Monroe Doctrine and the Germanization of part of South America. But its intent is no more incredible to thoughtful Americans than the announced purpose of Germany touching Europe was to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and countless other citizens of the British empire, who now find themselves engaged in a life-and-death struggle to prevent its consummation.

MURDER IN WARFARE

August 29, 1914.

REPORTS of atrocities by German troops, although presented with impressive circumstantial detail, are generally accepted with reserve. The dire necessity for a swift victory if Germany is to survive has inspired her forces with unparalleled fury; and such desperate conflicts as are now raging along the 300-mile battle front must inevitably produce ruthless methods of attack and reprisal. Despite the formidable evidence given to the world, upon the unimpeachable authority of judges of the Belgian high courts, civilization will be slow to credit the stories of the butchery of wounded soldiers and the slaughter of unarmed peasants.

Even the clear narrative of the first dispatches describing the rain of German Zeppelin bombs upon sleeping Antwerp did not carry conviction. The naked truth was too ghastly, too revolting to a belief in humanity, to be accepted without absolute confirmation. But there can be no further hesitancy concerning this villainy. The actual facts, as related by eye-witnesses, outdo in horror the early accounts. It should be understood that Antwerp had not been invested by the Germans. No attack or siege had been undertaken, no warning of bombardment given, according to the usages of war. The inhabitants, while fully prepared for an assault upon the fortifications, rested secure in the belief that the city was safe until the operations were

begun. In this confidence they slept last Monday night. An hour after midnight they were awakened by a hail of explosives. A thousand feet above the slumbering town passed a German airship, and from it descended a storm of death-dealing bombs, rending houses apart, tearing great gaps in the streets and hurling the mangled bodies of sleeping men and women and children among the ruins. A correspondent writes:

The first projectile completely demolished a building 200 yards from my window. Thirty seconds later came another crash, then another and yet another, ten in all. A policeman in the public weighing-square was blown to pieces. Six persons sleeping in adjacent houses were killed in their beds. Every building facing the square was partially or completely demolished.

A bomb burst on the roof of a physician's house, killing two maids asleep on the top floor. A child was mangled in a fashionable residence in the Rue de Justice. In a single house were found four victims; in another, nearby, a husband and wife, whose only son had just been slain in battle, were killed. The hospital of St. Elizabeth, flying the Red Cross flag, was partly wrecked.

The official investigation showed that sixty houses were destroyed, and nearly 900 damaged. Twelve bodies were taken from the ruins, not one of them a soldier; four were women and two little children. Fragments of the bombs found showed that they were 12-inch globes of 1½-inch steel, filled with shrapnel and an explosive of terrific force. Not the civilian mind alone is shocked by this causeless outrage. Military experts whose trade it is to devise effective methods of killing men, soldiers who would face unblinkingly the bloodiest slaughter of the battlefield, revolt from a deed so barbarous. A cable message from Major Louis Livingston Seaman, a noted American army surgeon, says "the Germans attacked the sleeping city like a hyena in the night, murdering helpless women and children; this war is assassination."

Germany's sole palliation for the brutal violation of Belgium's neutrality was a plea of "military necessity." But even this meager excuse for an act of dishonor cannot possibly be applied to a deed so foul as the flinging of bombs upon sleeping non-combatants. No possible military purpose could have been served. The assault must have been inspired by sheer blood lust, or else it was a natural development of that inhuman spirit of militarism which the German autocracy has taken such pains to instill in its people. Ever since the war began sinister boasts have been made that in its great airships Germany had a weapon which would smite terror to her foes. It must be believed that the murderous treachery at Antwerp is intended as evidence to support the assertion. In that case, the kaiser's "war eagles," as the Zeppelins have been called, must be regarded rather as vultures. But for an adequate characterization of the incident we turn to the New York Sun, whose acquaintance with the resources of the English language was never put to better use than in the following paragraphs:

If General Sherman were alive, he would have to apologize to hell. He was unjust to that amiable region. The war of his time was but an innocent, harmless, killing game. It has grown to that aerial triumph of German culture over Antwerp. To murder wantonly and futilely, to slay or mangle little children and young mothers in their beds, to salute the Red Cross with a bomb, to slaughter and terrorize non-combatants; random destruction with no military results, with no permanent result except to sicken and anger all civilized mankind—this is war as practiced on a city from Zeppelin airships.

Every nation which still believes that something of humanity should be maintained in the usages of warfare should raise its voice against this archdeed of pitiless savagery, against the repetition of such senseless and unforgivable blind massacre.

SERVIA

August 29, 1914.

“WE CAN take care of ourselves,” was the message of Servia to the world when the Austrian ultimatum threatened to set fire to Europe. Servia, the excuse for the war, would have been forgotten in the conflagration which has followed had it not been for the proof that her assurance to her powerful neighbors was no idle boast. Servia has taken care of herself. The one phase of the war which up to date seems to have been decisive has been Servia's defense of her territory. Allowance must be made for the enthusiasm of partisan reports. It seems difficult to believe the Servian figures that in a single engagement the Austrians lost 15,000 men. But the fact remains that Austria has withdrawn from Servian territory, and has offered the official explanation that because of the larger issues now involved future invasions of Servia will be regarded more as punitive expeditions than as war. It is a curious disposition to make of the subject which was the ostensible excuse for the biggest war in history.

There is in the sturdy defiance of Servia a reassurance to those who fear Russian domination of Europe. The southern Slavs, among whom the Serbs are leaders, are as passionately devoted to liberty as any people on the face of the earth. They are largely, almost exclusively, an agricultural folk. For five hundred years they have slept on their arms, carried their weapons with them to the fields, to the church, to the grave. After

five centuries of ceaseless warfare against one despotism, it is unthinkable that they would submit to another.

Five hundred years of fighting against a ruthless enemy has left its mark on the Serb character. Heedlessness of danger and fortitude under suffering have developed a certain ruthlessness in the pursuit of enemies. By the western standard, many things which the Serb regards as fair warfare are condemned as needless cruelty. But the Serb has the great primal virtue of passionate devotion to liberty. Freed from the menace of the Turk, with an outlet to the sea breaking the fetters of an unnatural boundary, in contact with modern culture, the Serb will supply to the western Slavs a new, strong and vigorous leadership which will assure against those peoples being used to impose a Cossack tyranny upon Europe. The best guarantee against a Slav despotism is the Slavs themselves.

THE FATAL WEAKNESS OF GERMANY

September 1, 1914.

IN ALL the great pageant of the European struggle there is no stranger or more significant contrast than that between Germany's might in war and her feebleness in statesmanship. All the world has been startled by the momentum and impetuous gallantry of her armies, which have rolled westward with the force of a tidal wave and the precision of a machine; all the world has paid tribute to the patriotism, the efficiency and the valor of her fighting men. But this only emphasizes the fact that in diplomacy the mighty empire is hopelessly outclassed; has loaded itself with a burden of incompetence which no triumphs of arms can lessen and of discredit which no military glory can assuage. History does not record such a sustained example of unredeemed blundering; certainly not on the part of a Power that had pursued for a generation a policy which was irresistibly plunging it toward a vast conflict. In science, in industry, in education and in war German efficiency has become proverbial; yet the observer will look in vain for evidence of like ability in the domain of international relationships. The contrast affords a curious study, and is susceptible of a curious explanation.

The effects, for which the student will seek to find a cause, stand plainly forth. The animating spirit of German autocracy, manifested in the empire's diplomatic dealings and its methods of warfare, has produced

two vital results—it has alienated the support of civilized governments and has created a belt of hostile opinion enveloping the globe. Facing a struggle for which she had long prepared, and in which, she declares, the alternative is “world power or downfall,” Germany finds herself almost isolated. Austria, another Teutonic autocracy, is her sole ally. Her one other possible supporter in what she terms “the fight of Western civilization against Asiatic barbarism” is Turkey the unspeakable—a despotism that still exists in Europe only on sufferance. But for these two she would be all but shut out from communion in the family of nations.

It is not as if she had been suddenly overtaken by unforeseen and incredible strife. Whether or not the war was actually of her making, she had long expected it in the exact form in which it began, and for forty years had been immersed in zealous preparation to meet its remotest eventualities. Every feature of her statesmanship, every principle followed in her systems of government, education and commerce, every move of her diplomacy, was devised and adapted with this end in view. Yet with all her getting she got not understanding; and in a life-and-death struggle, where the final issue must come before the court of the world’s judgment, she finds herself bereft, forced to put reliance solely upon the power of brute force. It would have seemed that the instinct of self-preservation, if no higher motive, would have suggested the wisdom of making sound alliances and combinations, and particularly of an international policy, in peace and war, which would enlist the widest support. But the poison of militarism paralyzed the intelligence of German statesmanship, just as it has distorted German warfare out of semblance to civilized combat.

Not to go further back, it will be recalled that two cardinal policies for Germany were insisted upon by Bismarck—friendship with Russia and friendship with England. The former country has been alienated by an attitude of offense, most marked in the constant preaching of a German war against “the Slav peril,” and the latter by an unceasing campaign of denunciation, abuse and threats. German diplomacy has been so lacking in intelligence that it has constantly thrust its imperialistic designs in the face of Great Britain. Utterances from the throne, speeches in the reichstag, fulminations by the fanatical university professors and a flood of writings in the newspapers and periodicals have arrogantly proclaimed Germany’s intent to crush and dismember the British empire. For more than a score of years war with Great Britain has been the favorite theme of German statesmen, pamphleteers and military leaders. The kaiser’s famous telegram to President Kruger before the outbreak of the Boer war was characteristic of the campaign of provocation which culminated in the astounding publication by members of the imperial general staff of detailed plans for war upon Britain.

Earnest representations have been made by Germany that she has sought to establish friendship with France and to make her forget the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. The worth of these assertions was illustrated in the aggression against France in Morocco nine years ago, and the subsequent demand from Berlin that Foreign Minister Delcasse be dismissed—an unexampled invasion of the sovereignty of a friendly state. Moreover, each new production of the imperial military strategists discussed with brutal frankness their arrangements for invading and humbling France just as soon as Germany’s world policy demanded that action. Not in Europe alone did German diplomacy pursue its

inflammatory course. When Japan defeated China in 1895, it thrust itself into the affairs of the Orient. The kaiser summoned Europe to make war against "the yellow peril," and formed a coalition that wrested from Japan the prizes of her victory. The harvest from this sowing is now being reaped at Kaio-chau.

But the amazing combination of arrogance and weakness in German diplomacy was not fully revealed until the outbreak of the present war. Austria was supported in her atrocious demands upon Servia without notification to Italy, and as a result the Triple Alliance crumbled at the first strain. War was declared upon France and Russia in the astounding belief that Great Britain would hold aloof while the friendly republic was overrun and laid waste. There was, indeed, a possibility that Britain might remain neutral; for the Triple Entente was no hard and fast alliance, and the temper of the British people was against any avoidable war. But the incredible thing is that German statesmanship actually conceived that the repudiation of a solemn treaty and the violation of Belgium's territorial integrity would make no difference. It was in this crisis that the viewpoint of German diplomacy was made clear to an astonished world. Surely there is not a more dramatic or more significant passage in the annals of international affairs than this from the report of the British ambassador to Berlin:

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg began a harangue, which lasted about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by Great Britain (insistence upon the neutrality of Belgium) was terrible to a degree. Just for a word, "neutrality"—a word which in war time had been so often disregarded; just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war upon a kindred nation. The policy to which he had devoted himself was tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done, he said, was unthinkable. He

wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate her neutrality. I replied that it was, so to speak, a matter of life and death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality. A solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?

The chancellor said: "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British government thought of that?" I hinted to his excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking a solemn engagement.

And precisely the same spirit which animates her diplomacy has been manifested by Germany in her methods of making war—an utter misconception of the unwritten laws of humanity, an utter disregard of international rights, an utter contempt for the principles of what must be called, for want of a better term, civilized warfare. Having trampled upon her treaty obligations, she has ruthlessly devastated a country whose neutrality she had solemnly guaranteed. Her troops have laid waste the countryside, obliterated villages, sacked and burned populous cities, put the torch to priceless relics of art and antiquity. They have executed civilians, with the announced purpose of terrorizing a people whose only crime is defending their homes against invaders. Not content with seizing cities, they have laid upon the survivors crushing levies of blackmail. They have even devised a new atrocity, in the raining of bombs from airships upon the sleeping homes of a peaceful community.

There is not on the earth a people more intelligent, more peaceable, home loving and generous than the Germans. It is one of the strangest anomalies of the times that the leaders of this great nation, possessing such

commanding ability in other fields of activity, should fail so lamentably in diplomacy and should with such deliberation inflame the hostile sentiment of the world. It would seem that there must be some central explanation, some fundamental defect, which produces a policy so reckless and so fatal. The secret lies in the fact that German autocracy is wholly devoid of international morality. Its leaders have no conception of or regard for the moral aspects of the relations between the peoples of the earth.

When the imperial chancellor burst into exasperation over the solicitude of Germany's antagonist for a "scrap of paper," he was expressing a sincere conviction. International honor, the sanctity of treaty obligations, the scrupulous observance of rights guaranteed by the strong to the weak—these things, in his mind, could weigh nothing against the iron purposes of militarism, imperialism, Pan-Germanism and all the other medieval "isms" that have poisoned the fine German mind. In their code of international ethics self-interest is the supreme law. If Belgium provides the easiest gateway to France, why should a mere word, neutrality, bar the legions of the kaiser? If the reputed danger of Slav domination makes expedient a war against French republicanism, why not strike? If the swift progress of the armies is obstructed by a brave people defending their homes, let them know what resistance means—slay without mercy, impoverish and terrorize the survivors, smite them into submission with ruthless assault by day and the horror of bombs from the midnight sky!

The fatal weakness of German statesmanship is shown in the fact that her every move prior to the war put her in the position of an arrogant aggressor, while her conduct of the campaign has steadily turned against her the tides of sentiment throughout the world. And

her failure becomes more pitiable when contrasted with the keen intelligence of Great Britain's course, which has put that imperialistic country in the position of defending the most sacred rights of nations and humanity. Consider the words of British statesmen, uttered to parliament and to the whole world:

We were sounded as to whether, if Belgian neutrality were restored after the war, it would pacify us; and we replied that we could not barter our interests or our obligations. * * * We are fighting, firstly, to fulfill international obligations which, if entered into by private individuals, no self-respecting man could have repudiated, and, secondly, to vindicate the principle that small nations are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith at the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power. * * * It was only when we were confronted with the choice between keeping faith or breaking our solemn obligations in the discharge of a binding trust, by shameless subservience to naked force, that we threw away the scabbard. We do not repent our decision.

These words are simple, almost trite; but to the exponents of German autocracy they are uttered in an unknown tongue. The proposition is, as the imperial chancellor said, "unthinkable" to German statesmen. Their loftiest conception of power is that huge war machine which is thundering across Europe. To them diplomacy is also a machine, remorseless, soulless—a force that can ignore the facts of human nature and the basic aspirations of the human heart. It is because of this distorted vision of Germany's leaders that she finds herself in her hour of trial alone, her destiny committed to the doubtful theory than an engine of war, though the most powerful the world has ever seen, is mightier than law and morality and the eternal principles of justice.

The Red Prayer

September 2, 1914.

CATHEDRAL, CHAPEL,
Altar, Pew—
All pray to Him of Galilee:
 *O, Help us, Lord,
 To kill!*

Teuton, Russian, Serb and Frank,
 In murderous guise, in serried rank,
All pray to Him of Galilee:
 *O, Help us, Lord,
 To kill!*

The stoleed priests the wafers lay
 On tongues that take new faith, and pray
To that meek One of Galilee:
 *O, Help us, Lord,
 To kill!*

The sounding pulpit preaches zeal
 To bending forms that suppliant kneel,
And pray to Him of Galilee:
 *O, Help us, Lord,
 To kill!*

The victors from the bloody field,
Where lie the dead who would not yield,
Give thanks to Him of Galilee,
Who gave them strength
To kill.

O, Man of Sorrows, Prince of Peace,
Who came in love that war might cease—
Behold Thy children!
Bow Thy head,
A second cross is Thine.
The plowshare has become the sword,
The sanguined earth hears but one word,
Kill!

THE SUPPLIANTS

OUT of a saddened and embittered heart, an eminent Philadelphian sends us the verses we print today—a searching satire upon one of the most depressing manifestations of the war. As though it were not enough that the twentieth century of Christianity should see half the civilized world engaged in barbarous conflict, the warring peoples beseech Omnipotence for aid in battle and raise to the Prince of Peace their prayers for supremacy in slaughter. King and kaiser, czar and emperor, have affronted heaven with their impious supplications. The new thought here is that this monstrous perversion of the religious instinct of man is not an offense of autocrats alone, but of millions of their people. By uncounted numbers of human beings it is still held that their national ambitions are to be fur-

thered by a divinely inspired war; that the God of the universe is a God of battle, of burning cities, murderous cannon and blood-soaked trenches. Nothing, we believe, has ever so grated upon the sense of reverence of this nation as the dreadful invocations that have issued from the thronerooms of Europe during this causeless war. As he launched his Cossack hordes against neighboring nations, the Russian despot proclaimed:

With a profound faith in the justice of our work and a humble hope in omnipotent providence in prayer, we call God's blessing on holy Russia and her valiant troops.

Immediately the war lord of Germany issued his prayerful defiance:

We are animated by the unbending desire to secure for ourselves the place where God has placed us. Devout before God and courageous before the enemy, let us confide ourselves to the everlasting Almighty, who will strengthen our defense and conduct it to a good end.

This godly aspiration was uttered when the government of Germany had trampled upon a solemn covenant and had begun a ruthless invasion of the territory of a neutral people. Within a few hours of the time when German bombs were flung from the clouds upon the sleeping homes of Antwerp the imperial government published to the world that touching telegram from the kaiser to the consort of the crown prince:

I rejoice with thee over the first victory of William. God has been on his side and has most brilliantly supported him. To him be thanks and honors.

Likewise, while the huge forces tore at each other in furious conflict, this dispatch to the king of Wurtemberg:

With God's gracious assistance, the duke of Albrecht and his splendid army have gained a glorious victory. You will join me in thanking the Almighty.

A little later he sent to his ministry an exhortation expressing "confidence in the irresistible might of our heroic army and unshakable belief in the help of a living God." Equally imbued with religious fervor, the aged emperor of Austria scanned the reports of carnage and devastation in Belgium and telegraphed to his illustrious ally:

Victory after victory. God is with you; he will be with us also.

Yet it must not be supposed that the regal effrontery of these utterances signifies that the autocrats are singularly depraved. They would not be moved, they would not dare, to proclaim such impiety if their sacrilegious faith were not shared by the great masses of their subjects. German troops on their way to the storming of Liege and the sack of Louvain knelt humbly in the streets of Berlin while ministers of God blessed their arms. We read of this scene in St. Petersburg:

Crowds prostrated themselves in the streets as the imperial family passed to the palace for the purpose of attending a special service of prayer. One hundred thousand persons gathered in front of the palace. The service was opened by a priest, who read the declaration of war, a *Te Deum* was sung and the czar venerated the holy cross and the ikon.

In ten thousand places of religious worship this scene has been duplicated in spirit, if not in pomp and magnificence. Countless altars are alight with votive appeals, and millions of hearts besiege the throne of mercy with prayers that organized slaughter may prosper. Even the Anglo-Saxon character, shrinking from the formalities of great religious ceremonies, thrills to the audacious spirit of the British "Hymn Before Action":

The earth is full of anger,
The seas are dark with wrath;
The nations, in their harness,
Go up against our path.
Ere yet we loose the legions,
Ere yet we draw the blade,
Jehovah of the Thunders,
Lord God of Battles, aid!

In the face of such demonstrations the instinct of reverence is shocked, and the hope that religion will help to abolish war is well-nigh extinguished. It would almost seem as if democracy alone must be the hope of an afflicted world for peace. Yet humanity will some day reach a higher conception of the teachings of the gentle Nazarene, and autocracy will learn too late the meaning of those terrible words:

"The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord. * * *
He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall have them in derision."

GERMAN THEORIES OF STATECRAFT

September 4, 1914.

FROM a reader whose views carry their own title to respect we have received this communication:

I am an American, although I was born in Germany. For twenty-five years I have been in this country, and am a loyal naturalized citizen. Nevertheless, when I see the dear Fatherland attacked on every side my heart goes out in sympathy. The continued life and prosperity of Germany are necessary to civilization.

For these reasons your editorials criticising the German cause have given me great pain. But I have read them all faithfully, and have been able to see where your viewpoint of international affairs and government has seemed to uphold your opinions. I firmly oppose them, but I do not resent what seems to be sincere opposition.

Your editorial of today (Tuesday), however, seems to me wholly unjust. You make sweeping statements without supporting facts. I read with amazement such expressions as these:

"The German autocracy is wholly devoid of international morality. Its leaders have no conception of or regard for the moral aspects of the relations between the peoples of the earth. International honor, the sanctity of treaty obligations, the scrupulous observance of rights guaranteed by the strong to the weak—these weigh nothing against the iron purposes of militarism, imperialism, Pan-Germanism, and all the other medieval 'isms' that have poisoned the fine German mind. * * * To them diplomacy is also a machine, remorseless, soulless," etc., etc.

All that I was taught from youth, all that I have observed, contradicts this scandalous charge, and I challenge you to support it.

The evident sincerity and the sound sense of this letter demand a straightforward answer. Our judgment as to the worth of German diplomacy and its standard of international morality is based very largely upon the events during the war. The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium and the imperial chancellor's derisive reference to a solemn treaty as "a scrap of paper" would appear to us to be fairly conclusive. In his speech to the reichstag on the Belgian invasion the chancellor remarked, "Necessity knows no law." This frank declaration that military expediency justifies the repudiation of sacred obligations suggests how much "international morality" there is in the imperial policy.

But a few isolated instances would not justify a general conclusion. We had in view also the fact that for generations the fundamental principle of Prussian statesmanship has been self-interest, and that the nation's aggrandizement and glory have been held by them to be supreme over all considerations of abstract morality and justice as applied to other peoples. This belief we shall rest upon the utterances of those who have made Germany what it is. The real founder of the mighty empire was Frederick the Great, that genius in war and statecraft, who reigned over a steadily expanding Prussia from 1740 to 1786. To this day he is venerated as the maker of Germany's imperial greatness; the most magnificent statues in Berlin and other cities are those erected by the present kaiser to the honor of his illustrious ancestor. It is the philosophy of Frederick the Great which inspires and guides the German statesmen of today. What that philosophy is may be

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gathered from these passages in his memoirs and in the astonishing counsels which he bequeathed in writing to his successors:

If possible, the Powers of Europe should be made envious against one another in order to give occasion for a coup when opportunity offers.

Examples of broken treaties are frequent. If a ruler is obliged to sacrifice his own person for the welfare of his subjects, he is all the more obliged to sacrifice treaty engagements, the continuation of which would be harmful to his country. Is it better that a nation should perish or that a sovereign should break his treaty?

Statesmanship can be reduced to three principles: First, maintain your power, and, according to circumstances, increase and extend it; second, form alliances only for your own advantage; third, command fear and respect even in the most disastrous times.

Do not be ashamed of making interested alliances from which only you yourself can derive the whole advantage. Do not make the foolish mistake of not breaking them when you believe that your interest requires it. Above all, uphold the following maxim: "To despoil your neighbors is to deprive them of the means of injuring you."

Never ask anything weakly; appear rather to demand. If some one is disrespectful toward you, reserve your vengeance for a time when you can obtain full satisfaction.

When he is about to conclude a treaty with some foreign power, if a sovereign remembers that he is a Christian he is lost.

War is a business in which the slightest scruple spoils the whole matter. Where can an honest man be found willing to carry on a war if he had not the right to make regulations justifying pillage, incendiarism and carnage?

There are unskillful statesmen who imagine that a state which has reached a certain point must no longer think of aggrandizing itself. But everything depends upon circumstances and upon the courage of the conqueror.

After Frederick, the man who left the deepest mark upon German statesmanship was Bismarck. In his "Reflections and Reminiscences" we find these maxims:

That any one should act in politics out of complaisance or from a sentiment of justice, others may expect from us, but not we from them. * * * Every government takes solely its own interests as the standard of its actions, however it may drape them with deductions of justice or sentiment. * * * My belief is that no one does anything for us unless he can at the same time serve his own interests.

When it becomes a matter of life and death, one does not look at the weapons that one seizes, nor the value of what one destroys in using them. One is guided at the moment by no other thought than the issue of the war.

Could the great chancellor have foreseen the sack of Louvain or the hurling of bombs upon sleeping Antwerp?

There are twenty-two universities in Germany, with 40,000 students. The 3000 professors, most of them imbued with the "blood-and-iron" philosophy, exert a tremendous influence upon German thought, both through their education of officials and professional men and their voluminous writings for the periodical press. "You hear nowhere in Germany more sneering at the peace and disarmament movements than among the university professors," was the proud boast the other day of Doctor Munsterberg, who is one of them. Of these molders of thought, the most influential in recent years was Professor von Treitschke, who died in 1896. In his works, which still have an enormous circulation, we read:

The most valuable part of the Rhine has come into the hands of strangers, and it is an indispensable task for German policy to regain the mouths of that river (from Holland). * * * England today is the shameless representative of barbarism in international law. Hers is the blame if naval wars still bear the character of privileged piracy. * * * In South Africa circumstances are decidedly favorable to us. If our empire had the courage to follow an independent policy with determination, a collision of our interests and those of England is unavoidable. We have

settled our accounts with Austria, with France and with Russia. The last settlement, with England, will be the lengthiest and most difficult.

The Treitschke philosophy is a frank adaptation of that of the most unscrupulous of statesmen:

It will always redound to the glory of Machiavelli that he has placed the State on a solid foundation, and that he has freed it and its morality from the moral precepts taught by the church; but especially because he has been the first to teach, "The State is Power."

The aggressive and provocative character of the German world policy is revealed in a thousand written and spoken utterances. We quoted recently from the war plans put forth by the imperial general staff for use in conflicts with Great Britain, France, the United States and other countries. The inflammatory cynicism of these productions is no more marked than that revealed in countless books and periodicals during recent years. For example, from a popular pamphlet on "Germany in the Twentieth Century":

We consider a great war with England in the twentieth century as quite inevitable. * * * We require a fleet only against England.

In works and periodicals of high repute, such as "Kolonaile Zeitschrift" and "Deutsches Wochenblatt," we read:

The nineteenth century was the Prussian century. In the history of the world the twentieth century will be called the German century.

Our motto should be: With the whole continent against England; with Austria against Russia when the time comes.

Our adversaries in a naval war would probably be our Samoa partners (the United States and Great Britain).

Our national policy requires the firm backbone of a strong fleet in order to oppose with energy the brutal instincts of exporting countries, especially those which export agricultural produce.

But it has not been university professors and military fanatics alone who have created the vision of an aggressive, grasping Germany, determined to increase her power by brute force. Again and again the kaiser has flung into the face of the nations such words as these:

Neptune with his trident is a symbol for us that we have new tasks to fulfill since the empire has been welded together. That trident must be in our fist!

Our future lies upon the water. * * * Without the consent of Germany's ruler nothing must happen in any part of the world.

May our Fatherland be as powerful, as closely united and as authoritative as was the Roman empire of old.

Surely, after 150 years of such teachings, in the schools, in the army, in politics and from the throne-room, it is not astonishing that the chancellor of the German empire should consider it "unthinkable" that any nation should go to war "just for a word, 'neutrality'; just for a scrap of paper." Perhaps the greatest good that could come from the lamentable war now raging would be the final discredit and condemnation of this philosophy, so seductive that it has laid a great and generous people into hideous conflict, and so monstrous that it is a shame and offense to all the nations of the earth.

LOUVAIN

September 5, 1914.

IN DISTANT years, it may be conceived, there will be a place of patriotic resort for Germans where they will take inspiration from the relics of an unexampled military glory. There will be found captured cannon, the swords of illustrious commanders, the war-torn standards of famous regiments. We can picture the people of that time looking with quickened pulse upon these silent mementos of courage and devotion; we can hear a father reciting their thrilling histories to his children:

“See, my son, this flag was carried over the flaming ramparts of Liege; this the sword of him who led and died at St. Quentin. Here are the colors that German valor followed into the storm of lead at Mons; yonder, in tarnished gold upon the tattered silk, you read the names that tell of the heroism of Namur and Charleroi and the blood-stained battlements of La Fere. Each is a chapter in German patriotism and fortitude.”

But there will be one word that will find no place in that gallery of glory; one historic name that will not be proudly emblazoned upon the battleflags of victorious armies:

Louvain!

Here is a name which brave men of that time will try to blot out from memory as a record of dishonor. But no act of daring or sacrifice in the war will outlive the barbarous deed which it recalls—the causeless, piti-

less destruction of a city which was a center of art and enlightenment when most of Europe was sunk in benighted savagery. The facts are of a nature that will burn them indelibly into the recollection of the world. Louvain, a peaceful community of 45,000 inhabitants, lay direct in the path of the invaders through Belgium. Utterly defenseless, it was yielded and occupied without resistance, and for a week had submitted quietly to the rigors of military rule. Suddenly it was condemned, and in one night was laid waste. According to the Belgian account, a force of Germans returning to the city from an expedition was mistaken for the enemy by the garrison and was fired upon. Richard Harding Davis, who has traversed the stricken country, declares:

The allies asked of the Belgians to hold back the invaders for only two days. They held them back for fifteen. It is for this that they are being punished, not because townspeople are firing upon the Germans. No one who has been in Belgium this last month believes that charge.

Let this pass, however; consider the act upon the report of the Germans, that some misguided citizens fired upon forces which had invaded their country in violation of a solemn treaty. If these outbursts of individual lawlessness were committed, the penalty was mercilessly exacted from innocent and guilty alike. Squads of soldiers were sent into different parts of the town to drive the people from their homes. Men, women and children were herded to the open country and sent adrift; and then, with torch and bomb, the invaders devoted the beautiful city to destruction, staying not until it was a heap of smoking ruins and its people houseless fugitives. The world was incredulous of the first reports of this appalling deed of vandalism. But those who hoped that German civilization would escape this infamy could not withstand the official announcement of the German embassy in Washington:

Civilians of the Belgian town of Louvain made a perfidious attack upon German troops while fighting. Louvain was punished by the destruction of the city.

The devastation was not, then, a strategic move necessitated by peril or the stern exigencies of military operations. It was a deliberate measure of unbridled revenge, committed against an unarmed people, upon the excuse, not substantiated, that some of them had violated laws which the German invaders had repudiated in their invasion.

And it is not alone by the impoverishment and suffering inflicted upon the thousands of innocent non-combatants that the world measures this crime. Louvain was more than a cluster of houses and shops and public buildings; it was a shrine of culture, one of Europe's most precious repositories of historic works of genius in art, architecture and learning. Its great university, its library, its magnificent cathedral and its collection of products of rarity and charm had made it a center of inspiration for five centuries. The Hotel de Ville, which was spared to stand like a forlorn monument among the blackened ruins, was noted the world over for its Gothic beauty. Nowhere had the spirit of the genius of antiquity been preserved with such solicitude and such benefit to mankind. In one night all was swept away. The ruthless order of an infuriated soldier obliterated in a few hours the priceless relics of five hundred years, destroyed from the face of the earth works which all the resources of science and human genius never can replace.

The magnitude of the crime lies in the fact that the beauty and historic value of Louvain were not the exclusive possessions of the inhabitants of that city. They belonged to the people of Belgium, the people of Germany, the people of the whole world. How is one

to classify this outburst of barbarism? Upon what theory can we explain such an enterprise, calmly announced as a calculated act of war by a nation which has laid claim to world leadership in culture? Of all the peoples of the earth, the Germans are by nature the most peaceable and home-loving, the most deeply imbued with the sentiment of veneration for what is good. No others respond so quickly and so surely to the appeals of art and music and literature; no others pay more sincere tribute to their gracious and uplifting influence. Under natural conditions they would be the last to commit or defend such a deed of destruction as that perpetrated upon Louvain.

It can be traced to only one force—the monstrous cult which has permeated every fiber of the national life and has perverted even the patriotism of a noble-minded people; which has made them the submissive instruments of a military caste and an insatiable autocracy. A system which asserts and maintains supremacy over individual liberty, over the obligations of human intercourse, over the dictates of international honor, over the principles of religion itself, cannot but blunt the sensibilities and harden the hearts of those whom it makes its ministers. Militarism has created an army whose exploits will add unfading luster to the annals of German valor; but it has also created a war policy which is ruthless enough to put a wanton torch to a priceless treasure house and inhuman enough to boast of it.

The world will forget Sedan before it forgets Louvain. The one redeeming hope is that it will charge this crime to the system that instigated it, and not to a people whose humane and liberal instincts it must some day awaken to enduring shame.

WHY THIS WAR WAS INEVITABLE

September 7, 1914.

A MORE impartial time than this must decide what personage or government flung the torch that started the European conflagration. Circumstances, moreover, make that a matter of minor importance. The vital fact is that the powder train had for years awaited the spark; that a long series of acts and incidents had created a situation in which no human power could avert an ultimate outburst. The world war is not to be charged to this or that potentate or people, to this ultimatum or that defiance, to this aggression or that reprisal; but rather to the relentless logic of cumulative events which, taken singly, would involve no deliberate culpability or turpitude. This truth we find stated with impressive force by a German writer. Professor Ferdinand Schevill, of the department of history at the University of Chicago, says:

In the face of the ruin which has already begun, the appalled witnesses of the tragedy are questioning one another with white lips: How did it begin? Why did it begin? What are they fighting for? Who is to blame? * * * Only passion, not reason or knowledge, will be content to put the blame exclusively on Serbia or Austria or Russia. Only fretful ignorance and firm-seated bias can put the blame upon the kaiser.

If it behooves poor mortals to distribute blame, he is, perhaps, not altogether free from guilt; but neither, in varying measure, is every other government of Europe. Together they must bear the blame, with their alliances, their ententes, their armaments, their lusts, their revenges and their jealousies.

In the spirit of this sane utterance we shall aim to set down without bias an historical outline of events which have produced their inevitable result. Without drawing deductions or analyzing motives, except as revealed in surface developments, we shall attempt to trace the chain of acts which link the present war to the past, and to show that most of the steps were not only taken with the tacit approval of the whole world, but were in themselves not wholly blameworthy.

In beginning with Germany we have no invidious intent. The great empire which is the central power in history's most colossal war is necessarily involved in all relevant events preceding it. The starting point, of course, is the Bismarck influence, which guided German development during and following the Franco-Prussian war until his dismissal by the present kaiser, in 1890. This policy, having triumphed over the shoddy imperialism of Napoleon III, aspired to give German civilization a commanding place in Europe. With painstaking energy, it set about creating a strong spirit of cohesive nationalism, and won its first success in the welding together of twenty-five jealous Teutonic divisions, under the standard of the German empire. The laudable aim of a vigorous nationalism led naturally to the cult of racial superiority and the high destiny of German culture and civilization. And the most effective means of stimulating this spirit and strengthening the national fiber of the newly created federation of states was the upbuilding of an army which should enlist the energies and the patriotism of the whole people. These were, however, mere means to an end, which was the development of the industrial and commercial genius of the nation under the invigorating guidance of a far-seeing collectivism.

Nationalism to unify thought, militarism to discipline character, a drastic paternalism to create efficiency—these three forces, directed with consummate skill and broad vision by German statesmanship, carried the empire onward with astonishing rapidity, and the close of the nineteenth century saw it leading the world in many vital activities. Conquest in the fields of industry and commerce logically inspired maritime development. German ships began to dot the sea lanes of all the globe, and German trade thrust itself into distant markets where older countries had known no rivalry. At home, the system of universal conscription and relentless training had produced an army which had become the overshadowing military power of Europe and of the world; and the swift spread of German foreign trade dictated the creation of a great navy to guard the far-flung routes of the empire's sea-borne commerce.

Sitting in his cell in London Tower, three hundred years ago, Sir Walter Raleigh wrote:

Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.

Nowhere was this maxim more profoundly believed and appreciated than in Germany. Unexampled efficiency, moreover, had so stimulated production, and prosperity had so increased population, that the lusty young empire felt the need of room to expand. New territories and new markets were imperative in the scheme of development. German settlements were planted in the few places of the earth still unclaimed by the great colonizing Powers, and to the plan of dominance in Europe was added the dream of a commanding sea power and spheres of influence encircling the earth. Meanwhile, the pressure upon Germany herself, both economic and political, made her extraordinary military

program a popular passion. Her great army was universally held by her people to be a rational measure of precaution, necessitated by the fact that across her frontiers on either side she faced nations which were her inevitable rivals. As Professor Schevill frankly admits, the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine as a prize of war in 1870 was an incurable blunder. It created inextinguishable rancor between France and Germany, and dictated an attitude of constant readiness against any possible attempt to recover the bitterly lamented provinces. Russia, on the other hand, was growing toward prodigious power, and the awakening of a Slavic spirit of nationality produced rumblings of ambition that sounded menacing in German ears.

All these conditions conspired to suggest a strengthening of the German position. Hence was formed the Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy—which was plausibly described as a mere arrangement of prudence, required in self-defense. The world remembers now chiefly the injudicious boasts of the impetuous young kaiser; it has been exasperated, too, by the inflammatory tirades of the fanatical professors who launched the dangerous project of Pan-Germanism. But an impartial retrospect will lead the student to conclude that the successive moves in Germany's military, naval and foreign policy had in themselves the color of right, and embodied no more than justifiable safeguards for a rapidly expanding nation.

Yet the results far outran these bounds. France, remembering the overwhelming disaster of Sedan, was stung into activity by the vast methodic preparations beyond her unprotected border. Purely as a matter of precaution she, too, became a devotee of militarism—summoned her citizens year by year to compulsory service, spent untold millions in erecting chains of for-

tresses, and exhausted the resources of science in devising effective weapons for war by land, sea and air.

Russia likewise saw in the swiftly rising power of Germany and the eastward sweep of German influence the doom of the long-cherished Slav ambition—a Mediterranean gateway to the world's great highways. Realization of this, a perfectly natural aspiration, had been won by the sacrifice of 200,000 lives in 1878, but the hand of Germany intervened. This had not been forgotten, and with her semimедieval civilization and policies, it was not to be expected that Russia would do otherwise than plan to build her military power parallel with that of Germany.

During most of this time Great Britain, for more than two centuries the unchallenged mistress of the seas, was content to keep that title secure. Having absorbed the richest territories of the world, and gathered to herself its most profitable trade—by conquest and intrigue as well as by colonization—her policy was simply to keep what she had. She could watch with complacency the struggles of Germany for a world power which was unattainable while British squadrons dominated every pathway in all seven seas. From the viewpoint of Great Britain, therefore, maintenance of British leadership in sea power was a natural ambition, and, indeed, a guarantee of peace. But the opening of the twentieth century revealed a situation which gave the statesmen of Downing Street grave concern. The German military machine had been developed in size and efficiency until it clearly outclassed any possible rival; and the German naval plans, advocated by German patriots as an open challenge to commercial Britain, carried a menace which the fundamental policy of British sea supremacy could not ignore. The vision of a conquered France and a possible invasion across the narrow Channel loomed up threat-

eningly, and the, instinct of self-preservation drove Great Britain to adopt naval expansion plans of unequaled magnitude. But this move—defended, as were all the others, as necessary to peace—did not insure tranquillity. She sought to erect new safeguards by alliance. A series of masterly diplomatic maneuvers brought about, in 1904, the Triple Entente, under the terms of which Britain, France and Russia pooled their policies of defense and made answer to the formidable challenge of the Triple Alliance.

With two such tremendous forces arrayed in opposition, each inspired by pride and self-interest, the balance of power was so delicately adjusted that a single act, a single word, it was foreseen, might precipitate a collision. Each side, therefore, strained every nerve to gain advantage. At first the struggle was secret and silent, operating through the hidden channels of diplomacy. But the irreconcilable issue could not be concealed, and soon the Powers were engaged in a furious rivalry of armament. Bigger and bigger grew the appropriations for military preparation, vaster and more real the annual maneuvers of the rival armies, more staggering the burdens of war taxation. Thus there was created across the continent of Europe an atmosphere so surcharged with the spirit of conflict that the breaking of the storm was recognized as only a matter of time. The tension was immeasurably increased by the propaganda of race hostility; but even this, and the intolerable swaggering of professional militarists, would not have started a universal war if the other conditions had not first been created.

We have endeavored to give a colorless review of the main events and policies which built up a situation wherein no solution was possible short of war. The actual move of provocation was Austria's assault upon

Servia, but in default of that there would have been some other. The curious point for the student is the fact that the conditions for this greatest of wars resulted from a series of acts which, viewed singly, might be upheld as guiltless and even admirable. But if it be conceded that the separate acts were justifiable, why did they, in combination, produce an unjustifiable war? For this anomaly we find four reasons.

First, natural and laudable as was Germany's ambition to open new fields for the exercise of her fine civilizing efficiency, she started 200 years too late. The division of the world's territory had become what the diplomats call *un fait accompli*. Every foot of land in Europe was pre-empted, and she could acquire holdings beyond the seas only at the expense of other nations.

Second, for one nation or an alliance of nations to declare that another shall not have free egress to the world's highways, to mark off certain territory and proclaim it closed to all but selected traffic, is an arrogation of power to which civilization will not submit, and which is a direct incitement to war.

Third, there is no room in this age for the superstition or theory or conviction, however sincerely held, that some particular race, whether Teuton, Slav or Anglo-Saxon, is endowed with peculiar qualities which give it the right to impose its authority or domination upon others.

Finally, it is against the laws of man, of nature and of God that a system which is not economically right, which cannot establish itself in accordance with methods sanctioned by modern civilization and the principles of human justice, should be carried through by brute force.

Until these four fallacies are condemned and swept away there will be no enduring peace in this world.

PROGRESSIVISM AND EFFICIENCY

September 10, 1914.

AMID all the tension and distress of war, there is one fact in which the people of Great Britain, we doubt not, take universal pride and comfort. We purpose to discuss that condition here because it carries an important meaning for the people of this country. The features in the British situation which seem to us noteworthy and significant are the commanding initiative, the steadiness of purpose and the masterful efficiency displayed by the government in meeting the greatest crisis that has confronted the empire since Napoleon loaded his transports to cross the English Channel. This statement has no relation whatever to the issues involved in the war. It is no more an indorsement of British policies than our recent eulogy of Germany's marvelous military machine implied approval of the ambitions of the kaiser. We shall discuss the actions of the British government solely as evidences of administrative capacity.

What makes them significant and of vital American interest is the fact that it is a Liberal government—that the party in power is the party of progressivism, of radicalism, as distinguished from the party of conservatism or reaction. From time immemorial it has been a settled belief of British Toryism that capacity for real statesmanship was an exclusive possession of that element of the population. Its exponents would loftily concede that occasionally the Liberal party might show a certain intelligence, and that its policies revealed a pio-

neering spirit that was commendable; but it was held that beyond this point no dependence could be placed upon that organization. Politicians whose minds were engrossed with extravagant schemes of social betterment—so ran the Tory tale—statesmen who burdened parliament and the property interests with socialistic projects of land reform, old-age pensions, national insurance, housing improvement and the like, could never administer successfully the magnificent affairs of empire. Even granting to them sincerity and shrewdness, it was argued that their judgment was too distorted by concentration upon the irrelevancies of social and industrial justice to grasp the far-reaching questions of imperial safety and progress. Their natural and useful function, in this view, was to serve as a stimulating party of opposition; only from the Tories, the representatives of constitutional precedent, rational conservatism and historic accomplishment, could the country expect competence and constructive genius.

And this comfortable estimate was resolutely held through nine years of Liberal ascendancy. "Liberal luck" became a byword among the devotees of a scornful Conservatism. It was "luck" that carried the party through the storms of three general elections; that developed in Premier Asquith and his colleagues a resourcefulness which outmaneuvered the most adroit opposition and continuously held the confidence of the country; that enabled the party to remake that dread instrument, the British Constitution, and strip the house of peers of its historic powers; that snatched victory from defeat, made increased prosperity follow increased taxation, and derived new strength even from the elaborate conspiracy of a disaffected army.

It is true that by their very virulence during the home rule crisis the Tory forces showed an unwonted

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respect for the ability of the party in power; their desperate tactics were a tribute to the genius of those whom they affected to despise. But the darkening of the European war cloud revived their patriotic forebodings. What was to be the fate of national safety and national honor when those to whose care these precious interests were committed were not representatives of safe and sane conservatism, but unbalanced radicals, visionaries whose minds were occupied with experimental social and political nostrums?

The stirring events of the last five weeks provide the answer. Even the Tory press evinces heartfelt admiration for the manner in which the nation has been served, during the most perilous period in British history, by the followers of Liberal heresies. It took this supreme crisis, in fact, to disclose that in one of her most uncompromising radicals Britain possessed a statesman of commanding stature. Upon Sir Edward Grey, secretary of state for foreign affairs, fell the tremendous burden of carrying the nation's interests through the turmoil which enveloped Europe from the hour that Austria delivered her fatal ultimatum to Servia. Every step of the negotiations that ensued was beset with hidden perils; the issues not only of peace or war, but of national integrity, were at stake. One false move, one deviation from the path of strict honor, one hint of either arrogance or weakness, would have hastened the crash and would have involved the British cause in irredeemable discredit. All the world knows with what mastery the tremendous problem was handled—the resolute efforts for peace, the steady avoidance of provocation, the adroit diplomacy which made Britain's antagonists the aggressors, and the final stand upon principles which enlist the utmost devotion of every faction.

With the dread summons to war came new problems of equal magnitude and consequence. First was the question of food. Great Britain is always within less than half a year of famine; let the supplies from other parts of the world cease for that period, and she starves. While the threat of war still hung in the balance, this government of theorists took charge of the nation's larder. It learned, and announced, that a full five months' quota of food was on hand. It extended its authority over these supplies, named the maximum prices at which they might be sold, and gave notice that it would regulate distribution if that step became necessary. As a result, the excited vision of hunger was dispelled, the hoarding of supplies ceased, and inside three days the food barometer was at normal.

The supreme aversion of Toryism is, of course, David Lloyd-George. To the offense of being a Welshman and of having risen from the "lower middle class" to the chancellorship of the exchequer, he had added that of promoting all sorts of schemes of "uplift." And this visionary was in charge of the nation's finances at a time when their very foundations were threatened! Yet a Conservative writer bears witness that "the cabinet rose to the situation with superb competence." When the shock came the banks were closed for the August holidays; and they were kept closed until arrangements had been made to meet the strain. Then the government postponed for thirty days the payment of all bills of exchange and all contracts except for wages. To avert a currency famine it issued banknotes for 10 and 20 shillings, the smallest denomination ordinarily being 5 pounds. Moreover, it was Lloyd-George and his hare-brained colleagues who put into effect the plan of government insurance of import cargoes to 80 per cent of their value, a move which—the United States having failed

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to take like action—started shiploads of sugar and other necessities toward the ports of Britain. So complete was the government's financial command that four days after the opening of the war the British business man, with the country entering a gigantic conflict, could obtain all needed money at 5 per cent, while enterprises in Philadelphia, 3000 miles distant, had to pay 6 to 7 per cent for accommodation. When it was learned that certain institutions were attempting to squeeze business by refusing credit at the specified rate, it was the despised Lloyd-George who broke the conspiracy by announcing that he would publicly name the banks that did not comply with the government's policy.

It was "Liberal luck," no doubt, that brought Kitchener to England from his post in Egypt at this crisis; but it was clear-sighted wisdom that instantly requisitioned his services for the war office. Here, again, the government showed the statesmanship that rises above politics. Kitchener is an inveterate Conservative, but he is the ablest military organizer the empire has ever had, and Liberal efficiency gathered him in. But more picturesque and more vital than any of these things was the incomparable readiness of the navy. So well prepared was the admiralty that the outbreak found the vast home fleets assembled on a war basis, manned with trained crews, their gunners on edge with practice; their supplies of coal, food and ammunition at hand. When the hour struck there was no delay. One brief order was given, the great gray squadrons faded into the mists of the North Sea, and from that day England has rested secure. The man responsible for this exhibition of almost German efficiency is Winston Churchill. Born an aristocrat and nourished in the bosom of Toryism, he is by choice a democrat, and is the most advanced and most enthusiastic of the representatives of Liberalism.

He is not yet 40 years old, and when he was made first sea lord, two or three years ago, Conservative England almost wept with chagrin. Today the confidence in young Churchill is like unto that reposed 200 years ago in his illustrious ancestor, Marlborough.

The application which Americans can make of these facts is obvious. In this country, too, there is an influential cult which holds that progressivism is fatal to efficiency. Eminent leaders of thought, and parrot-like followers, will patronizingly explain that the advocates of political, social and industrial betterment are useful in a way, but are incapable of constructive achievement. That, they say, must be left to sober-minded conservatives, inheritors of the wisdom of the fathers, guardians of the ark of the covenant. There never was a more baseless and mischievous fallacy. The war record of the British Liberal party is sufficient answer. Times of stress demand statesmen who are progressive enough to make their own precedents, and keen-witted enough to adapt themselves to present problems. Broad sympathy for humanity and a desire to establish better conditions of life are the strongest possible stimulants for practical efficiency in administration.

SOCIALISM AND THE WAR

September 15, 1914.

THIS great war will not only remake maps and rebuild governments, but rechart the courses of human thought. One fallacy that seems to have been ended is that which conceded control of the issues of peace and war to international Socialism. For many years the world had been instructed that the era of armed strife had been brought to an end by solemn resolution. Socialism had virtually leveled the barriers of race and obliterated the boundaries of nations; had laid a paralyzing hand upon the unscrupulous designs of autocracy and the intrigues of ambitious statesmen. Declarations of war, from whatever quarter or with whatever color of justification, would be met by a general strike; the summons of social brotherhood, stronger than the ties of blood or the instincts of patriotism, would unite the workers of all countries in a numberless army of peaceful resistance, and the elaborate preparations of militarism would collapse amid universal ridicule.

Nothing in this conflict has been more striking and significant than the dissipation of this agreeable theory. A review of some of the facts will show how complete was the misconception, not only among outside observers, but among Socialists themselves. Opposition to war has always held a commanding place in the propaganda. It has been assailed as a device of capitalism to divert the power of the people from the evil system which oppresses them. Great standing armies have been

denounced as the weapons of greed and autocracy against the proletariat. Socialism has demanded that its adherents recognize no national borders and obey only the principles of universal brotherhood.

Conditions prior to the outbreak of hostilities seemed to support this attitude. Russian agitators had called a great strike that was giving the authorities at Petrograd grave concern. Belgium for years had been a forcing-house for Socialistic projects, and the advance of the cult there had been an inspiration to its followers throughout the world. France had delivered itself to Socialist power, which had startled civilization by the ease with which it was able to paralyze not only industry, but the most vital functions of government. Powerful statesmen of Italy moved to put the forces of the kingdom at the disposal of Germany and Austria; but Italian Socialism interposed a veto, backed by popular hatred of Austria; and the Triple Alliance crumbled. Even in Great Britain, where there is no autocracy to stimulate it, Socialism has become powerful enough to put a representative in the cabinet as a member of the Labor party and to trade its votes with the dominant party in the government.

But these things were trivial compared to the might of Socialism in Germany, its birthplace. There it had been such a growing force for a generation that in sheer self-defense the autocratic regime had been compelled to fight the advancing conflagration by setting backfires of monarchical socialism—making its own some principles of the new economy and retaining the application of them. Only by adopting a program of the most advanced social legislation and collectivism has the imperial government been able to withstand the pressure of the leveling movement. Even so, its growth has been phenomenal. The Social Democratic party has become a minority

so powerful that it is able to dictate in great measure the internal affairs of the empire. The story is told in the popular vote cast at elections during the last forty years:

1871.... 124,700	1884.... 550,000	1903.... 3,010,800
1874.... 352,000	1887.... 763,000	1907.... 3,259,000
1877.... 493,300	1890.... 1,427,000	1912.... 4,250,329
1878.... 437,600	1893.... 1,789,700	
1881.... 312,000	1898.... 1,107,100	

Today the party owns seventy-six newspapers, a press association, several illustrated periodicals and fifty-seven publishing houses. It maintains 200 central circulating libraries, with hundreds of branches; an academy at the capital and a vast corps of writers and lecturers. The 1912 vote of 4,250,329 was more than one-third of the total vote cast. Socialism, then, confronted the existing order in Europe before the war with impressive numbers and far-reaching organization, and was even intrenched in more than one government. And at every international gathering its forces exploited the principle of drastic opposition to war. Definite claim was made that one threatened conflict had been averted by the power of the organization. On this incident Charles Edward Russell has been quoted:

The real power of the world had spoken, that was all. Wonderful lesson! One word from the international Socialist party, and reason resumes her reign in the excited brain of every statesman in Europe.

Within a month of the outbreak the leaders met in Brussels and made a tentative program for a general strike to smash the plans of any government that moved to mobilize. Emil Vandervelde, a Belgian Socialist of world fame, spoke for all when he declared: "Because all governments are capitalistic, we declare that patriotism and Socialism are utterly contradictory." This was the stern spirit which animated Socialists as late as

July. But almost at the first drumbeat the barriers of race and nation sprang up and the vision of united brotherhood melted away.

The strike in Russia was canceled forthwith, and the Socialists trooped to the colors of the czar. All Belgium sprang to arms, and Vandervelde himself took a seat in the cabinet. The Socialist government of France enthusiastically ordered mobilization, and the party has officially declared that the republic is "upholding the principles of liberty" in making war upon the brotherhood in Germany. In England the Labor member resigned from the cabinet, but the party has sent thousands to the fighting line. And in Germany it is estimated that nearly one-third of the troops of the kaiser are Socialists.

Belgian Socialists the other day drafted an appeal to their brothers of Germany—but they did it with rifles in their hands. A delegation of German Socialists visited their brethren in Italy, asking them to turn that government toward Germany; but they were rebuffed, the Italians expressing a fervent hope that "the infamous war will crush those who provoked it." After these singular demonstrations of solidarity, it is rather pitiful to read that "10,000 Socialists in New York have inaugurated 'Red Week,' a country-wide protest against the war, and will begin an international campaign to elect anti-war legislators. What is the meaning of it all? A courageous effort to explain is made by Allan L. Benson, one of the ablest of the American leaders:

Socialists are human; they are home-lovers. Like everybody else, they resent attacks upon their respective countries. Every nation at war contends that it was attacked. Wherever we were—in Germany, France or Belgium—we had the ordinary white man's hatred of invasion; and the war came so suddenly that we had no opportunity to meet and exchange views. Given a month's notice, the Socialists of Germany

might have united with the Socialists of France to resist the war, even to the extent of martyrdom.

A fortress in our defense is gone. Either we must make the international solidarity of our party a fact, or we would do well to stop talking about it. It can never be a fact—except in time of peace—until the war-making power of the nations is democratized.

This is sound reasoning, so far as it goes; but the truth, we think, lies somewhat deeper. Socialists of the different nations find themselves actually at war with one another, all their theories of universal brotherhood overturned, simply because in this matter of war they failed to take into account the fundamental passions and aspirations and prejudices and weaknesses of human nature.

The Belgian Socialist loved his German brother dearly—until that esteemed relative-by-resolution came across the border with bombs and siege guns. The German Socialist yearned over his coworker in Russia—until some one whispered that the czar plotted to overwhelm German civilization with his Slavic hordes. Not a single case of Socialist desertion or mutiny has been recorded; literally by millions the preachers of brotherhood are battling with courage and devotion in the cause of that patriotism which they had denounced. The inspiring theory of the system, in a word, came into conflict with the elemental forces of the human heart; and it crumbled away.

This revelation has a meaning far beyond its immediate effect. It suggests the fundamental weakness of the entire Socialistic scheme. The ideal society under that rule would require a race freed from the faults and ambitions that are inherent in humanity. The philosophy which is shattered by the blast of a war trumpet will never regenerate a world made up of thinking, feeling, striving human beings.

STRANGE MISCONCEPTIONS

September 17, 1914.

MUCH can be forgiven a people laboring under such a strain as now tries the endurance, the temper and the very soul of the German nation. Perfect poise amid such upheavals and perils is not to be expected. But a Berlin incident of a few days ago has a significance far deeper than its surface interest. Reputable newspapers of the capital called attention to the fact that the United States ambassador was urging all Americans to leave the country, and they cited this action as supporting a rumor that the United States was about to declare war upon Germany. So widespread was the report that Ambassador Gerard was compelled to denounce it formally as a preposterous invention.

That any German citizen or newspaper should give an instant's credence to such an impossible idea will seem to Americans fantastic. Far from having any quarrel with Germany, this country maintains with her singularly emphatic relations of friendship. So serene is the spirit of amity that this government now represents German diplomatic interests in all the countries with which she is at war.

Why, then, should such a mad idea gain circulation? It was not wholly the result of nervous strain. It is worth noting simply because it was a characteristic result of the German point of view. The empire is beset by powerful foes, her economic and military resources are strained to the uttermost, and there could not be a

more favorable opportunity for a commercial rival to strike. True, the United States is under certain obligations of friendship; but why should these weigh against the chance to wrest advantage from a competitor delivered into our hands? Of course, the German people would bitterly resent an attack from this country, but they would not consider it incredible.

Nor is the incident we have cited unique. State Senator Sproul, who returned from Europe the other day, said the belief was prevalent in Germany at the outbreak of the war that the United States would immediately seize Canada. He heard the view expressed not only in the streets, but in educated circles. This wild imagining likewise was discussed gravely as a natural move. A century of unbroken peace and a 3000-mile border unmarred by a single fortification impressed the German mind not at all, in view of the glorious opportunity presented to the United States in Great Britain's preoccupation in Europe. Those who have imbibed the ruthless teachings of militarism and Pan-Germanism could conceive of nothing more reasonable than that this nation should seize the opportunity to impose "American culture and civilization" upon a weaker neighbor. They would be astounded to learn that that part of the British empire most secure from aggression is that which lies defenseless beyond our northern border line.

These manifestations of a distorted nationalism illustrate strikingly how deep has wrought the poison of a misguided philosophy. The people who for years have permitted an arrogant autocracy to publish detailed plans of aggression and conquest have strayed far indeed after false gods. Among the lessons they are to learn in the stern school of this war, not the least useful will be that there are civilizations governed by higher principles than a belief in racial supremacy and brute force.

ARE AMERICANS PREJUDICED ?

September 19, 1914.

IN MOST of the writings advocating the German cause there is a tone of resentment against the course of American public opinion and of complaint that animosity is revealed against the German people. It is to be observed that the extraordinary outburst of sympathy for the empire by German-Americans has never been condemned by broad-minded citizens here. This nation's love of fair play and free speech opens the columns of every newspaper to these advocates. The aggression, the charge of unfair partisanship and prejudice, comes from them. In terms ranging from pained regret to bitter taunts of "ingratitude" and "race treachery," these writers not only protest against the refusal of Americans to accept the German view, but accuse them of harboring anti-German prejudices. Their letters are filled with such phrases as "deliberate animus," "virulent abuse," "ignorance and prejudice," "unfair American attitude" and "anti-German bias."

This misconception is assiduously fomented by the German newspapers of the country. Most of these organs have lost caste in recent years, because so many of them exist chiefly by acting as the mercenary allies of corrupt political machines; and they have seized eagerly upon the chance to win over German readers by spreading the charge that the German people are the victims of racial discrimination. Ordinarily, such an unjust complaint would be futile, but the war has exposed sensitive nerves

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of feeling which wince under the lightest touch; and thousands of well-meaning German citizens are being embittered by the reiterated fiction that they are unjustly aspersed. The briefest glance at the conditions of American life will show how utterly baseless is this belief. Let us begin with childhood—has any reader ever heard of a German boy or girl or teacher suffering discomfort in an American school because of race?

In business, in finance, in the professions, is there any anti-German feeling? On the contrary, is it not true that the German merchant, the German banker, the German doctor, lawyer or clergyman enjoys a prestige as great as that of any American—nay, often commands exceptional confidence by reason of his sterling qualities of heart and mind associated with his race? Consider politics. Campaigns have been known wherein partisanship has been distorted and disgraced by vicious appeals to prejudice against certain foreign-born citizens, but never have these objects of base passion been Germans. They alone have always been accepted at their true worth. The Steubens of the Revolution and the Schurzes and Sigels of the Civil war are claimed as blood-brothers and national heroes by the people of this country. Our colleges and universities delight to employ and honor German educators. There is hardly a public office or a public function where the fitness of German citizens is not accepted.

But the ultimate test of racial harmony is intermarriage. Prejudice which is not invoked against the sacred union of wedlock is non-existent. And there has yet to be cited a case wherein the marriage of an American to a German met such criticism as is frequently visited upon alliances with other races. The intermingling of the native-born and German elements of the population is so complete and cordial that the complaint

we have noted refutes itself. This condition emphasizes the fact, however, that in another respect American public opinion is really "anti-German."

There is here, in truth, a prejudice, deep and lasting, against the government of Germany, against the system which it represents, against the philosophy which it boldly proclaims to the world. The autocracy and militarism of Germany, modified though they are by parliamentary forms, constitute a challenge and a menace to American institutions; against them the American mind instinctively revolts. Militaristic monarchism and democracy are incurably antagonistic. Both systems cannot endure. The triumph of one means the extinction of the other. There are fundamental differences which no sophistry can reconcile and no patriotic eloquence resolve. Operated by German efficiency and genius, the German system has arrayed itself in the garments of progress; autocracy has strengthened itself by adopting programs of social and industrial reform, and actually has created the myth that only by surrender of their rights and liberties can the people obtain justice, by means of acts of grace from a divinely appointed power. But at bottom remains the vital conflict of principle so boldly expressed by Professor Munsterberg:

The democracy believes that the state exists for the individuals, and that the individuals, therefore, are above the state. The idea of an emperor is that he is the symbol of the state as a whole, independent from the will of the individuals, and therefore independent of any elections; the bearer of the historic tradition, above the struggle of single men.

The American view is that science and art and law, like the state, exist for the good of the individual persons; that their whole value is to serve them (the people). The Germans believe that science and art and law and state are valuable in themselves, and that the highest glory of the individual is to serve those eternal values.

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Undeviatingly friendly toward the Germans, so many of whom are their loyal fellow-citizens and proved friends, Americans do condemn with implacable hostility this undemocratic doctrine, and the provocative, imperialistic militarism which it has produced and which it champions. They despise the theatrical falsehood of a divinely endowed absolutism; they resent the irritating influence of a brass-helmeted, saber-clanking caste which divides the great German nation into an aristocracy of arrogant officialdom and a mass of "cannon fodder"; they revolt against a social system that permits insolence in uniform to swagger along the sidewalks of a modern capital and shoulder civilians, men and women, into the gutter. It is these things that have brought into disrepute not the German people, but the system which they tolerate and which at last has plunged them into unutterable woe. It is because of these things that the word Germany, which should suggest to the American mind pictures of a peaceful, home-loving people, a rational progress and a brilliant culture, irresistibly evokes instead the spectacle of a bedizened, overbearing militarism, whose very existence is a provocation to a world of intelligence and an affront to a Christian civilization.

But here is a singular and unfortunate fact: those who assail American public opinion as prejudiced will not permit it to differentiate between the German people and the German system. They insist that the nation's progress is due wholly to the enforcement of that doctrine which is the direct antithesis of Americanism. Here are extracts from recent writings by the ablest advocates of the German cause:

Any attempt to create editorially a Germany of the Germans and another of the kaiser's is an excursion into the land of baseless speculation. The modern Germany of our

day and all her great achievements, commercial and cultural, is inseparable from the Germany of military discipline, and would never have come into existence without the support of a strong, steadfast and determined government. The "two Germanys" of your creation must stand or fall together, for the German people and their kaiser are one.

The German people are as inseparable from their kaiser as we are (in America) from our Constitution.

The whole German people are practically unanimous in the opinion that the monarchical form of government, with great authority and strongly centralized, is the best for them. Even the great Social Democratic party is organized upon this principle, and does not in the least resemble a Democracy in the American sense of the word.

If we are to accept these utterances—and they come from German-Americans of high repute—then the condition is deplorable. If the German people are incapable of rising to the rights and responsibilities of democracy; if they must be disciplined and dragooned and goose-stepped into progress by a military aristocracy; if they cannot work out their destiny unless they order their affairs to the snarling of trumpets and the rattling of drums, they are in a bad way, indeed.

But from this view we utterly dissent. The German in this country has shown his worth and his commanding intelligence too clearly to justify any such discreditable idea; and it is an affront to maintain that his brethren of the empire are not equally capable of developing political liberty along with commercial and cultural advancement. One supreme benefit of this dreadful war will be to dissipate a theory so unjust and so vicious as that which we have noted, and to hasten the day when the genius of Germanic civilization will free itself from the outworn trappings of medievalism and move forward to higher destiny under the guidance and inspiration of twentieth-century democracy.

IRELAND AND THE EMPIRE

September 24, 1914.

WHEN the Liberal premier announced to parliament the momentous decision to stake the fate of the British empire upon the rescue of violated Belgium, the Tory leaders unanimously joined in patriotic approval. They responded with enthusiasm to the plea that the government and people had no higher duty than to "vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed at the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power." The plight of gallant Belgium, doomed to become a province of imperial Germany, moved them to humane indignation. The sentiment did them credit. It is a curious fact, however, that these were the very statesmen who had been fighting viciously to perpetuate a wrong no less grievous within the borders of the British empire. The summons to restore the right of self-government to Belgium roused Tory patriots to exalted fervor; but to strangle the equal right of Ireland to home rule they had fomented treason and brought the nation to the verge of civil war.

This contrast has a wider interest than an example of political inconsistency. The Tory attitude toward Ireland for a hundred years has been, in familiar phrase, "worse than a crime—a blunder." The so-called Union of 1800, procured by wholesale corruption and maintained by force, was, in fact, a separation; the dissolution of that unnatural arrangement has done more to unify the empire than the proudest achievements of

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Toryism in the century during which it stubbornly enforced the terms of the unholy alliance. In "Ireland Yesterday and Today," written five years ago by a member of The North American staff, it was declared that home rule was inevitable, and the prediction was made that this just measure would make Ireland one of the strongest factors in a united empire. The writer said:

By every test that can be applied, the present system of governing Ireland is a failure. It is complicated, costly, irresponsible, incrustured with prejudices and injustices, a detriment to the advancement of the country and its people. No less is it a disadvantage to Great Britain. Continuance of the system which breeds Irish hostility must be a far greater peril than the granting of autonomy would be. It is difficult to understand the theory that governing a people against their will makes them a source of strength, while giving them the form of government they desire would arouse enmity.

After all, is not home rule the best of unionisms? Is it not the most solid basis and the surest guarantee of Anglo-Irish union?

At the time this was written, three-fourths of Ireland was implacably hostile to the government; she had sent to the imperial parliament a man who had been convicted of sedition, and England was still smarting from the memory of Irish troops fighting with the Boers against the British flag. Yet within five years the prediction of unity has been verified in an extraordinary manner. In the gravest crisis of the empire's history it was the leader of the people that for a century had been in unarmed rebellion against the crown who uttered to parliament these stirring words:

Wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history has altered the view of the democracy of England toward the Irish question, and today I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn to England, with the utmost anxiety and sympathy, in every trial and every danger that may overtake her.

I say to the government that they may tomorrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coasts of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by their sons—and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the south will be only too glad to join with armed Protestant Ulstermen in the north.

John E. Redmond knew the people for whom he spoke; he knew their generous temper; he knew that the bitterness of past years was the product of misrule, and that beneath it lay a national character deep, patient and strong, which would respond instantly to the granting of justice. The incredible thing is that a purblind Toryism should so long have deceived itself with a belief that Irishmen were disloyal from a mere spirit of belligerency, that their aspirations for freedom could be crushed by an intolerant system of bureaucracy, and that self-government would alienate them from the empire. The pledge given by the Irish leader, whose skill and broad vision have lifted him to a commanding place among the empire's statesmen, has been made good by his countrymen. Regiments for foreign service are being recruited among both Ulstermen and Nationalists, and those German statesmen who counted upon an Irish rebellion as one of the first results of the war will find Irish troopers fighting shoulder to shoulder with the men of England, Scotland and Wales.

Already Great Britain has had cause to give devout thanks for the loyal assistance of distant dependencies; but to none of them will her debt be greater than to the people she so persistently wronged, yet whose valor and devotion are now at the service of the empire. And the significance of it all lies in the fact that this invaluable unity has been brought about by a simple act of justice, enforced by an enlightened democracy.

HOW GERMAN SCHOLARS HAVE WRONGED THE GERMAN PEOPLE

September 26, 1914.

A LITTLE tale of a dead soldier, that came from the battle front the other day, was perhaps more suggestive, got nearer to the heart of this dreadful business, than the most stirring accounts of heroism and sacrifice. He was a young German officer, a representative of the educated class. He lay on the torn ground, his dead eyes staring up to the sky as if in dumb questioning. When the searchers took from the broken body the identification records they found in a pocket a small diary, and on the stained pages read these entries, among others:

July 20. At last The Day—to have lived to see it! The world race is destined to be German.

August 2. We are at Ma'mselle Belgique's door. Will she open, or must we burst our way in?

August 5. Our losses before Liege have been frightful. Never mind, it's all allowed for. The fallen are only beginners; the spilling of blood will spread the war lust, a necessary factor.

On later pages were these quotations from books:

"Teutons are the super race of the world. They have done everything worth doing, and it is necessary for humanity that the Teuton race shall lead. It is endowed with the greatest power, and power is the one thing in life best worth possessing."

"Pity is opposed to the tonic passions which enhance energy and the feelings of life. Its action is depressing. A man loses power when he pities. On the whole, sympathy

thwarts the law of development, which is the law of selection. It preserves that which is ripe for death. It fights in favor of the useless and hinders progress of the useful."—Nietzsche.

Here is more than a pathetic incident; one can discern in this slain youth a type of that young Germany of idealism and culture, which with supreme courage and devotion is sacrificing itself in an effort to turn back the hands of time and link modern civilization with the paganism of forgotten centuries. On those pages, the more pitiful for the scorn of pity, where he had set down the thoughts of his brave, misguided heart, is written in brief the history of Germany's fall—a people fitted by nature and self-development to lead the world in peaceful civilization, plunging headlong in pursuit of the primitive ideal of tribal supremacy and a world empire founded upon force. He was just one of a hundred thousand loyal victims of a Prussianized philosophy, which has done more than any other one thing to create the terrible engine of German militarism and put behind it the ruthless power of a fanatical nationalism.

A popular conception is that the aggressive German world policy, which has at once terrified and infuriated Europe, is due to the spirit of autocracy and an indomitable pride of race; to believe that the nation has been driven upon its course by the genius of the kaiser and his masterful advisers. The truth is that the makers of modern Germany—those who not only have created her leadership in science and industry, but have inspired her overmastering ambition for world empire—are the historians, philosophers, scholars and publicists of her universities and her literature. It is the teachings of these leaders of thought that have fired the German imagination with the conviction of racial and cultural superiority; that have revived the prehistoric instincts of race hostility; that have launched the doctrine of a

Teutonic mission to dominate the world; that have made a whole people the devoted adherents of a medieval system; that have put behind a pagan philosophy the might of twentieth-century efficiency.

The kaiser, with his proclamations of divine authority, and the Bernhardis, with their cold-blooded plans for aggression and conquest—these are the intellectual heirs of the high priests of German philosophy, the professors of the imperial universities and other preachers of the Germanic crusade. All that monstrous deification of absolutism and force; all that scorn of democracy; all that anachronistic doctrine of a people chosen of God to rule the earth; all that brazen, trampling, merciless militarism which subordinates the laws of morality and of civilization to the purposes of national aggrandizement—these are the products of a philosophy which emanates from the cloisters of German scholarship.

This is not a unique phenomenon. From the dawn of history, despotism, militarism and conquest have ever found their subtlest and most powerful defenders among the representatives of learning. When education was restricted to the few, it was the clerkly scholars of the time who loaded the bookshelves with works upholding the divine right of kings, the sacredness of anointed authority and the justice of a system that enslaved the mass. When enlightenment slowly spread, they adapted their teachings to the age—condemned the aspirations of democracy, buttressed kingcraft with subtle casuistry and stamped with their authority the doctrine that the rights of property were superior to the rights of man. Even in this day of boasted advancement the remnants of the system are extant. This nation, devoted to democracy, finds some of its ablest teachers aligned as the defenders of plutocracy, the assailants of popular government and the upholders of special privilege. It is

true that in our universities are the most influential leaders of progressive thought, and that as a class our scholars do infinitely more good than harm. But the instincts of reaction are strong, and the most powerful exponents of undemocratic doctrines are men of learning whose skill and repute give force to their utterances.

But it is in Germany that the system is most clearly observed. Nowhere else in the world is scholarship so venerated; nowhere else is there such ready submission to the influence of teachers. The intellectual authority of the professor is as potent as the regal authority of the emperor. With a natural bent toward philosophic inquiry, the educated youth of Germany is swayed throughout his life by the teachings of the classroom and the writings of learned publicists. It is the professors who have molded German thought, who have instilled in the people a universal devotion to imperialism and have created the all-devouring spirit of German supremacy. Their ascendancy is as marked in affairs of state as in education and periodical literature. It is from her political economists, theologians, jurists, historians and philosophers that modern, material Germany derives her inspiration.

Now, what is the philosophy with which these leaders have imbued the whole German people? Its surface meanings are vividly made known to the world in the events of this war. It is the inspiration of the militarist cult; of the marvelously efficient army machine; of the cynical diplomacy that ceaselessly irritated Russia, infuriated France, aroused the undying enmity of Great Britain and awoke the suspicion even of America. From it was born the defiant support of Austria's inflammatory demands; the contempt for treaties as "scraps of paper" and for international pledges as "mere words"; the brutal violation of neutral territory; the invoking of

“military necessity” to justify the destruction of ancient monuments, the dropping of bombs upon sleeping non-combatants, the sacking of cities and the levying of tribute upon helpless civilians.

These astounding manifestations have not been accidental. They have arisen naturally from a belief in the destiny of Germany to be the commanding Power in Europe and the world. The immovable ambition of government and people is expressed in the terrific phrase which is the rallying cry for this war, “World power or downfall!” The tremendous development of the last forty years is, to the German mind, less important in itself than as a promise of wider domination. As German industry and commerce have irresistibly expanded, so must German civilization and culture and political influence be carried by force of arms to new triumphs. In support of these policies the basic principles of a materialistic philosophy have been invoked. These teach that in international affairs, as in nature, the law of the survival of the fittest is supreme, hence force is the ultimate test; that the importance of individual and national growth outweighs all so-called ethical and moral considerations whatever; that militarism and autocracy are the true weapons of a conquering civilization, and war the noblest means of national expression.

Does this outline seem like a fantastic invention? Rather it is a moderate statement of the truth. We have already quoted in these columns Professor Munsterberg’s eulogy of the imperialistic system of government and his scornful repudiation of democratic ideals; also his blunt avowal that “You hear nowhere in Germany more sneering at the peace and the armament movements than among the university professors.” Let us turn to even more eminent exponents of German thought. The ablest historian and one of the most influential scholars

of modern Germany was Heinrich von Treitschke, of the University of Berlin, who died in 1896. Magnetic, eloquent and profoundly learned, he left his impress deep upon the minds of his countrymen. His obsession was a contemptuous hatred for Great Britain—"the shameless representative of barbarism"—but the power of his name rests upon such utterances as these:

It will always redound to the glory of Machiavelli that he has freed the state and its morality from the moral precepts taught by the church, but especially because he has been the first to teach: "The State is Power."

Every state reserves to itself the right of judging as to the extent of its treaty obligations.

The institution of a permanent court of arbitration is incompatible with the very nature of the state, for a state can only by its own will set limits to itself. An authoritative tribunal of nations is impossible. To the end of history arms will give the final decision, and herein lies the sacredness of war.

War is not only a permanent factor in human life, but a noble factor. It is an expression of its vital force, of its will to power, its will to life. A nation's military efficiency is an exact index of its idealism.

Saturated with such doctrines as these, the Germans naturally exulted in that famous work by von Bernhardi, issued only three years ago, in which this apt student of von Treitschke wrote:

We must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. Extension of territory must be obtained, if necessary, as the result of a successful European war.

War promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than achievements of mechanics, industries, trades or commerce. The inevitableness, the idealism and the blessing of war must be repeatedly emphasized.

War is a biological necessity, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and, therefore, of all real civilization.

But the real hero of countless intellectual Germans is the author of that atrocious paragraph in the young soldier's notebook—Friedrich Nietzsche, the drug-inspired apostle of negation, whose genius glowed like the fitful light that hovers over corruption until it flickered out in the gusts of insanity. Admirably do the policies of absolutism and militarism fit in with the brutal philosophy of the creator of the superman, who should know no sin but weakness and no law but self. Hear him:

Life is essentially the appropriation, the injury, the vanquishing of the unadapted and weak. In itself, an act of injury, violation, exploitation or annihilation cannot be wrong, for life operates, essentially and fundamentally, by injuring, violating, exploiting and annihilating.

I preach not contentedness, but more power; not peace, but war; not virtue, but efficiency. The weak and defective must go to the wall. And we must help them to go.

A good and healthy aristocracy must acquiesce in the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, for its benefit, must be reduced to slaves and tools. The masses have no right to exist, on their own account, their sole excuse for living lies in their usefulness as a sort of scaffolding with which a more select race of beings may be elevated.

I condemn Christianity. It is to me the greatest of all imaginable corruptions. It has left nothing untouched by its depravity. It is the one great curse, the one immortal shame and blemish upon the human race.

You say that a good cause will hallow even war? I tell you that a good war hallows every cause. War and courage have done more great things than charity.

"The ideas of Nietzsche," says his best biographer, "are dominant in the German universities, and have colored the whole stream of German thought." And the corroboration lies before us, in the ashes of Louvain and the blood-soaked trenches of France. This has been the inspiring message of German scholarship to the German people. Making due allowance for British hostility, surely the characterization of Hall Caine is just:

The philosophers, historians, theologians and soldiers of Germany have together been preaching the doctrine of force as the supreme Divinity, on whose altars the gods of Christian faith are to be ruthlessly sacrificed. The sheer audacity of this modern paganism is perhaps the most astounding fact in modern history.

While Christianity for 2000 years has been preaching the supremacy of the individual soul, the new paganism of Germany has set out to destroy that supremacy and set up the absolutism of empire, the superior virtue of war. For forty years Germany has been inspired by a pagan ideal that is utterly opposed to the best interests of humanity, destructive of democracy and at war with Christianity—the ideal of a world empire built absolutely on force.

If the world seeks, then, to identify the evil genius of Germany, in what guise shall it be found? History will turn from the brilliant erratic figure of the kaiser; it will take little account of the circle of ambitious statesmen and ruthless militarists that surrounds the throne; rather it will accuse of betraying a great nation that company of scholars who have prostituted their genius to the task of resurrecting a malign philosophy that was outlawed nineteen hundred years ago.

MORE ON GERMAN EFFICIENCY

September 29, 1914.

WHEN the gray hosts of the kaiser made their astounding dash toward Paris the world was stunned by the demonstration of power. Resentment against an immoral policy and the repudiation of pledges could not obscure the wonder of the achievement. The marvel began with the mobilization. At the first war summons every activity in the empire was halted, then turned into the channels of military movement. Like the workings of a perfected irrigation system, the numberless streams of soldiers were collected and concentrated for the vast flood of men that poured across Belgium and into France, every unit trained, equipped and armed, every feature of the intricate plan worked out to the last detail. That unexampled drive on Paris was not a mere feat of war; it was a mathematical result of scientific preparedness. It was a supreme demonstration of governmental foresight, intelligence and energetic precision. But it was only one achievement of the system. Those who would grasp the full meaning of German efficiency and measure the full scope of German vision must examine other evidences. Great Britain's naval supremacy, for example, is a tremendous factor in the war, as shown in the security of her commerce and the sweeping of German merchantmen from the sea. But the world is just beginning to realize that German science has virtually paralyzed the offensive power of the mighty British fleet, and has laid

it open to such devastating attacks as the submarine exploit of last week. Hopelessly distanced in the building of warships, Germany has fashioned two defenses that baffle the might of the enemy's great squadrons.

One of these is the Kaiser Wilhelm canal, better known as the Kiel canal. Begun in 1887, it was completed in 1895—a protected, fortified waterway sixty miles long, giving safe passage for warships from the naval base of Wilhelmshaven, on the North sea, to the vast harbor of Kiel, on the Baltic. The open distance around Denmark is 530 miles. The canal is 213 feet wide at the top; since 1908 the bottom width has been increased from 72 to 144 feet, and the depth from 29 feet 6 inches to 36 feet, so as to accommodate the largest war craft. The Kiel canal is perhaps the greatest single piece of naval equipment in the world. It gives to Germany the command of two coasts and makes two fleets of her one. Great Britain might range her warships in a steel wall across the North sea, but the fighting craft of the kaiser could pass at will to the Baltic and back again. They can strike Russia, or assemble for a dash into the open, at their chosen time. How many dreadnoughts is this worth? By a noteworthy coincidence, this tremendous work was completed last June, only a few weeks before Germany declared war. With grim irony, the kaiser invited a British squadron to the dedication of the great "commercial" waterway; and there are now commanders on the perilous North sea patrol who politely assisted at that peaceful function, the ominous meaning of which they fully understood.

But Germany has planted the shaft of a still grimmer jest in the vitals of British sea power. Some thirty miles off shore from Wilhelmshaven a red speck of an island arises from the turbulent waters. This is Heligoland, ceded by Great Britain to Germany twenty-four

years ago, in return for Zanzibar. British statesmanship, headed by the Tory premier, the marquis of Salisbury, could hardly conceal its glee at having foisted upon the unsuspecting Germans a gale-swept patch of crumbling clay which scientists said must in a few years be overwhelmed in the sea.

But dogged German efficiency literally made a mountain out of the molehill. Heligoland today is the Gibraltar of the north—an impregnable fortress, a vast arsenal, a base for battleships, submarines, aeroplanes and Zeppelin cruisers. A patch of land only three miles in circumference, it is the most menacing feature of German sea power, for it actually has advanced the naval base 100 miles nearer the English coast. "This island," said the kaiser in 1890, "is destined to be a bulwark of my empire," and Britain laughed at his grandiloquence. A current gibe was that Germany had exchanged a pair of trousers for a button.

It seemed so. In the passing years the winter frosts and gales had eaten far into the islet's precipitous sides. The friable red clay was deeply cut with fissures; whole sections had collapsed and been swept away. But with incredible audacity the government set about rebuilding the structure which nature had condemned. In twenty years it spent \$25,000,000 on the work. The huge fissures and caverns were filled with ferro-concrete, and clear around the crumbling cliffs the military engineers built granite buttresses, 26 feet high and 16 feet thick, until the island was virtually incased in armor plate. During the same period \$7,500,000 was spent on fortifications. Massive casemates were built; disappearing Krupp guns were mounted on the hilltop; vast magazines, with connecting tunnels, were constructed, and Zeppelin sheds and wireless plant erected, until the despised islet, hardly a dot in the admiralty charts, lay

like a colossal anchored dreadnought in the path of an invader. Another \$7,500,000 was spent on harbor works, and the entire German fleet might lie safe under shelter of the guns ashore. Special provision has been made for torpedo craft, and there is little doubt that the three British cruisers destroyed the other day were lanced by submarines from Heligoland. In the judgment of naval experts, this tiny triangular hillock of clay, which lies pointing like a spearhead at the heart of England, has doubled the efficacy of the German fleet.

Just another example. In 1897 Germany wrested from China a "concession" on Kiao-chau bay, commanding a harbor and a "sphere of influence" over Shantung province, which has an area half as large again as Pennsylvania and a population of 35,000,000. That was only seventeen years ago. Today Germany has there a city of 60,000 inhabitants, as solidly and handsomely built as any community of like size in the empire. There are whole streets of shops, banks, hotels, office buildings and warehouses; whole districts of residences costing \$10,000 and upward; a technical school that is famous throughout the Orient; stone barracks to accommodate 4000 troops; an artificial harbor, with huge granite piers, fit to receive a commercial navy; a drydock that will float a dreadnought, and fortifications that will tax the military science and daring even of the relentless Japanese. The hills surrounding the bay, stripped bare hundreds of years ago, have been clothed with planted forests; scientific agriculture and fruit raising have been established; German railroads penetrate to the interior and connect with lines to Peking and St. Petersburg. German capital has opened vast coal fields and built furnaces and steel mills to develop the limitless deposits of ore.

Tsing-tau, the city created from barrenness in seventeen years, is now the fifth port in China. Perhaps

\$50,000,000 of German money has been sunk in this stupendous creation—just the total of one year's trade passing through the custom house! The significance of all this is frankly set forth in an official report of the German colonial office:

Why did Germany go to Tsing-tau? First, because we had to have control of a base where we could be master in our own house, dock our ships, lay in supplies of coal and provisions, and carry out naval and military maneuvers unhampered.

Tsing-tau was, therefore, laid out primarily as a naval base. It has fortifications of the most modern and formidable type; indeed, it is prepared to withstand a long siege by a large attacking force.

But there is still more striking evidence of the far-sightedness and pertinacity of the German world policy. In 1860 the Prussian government sent out an expedition, accompanied by the celebrated geographer, Freiherr von Richthofen, to explore China, Japan and Siam. After minute investigation, Von Richthofen reported that Kiao-chau was by far the most valuable harbor in China. Thirty-seven years later Germany was ready to extend her empire to the Far East—and Kiao-chau was the spot selected.

With such marvels of military efficiency before them as the Kiel warship canal, the Heligoland Gibraltar and the great naval base commanding the China sea, the peoples of the world need not wonder at the precision and driving force of the great German army machine. Incidentally, these tremendous preparations afford a curious commentary upon the plea that Germany never dreamed of world empire and is the victim of a war "forced" upon her unsuspecting, peaceably disposed government.

A FALSE AND DANGEROUS PLEA

October 3, 1914.

WE HAVE attentively read, we think, all of the official and unofficial presentations of Germany's case in this war, from the inspiring proclamations of the kaiser to the earnest letters to the newspapers by his admiring subjects in this country. We have studied the "white paper" containing the diplomatic correspondence; the speeches of the imperial chancellor; the statements of the ambassador to the United States; the resolutions of German-American organizations; the utterances of German publicists, poets and editors, and particularly the erudite essays of that populous and fluent body of writers, the German professors.

From each of these we have learned something; for the earnestness of all of them we entertain a profound respect. While unconvinced by their arguments—for we totally reject the political philosophy upon which they base their pleas—we recognize that they sincerely believe in the system which they uphold. There was issued a few days ago, however, a declaration in this behalf which we consider wholly deplorable. The statement addressed to the Federal Council of Churches in this country by "twenty-nine leading Protestant churches of Germany" is not only a discredit to those who put it forth, but an injury to the cause it aims to promote.

These churchmen are not satisfied to urge the justice of their nation's purpose as they see it; they are not

content to speak as loyal citizens of the empire and frankly to uphold its aggressive policies. They assume the right to stamp with the favor of the Almighty the political designs of autocracy and militarism and to justify brutal violations of international and moral law. Far worse than that, they endeavor to thrust into a conflict already indefensible the disgraceful factor of religious prejudice and passion. The communication avers that Germany made war "only under compulsion to repel a wanton attack," and says:

We recognize clearly that we have to defend our existence, our individuality, our culture and our honor. We stand fearless because of our trust in a holy and righteous God.

In a holy enthusiasm, not shrinking from battle and from death, and looking to God, we are all of one mind.
* * * Into the war which the czar has openly proclaimed as the decisive campaign against Teutonism and Protestantism, heathen Japan is now called.

Not for the sake of our people, whose sword is bright and keen, but for the sake of the unique world-task of the Christian people in the decisive hour of the world mission, we now address ourselves to the evangelical Christians abroad.

If the peoples among whom missions and brotherly love had begun to be a power lapse into savagery; if an incurable rent has been made in Teutonic Protestantism; if Christian Europe forfeits a notable portion of her position in the world, the guilt rests not on our people.

Much of this is mystifying, but it seems clear that the clerical spokesmen for Germany regard Austria's assault upon Servia, the rape of Luxemburg and Belgium and the invasion of France as measures necessary to defend their existence, their individuality, their culture and their honor from wanton attack. It is worth remarking, however, that not a single act of the German government or the general staff, from the time "a free hand" was given to Austria to the day when the desperate rush toward Paris was checked, bore the remotest

resemblance to self-defense. Each and every move, political, diplomatic and military, was a calculated act in a plan of aggression worked out to the last detail years ago and arrogantly published to the world in a hundred official and unofficial deliverances. These considerations we dismiss. What we hold to be a far graver misstep by these churchmen is their attempt to invoke the spirit of Christianity in support of a ruthless militarism and an imperialistic policy based upon force. Ministers of the Almighty and preachers of the gospel of the Prince of Peace, they presume to put God back of a political philosophy whose ablest and most influential exponents have declared:

When he is about to conclude a treaty with some foreign power, if a sovereign remembers that he is a Christian, he is lost.—Frederick the Great.

That any one should act in politics from a sentiment of justice, others may expect from us, but not we from them.—Prince Bismarck.

It will always redound to the glory of Machiavelli that he has placed the State upon a solid foundation, and that he has freed it and its morality from the moral precepts taught by the Church.—Professor von Treitschke.

Christianity is to me the greatest of all imaginable corruptions. It has left nothing untouched by its depravity. I call it the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, mean! I call it the one immortal shame and blemish upon the human race! You say that it has made the world better? I say that it has made it worse! You say that it is comforting and uplifting? I say that it is cruel and degrading!—Frederich Nietzsche.

It is a curious circumstance, too, that the clergymen obtained for the memorial the names of half a dozen noted German university professors, several of whom are world famous for their relentless assaults upon the very foundations of church dogma and doctrine. But the greatest offense of these zealots is that they would

degrade a war which is inspired by nothing worse than national rivalries and ambitions to the level of a religious crusade, than which there could be, in this age of enlightenment, no blacker crime against earth and heaven.

The suggestion is, of course, a brazen defiance of the facts. Do these champions of autocracy and militarism imagine that Americans can be misled by such an atrociously false plea as that this is a war upon "German Protestantism," or upon any other faith whatever? One-third of the people of Germany are Roman Catholics—do the twenty-nine Lutheran clergymen speak for them? But if we term Germany Protestant, what of her ally, Austria—the last fragment of the Holy Roman Empire, boasting the most Catholic court in Europe and a sovereign who is "eldest son of the Church"? Leading the allies is England, historically and actually the center of Protestantism, united with Calvinistic Scotland and Catholic as well as Protestant Ireland. With Great Britain stands Belgium, valiantly fighting not only Protestant Germany, but Catholic Austria, and Russia, under the sway of the Greek Church. Blind must be the judgment or desperate the need which can extort from this alignment a religious war. The great struggle is, indeed, a terrific blow at civilization; it has awakened hatreds and savage instincts which shame the human race; it has stained the record of an enlightened age with a causeless reversion to brute force. But one disgrace has been spared—the spectacle of men battling over forms of worship, the sacrifice of human lives on the altars of distorted religious zeal. The lamentable thing is that it has remained for a group of Christian leaders to add to the dreadful outburst the crowning infamy of an incitement to religious hostility and rancor. One result has been an equally objectionable utterance from an eminent Catholic, Monsignore Benson, of Lon-

don, who calls upon Catholics throughout the world to unite against Germany.

It may be, however, that we are going too far in condemning what seems to us a deplorable misuse of the sublime tenets of Christianity by its official representatives. For the drafters of the astonishing German appeal are more than ministers of the gospel. Each division in the German empire has its own state church. The kaiser, as king of Prussia, is *summus episcopus* of the church which these militant Christians serve. Fifty-six per cent of the pulpits are filled by imperial appointment; 34 per cent by the favor of municipalities or wealthy private patrons; only 10 per cent by the humble worshippers. The state makes an annual appropriation for the clerical salaries. The grip of the mailed fist of autocracy is as firm upon the church as upon the military establishment.

These advocates, therefore, who attempt to make this a religious war, may speak as clergymen, but actually they are imperial office holders. But that their uniform is a surplice instead of a scholastic gown or an epauletted tunic, they are as much representatives of the kaiser's government as the Von Treitschkes, who teach the poisonous philosophy of force in the universities, or the Von Klucks, who uphold it with howitzers, bayonets and airship bombs in the field.

This circumstance, we take it, detracts somewhat from the merit of the memorial, but it relieves the Christian Church of the stigma of fathering an appeal so revolting to the principles of liberty and the truest religious instincts of the race.

AN INJUSTICE TO THE GERMANS

October 6, 1914.

IT HAS been a noticeable habit of unfriendly critics of the German people in the past to describe them as lacking in certain virile qualities of moral fiber. Their failure as colonizers and their rapid absorption into the races with which they mingle as a minority have been referred to as an inherent defect, a soft pliability of character, which forbids domination and causes a ready compliance with whatever social and political order they find in existence. This alleged peculiarity, moreover, is cited as an explanation for their support of the medieval system of aristocratic feudalism under which they live; for their contented submission to the twin burdens of autocracy and militarism. It is declared that nothing short of these rigorous methods, which discourage initiative, crush out individualism and reduce the nation's life to the imperative guidance of set rules formulated by an irresponsible power, could have achieved the marvelous material growth which the empire has attained. Under free institutions, it is argued, the German people would long ago have fallen behind in the arduous struggle for existence; they would never have won their way to the first rank among the nations of the earth, nor sent German commerce upon its conquering world mission, nor made German power the terror of Europe. Even German Socialism, it is pointed out, is, in a sense, submissive to the monarchic idea, and is not a democratic movement as we understand the term.

This estimate is so uncomplimentary and so difficult to reconcile with German superiority in many lines of endeavor that its acceptance has been left to the critics who originated it. Americans have refused to adopt a judgment reflecting so severely upon a large number of their countrymen. Thus at the beginning of the war they regarded tolerantly the outburst of German-American enthusiasm. They recognized the call of the blood, and on this ground did not condemn support of what seemed to them an unrighteous cause. They deplored the catastrophe brought upon a great nation by an autocratic regime, and expressed their discrimination in the characteristically whimsical phrase, "We hope the kaiser will lose and that the German people will win." But, to their utter bewilderment, German-Americans and American Germans refused to accept this friendly and natural differentiation. With indignant pertinacity their spokesmen declared that this war was a war of the German people; that imperialism alone was responsible for their intellectual and material progress, and that no other force could have produced such effects from such material. So authoritative an interpreter of the German spirit as Prof. Hugo Munsterberg wrote:

Those men who have achieved the marvelous progress of German civilization have done it in the conviction that the military spirit is a splendid training for cultural efficiency. The university professors have always been the most enthusiastic defenders of the system. * * *

Germany is not understood by those who fancy that defeat would tear an abyss between the people and the emperor. There is no room in Germany for a president. The idea of a president is that he draws his power from the will of the millions of individuals. The idea of the emperor is that he is the symbol of the state as a whole, independent from the will of the individuals, and therefore independent of any elections. In the symbol of the crown, far above the struggles of partisan individuals, lies the idea of the German nation.

That the German ideal is found in autocracy and militarism, both antithetical to democracy, is not the declaration of scholars alone. Here are quotations from the published letters of other representative Germans in America:

The overwhelming majority of the Germans give their heartiest support to their far-seeing and wise monarch.

Modern Germany and all her great achievements is inseparable from the Germany of military discipline, and would never have come into existence without the support of a strong, steadfast and determined government. The "two Germanys" must stand or fall together, for the German people and their kaiser are one!

The German people are as inseparable from their kaiser as we in America are from our Constitution.

The whole German people are practically unanimous in the opinion that the monarchical form of government, with great authority and strongly centralized, is the best for them. Even the great Social Democratic party is organized upon this principle, and does not in the least resemble a Democratic party in the American sense of the word.

Such statements emanating from critics of alien blood and interest might be discounted as due to prejudice; put forth in all sincerity by thoughtful men who are proud of their German blood and filled with ardent faith in German tradition and achievement, they have a tremendous meaning. To understand their significance we must realize the irreconcilable differences between the German system and that which prevails in democratic countries. The institution of monarchy is not of itself a barrier against democracy. In Italy and Belgium, for example, it is largely subordinated to "the will of millions of individuals," for which Professor Munsterberg has such cultured scorn; while in Great Britain it lingers but as a beloved tradition among a free people whose destinies it in no way controls.

But monarchy in Germany, as the world knows, is the commanding force in the nation's life. It grips the levers of control of all the vast social and administrative and political machinery of the empire; and its will, exercised through an autocratic system of centralized authority, is rigorously applied to every activity of its subjects. The conception of the relative positions of state and people is totally foreign to that under the forms of democracy. Here the government is meant to be, and is made to be, subservient to the popular will; in Germany the will of the individual is deliberately subordinated to the will of an absolutistic state. There the whole nation is kept under discipline from the cradle to the grave and taught that unquestioning obedience to authority is its first duty; here the people dictate policies and legislation, and the government is their servant in administering them. Political initiative from individuals or parties in Germany is strongly discouraged. The government, an absolutism but thinly veiled by parliamentary forms, reserves to itself the power to lead, to regulate, to instruct, to supervise, to initiate. The people are trained not to rely upon themselves, not to formulate and enforce ideas representing the common needs and aspirations, but to look to their rulers for guidance, for enlightenment, for encouragement, for admonition and protection.

This does not mean that the German autocracy is not progressive. It has adapted itself with surpassing skill to the changing spirit of an enlightened age. In a more primitive time monarchy was easily maintained by the simple devices of invoking "divine right" and brute force. In modern Germany it has ingeniously fortified itself by boldly adopting some principles of the new economy while retaining the entire application of them. Nor can it be charged that this crushing system of paternalistic absolutism is wholly injurious. The colossal

strides of Germany toward supremacy in commerce, industry and world power are sufficient answer. But the issue is whether autocracy and militarism alone have produced these marvels of progress; whether the German people are physically, intellectually and temperamentally unfit to achieve their rightful place in the world except under an iron discipline that reduces them to minute cogs in a vast machine, blindly obedient to the force of a superior caste.

Lest we be accused of maligning a system which has produced such impressive results in national efficiency and progress, we shall quote an impartial, if not friendly, witness. Price Collier, most American of Americans, was educated in Germany and spent years in close intimacy with German life. His regard for German institutions was so high that he urged universal compulsory military service for this country. Yet in "Germany and the Germans," published this year, he offers these conclusions upon the whole system:

There is no such thing in Germany as democratic or representative government. * * * The orderliness of the Germans is all forced upon them from without, and is not due to their own knowledge of how to take care of themselves.

German state socialism is, in a nutshell, the decision on the part of the rulers that the individual is not competent to spend his own money, choose his own calling, use his own time as he will or provide for his own future or the various emergencies of life. By minute state control they are rapidly bringing the whole population to an enfeebled social and political condition, where they can do nothing for themselves.

* * * There are 3,000,000 officials, great and small, in Germany, and 14,000,000 electors, or, roughly, one policeman to every five adults. I have said that the population is well fed, well clothed and well looked after. Of course they are. No slave owner so maltreats his slaves that they cannot work for him. But is man fed by bread alone? * * * The electors, now so flattered by the smooth phrases of their tyrants disguised as liberators, will one day be aghast to find

themselves in a veritable house of correction paid for from their own savings.

The very barrenness of the soil, the ring of enemies, the soft moral and social texture of the population, have, so their little knot of rulers think, made necessary these harsh, artificial forcing methods. The outstanding proof of the artificiality of this civilization is its powerlessness to propagate. Germans transplanted from their hothouse civilization to other countries cease to be Germans; and nowhere in the world outside Germany is German civilization imitated, liked or adopted. Autocracy, bureaucracy and militarism are triplets of straw, not destined to live. They are precocious children, teaching the pallid religion of dependence upon the state and enforcing the anarchical morality of man's despair of himself.

Germany has organized herself into an organization, and is the most overgoverned country in the world. Life is to live, not to think, after all. This is where the metaphysician invariably fails when he mistakes thinking for living, when he mistakes organization, which can never be more than a mold for life, for life itself. Germany has shown us that the short cut to the government of a people by suppression and strangulation results in a dreary development of mediocrity. She has proved again that the only safety for either an individual or a nation is to be loved and respected; and in these days no one respects slavery or loves threats.

Such is the true meaning of the system which has produced the modern Germany of machine-like efficiency, of a governmental philosophy founded upon force, of universal submission to undemocratic ideals. It is a picture to sadden all admirers of the race which has wrought such benefits to mankind. Yet this is the system which patriotic Germans in America insist is necessary. The fruits of German energy and genius, they say, are due not to racial capacity, but to the crushing out of individualism and the surrender of national liberty to the purpose of creating a glorified State. In plain terms, they declare the astonishing theory that the German people are incapable of progress under democratic insti-

tutions, but have become great in the mass only because they have subordinated the nation's will to an intelligent officialdom and ordered their lives to the commands of a militaristic discipline.

If this were true, how hollow a thing would be that Germanic civilization which dreams of dominating the world. But we know that it is not true. We know from the physical, intellectual and moral vigor of the Germans in this country, from their virile and independent spirit, that the German people are fitted to take a commanding place among the liberty-loving, self-governing nations of the earth. For half a century they have been dazzled by the glittering successes of a false philosophy, have been misled by their rulers' skillful perversion of democratic principles to the uses of autocracy.

But if this war does nothing else, it should bring them to realize that today mankind chooses to live under a government of citizenship, not of soldiery; under the rule of law, not of fear; that the commercial and political power of a nation which rests on absolutism and force rather than on the endeavors of a free and self-reliant people, is purchased at too great a cost, and that, moreover, it cannot, with any number of bayonets and howitzers, maintain itself in this age of the world.

JAPAN MOVES AGAIN

October 8, 1914.

IT IS curious, and somewhat depressing, to recall the hopeful predictions of wise statesmen, at the beginning of the war, that the conflict would be "localized" between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Within a week of the expiration of the Austrian ultimatum Germany, Russia, Montenegro, Belgium, France and Great Britain were engaged; a fortnight later Japan had joined, while Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria and Portugal were on the brink of hostilities; fighting was on in China, in East, South and West Africa and the islands of the Pacific, while from Canada, India, Egypt, Morocco and the very Antipodes armed forces were hastening to the fray. Deeply deploring this widening of the circle of strife, the people of the United States were most nearly concerned by the inclusion of Japan. And within the last twenty-four hours the American nation has had disturbing evidence that its distrust of this needless, mischievous and possibly ominous complication has been well founded. In defiance of the strongest pledges given by both London and Tokio, Great Britain's Oriental ally has carried the war three thousand miles beyond the sphere to which she promised to confine her operations.

"For military purposes" Japan has landed an armed force and seized Jaluit, the seat of government in the Marshall archipelago, which has been a German possession since 1886. These islands lie midway in the direct route between American Hawaii and the American Phil-

ippines. It is reported further that she has also occupied one of the Caroline group, and that by agreement with the British, Japan is to occupy all the German naval stations in the Pacific. When Japan, on August 16, sent to Germany an ultimatum as arrogant and as impossible of acceptance as that sent by Austria to Servia, the neutral nations of the world were shocked and incensed. The move, which was in essence a deliberate declaration of war, since it designedly forbade a peaceful arrangement with Germany, was recognized as a purposeful intrusion of Oriental power into affairs which properly concerned only Europe. Japan's apparent aggression created grave concern, particularly in this country, which has a direct interest in the Pacific and in the integrity of China.

Apprehension was not greatly allayed, and the feeling of unpleasant surprise was measurably increased, by Great Britain's announcement that she had instigated her ally to attack Germany's colony of Kiao-chau in China. Great Britain needed no help in the Far East, where the combined Anglo-French force was adequate for any necessary operations; she was inciting a violation of neutrality as vital to world order as that of stricken Belgium; she gave justification for the German contention that Germany is fighting for western civilization against Asiatic aggression; she set the dangerous precedent of using an Oriental power to strike at a European foe and of giving Japanese influence a foothold in western affairs; and she extended the area of the war, which she was bound in honor and decency and humanity to limit.

On these grounds alone, American opinion was inclined to condemn the move; and that the sense of uneasiness was not ill-founded has been shown by the deliberate manner in which Japan has flouted Chinese protests, violated the principles of Chinese integrity and

overrun at will Chinese neutral territory. Only four days ago the government of China registered a new complaint that the Japanese operations against the German station of Tsing-tau had extended far beyond the prescribed and necessary limits, and that Japanese forces had seized a Chinese railroad.

But from the beginning a more serious possibility than an invasion of Chinese rights has loomed behind the situation as it affects the United States. This was the possibility that Japan might decide to begin action against Germany's insular possessions in the Pacific, which lie across the path of communication between this country and the Philippines. The question was raised by public opinion instantly upon the publication of Japan's ultimatum to Germany. That warlike pronouncement specified Kiao-chau as the sole objective of Japanese arms, and averred that the Mikado's government was interested only in "securing a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia"; nevertheless a more definite statement of policy was desired. Great Britain hastened to reassure the American people. On August 18 was published an inspired statement containing these paragraphs:

The ultimatum and its consequences are in accordance with and limited by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which expressly sets forth as one of its objects the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of China.

* * * The Japanese government has given an assurance that it does not intend to operate in the waters of the Pacific except so far as it may be compelled to do so for the protection of shipping, and meditates no hostile move against any of Germany's far eastern possessions apart from Kiao-chau.

* * * In other words, the Japanese government has pledged itself to its ally not to proceed against Samoa, the Marianne islands, the Bismarck archipelago or any other of Germany's insular holdings in the Pacific.

On the same day the British embassy handed to the department of state in Washington a copy of the official

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British announcement that Japanese operations would be confined to the China mainland and the China sea. And following that, Premier Okuma announced:

Japan's warlike operations will not extend beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of the object of the defense of her own legitimate interests. The government will take no such action as could give a third party (the United States) any cause for anxiety or uneasiness regarding the safety of their territories or possessions.

Further, the Japanese premier cabled to the New York Independent an emphatic message of friendship for this country, in which he said:

It is my desire to convince your people of the sincerity of my government and my people in all their utterances and assurances. As premier of Japan, I have stated, and I now again state, to the people of America and the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they may now possess.

On August 27 Ambassador Chinda stated:

I take this occasion to deny categorically that I have ever stated, or even hinted, that Japan might be found extending her activity outside the zone of German hostilities in the China sea.

It is in the light of these assurances and protestations that Americans read the official announcement that Japan has seized German possessions in mid-Pacific, three thousand miles from the specified area of hostilities. The political possibilities may be inferred from the geographical position of the captured territory. Should Japan proceed to the logical limit of the policy now begun, there would be an alternation of American and Japanese holdings athwart the Pacific—first Hawaii, then the Marshall islands; then Guam, with the Ladrões nearby; then the Carolines between Guam and the Philippines.

No reader of this newspaper needs to be assured that it hates and despises jingoism; nor do we in the remotest degree reject the repeated protestations by Japan that she has no designs to encroach upon American rights. We pay slight regard to such incendiary utterances as that of Representative Mann last week, in which he declared war with Japan to be a certainty of the future. But we do hold that Americans should face the facts and conditions as they are. Japan gave an explicit pledge to guard the integrity and neutrality of China, yet she has invaded Chinese territory; she repeatedly declared that her operations would be confined to the mainland and the China sea, and now her forces are at work 2400 miles east of the Philippines. The Japanese government gives assurance that the seizure has been made "for military purposes, and not for permanent occupation." We cannot challenge the statement; but it recalls in a suggestive manner Germany's justification of "military necessity" for the assault upon Belgium, the incorporation of which in the empire is now an admitted part of the program. Not for nothing, apparently, do the Japanese term themselves proudly "the Prussians of the east." On August 22 we said:

Because of her lofty pretensions and the power derived from her unimpeachable attitude in the war hitherto, it rested with Great Britain to keep the strife at least within the bounds of Europe. Her partnership with Japan may serve her immediate purposes, but she is likely to find her needless call for its fulfillment the costliest move she ever made. For she has strengthened the case of her great antagonist, while forfeiting much of the good opinion she has justly earned. And she has let loose upon Europe and America influences which may embarrass them for generations to come.

We see no reason for greater apprehension now. Nor, on the other hand, do we see any reason to modify the judgment then expressed.

THE WAR OF ADVOCATES

October 14, 1914.

THIS has been aptly termed "the silent war." Through the thick curtain of secrecy only faint echoes of crashing events reach the ears of men. Never was the modern world so shut out from view of vital forces that are making history and changing the destinies of generations yet unborn. Historic battles have been outdone in size a score of times, and the operations have been reported in a dozen lines. "A violent attack by the enemy was repulsed," tells of an engagement greater in extent than Waterloo; "some ground was gained, though with a considerable number of casualties," records a bloodier conflict than Gettysburg. But the war which sets this new record in secrecy in another phase has been marked by unheard-of publicity.

More significant than all the moves of military science has been this world-wide campaign of advocacy, of education and enlightenment. For behind the tremendous activities on sea and land there is a force greater than the power of fleets and armies. In the end it will be the judgment of mankind, the public opinion of the world, that will render the verdict and deliver the decrees. From the very beginning of the war the various governments used their utmost endeavors to justify their acts; each one has presented its case through formal utterances, fortified with records. But these methods are not unusual. The new feature is the campaign of unofficial controversy.

Never were such sustained efforts made to gain advantage in the court of human judgment. "A decent respect for the opinions of mankind" has in this war developed into a campaign of earnest advocacy. The ablest writers of the age are lending their talents to the cause each thinks is just. The records of history and diplomacy and literature are being ransacked for facts, arguments and analogies and national policies are defended in words that burn with fervent conviction. France has such noted champions as Henri Bergson and Gabriel Hanotaux. Belgium's sufferings are exalted into a holy martyrdom by the genius of Maeterlinck. Guglielmo Ferrero's gift for historical analysis is used to justify Italy's repudiation of the Triple Alliance. Doctor Pupin, of Columbia University, answers those who assail "Slavic barbarism." Austria, Serbia and even Turkey have their eloquent spokesmen.

But the two great antagonists, Great Britain and Germany, lead in these forces, just as they dominate the tremendous drama of the field. Indeed, the literary campaign, though bloodless, has engagements as spirited as those of the Marne and the North sea. If one country leads in mass, the other excels in mobility and the science of controversial warfare; so that the struggle is fairly equal. The Britons won the first advantage in selecting the battleground. The masterly diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey and the Liberal government pinned the German cause once for all to militarism and international honor, and branded the violator of Belgium as a nation forsworn. With far-seeing skill the British writers have intrenched themselves behind these issues, whence all the onslaughts of Germany's champions have been unable to dislodge them.

But the German habit of close reasoning and the German trait of pertinacity—to say nothing of a fervid

patriotism—have given penetrating force to the German assaults, particularly by the flank. Never have the blunders, inconsistencies and crimes of a nation's history been more mercilessly revealed than have those of Great Britain during the last two months. German historians, scholars and statesmen have dragged to light every skeleton in her historical closet and rattled its bones before the world. By impressive citations and thundering arguments they demonstrate to their own satisfaction that British regard for international obligations is the shallowest hypocrisy, British patriotism blind arrogance, and the highest British motive a greed for power. The most formidable effort in this direction was a statement that filled three newspaper pages, signed by twoscore leaders in German industry, science and statesmanship. Professor Francke, of Harvard, has ably presented the plea that Germany was peaceful, England malignantly jealous and France insanely revengeful. Professor Munsterberg has produced a whole volume, in which he not only absolves Germany of all blame for the war and pictures her as defending the world against Asiatic barbarism, but frankly and forcibly upholds German imperialism as against democratic institutions.

With these exceptions, Germany has not been well served by her scholars. The strongest advocate she has had is Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, formerly minister of colonial affairs, who has upheld her cause with patience, learning and force.

Great Britain's case has had two joint presentations of note, one by the Oxford faculty of history, the other by an extraordinary group of writers, many of whom had been crusaders in behalf of peace and an Anglo-German union. The list includes such noted names as J. M. Barrie, Arnold Bennett, Hall Caine, G. K. Chesterton, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Sir Rider Haggard, Thomas

Hardy, Maurice Hewlett, Rudyard Kipling, Sir Gilbert Parker, H. G. Wells and Israel Zangwill. Their utterance was exceptionally effective, because it was exceptionally brief, lucid and moderate in tone. As individuals also these writers have done valiant service. Kipling's poem, "For All We Have and Are," rang around the world. Caine has presented a ruthless analysis of the Nietzschean and Bernhardian philosophies and their evil influence. Doyle has used his slashing style to discredit Prussian ambition. Chesterton has contributed some deadly epigrammatic attacks—for instance, this characterization of the German proposal as to Belgium:

Simplified, it certainly came to this: Germany came to England and said, "If you will break your promise, in the hope of helping me to break my promise, I will reward you with another of my celebrated promises." Or, "I am going to lie. If you lie, too, we can both be trusted to tell the truth." This, of course, is what we call the scrap-of-paper argument.

Another effective bit of sharpshooting was this:

What Germany has insulted in us is not the guttersnipe glory of Mafeking night, but all that remains of that mercantile probity which can alone save a nation of shopkeepers from becoming a nation of shoplifters.

But the most active of the British literary champions, and the most effective, after Viscount Bryce, has been Wells, Socialist and peace advocate, who in a mass of aggressive writing has given to the world the really big thought that this is a war against war:

The real task of mankind is to get better sense into the heads of humanity, and to end not simply a war, but the idea of war. We fight not to destroy a nation, but a nest of evil ideas.

We cannot begin to give an adequate idea of the ability displayed on both sides of the controversy. A studious review, however, suggests three conclusions.

First, there is just as much sincerity and deep, faithful conviction in one party as in the other. Second, the Germans are fatally handicapped in an appeal to this country by the fact that they uphold a political philosophy and system which are irreconcilably antagonistic to American principles and institutions, and, likewise, by the fact that the rape of Belgium was utterly indefensible. Third, the war has already given an astounding impetus to the world-wide democratic movement. In the writings of all the anti-German advocates there is one common thought—that Britain is fighting for democracy against imperialism and militarism. It is of itself a promising thing that the representatives of an imperialistic nation should thus find themselves championing democratic ideals.

This has been a war of new methods and new weapons. The trackless wastes of the air and the hidden depths of the sea have been conquered by man for the uses of destruction. The wireless annihilates space and time; secret explosives open craters in the earth where men have stood; huge guns make fortresses of stone and steel as worthless for defense as the wooden stockades of bushmen. But there is an engine of war more subtle and more powerful than these. It needed the most colossal conflict in history to prove that the pen is, in very truth, mightier than the sword. For the pen will yet undo the plans of empires and paralyze the might of armies. When the thunder of cannon has died away; when the smoke has lifted from ruined cities and devastated fields; when the shattered fleets lie silent and the graves of the dead are melting into the scarred earth, the work of the pen will still remain; and not guns, but the thoughts of men, will dictate the future of an enlightened world.

SHOULD WE ADOPT MILITARISM?

October 15, 1914.

IN A RECENT issue, the Army and Navy Journal offers this curious editorial instruction and advice to the people of the United States:

By German militarism, we take it, is meant a plant of a peculiarly baleful influence upon civilization, a plant that grows only on German soil, and unless exterminated, threatens to blight the whole world. It is gratifying in a measure to have the term "militarism" against which the present wrath is directed qualified with the word "German," for too long before has it been applied to any attempt to give a country proper military defenses. But the present war has resulted in a differentiation. There is militarism and militarism. The special brand which needs the immediate application of an extinguisher is the German brand. The inference is not unwarranted, therefore, that those who hope to purify the world by getting rid of German militarism see in it elements which the military establishments of other big continental nations do not possess.

We have kept a fairly close watch of the development of the military systems of Europe in the last fifty years, and we confess to an utter inability to find anything in "German militarism" which differs radically from the military establishments of other countries. The two fundamentals of present day "German militarism" are universal compulsory military service for all citizens of the German Empire and complete readiness. But compulsory military service is not confined to Germany. It obtains in France, Austria, Italy and Russia. Of the large European powers Great Britain alone has no compulsory service law. It is not, then, in compulsory service that "German militarism" differs from the other "militarisms" of Europe. It may be said that Germany's

military establishment exacts more of the country in the way of annual drafts from the ranks of its young men than any other of the nations of the continent, but study of the military strength of Germany and France discloses the fact that with a population nearly 25,000,000 less the actual war strength of the two countries is practically the same. The point is firmly established that "German militarism" does not demand extraordinary sacrifices from the people of the empire, that the sacrifices are greater in France.

Two things have now been cleared up: (1) That Germany is not peculiar in having compulsory service; (2) that her military system does not draw upon her resources as heavily in proportion to population as other systems draw upon her neighbors. There is left, then, only the last supposition, namely, that "German militarism" is condemnable because of its extreme readiness. As General McCoskry Butt wrote from Europe the other day, Germany was ready, the other countries were not. But this is a feature of her military system for which Germany should be praised, not blamed, for what is any army worth if it is not ready when the call comes? The more nearly ready it is, the more nearly it approaches those standards of value and efficiency for which all great commanders have striven through all the ages. Instead, therefore, of "German militarism" being something that should be "wiped out," it is something that should be imitated closely by other nations, not excepting our own United States.

Whether the country is indebted for this gratuitous advice to the callow enthusiasm of some untried warrior or to the pompous ignorance of some superannuated arm-chair strategist we do not know or greatly care. But we intended that the preposterous and dangerous assertion, put forth with the authority of a semiofficial publication, shall not go unchallenged. The truth is that the world does very clearly see in the "special brand" of militarism which now afflicts it a burden, a menace and an intolerable nuisance; and if the Army and Navy Journal cannot see anything in the system to condemn, it is time that that periodical was repudiated by the brave, loyal and

intelligent men of our land and sea forces, whom it assumes to represent. If militarism meant nothing more than universal military training and national readiness for self-defense, no sane person would denounce it for the hideous and barbarous anachronism which it is.

We would be the last to deny that militarism at its very worst has its admirable features. It unquestionably tends to the steady growth of national discipline, to the upbuilding of a people physically sound and, in a sense, morally vigorous. It instills the spirit of an alert patriotism and a compelling unity of national purpose. It makes for efficiency, not only in military service, but in the productive activities of life. And it guarantees that no peril shall so swiftly come upon the nation that it will not be met by a tremendous force of trained, powerful defenders.

If militarism meant only these things, where is the patriot so misguided as to fear or condemn it? But the submissive devotion of a strong people to the system, as we now know, has consequences of evil so far-reaching and destructive that they utterly submerge all real or possible advantages.

Consider the effects which militarism has economically. It takes some of the best years out of the life of every able-bodied man, removing him from productive enterprise. It puts upon the nation—upon all nations with converging interests—the weight of vast armaments and crushing burdens of taxation. Figuratively, it places a soldier upon the back of every worker. Its logical end has been vividly pictured as a world of “bankruptcy armed to the teeth.” Moreover, inevitably it is a force directed by absolutism or by a military oligarchy, and it is at the summons of an irresponsible power that all the productive energies of a nation are perverted to the uses of destruction.

Morally, militarism is a blight upon the highest ideals of the human heart and the noblest aspirations of the human soul. The pretense that its aim is concord and the guardianship of peaceful progress is the sheerest hypocrisy. Its fundamental doctrine, on the contrary, is that war is the most glorious activity of men and nations and peace an ignoble surrender. It teaches that might makes right; that the only true test of national greatness is brute force; that the mailed fist is the emblem of a triumphant civilization. It overshadows pacific traditions and humanizing policies with the dazzling ideal of conquest. It holds that the strong alone have the right to exist, and that the weak must be thrust aside in the interests of evolution toward more vigorous types. Such abstract virtues as sympathy and generosity and justice it derides as symptoms of weakness, to be humored in times of peace, but to be stamped out ruthlessly in the test of war. It prostitutes even the religious instinct of man to the service of slaughter, and worships a God who directs the flight of death-dealing explosives against selected enemies. It teaches a degrading philosophy, thus outlined by its ablest and most eloquent apostle:

War is in itself a good thing; it is a biological necessity. The inevitableness, the idealism, the blessing of war as an indispensable and stimulating law of development must be repeatedly emphasized.

War is the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. * * * Efforts directed toward the abolition of war are not only foolish, but absolutely immoral. * * * Courts of arbitration are pernicious delusions. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on natural laws of development.

Despite its incidental benefits, in its national effects militarism has an influence overwhelmingly vicious. It inculcates the atrocious theory of a suprenation, the in-

tolerable doctrine that some particular people or race, by reason of superior force, has the right to impose its institutions or its civilization upon other nations or upon the world. It preaches an unceasing crusade of race supremacy, which inevitably implies racial contempt and hostility. It foments a restless spirit of aggression and an attitude of truculent superiority. It exalts the soldier as the highest type of humanity. It inspires even educators, teachers of the young, molders of the minds of the next generation, to sneer at peace and glorify force. It creates a military aristocracy—a swaggering bigoted caste of uniformed cads who cannot walk the streets without shouldering civilians into the gutter in testimony of their social eminence, and whose leaders inevitably become the dominating power in the government.

Finally, it crushes initiative, subverts liberty and reduces a people to be the slaves of a barrack-rule despotism. It means Bonapartism plus twentieth century science and a perverted modernism. It exhausts the resources of ingenuity to make a nation read, think, write, talk, dream and act war; and then, when the war it has worked for comes, it whimpers that a malignant world is persecuting the only champions of peace.

Internationally, militarism inspires a hectoring diplomacy in behalf of a policy of "blood and iron." Spurning such weaknesses as international friendships, it proclaims long in advance its designs of conquest, and maintains hordes of spies in peaceful countries. Perpetually keeping the world in an atmosphere of uncertainty and apprehension, it boasts of its moderation in not always using its power, while its spokesmen continually preach the degeneracy and worthlessness of all other nations. It holds that big, powerful nations alone have the right to live—that the survival of the fittest demands the extinction of small, independent nationali-

ties. It mocks at neutrality, puts "military necessity" above international law, and scorns solemn treaties as "scraps of paper," making its international policy that of a fraudulent bankrupt. Where the obligations of honor and the rights of others obstruct its path, it "hacks its way through."

In peace a world-wide irritation and offense, in war militarism becomes a livid horror. It justifies, in the cause of racial aggrandizement, the overrunning of neutral territory; the levying of crushing tribute upon conquered cities; the seizing of civilian hostages and their execution for the revolt of others against brutal invasion; the flinging of bombs upon the homes of sleeping noncombatants; the destruction of cathedrals and monuments of art and antiquity; the annihilation of unfortified cities as a penalty for civilian resistance.

But the root of the deathless antagonism between this system and the American spirit lies in the fact that militarism is the inveterate enemy of democracy. Its worst influence is political. It makes the army the master, instead of the servant, of the nation. Inevitably it produces in a government a "military party," which plots and maneuvers until it gains political ascendancy upon the foundation of a distorted spirit of nationalism. Such an organization has been described within the last month by Guglielmo Ferrero, the eminent historian:

For the last ten years the party longing for war grew and flourished. It was called the "military party," but it was not composed solely of officers. Many of the highest civil officials belonged to it, together with political personages of conservative parties, great land-owning nobles, university professors and journalists, intoxicated by memories of a successful war and by knowledge of the country's overwhelming strength.

For years this party had been preaching the necessity for another war, so that the nation might become a world

power. It covered the country with societies whose object was to fan the flame of patriotism and incite the younger generation by means of the press, the schools and the universities.

It penetrated everywhere, into parliament, the government, the court. In the end the resistance opposed against this formidable movement by the ruler and the government gave way like a dike before the irresistible inrush of a flood. The war party triumphed, and Europe burst into flames.

This is the logical result of militarism. It hates democracy as it hates peace—nay, it cannot exist in a democracy, for its very life-blood is the domination of a caste which rules alike government and people. Militarism is the handmaiden of despotism. Between it and a self-governing, self-reliant, self-respecting democracy there is irreconcilable antipathy. One or the other must disappear from this world.

The Army and Navy Journal would be well advised to reconsider its airy assumption that this militarism "is something that should be imitated closely by other nations, not excepting our own United States." The sentiment is not only profoundly foolish, but it is well-nigh treasonable to American institutions. The organ which assumes to speak for the American forces is grievously in error. The people of the United States are not so mean-spirited as to condemn militarism because it demands patriotic sacrifices, nor so thick-witted as to oppose readiness for defense. They detest and abhor militarism because its good effects are overwhelmingly outweighed by its evils; because it is a barbarous survival of medievalism; because it perverts patriotism and destroys the sense of national honor; because it exalts brute force as the governing power of the world; because it is the last prop of absolutism and the most dangerous foe of democracy, of liberty and of civilization.

THE TRAGEDY OF BELGIUM

October 26, 1914.

THE government of Germany has announced that "the occupation of Belgium is now virtually complete"; and the people of the empire are celebrating the achievement with pride and exultation. Thus is closed one of the bloodiest chapters in the war—and one of the darkest chapters in the records of international dishonor. No matter what horrors may await the world in the unfolding of the dreadful conflict, none can exceed in poignant tragedy the fate of this devoted people. From the time of Caesar the bravery and the dauntless independence of the Belgians have been celebrated by historians and sung by poets. And now these high qualities have inspired a supreme demonstration of heroism and sacrifice which makes all humanity the debtor of the martyred nation.

The pitiful thing is that Belgium alone, of all the countries involved in the war, was guiltless. Stricken and wounded unto death, her honor shines unsullied by base ambition or false pretense. She simply stood for the sanctity of law and human rights, asking nothing but the fulfillment of a guaranteed security. Yet by the savage irony of fate it is her territory that is devastated, her innocent people that are slaughtered and flung homeless into highways of the world, her national existence that is trampled into the bloody earth. One of the paradoxes in human nature recognized by psychologists is the inclination of men to hate most bitterly those whom

they have injured. It would almost seem that Germany reserved the severest rigors of her iron purpose for the nation she wronged.

The history of the case is so familiar that a very brief outline will suffice to reveal the monumental injustice. On April 19, 1839, Belgium and Holland signed a treaty which provided, "Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual neutrality." On the same day Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria and Russia solemnly constituted themselves guarantors of that treaty. This established for all time the principle that Belgium's territory was neutral, to be held safe from invasion or from use for military purposes by any Power. But while Belgium received the advantage of this protection, the treaty laid upon her a reciprocal obligation. She was forbidden, in case of war, to take the part of any of the belligerents. They agreed to respect her neutrality; but, on the other hand, she agreed to maintain it. This duty Belgium has fulfilled with scrupulous fidelity for three-quarters of a century. So high was her sense of honor that in the Franco-Prussian war she restricted the clear legal rights of her people by forbidding them to supply arms and ammunition to the French, thus construing the treaty to her own disadvantage. It was in this same war that the sanctity of the agreement was buttressed by no less a ratification than that of Bismarck. That ruthless soldier and statesman wrote to the Belgian minister in Berlin on July 22, 1870:

In confirmation of my verbal assurances, I have the honor to give in writing a declaration which, in view of the treaties in force, is quite superfluous, that the Confederation of the North and its allies will respect the neutrality of Belgium, on the understanding, of course, that it is respected by the other belligerent.

This was the record upon which Belgium stood when the troops of the kaiser crossed her frontiers on August

2 last. The German government, having already violated the territory of Luxemburg, demanded passage for its forces through the country whose integrity it was sworn to honor and protect. With unblushing effrontery it called this demand a request for "friendly neutrality," and declared that in case of opposition Germany would "consider Belgium as an enemy." There was here a double crime. Germany not only forswore her own covenant, but undertook to penalize Belgium for observing that country's solemn obligation; for, of course, consent by Belgium to the free passage of the kaiser's forces would have been a repudiation of the treaty by Belgium and tantamount to an act of war against France. Apologists for the invasion have attempted to set up two defenses. The first is that France was preparing to violate the treaty, and that Germany simply forestalled her. Fortunately, there are records which utterly disprove this pretense. After Germany's ultimatum, France offered the services of five army corps to Belgium to defend her neutrality. The answer was:

We are sincerely grateful to the French government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The Belgian government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.

Belgium preferred to make her first appeal to Germany's sense of honor, and, when that failed, to the heroic resistance of a wronged people. And France was so ill prepared for the invasion which Germany says she plotted that ten days elapsed before she had her forces in the neutral territory.

The second excuse offered in ex post facto palliation of the offense is that in the Belgian archives Germany has found dispatches showing that in 1906 the British military attache and the Belgian general staff discussed

tentatively plans for landing a British force to defend Belgian neutrality if it were attacked. It shows the desperate nature of the German case when this incident is cited to justify a brutal invasion. The arrangement for giving help to Belgium if needed was discussed at the time Germany had thrust herself to the verge of war with France over Morocco; and the proposal of Great Britain to defend the neutrality of Belgium, as she was bound to do, was as creditable as Germany's violation of that neutrality was dishonorable. All the eloquence and sophistries of the professors, poets and psychologists advocating the German cause cannot remove the black stain of this deed. Indeed, all defenses fall before that terrible confession of the imperial chancellor to the reichstag and the exclamatory approval from the members which greeted it:

Necessity recognizes no law. (Very true!) Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have also found it necessary to enter Belgian territory. (Hearty applause.) This is contrary to international law. We knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. (Hear, hear!) France could wait; we, however, could not.

So we are forced to disregard the protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. We shall try to make good the injustice we have committed as soon as our military goal has been reached. (Applause.) Those who, like us, are fighting for the highest ideals, must only consider how victory can be gained. (Enthusiastic applause in entire house.)

It was on the following day that the chancellor revealed still more clearly the ruthless philosophy behind German policy, when he derided the treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality as "a scrap of paper." The reichstag generously applauded the promise that Germany would make amends. What a ghastly mockery is this let the spectacle of the prostrate nation declare.

Though Germany recalled her armies and restored the stolen charter of independence; though she gave all

her vast wealth and skill to the work of reparation, could she raise peaceful homes where the earth is blistered with consuming fire, or rebuild shattered monuments of art? Could she replace the priceless relics of antiquity buried in the ashes of Louvain, or restore the happiness of families hunted into impoverishment or exile? Could she put the breath of life into women and children mangled by midnight bombs, or call from their graves ten thousand slain defenders of their nation's existence?

"Belgium is conquered!" is the exulting cry in Berlin. So was England conquered by the Norman, Holland by Alva, Germany and Italy by Napoleon—yet from the ashes of conquest arose nations, new born, whose genius has blessed mankind. The greatness of peoples, as of men, is not of the body, but of the soul; and the soul of Belgium all the legions of imperial Germany cannot kill. But, dead or living, the nation has served greatly. A military expert, writing in this paper last week, pictured vividly mankind's debt to Belgium:

In all ages this has been the price of liberty. In our own time it has become natural, as it was easy, to think of the blessings which are our inheritance—peace, independence, the right to speak the language of our fathers and follow the traditions of our race—as things assured by mere right of existence, guaranteed by laws and powers divine and super-human and beyond the challenge of living men or nations.

Thanks to Belgium, the world is able to see two things clearly. First, that the necessity to defend the things which all men hold dear is as modern as the latest invention. Second, that while all the conditions of war have changed, the spirit of man himself remains unchanged, still unconquerable, still willing to dare all, that those things he holds dear may survive, even though he may perish.

Thus it is that even as the world mourns the destruction of the glorious monuments of Belgium, it must in the same moment recognize the gain, the increase, in the spiritual glories of mankind.

TURKEY'S WAR FOR CULTURE

November 4, 1914.

ONE of the dire effects of the war is revealed in the official announcement by the German government, that "the exploits of the Turkish fleet have created unbounded enthusiasm in Berlin." It would be difficult to imagine more pathetic evidence of a misguided and distorted national intelligence than the belief that the cause of Teutonic culture has been advanced because Turkey has been inspired to run amuck. It is conceivable, of course, that the adventure ultimately may have an appreciable effect; but its most prominent immediate result is to reveal unsuspected capacities for blundering on the part of the German autocracy.

Putting aside all questions of morality, the affair has been managed so as to give Germany the minimum of advantage and the maximum of discredit. Ordinary shrewdness would have supplied the new ally with an appropriate and dignified entrance into the war drama; but after weeks of laborious rehearsal the unhappy Moslem is precipitated onto the stage in a manner almost comic. This ineptitude, however, is quite consistent. The diplomacy which insulted Russia, infuriated France, aroused Great Britain and alienated Italy; which affronted civilization by repudiating treaties and created world-wide hostility by assaulting a neutral neighbor, could hardly be expected to handle successfully the dangerous expedient of an Oriental alliance. But it is quite certain that nothing more clumsy has been achieved by

the Berlin strategists. Once more Germany has put herself in the position of aggressor; for the Black sea raid of her cruisers under the Turkish flag was made without even the pretense of a declaration of war. It was planned and carried out on the same basis as the ill-starred invasion of Belgium—"the enemy could afford to wait, while we could not."

The action destroys, of course, all that tremendous structure of defense embraced in the plea that "Germany is fighting the battle of western civilization against Asiatic barbarism." It obliterates whatever American sympathy may have been stirred by Great Britain's misguided employment of Japan; for Japanese activity will at least be confined to the Far East, while it is the desire of Germany to loose the unspeakable Turk on Europe. But, regardless of the character of the alliance, its consummation is a direct affront to the good opinion of the world, since it involves an almost incalculable widening of the area of conflict. If Turkey's opera bouffe intrusion becomes a serious reality, nothing can prevent the participation of Greece, Rumania, Italy and Bulgaria, involving a total additional population of 70,000,000 and spreading the war to the remotest parts of Africa and Asia. One happy effect, perhaps, should not be overlooked. The dragging in of the Ottoman empire in this deliberate manner should produce a welcome silence among the voluble German professors, who have complained with such pathos that a cruel war was forced upon the peaceful Hohenzollerns. Indeed, the more the situation is examined the more difficult it becomes to fathom the policy which created it. Germany's act can bring her no possible moral advantage; rather, it damages irreparably her case before the court of the world's opinion. And as to military advantage, the greatest imaginable addition of strength from Turkey and Bul-

garia will be overbalanced by the swinging of Greece, Rumania and Italy to the side of Great Britain, France and Russia.

Far more important than the effect upon Germany, however, is the undoubted injury done to the cause of civilization. The war which already was a colossal world calamity is made infinitely worse. Countries which otherwise might have escaped its evils are to be dragged into the hellish ferment. And a bloody crusade by the fanatical hordes of Mohammedanism, for generations a nightmare of civilized humanity, is brought at last within the realm of possibility. The inciting of a "holy war" of this character has been an avowed purpose of Germany ever since she struck at "Asiatic barbarism" by invading peaceful Belgium. While every other western nation has labored ceaselessly to avoid inflaming the fanaticism of Islam, so long quiescent, agents of Teutonic culture have been indefatigably plotting to light the dreadful fires of Moslem hate.

There has never been any concealment of this policy. The Bernhardis and Von Treitschkes, in their prophecies of the war that was to make Germany the dominant power in the world, always exulted in the fact that her selected enemies ruled over vast Mohammedan populations, who could easily be inspired to undertake a sanguinary revolt. Since the war actually began the efforts to accomplish this end have been redoubled. The statesmen and university professors of Germany have uttered desperate threats of the coming uprising by followers of the Prophet, and hordes of paid spies have been busy at their infamous work in India and northern Africa. Fortunately, according to competent observers, the dream of a "holy war" is but another evidence of German misinformation, like the mad theory, gravely discussed in Berlin, that the beginning of the war would be a signal

for civil strife in Ireland, the secession of Australia from the British empire and the invasion of Canada by the United States. It is quite possible that German intrigues may result in isolated outbursts and massacres, but the vision of a great "jihad" was pretty effectually laid by William T. Ellis, who gave the results of wide observation in a recent issue of this newspaper. He wrote:

The possibility of rallying the hosts of Islam to the aid of Turkey has taken such a hold of popular imagination, that since that nation's participation in the present war became reasonably certain, the talk of a "holy war" has been revived on all sides.

By all the laws of sound logic and things as they are, there never will be a general "holy war," in which legions of the followers of the Prophet will go forth to do battle under the crescent flag. The war between Turkey and Italy and the Balkan war effectually disproved the possibility of this.

Even without these recent demonstrations, there are abundant evidences of the impossibility of such a consummation. An international war, "holy" or unholy, needs organization and commissariat and equipment and a navy; the Moslems have none of these things. Grant that they have all the will in the world to rally to the sultan's banner, they have not the transports to carry them, the provisions to feed them or the weapons to arm them.

But whatever Germany's hopes may be, the Young Turks, who are plunging the Ottoman empire into the war, have no hallucinations about starting a world-wide Mohammedan crusade; they know too well that even in Turkey there is a seditious spirit. The fact is that the government is simply making a desperate gamble. It is emulating in its feeble way the German policy of "world power or downfall," and has allied itself with Germany because victory on that side would preserve Turkey's vanishing power in Europe, while triumph of

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the Triple Entente will infallibly mean the driving of the crescent back to Asia, whence it came 600 years ago.

Germany's frantic efforts to make use of Turkey is not by any means a sudden development. The extravagant policy of Pan-Germanism embraced an extension of Teutonic influence through the Balkans and Turkey into Asia Minor and thence to the Persian Gulf and the Far East. The German-built Bagdad railway was an ambitious link in the chain, and the reorganization of the Turkish army and navy by German officers has been an important factor, together with vast German loans. The overwhelming of Turkey by the Balkan states was a serious check to this scheme, as it not only reduced the European Moslem territory to a small section near the Bosphorus, but also stimulated the spirit of independence among the hardy Balkan peoples. German tenacity, nevertheless, has maintained Teutonic ascendancy in Turkish affairs; and the sultan's army and navy, such as they are, are officered by German strategists.

Great Britain's influence at Constantinople began to wane sixteen years ago, when the kaiser made his theatrical pilgrimage to Palestine, paid honor to the memory of Saladin at the tomb of the great Moslem and greeted the blood-stained Abdul Hamid as his "good friend." Since that time Germany's dominance over the Sublime Porte has steadily increased, and the purpose to invoke Mohammedan aid in spreading the blessings of Teutonic culture has never been concealed.

It cannot be denied that the Turk has chosen the more promising side in the conflict, or, at least, the one side which carries any remote possibility of advantage for him. If Germany should be defeated, it is certain that Russia will claim Constantinople, which she won in 1877, only to have the prize snatched from her through Prussia's influence. On the other hand, in the event of

German victory, the Moslem will get another lease on life in Europe. That which is impossible to understand is Germany's hope to better her position by this discreditable alliance. With Irish "rebels" and Indian Mohammedans fighting valiantly for Great Britain in France and Boers putting down Boer insurrections in South Africa, it would seem that the German plan to incite racial and religious wars against her enemy will produce nothing more effective than sporadic massacres in Asiatic Turkey, which would still further turn world sentiment against her.

Moreover, exactly as she gave Britain a just cause for war by violating the neutrality of Belgium, so she has provided Italy with an excuse to aid the allies, by urging the Turk to attack Egypt, and so threaten Italian Tripoli. In a word, for every new soldier she has added to her strength she has raised up two to fight against her. The only certain result will be the final expulsion of the Turk from the western continent. The valor of the Balkan peoples reduced Turkey in Europe to little more than a geographical expression; the diplomacy of Germany will end in leaving of it only an evil memory. This will be a distinct gain to humanity. Lamentable as is the widening of the circle of the war, it will be a benefit if it hastens the end and removes from Europe an intolerable anachronism. Turkey has never contributed anything of value to civilization, either in art, literature, science or government. Germany, therefore, has involuntarily earned the thanks of the world by making impossible any peace which will not drive the barbaric Moslem regime back to the Asiatic wastes where it belongs.

THE REAL ANTAGONISTS

November 11, 1914.

THE war is so vast in scope and the international interests which it affects are so complex that the world is still staggered by its confusing magnitude. Even now, after more than three months of carnage and the inclusion of eleven nations, the direct and underlying causes of the conflict are the subjects of vigorous controversy; still more perplexing are the theories of the meaning of it all, the central issue to be determined. The operation of certain forces was clear enough from the beginning—racial hostility, national jealousies and ambitions, historic enmities between rival Powers. These issues are not to be obscured even by the piteous fate of Belgium or the popular conception that ten million men are fighting over a violated treaty. With the changing of the battle lines and the development of the campaigns the titanic contest has been stripped to its essentials. Only incidentally is this a war between Teuton and Slav, between two groups of allies. It is at its heart a war between Germany and Great Britain; or, as both of them would phrase it, between Germany and England. It is the fate of this generation to witness a struggle which will mean life or death to the two great empires of modern times.

At first the welter of warring Powers was too stupendous a spectacle for this to be observed. It is curious to recall that a few weeks ago Serbia was in the news, Austria a considerable factor. But although Russia's hordes are pouring across the frontier of East Prussia;

although Belgium, an historic state, has been trampled into subjection; although half of France is swept by the tempest of war and her troops have revived the glories of a hundred years ago; although 70,000,000 Orientals have been drawn into the struggle and unnumbered hosts may yet be added, the world is coming to realize that there are but two great antagonists—Germany and England.

It is interesting to examine in retrospect the concealment of a fact which now stands forth in overshadowing prominence. The persistent refusal of the English people to recognize the crisis rushing upon them was no more remarkable than the efforts of Germany to avoid acknowledgment of a purpose for which she had sedulously prepared and which had been the theme of her ablest spokesmen for twenty years. Despite the fairly obvious significance of the thunderbolt attack upon France by way of Luxemburg and Belgium, for a long time after the outbreak of the war all official and unofficial presentations from the German side charged the upheaval to Pan-Slavic aggression and declared the cause to be the protection of German culture against semi-Asiatic barbarism. The terrific drive on Paris was described as a measure of defense against Russia's ally, which, it was averred, was moved by a causeless spirit of revenge, and must be crushed by swift assault in order that Teutonic civilization might protect itself against the Tartar incursion. True, there was stupefaction in Berlin when England entered the conflict; but this by no means implied German belief in the maintenance of peace between the two nations. Indeed, the irreconcilable antagonism between Germany and England had been for years a national passion, although the "reckoning" had been referred to a later day, after France had been reduced to impotence.

Profoundly convinced that the English people not only were sunk in the lethargy of ease, but were invincibly stupid, Germany conceived that she could seize Belgium and conquer the southern coast of the English channel without arousing her chosen enemy. Hence all her early proclamations were directed against the "Slav peril." But no sooner had England taken her stand than the mask dropped. A veritable surge of hatred rolled over the German nation. From the palace and the parliament to the humblest cottage the name of England was execrated, and the war spirit, which in the beginning had been fired by mere patriotic exaltation, glowed with the white heat of passion. Once concealment was abandoned, the spokesmen for Germany declared her sentiments with the utmost frankness. "For Russia," they said, "we feel contempt and aversion; for France, the respect due to a chivalrous foe; for Belgium, admiration and pity. But England we hate and despise with unutterable loathing!" The most popular war poem produced in Germany is a "chant of hatred" in this tone:

Come, hear the word, repeat the word,
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard.
We will never forego our hate,
We have all but a single hate;
We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone—
ENGLAND!

Richard Witting, a privy councilor of the empire and one of its leading financiers, said in an interview the other day:

God, how we hate England and the English; that nation of hypocrites and criminals which has brought this misery upon us and upon the world! For the French there is no feeling except pity and regret; the feeling against Russia is subsiding; but against England there is growing among low and high the most fanatical hatred and contempt that one nation ever had toward another.

It is a fight between England and Germany to the bitter end. It is a war of annihilation between these two countries.

On the other hand, while England made the violation of Belgium her cause, and justly—Germany had furnished her with a magnificent pretext for joining the war—the real reason lay deeper. England knew at last that the hour foretold by her wiser men had struck. In the flash of the first guns she saw the pit yawning at her feet; her own national existence, as well as that of Belgium, was at stake. Today no fact stands out clearer than that this conflict of the nations and the races is a grapple of Teuton and Anglo-Saxon, from which one must emerge master and the other sink back into submission. The splendid heroism of Belgium and the valor and sufferings of France are but secondary to this great fact. The grim struggle suggests that familiar problem in physics which supposes the meeting of an irresistible force with an immovable body. No one can say now which factor—Germany's force or England's resistance—will prove false, but the fundamental conditions of the problem are plain.

Two things made the collision inevitable: First, England's world predominance, and second, Germany's consciousness of a greater genius, cramped by fate within narrow boundaries. The approaching conflict of these irreconcilable elements was set forth with relentless precision fifteen months ago by Prof. J. A. Cramb, an English historian; and it is chiefly upon his prophetic work, "Germany and England," that we base our present remarks. His testimony is convincing not only because of its logic, but because he presented the German view with a sympathy based upon long association with the German people and study of their history and literature.

For a full generation Germany has brooded upon forcing a reckoning with her great antagonist; back of

this purpose has been her determination to achieve the world empire for which she believes her virile genius is fitted. The progress of Teutonic civilization during the last forty years has proved the superior qualities of their race, say the Germans. The nation has felt within itself the surging vitality of youth and strength, the stirring of that genius of empire which, like the genius of the inspired artist, must express itself or destroy its possessor. Achieving world leadership in many fields of science, commerce and industry, Germany adopted as a religious faith her right to world power. But wherever she looked on the globe she found she had come too late—the richest and most populous areas of the earth had long been pre-empted.

Russia sprawled across two continents; France had appropriated great territories in Africa and Asia; Italy had seized rich provinces abroad; even Holland and Belgium and Portugal had their oversea possessions, yielding huge revenues and prestige. But in every path to empire that she explored Germany found one rival predominant—England; the whole world seemed to have been adjusted to serve that vast, impalpable thing called the British empire. Picture patriotic Germans studying the world map and noting the unbroken chain of British power encircling the globe—not alone the vast reaches of Canada and Australia and India, but the innumerable fortresses and coaling stations and naval bases, the distant coasts that were dotted with English ports, the seas that were English lakes!

They found the gates of the Baltic guarded by English patrols, and the whole western boundary of the North sea English territory, the one outlet being actually, as well as in name, the English channel. They found English cannon and warships holding the Mediterranean—Gibraltar in the west, Malta in the center, Cyprus and

Port Said in the east; all Egypt under English sway, with the Red sea controlled by Perim and Aden. Africa, they saw, was English from Good Hope half way to Cairo, and the coasts dominated by the English settlements of the Gold Coast, St. Helena, Cape Town, Durban, Zanzibar and a dozen others. There were English strongholds in the Persian gulf; in India and Ceylon; in Burmah and the East Indies; at Hongkong and Wei-Hai-Wei; at a score of points in the southern seas; at Vancouver on the Pacific; at Halifax, St. Johns, Bermuda, Jamaica and Trinidad in the Atlantic. Was there ever such a theme for the crusading Von Treitschkes and the promoters of Pan-Germanism, with their ceaseless preaching of English decadence and German destiny?

Here were two states, each dowered with the genius of empire; the one for 200 years enjoying the richest possessions of the earth, the other shut within the limits of the North sea, the Rhine and the Danube and forbidden by unenforceable laws to expand her energies; the one sated with the glories of empire, eager for peace, anxious only to hold what she had, the other cramped and confined, but throbbing with life and ambition, driven by furious energy to test her faith and her genius—what result could there be save a death-grapple for mastery? There were a few far-seeing Britons who discerned the coming of the inevitable clash. With notable frankness, Dr. E. J. Dillon, an authority on international affairs, stated the case nearly three years ago:

The root of the antagonism between Germany and Great Britain is this: We want to keep what we have, and, therefore, we favor the maintenance of the status quo; whereas our continental cousins crave what they have not got, and are minded to wrest it from the hands of those who possess it.

The orderly citizen would answer at once that the law of nations, the right of long possession, would forbid

such an enterprise. For this German philosophy and patriotism had a contemptuous rejoinder. What law, they demanded, gave England her empire? It is built on fraud and violence, on diplomatic craft, on bribery, treachery, the murder of nationalities. Look, they said, upon the conquest of India, the theft of Egypt, the rape of Gibraltar, the crushing of the Boer republics, the centuries of cold-blooded, calculating rapacity that have gathered together these stolen possessions, and prate to us of law! There is no law here but the higher law of fitness. As Professor Cramb stated it, seeking to declare the German view:

It is very well for England to protest that she has no aggressive designs against Germany; England's mere existence as an empire is a continuous aggression. So long as England, the great robber state, retains her booty, the spoils of a world, what right has she to expect peace from the nations?

England possesses everything and can do nothing. Germany possesses nothing and could do everything. What edict, human or divine, enjoins us to sit still? What are England's title deeds and by what laws does she justify her possession? By the law of valor, indeed, but also by opportunity, treachery and violence.

The contest, then, was inevitable. England in the twentieth century has reached a stage in her career of empire when her policy becomes a policy of peace, not war; when her task is no longer expansion, but organization; not to get more, but to develop what she has. She inclines now to arbitration, makes suggestions for "naval holidays," hints at disarmament. But these signs of change wake only scorn in her lusty young rival. The retired burglar, says Germany, yearns for tranquillity—there is no virtue in that. The English authority we have quoted foresaw clearly more than a year ago the outcome:

England may pray for peace in order to shape out the great problems of imperial progress toward freedom and justice; but there beyond the North sea is the stern Watcher, unsleeping, unresting, pursuing her distant goal undeviatingly, unfalteringly, weighing every action of England, waiting for every sign of England's weakness. It is here that Germany's will to power comes into tragic conflict with England's will to peace.

England, indeed, desires peace; England, it is certain, will never make war upon Germany. But how is the youth of Germany, the youth of that nation great in arts as in war, to acquiesce in the world predominance of England? If Germany has not declined from her ancient valor, the issue is certain, and a speedy issue. It is war.

This is the ultimate meaning of the tremendous conflict in which are engaged nations representing more than half the population of the globe. It is for this that England has maintained her mighty fleets; it is for this that Germany has trained every male child for battle and inspired every woman to supreme sacrifice. Changes there will be in the destinies of France and Russia, of Turkey and Japan; but the supreme issue is whether the British empire will remain or will give way to a stronger power.

We have not attempted in this discussion to argue where lies the right. According to one's viewpoint, England's desire for peace is a righteous one, or a sign of weakness and selfishness; and Germany's ambition is a noble aspiration to develop a useful civilization, or a cynical reversion to the lawless despotism of force. The fact to be recognized is that the two ideals have met in final conflict. The world is to learn whether the structure of civilization as it is shall endure, with its past evils and injustices and its present strivings toward good; or whether sheer force shall remake it at the will of a great people who purpose to seize what fate has denied to them.

AN UNWHOLESOME MYTH

November 14, 1914.

FROM time to time we receive, as every newspaper does, urgent communications from readers who are aroused by reports of atrocities in the European war. Most of the writers simply recount incidents they have heard, and suggest inquiry; but some declare that they have direct, personal knowledge of dreadful cruelties on the part of one or other of the belligerents, and complain bitterly that the newspapers are suppressing the truth.

Charges of this nature seem to be inseparable from war. The actual, inevitable horrors of the battlefield and of a country devastated by contending armies are so shocking that those who witness them become incapable of rejecting any rumor, and tales of the most incredible savagery, spreading from lip to lip, are implicitly believed and are sent broadcast throughout the world as the solemn testimony of experience. Every great conflict is marked by these unconscious inventions. During the civil war countless intelligent persons in the north were persuaded that the confederate forces inflicted deliberate barbarities upon prisoners, while in the south the gentle Lincoln was pictured as a monster who lusted for blood. Alleged atrocities by Boer soldiers inflamed the public mind in England a few years ago, while charges equally impressive accused British officers of torturing prisoners and slaughtering women and children in cold blood. Acts of indescribable infamy

were reported against every nation concerned in the recent Balkan wars.

But never have allegations of this kind been made with such persistence as in the present conflict. The word atrocity has become almost commonplace. Each nation in turn has been held up by its opponents as a nation of savages, and charges of murder, torture and mutilation have been reiterated with astounding detail. With millions of men engaged in furious conflict over hundreds of miles of territory, crimes against humanity are inevitable. There is no doubt whatever that non-combatants have been slain, houses looted and burned, women cruelly wronged. But these offences are isolated, and unquestionably are rigorously punished when the guilty are known. The stories which have never been substantiated are those of the cold-blooded slaughter of wounded men and prisoners and the systematic mutilation of helpless soldiers; yet it is these that are most persistently circulated.

Two incidents in our own experience will illustrate the baselessness of two of the most popular fictions. Several weeks ago it was reported to us that an eminent Philadelphia clergyman, just returned from Munich, had "personally seen" in a hospital there German soldiers whose eyes had been gouged out by Belgian women. Upon direct inquiry, we learned from him that he had said only that he had spoken with persons who said they had seen these victims. Five days ago a member of our staff reported hearing of two Belgian children, now cared for by a family in Bryn Mawr, whose hands had been cut off by the Germans. The story, told to him by the daughter of a high official in one of the eastern states, was related with the most circumstantial detail. The mother of the victims, she said, was an American woman who had married a Belgian officer and who had

returned here after his death in battle, bringing her mutilated children. The informant of our reporter had the facts from the lips of the woman who was caring for the afflicted ones.

We sent to this woman. She verified at once the fact that she had related the incident to a group in which our informant was present. But, she said, she told it, not as a personal experience, but as a story which she had heard. Her friend had misunderstood. This result is characteristic of that which has followed every inquiry of like nature. Innumerable as are the reports of mutilations, told with the most convincing detail, not a single one has ever been traced to an actual eye-witness.

The real horrors of war are grievous enough to afflict every humane mind. But happily there is no conclusive evidence that it has inspired such deliberate savagery as many imaginative persons are ready to believe.

GERMANY AND ENGLAND

November 16, 1914.

THERE is evidence of attentive reading and a brisk method of reasoning in the following communication from a valued German-American reader:

To the Editor of The North American.

Your editorial entitled "The Real Antagonists in the War" is marred here and there by passages that show hostility to the German cause, such as "concealment (by Germany) was abandoned" and "the mask dropped," implying a policy of hypocrisy, and the references to the "despotism of force." But the utterance as a whole was more accurate in statement and more generous in tone than most of those from newspapers opposing the German side in the war.

Now that the real issue has been discovered, however—now that the contest, as you say, has been "stripped to its essentials"—where do you stand? It is no longer enough to write long dissertations upon race antagonisms, the blunders of diplomacy, the woes of Belgium and the bugaboo terrors of militarism. This is at bottom, you admit, a death grapple between Germany and England. Where do you stand? Where do the American people stand?

Have you forgotten the plundering of India, the murder of South African independence, the long martyrdom of Ireland? I recall that you bitterly denounced the brutal war against the Boers, and championed the Irish people against English tyranny. You have set down accurately in your editorial the indictment of civilization against the British empire. Is it possible that you will range yourself with England, the robber state of history? How can you justify an American newspaper, devoted to liberty, in withholding its support from the brave German people, who are fighting against this monstrous system, and whose valor will yet destroy its evil predominance in the world?

Mindful of the injunction of the president, and of the proprieties to be observed by a neutral people, we must decline the spirited challenge of our correspondent. We shall not declare partisan adherence to either side. The decisive position we have taken upon the sanctity of treaty obligations does not imply anti-German bias, any more than our repudiation of fabled German "atrocities" means that we hope England will be crushed. We purpose to remain free to denounce with equal vigor such evils as the inclusion of Japan and the inclusion of Turkey. But we cheerfully accept the challenge as an invitation to discuss frankly the reasons which we find to underlie the very obvious preponderance of opinion in this country favorable to the allies' cause; or, if our correspondent insists upon a more definite statement, favorable to England.

It will hardly be necessary to argue with him to show that whatever opposition to Germany there may be now has been wholly a product of the war. Historically, sentimentally and actually it is England that has been regarded as the chief "enemy" of this country. Not to speak of the wars of 1776 and 1812, the record which includes the Alabama case, the Venezuela crisis and the Panama canal tolls demand has been sufficient to keep alive a very widespread distrust of English foreign policy. Germany, on the contrary, has ever been our very good friend. Such unpleasant incidents as the interference with Dewey at Manila have been exceptional, and the threats of jingoistic German newspapers and statesmen against the Monroe doctrine have never been taken seriously.

Moreover, in recent years America has turned more and more to Germany in admiration and for counsel. We have learned from her lessons of incalculable value in conservation, industrial efficiency and sound municipal

government. The two countries have been drawn into relations of cordial friendship by the interchanges of commerce, diplomacy and scholarship. Quite apart from the influence of the millions of industrious, patriotic Americans of German birth or blood, this nation had come to like the German people and their brilliant ruler. Nor have Americans failed to pay tribute to the skill, the intrepidity and the exalted patriotism of Germany's citizen soldiers in the dreadful ordeal which they have endured.

This bond of sympathy, as everybody knows, was strained to the breaking point by the headlong rush of the German government into a causeless war; it suffered still more when the ruthless onslaught upon peaceful Belgium was begun; and the last strand parted when Germany flouted a treaty as "a scrap of paper" and when "military necessity" was invoked to justify the destruction of unresisting cities and the levying of monstrous tribute upon communities devastated by invasion. On the other hand, in this case England's diplomacy was by contrast scrupulously correct and honorable; England's aversion to the war was as pronounced as Germany's haste to enter it; England's championship of Belgium's violated neutrality was an indictment of Germany for her cynical repudiation of that instrument.

The citing of a thousand pages of history, though they be filled with records of English rapacity and aggression, from Bunker Hill to Pretoria, cannot affect the status of this case, considered on its merits, nor obscure the conflict of irreconcilable conceptions of international morality.

But we specify these familiar evils of the war merely to dispose of them before discussing the fundamental reason for the existence of American opinion adverse to Germany. This lies deeper than the provocation of a

causeless war or the wrongs committed against a neutral nation, deeper even than the violation of pledged treaty engagements. It was not alone these manifestations, but the system which produced them, that aroused American condemnation.

This nation was founded upon the principle of democracy. It was "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." Through a century and a quarter of peace and war, in spite of the weaknesses of human nature and the subtleties of the enemies of the principle, the American people have pursued unfalteringly their ideal, and today they have attained a development of democratic institutions that far transcends the dreams of those who founded the republic. In their jealous devotion to this system they have an instinctive aversion toward despotic or illiberal forms of government. Even in times of peace their admiration for and sympathy with German achievements were tempered by distrust of German institutions. Behind the wonderful efficiency and national unity of purpose they saw the menacing domination of an autocracy; behind the patriotic service of universal conscription, the rule of an intolerant military caste; behind the loyal submission to an all-powerful State, the extinction of individual freedom and the surrender of popular liberties into the keeping of a dynastic power. With the outbreak of the war the results of the system were made plain in a fashion to intensify American conviction. As we said a few weeks ago:

There is here, in truth, a prejudice, deep and lasting, against the government of Germany, against the system which it represents, against the philosophy which it proclaims to the world. The autocracy and militarism of Germany, modified though they are by parliamentary forms, constitute a challenge and a menace to American institutions; against them the American mind instinctively revolts. Militaristic

monarchism and democracy are incurably antagonistic. Both systems cannot endure. The triumph of one means the extinction of the other.

If there is, therefore, a widespread tendency here to sympathize with the stand taken by England, this is the explanation. The condition is not to be traced to a common ancestry and language, but to a common devotion to the principles of democracy, which is the governing power in English affairs despite the ornamental instrument of constitutional monarchy. Americans have been drawn to England in this crisis not by ties of blood, but by bonds of sympathy in governmental ideas.

The best illustration of the cause of American feeling in the war is found in the relations existing between the United States and Canada. Beyond our northern border lies a foreign power, one of the principal parts of the British empire. Yet for a hundred years there has not been a threat of conflict, and the 3000-mile border is unguarded from end to end. This record of unbroken amity has not been due to racial kinship or diplomatic endeavor, but solely to the sympathy which is based upon adherence to the same governmental ideals. To conceive autocracy and militarism in control on either side of the frontier is to picture it bristling with fortifications, and the menace of war overshadowing every act of the two countries.

Democracy is the solvent of international enmities, the best guarantee of peace and security. Moreover, it is the unalterable ideal of the American people, and they cannot be brought, by any arguments or appeals, to indorse the policies of a system which is inherently antagonistic to the principles upon which their conception of human liberty is founded.

TWO WONDERFUL CARGOES

November 17, 1914.

ACROSS the wintry sea two ships are speeding from this country to Europe, freighted with strange cargoes. They are neither commissioned for war nor chartered for trade. They are on missions of benevolence, of human helpfulness and loving kindness. No craft were ever employed upon voyages more glorious; none ever were followed with such heartfelt good will. On Thursday, from Philadelphia, sailed the mercy ship *Thelma*, laden with food for famine-stricken Belgium. On Saturday, from New York, left the United States naval ship *Jason*, her hold packed with Christmas gifts for the war-orphaned children of eight nations. The cargo of the freighter came from the big-hearted people of Philadelphia and nearby communities; the government vessel was loaded with gifts from scores of cities throughout the country.

The thought of the Christmas ship, which was the first to be suggested, was more than a brilliant conception; it was nothing short of an inspiration. Its appeal was universal, and its influence will be felt in blessing throughout the world. The power of this simple idea was so great that every warring nation, deaf to all other appeals involving unity of thought or action, yielded to its charm; so great that the United States government modified its rigid policy of inaction and supplied a naval vessel for the transport; so great that the ministers and ambassadors of the belligerent powers, otherwise impla-

cable in their official antagonism, exerted themselves eagerly to forward a project designed to benefit war victims of all countries. More than all this, the gracious spell of the idea subdued for the time the rancor of partisanship. Those contributors who in blood or sympathy are German or English or French or Austrian or Russian do not seek to favor their own kind. The pictures they saw were of forlorn little children; and they did not ask whether their gifts were to bring light to the darkened homes of friends or foes.

It is not strange that a thought so touching, yet so practical, should have been born in the heart of a woman. Nowhere else is there such intuitive yearning to childhood, such understanding of the tender meaning of Christmas, such sympathy with the blank grief that the festival must bring to uncounted homes shadowed by death or the terror of it. Lillian Bell, whose suggestion started the movement, knew instinctively that it would bring a generous response. For what could be more appealing than the opportunity to assuage for sorrow of children on the day whose joy is the world's heritage from the Babe of Bethlehem? But an idea of this magnitude needed to carry it out a man of rare vision and capacity, and it found its ablest possible champion in James Keeley, of the Chicago Herald. This great American editor, a journalist who believes that a newspaper should be more than a mere lifeless mirror of events—should have a heart as well as intelligence behind it—put his genius for organization into the movement and worked tirelessly for its success.

He enlisted the co-operation of nearly one hundred of the leading newspapers of the country. Through them the Christmas appeal on behalf of the little war orphans was made, and the big-hearted American people did the rest. When the great ship, under the protection

of the American flag, the Red Cross emblem and all the sea patrols of the warring nations, sailed on her cheerful pilgrimage to the ports of the war-torn countries, she carried 10,000 big cases and 10,000 additional express packages filled with articles of clothing and Christmas toys—gifts enough, the army officer in charge of the shipments declared, to give something to 5,000,000 women and children. The North American had the honor of being selected to promote the plan in Philadelphia; and its readers responded, as they always do, with splendid generosity. No less than to the public, however, is credit due to the Child Federation, which unselfishly volunteered to take over management of the enterprise. It was the wonderfully efficient work of this organization, in receiving, packing and transporting the countless gifts, that made Philadelphia's contribution of two carloads for the Christmas ship's cargo notable for its completeness and competent handling.

The daily scenes at the headquarters made a wonderful picture of the democracy of good will. Here was a woman in worn clothes, stinting herself to give a day's wages "in memory of my little boy"; next to her, perhaps, a well-groomed business man, passing over a substantial sum with a cheery word; then a bereaved mother, offering little, dainty garments that her own lost baby would have worn; then a big, bronzed man with a contribution from lighthouse keepers; or an eager child, emptying a few warm pennies from its hand. Surely the big heart of the American people never had a finer expression than in this demonstration of humane feeling. The appeal to which they responded was one of singular force. It carried the picture of little lives darkened not only by grief and privation, but by the shadow of a Christmas—the day of the Child—giftless and cheerless.

There was peculiar pathos even in the thought that these fatherless ones live in countries that have taught all mankind the joyousness of the season and have wreathed its sacred festival with the garlands of tender, poetic custom. So the Christmas ship sails on its journey bearing a little happiness to unnumbered homes where sorrow broods and carrying a message of peace and good will that seems like an echo of the song that woke the herdsmen of Judea on the first Christmas night.

No less, surely, will Philadelphians follow with pride and sympathy that other ship, more peculiarly their own, whose mission is to save the lives of famine-stricken Belgians. The idea of the *Thelma* was the inspiration of a man; and John Wanamaker supplied not only the big idea, but the big ship. The splendid initiative and the transportation cost were his contributions; then, as in the other case, the appeal was made by the newspapers—all the Philadelphia journals working together—and the making of the cargo left to the public. Never, we confidently declare, did a community make such a response. It was on Saturday morning a week ago that the first announcement was made. Inside of forty-eight hours the cargo had been provided for, in cash or consignments of food. By Tuesday night the contributions totaled \$140,000, and on Thursday the *Thelma* sailed, loaded to the hatches with a cargo of supplies valued in the manifest at \$104,000. Another vessel, to be called the "Thanksgiving ship," is already under charter by Mr. Wanamaker. The outpouring of charity on behalf of Belgium tested even the admirable arrangements made to meet it. Men and women and children thronged the headquarters, and money was piled up so fast that it was difficult to record it.

The rich gave of their abundance and the poor out of their poverty. The contributions ranged from checks in four figures to the pennies of newsboys. Inmates of homes, of orphanages and of hospitals sent their gifts. Churches and business organizations, clubs and lodges and groups of office, store and factory workers added their offerings to those of unnumbered individuals. The very prisoners in the penitentiary from their scanty earnings sent twenty-six barrels of flour to the ship, and there were countless other gifts that meant life to famished victims of the war, but the sacrifice of comforts by the givers. The swift loading of the *Thelma* was a demonstration of the limitless benevolence of Philadelphia, the more striking because it followed so closely and exceeded in magnitude the consignment of gifts for the Christmas ship. But her right to the name of the City of Brotherly Love does not rest upon these two enterprises, splendid as they are. Philadelphia has a long and noble record of philanthropy, of the open-handed charity that vaunts not itself, but is ever ready to answer the call of suffering humanity.

The two ships that have gone will do far more than relieve suffering and lighten sorrow; they will give to the word neutrality a nobler meaning than any proclamation could give, and will spread, we know not how far, teachings of brotherhood that will never be forgotten. For the drawing together of America and Europe in this hour of stress shows that deep down beneath the ruin wrought by war there is a foundation of human sympathy among all the races of men. It is on this that civilization rests, and it will remain unshaken when the storm of hatred has spent its fury and passed away.

OUR DEBT TO BELGIUM

November 19, 1914.

A SECOND food ship for Belgium, chartered by John Wanamaker, is to sail from Philadelphia next Tuesday or Wednesday. To fill its hold with supplies, \$5000 a day must be raised. The splendid burst of liberality that loaded the *Thelma* in four days is almost a guarantee that this further duty of Pennsylvania will be met. But the response must be swift and generous. Certain it is that there never has been a cause so tragically entreating, so piteously urgent. By hundreds of thousands, by millions, the people of Belgium are in the shadow of starvation.

Their country is literally blasted by war. There are no crops, no funds to buy food, no food to buy if there were funds. They cannot even flee. Shelterless and hungered, they are prisoners of despair. If America does not succor them, they die. Misery so cruel is unparalleled. A whole people is prostrate. By disaster, sudden and terrible, a prosperous civilization has been obliterated. The tumult of war has passed, but what has followed is the peace of desolation. Every industry is paralyzed, homes unnumbered have been destroyed, the inhabitants are in the very grip of famine. If there were nothing else to be said, such anguish would plead for instant, unquestioning relief. But Belgium is no mere suppliant for alms. Forlorn amid the ruins and ashes of her hopes, she is still the benefactor of the world, whose destitution is a charge upon mankind. Let

Americans put aside all questions of partisanship and consider only what she has done and suffered, and why.

Hardly a hundred days ago Belgium was a conspicuously successful state, a model in thrift, in industry, in the arts of civilization which make for security and happiness. By the genius and energy of her people this little country, the most densely populated on the globe, had become one of the most prosperous. Her people were self-supporting, self-reliant, self-respecting. The handiwork of Belgian artisans was found in every market; the soil was tilled with such skill and patience that it supplied seeds and lessons in scientific agriculture to all the world. For a thousand years the battleground of warring nations, Belgium for three-quarters of a century had enjoyed freedom from violation under the guarantee of the great powers. Her people had proved their valor on a hundred fields. They invited no offense, and gave none. All they asked was to be left free to pursue their own destiny.

It was upon this scene of national progress and tranquillity that the storm of war broke in unimaginable fury. With hardly a warning, Belgium was brought face to face with the supreme test of a nation's soul. We state again the plain facts, not to accuse any nation, but to show the terrible choice that confronted this people. They were asked to waive their rights as a neutral state, and to disregard their obligations to maintain that position. They were not urged to give active aid—merely to permit passage of foreign armies through their country. And they had solemn assurances that not only would none of their territory be taken, but that all damage inflicted would be paid for and the submission generously rewarded. The alternative was relentless war, the extinction of nationality, political enslavement to a foreign power.

The temptation was seductive. What could little Belgium owe to the abstract duty of neutrality, which the mighty empire confronting her did not regard? What could her utmost obligation weigh against the threat of vast armies pouring across her frontier? What honor would be lost if she made urgent protest, but yielded to overwhelming force? What nation would dare accuse a government which yielded to such necessity in order to save its people from the horrors of an utterly hopeless resistance? All these considerations were clear. Belgium might have taken "the easiest way." She might have pleaded the impossibility of successful defense, the right of self-preservation, the sacredness of the lives which she knew must inevitably be paid—not alone the lives of soldiers, but of civilians, of women and children.

But she chose otherwise. Without hesitation, in the certain knowledge that she was inviting the rigors of merciless conquest, with full realization that the utmost endeavors of Britain and France could not save her, she uttered her steady denial to the invader and devoted herself to the sacrifice. In all the records of human service to the principles of liberty and honor, from Marathon to Lexington, there is none more glorious than this. In the ruins of Liege and Namur, in the ashes of Louvain and Dinant, Aerschot and Malines, in the countless graves of the soldier dead, there is written an imperishable tale of national heroism.

The end was as had been foreseen from the beginning. League by league, town by town, the land was laid waste, the patient work of centuries devastated, the people slain, scattered, hunted into exile. The little army, overpowered by weight of numbers, torn by the frightful engines of modern warfare, gave way slowly before the resistless tide of invasion. When Brussels fell, it

moved back to Antwerp; that taken, it moved over to France. And today, with their country desolated, their homes destroyed, their families either fugitives abroad or sunk in misery unspeakable at home, the remnants of that army are in the storm-swept trenches of Flanders, still facing the foe, still maintaining the great traditions of their Celtic ancestry, unconquered and unconquerable.

Yet this record of unfaltering heroism is not the full measure of Belgium's manhood and womanhood. Through all the sufferings of the war and the flight, the terrors of battle and the anguish of defeat, there has reached the world no word of complaint, no whisper of regret. Homeless, helpless, crushed under the iron rule of conquest, the Belgian people have not by a single utterance expressed repentance for their action. Between ease and honor they made their choice, and to that they hold fast. The nation is wounded unto death, but the flame of its great soul burns pure and undimmed.

Shall such a people hunger for bread? Shall those who have laid their very national life upon the altar of sacrifice be left to perish? Their sufferings must appeal to every nation; but of all the peoples of the earth, Americans should be the most generous and eager in response. For Belgium has immolated herself for a single principle—the sacredness of a nation's pledged word, the sanctity of treaty obligations. And that principle is the ultimate defense of democracy. If neutrality is but a "word"; if solemn treaties are but "scraps of paper"; if international rights are to be overridden at will upon the plea of "military necessity," then our experiment in the establishment of a peaceful, self-governing, non-military nation is doomed. For the final security of democratic peoples lies in the strict observance of covenants among the nations; without that, democracies

cannot endure, and the governing power of the world must be surrendered to autocracies backed by armed force.

In all this, we repeat, we are framing no partisan indictment. The present issue is not whether any nation has done wrong, but whether Belgium has done right; whether her valor and her supreme sacrifice for principle have not earned for her the unending gratitude of mankind, and chiefly of the people of the United States. To such as divide their allegiance, her silent appeal will have little force. But for those in whose sense of nationality the word American comes first, who truly revere the principles upon which this republic is founded and who hope for the security of its institutions, the duty of the hour is imperative.

Belgium, of all the countries involved in the war the most innocent of offense or selfish ambition, has been struck down in defense of the most sacred rights of nations, the most fundamental principles of peaceful civilization. Because she has martyred herself, the ideals and institutions which we in America cherish will live and prosper. She is the creditor of all mankind, but the very ward of the American people, and they will belie their justice-loving nature if they do not carry to completion the work of mercy which Philadelphia has so splendidly begun. The call for the loading of the second food ship is a summons to show what Americans think of a people who have served humanity as nobly as did the men of Saratoga and Valley Forge. Those who give to its cargo will do more than save lives; they will repay in small part the debt which we in this land, above all others, owe to a nation of patriots and martyrs.

THE NEW FRANCE

November 20, 1914.

IT WILL be recalled that a member of The North American staff, who was in Paris at the outbreak of the war, wrote a series of vivid articles which depicted the change of the pleasure-loving capital into a city of quietude and sobriety. The impression which the writer gave of the new spirit animating the nation was not only entertaining, but strikingly significant. None of the tremendous moves on the battlefields has been more important or more prophetic than this sudden transformation, this evidence of national earnestness and determination evoked by a peril which might have excused an irruption of excited feeling. Many observers have testified to the appearance of a quality which one of them suggests by classifying the people as "the unemotional French."

Paris lost overnight its air of unthinking gayety and careless ease. The whole face of the city was altered. There settled down a sense of gravity that was as far removed from panic as from exultation. The outburst of mingled execration and boastful defiance against the enemy, which a good many of us expected, did not take place. Instead, there was a revelation of quiet, business-like efficiency that made the world marvel and admire. The excitable Gaul of popular caricature is a figure with authentic historical basis; but those who looked for him to exhibit his picturesque activities in this crisis were disappointed. Confronting the supreme test of a nation's

sanity and spiritual vigor, the French people showed a dignity and self-command which had been thought foreign to their nature.

With the declaration of war, the accustomed spirit of light-hearted political agnosticism literally disappeared. "La patrie," an agreeable abstraction compounded from the legend of Joan of Arc and the exalted measures of "The Marseillaise," became a stern reality. From the capital to the remotest provincial village, the machinery of mobilization, equipment and transport moved with swift precision. This, to be sure, was a tribute to governmental preparedness; far more significant was the spirit in which the people met the long-dreaded emergency. The rigors of martial law were submitted to with uncomplaining obedience. Those who were called to the colors responded quietly, readily and without heroics. The terse placards announcing mobilization orders, the speeding to and fro of officers, orderlies and couriers and the passage of detachments of troops in service uniform were almost the only signs of military activity that were relied upon to check a mighty army of invasion.

And these created fewer demonstrations than trivial diversions were wont to cause in times of peace. The regiments marched away amid a sort of grim cheerfulness, but without arousing any extraordinary excitement or ebullitions of popular ardor. The street crowds uncovered as the colors passed, or waved their hands in mute farewell. There were no cheers, no bands blaring martial music, no bugles sounding stirring calls. What confusion there was in Paris, said observers, arose among the tourists, who had been halted in their journeys by the sudden interruption of ordinary railway travel. These showed far greater perturbation than the people whose very national existence was at stake. Many

an American who could not find a taxicab to carry his trunk to the station showed more agitation than French men and women who had seen their sons march away into the unknown.

The steadiness and restraint of the French under stress were in striking contrast to the tumult of patriotism in Berlin, where the streets were filled with wildly enthusiastic parades and the kaiser and members of the imperial family were hailed with exultant demonstrations of loyalty. Even among the "phlegmatic" English the war declaration caused an outburst of national feeling, and cheering throngs massed themselves at the gates of Buckingham palace until the king and queen showed themselves and acknowledged the acclamations of their devoted subjects. True, this tendency subsided quickly; but among the French it did not appear at all. The popular conception of the French character had its nearest approach following the brilliant but futile dash into Alsace-Lorraine during the opening days of the war. But the sentiment aroused contented itself with draping the tricolor over the mournful statue of Strasburg in the Place de la Concorde, which for forty-three years had been decorated with memorial wreaths. Otherwise, the people maintained their attitude of studied calm. The suppression of news was accepted without resentment. No generals were named to arouse popular plaudits. Each day of the threatening German advance on Paris seemed to find the national spirit steadier. The departure of the government from Paris created alarm, but no panic.

The significance of all this is to be measured only by comparing the present attitude with that in the last great war, forty-four years ago. When the mad ambition of the ministry of Napoleon III and the adroit intrigue of Bismarck had brought on the Franco-Prussian

war, the nation exulted with vainglorious delight. It regarded the conflict as a happy adventure, in which traditional French valor would win imperishable renown. The fantastic enterprise took its tone from the government. Louis Napoleon, who had daring without sagacity and vigor without stability, had thought to revive the imperialistic glories of his mighty uncle, but had succeeded only in creating an empire sustained by bayonets and a court immersed in frivolity. The whole nation was intoxicated by the Napoleonic legend and the tinsel grandeur of a worthless imperialism which had behind it neither a great leader nor a consistent program. What it thought was the thrill of patriotism was the poison of a false philosophy.

It took just one month to awaken the infatuated people and their feeble ruler. Within three weeks of the opening hostilities four French generals had been routed in six battles; at the end of thirty days Napoleon had capitulated at Sedan, the main French force was shut up in Metz and four German armies were converging on Paris, while the rotten structure of the third empire crashed down in the violence of the Commune. With despairing energy the French people, freed from their delusion, rallied to the defense of their country. But it was too late. Paris was starved into submission, and the nation bought peace only by surrendering two provinces and paying a staggering indemnity.

How far the Germans counted upon a repetition of these ghastly failures only their general staff knows. But if they expected to meet another Bazaine and march to the easy triumph of another Sedan, they have been disillusioned. The France of 1870 and the France of 1914 are as far apart as if the people were of different races. The careless followers of a selfish autocracy have become the sober, diligent and informed patriots of

today; the vain, incompetent commanders have been replaced by scientific leaders, whose armies have paralyzed and all but wrecked Germany's mighty war machine. The change is startling, but not mysterious. In 1870 the French people were the subjects of a despotic imperialism, and a weak one at that; they were fighting for the glory of a dynasty and the false glamour of military conquest. Today they are free citizens; their government is a democracy; they make war in the righteous cause of self-defense. They have learned the lessons of humility, sobriety and efficiency. They are inspired not by visions of imperial glory, but by love of their free institutions.

These facts account for the early reverses as well as the later victories. It is an axiom of political science that the most efficient system, particularly in war, is an intelligent autocracy. Such prodigious feats as the swift German mobilization and the irresistible drive toward Paris require the surrender of popular rights to a centralized power. Democracy is never so well prepared, never can mobilize so readily its full strength. But, on the other hand, autocracy must have victory to endure, while democracy can survive defeat. Autocracy is at its maximum of strength in the beginning; democracy, if not then overwhelmed, steadily increases its efficiency and striking power. Thus the military strength of France, despite enormous losses, is greater today than at any other time since the war started. The armies that gave way before the first terrific pressure of the German hosts have stiffened into human ramparts that defy assault, and behind them are others whose weight can be thrown into the scale when needed. The greatest fear was that the French troops, while valorous in attack and pursuit, would crumple up under defeat. But throughout the terrible retreat to the Marne they main-

tained their front with unfaltering courage and tenacity, and when the time came to advance they flung themselves upon the invaders with such impetuous gallantry that armies which were the terror of Europe were rolled back in disorder.

It is not only a new army, but a new nation, that France shows to the world today. Democracy has put into her people a fiber of patriotism infinitely stronger than the shallow enthusiasm inspired by a glittering imperialism. They are almost somberly restrained, but their calm is ominous for those who foresaw a repetition of Sedan and Gravelotte. Not even the natural desire to regain lost provinces could evoke such stern resolve. These people are not making war to gain territory, but to preserve their liberties.

A nation which fights at the bidding of an efficient autocracy can deliver crushing blows and reveal qualities of the most inspiring courage and devotion. But men who fight for a government which is their own, for the integrity of their country and the security of their homes, are unconquerable.

THE SPY

November 23, 1914.

IN ALL times and among all peoples, no doubt, the spy in warfare has been a hated figure. By those against whom he operates he is held in loathing hardly less bitter than that visited upon the traitor. He is considered beyond the pale of chivalry, just as he is without the protection of law. Even from the country he serves he cannot hope for aid, nor even for recognition. If he succeeds in his mission, he gains no glory; if he fails, he is despised and forgotten; if he is captured, he meets the ignominious death of a criminal, without even the poor consolation of being remembered by his countrymen.

It is a singular fact that exploits requiring the steadiest fortitude and the most devoted patriotism, although recognized by the law of nations, expose those who perform them to the execration of mankind. Yet there has never been a war when men could not be found to follow this dreadful pursuit, in which there is no honor to be won and the most pitiless of deaths to be braved. Many men still living can recall the execution of spies during the civil war—sometimes by the merciful volley of a squad of soldiers, sometimes by the shameful rope, but with always at the end a nameless grave. For one Nathan Hale, whose sacrifice has been commemorated by a grateful people, unnumbered men as brave have died dishonored.

The other day one was put to death in the Tower of London, and through some unusual circumstance his

name was made known around the world. Perhaps it was the place of his death that gave such wide interest to the event—the grim old pile that has been the scene of the bloodiest chapters in English history. The sentence was just, yet there was something dramatic in the letter the doomed man wrote to a friend a few days before he faced the rifles of his executioners:

* * * I am prepared to make a clean breast of all this, but I must protect my friends in the Fatherland and avoid humiliation for those who are dear to me.

You may have an opportunity to say a word to some of those for whom I feel an interest. Ask them to judge me not harshly. When they hear of me again, doubtless, my body shall have been placed beneath this old tower, or my bones shall have made a pyre. But I shall have served my country. Others have suffered, and I must accept the reward of fate.

* * *

There was no Iron Cross for Karl Hans Lody. His name will not be found in the long list of those who have died for the glory of the empire. Let him be forgotten. He was "only a spy."

THANKSGIVING

November 26, 1914.

AS NOTED in the president's proclamation, "it has long been the honored custom of our people to turn in the fruitful autumn of the year to praise and thanksgiving to Almighty God for His many blessings and mercies to us as a nation." It is just half a century since the first national Thanksgiving. The idea we owe to a Philadelphia woman, and its adoption to Abraham Lincoln. The summons of the day in 1864 was to devout acknowledgment and high resolve; a great national peril was passing away, and it seemed fitting that the people should give thanks for their deliverance and dedicate themselves anew to justice and brotherhood. As the dark shadow of the civil war drew further into the past, the celebration returned more and more to the character of a harvest festival, in which were combined the sober prayerfulness of the Puritan and the joyous acclaim of nature's bounty which has been a feature of all religions since the remotest ages.

This year the spirit of solemnity once more broods over the day. No matter how careless may seem the enjoyment of the people, those who are thoughtful cannot but feel a haunting sense of sorrow and disquietude. The comfort and peace that surround us cannot dull our ears to the moaning of an earth in sore travail. Some perception of this kind, we think, must pervade every serious utterance that marks the holiday. No prayer will ascend from home or house of worship that will not

render thanks for peace and prosperity, and an aspiration that rest will soon come to peoples afflicted almost beyond the power of man to endure.

No one who believes in the existence of an all-wise Power above and beyond the works of men can fail to honor this instinct of gratitude of the Giver of every good and perfect gift. All the countless songs of praise and thanksgiving will but feebly express the veneration humanity owes to Him whose omnipotence has carpeted the earth with plenty and breathed into the heart of man a deathless aspiration toward good. Yet in the very magnificence of our heritage as a people, in the very lavishness of the good fortune that is ours, lies the possibility of a distorted thankfulness that is really complacency, and perhaps akin to vain-glory. Even the president, whose felicity of phrase and studied exactitude of expression are noteworthy, commends "our peace and self-control" and "the self-possession of our people amid the most serious anxieties and difficulties."

True, we have peace; and we cannot too earnestly give thanks for its supreme blessing. But how much is it due to self-control, or any other virtue, and how much to isolation from the insoluble antagonism of race which envelop nations less fortunately situated? Is our self-possession amid security more noble than the flaming devotion of people who are giving their lives to uphold their national ideals and their conceptions of right? And how serious are those "anxieties and difficulties" which test our spiritual courage, compared to the torments that others are enduring?

Our thought is that nothing could be more unworthy of this day than a spirit of contentment and self-congratulation. Especially would we deplore that sincere but unthinking devoutness which conceives our present tranquillity to be a special dispensation to a chosen

people. Have we won the right to peace by preparedness to defend it? Have we earned it by conspicuous regard for the feelings and rights of others and for our own obligations? Have we deserved, by the exercise of singular virtues, any exclusive protection from a just Providence?

Shall we give thanks that we are "not as other men are," when we know in our hearts that our neutrality is a result of geographical, rather than moral, superiority over peoples immersed in furious conflict?

But there are facts stronger than these abstractions to warn us against a belief in our peculiar excellence. Before we assume that we are exceptionally deserving of providential favor let us consider another nation. Between us and the Almighty whom we would thank as our protector lies a gaunt and bleeding figure, for whom this day of our rejoicing is a day of desolation. Her courage was as high as ours could be; her fidelity to truth and honor has been an inspiration to humanity; her devotion to duty has not faltered at hopeless sacrifice. Innocent of wrong, brave, devout, faithful unto death, Belgium lies prostrate beneath the iron wheels of war. What have we done wherein she has failed? What virtue is ours that she lacked? Which of us will accuse her of having fallen short of ideals that we maintain? Yet Belgium is stricken, while we enjoy untroubled ease and are pleasantly conscious of our "self-possession." If we conceive the Creator to have singled us out for particular recognition, do we not imply that He has sent this dreadful visitation upon a people whose virtues are no less admirable?

Prosperity, too, is ours; and it is well that we should humbly acknowledge the boundless munificence which made this land one vast treasure-house. But let us, in our thankfulness, remember what use we have

made of the bounty. For a hundred years and more we have used and exploited and wasted with prodigal profusion. The forests and the fields have been stripped of their wealth; and the natural treasures of the earth, placed there for the sustenance and comfort of all, have been made the means to enrich a few and to give them unjust power over their fellows. When we examine the records of the nation's aggregate wealth, a sense of pride inevitably mingles with a feeling of gratitude to Him who created our measureless opportunities. But as we praise Him, may we not properly confess the failure that lies in the spectacle of unnumbered human beings suffering want amid all this plenty? Great are the achievements of producing vast crops, colossal outputs of manufacturing, stupendous totals of commerce, towering fortunes and unexampled luxury. Yet a greater cause of thanksgiving would be the establishment of a social system more truly balanced, a distribution more consistent with the conception we have of the Divine plan for this world and its inhabitants.

There is, nevertheless, one thing for which we may be profoundly grateful, and that is the spirit of humane helpfulness, which all our wealth and material success have not been able to extinguish. The American people, in giving so generously to the victims of the war, have done such honor to the true spirit of this day as no ceremonial forms of worship could give. They are thankful for the opportunity and the power to succor helpless ones in distress.

Thanksgiving is a gracious and uplifting festival, whose celebration may well inspire reverence. Yet its deeper meaning, we think, would be better served if, in a national sense, we marked it not only as a day of gratitude, but as a day of humility and repentance.

WHAT IS GERMAN "CULTURE"?

November 28, 1914.

IN COUNTING up the adverse influences which have beset Germany in her relations toward the world, most of us consider only the armaments allied against her and the moral opposition aroused against certain of her acts and policies. Yet there is another thing, a seeming trifle, which has had a potent effect in causing misunderstanding of German thought and purpose; and misunderstanding is the parent of injustice and enmity. This handicap lies in the difficulty of expressing German ideas with exactitude in other languages, and particularly in English. Next to a democratic form of government and a somewhat higher conception of international morality, Germany's most urgent need, we should say, is a competent interpretation.

The possibilities of confusion that lurk in hasty, ill-considered translations from one tongue to another are really stupendous. There are thoughts and ideas quite elementary to one people which members of another race cannot mentally visualize with even approximate accuracy. For example, the Japanese who speaks of his "honorable grandmother" expresses a pious veneration which reaches back into the dim regions of antiquity and passes the borderland of religious sanctity. Yet a fictitious Japanese schoolboy of current American humor makes the phrase "Hon. grandmother" irresistibly comic. To give another instance from the same nation, a Japanese convert to Christianity rendered into his

tongue the solemn words "Rock of Ages, cleft for me." His intent was the most pious in the world, but his hearers among his own people were profoundly puzzled by reading the Japanese equivalent of "Very old stone, split for my benefit."

That Germany has suffered seriously by the perversity of transplanted words is not to be doubted. While she was at peace with all the world no great damage to her standing was apparent. But no sooner had she become involved in war than her foes and her critics made joyous use of distorted translations which had long been current. The kaiser, as the most noted and most picturesque spokesman of the nation, has naturally been the chief victim in this regard.

"Supreme war lord"—thus, as everybody knows, his imperial majesty is sometimes addressed; and thus he is wont to name himself in his stirring exhortations to his troops. It is a mouth-filling term, worthy of the military magnificence and worshipful pomp that supposedly envelop the kaiser, and has become so imbedded in popular thought that it would be hopeless to endeavor to pry it out. Yet the fact is that the phrase as it has reached us is wholly misleading. Wilhelm II never was hailed and never described himself as "supreme war lord" of the German people. The title he uses, with perfect right and propriety, is "Oberkriegsherr," and its real meaning is pretty well rendered by "Commander-in-chief," a title which the president of the United States bears, in his capacity as head of the army and navy, without arousing fears of imperialistic designs.

Since the beginning of hostilities the emperor's words have been more closely scrutinized than ever by his foes. A perfect fusillade of criticism was leveled at him a few weeks ago by persons whose religious sensibilities had been shocked by a sentence in an address to

a regiment. "We shall yet destroy our enemies," ran the report of the imperial speech. "Our old God up there will give us the victory."

This was really too much. A belief in the divine right of kings is bad enough, but it is intolerable that the delusion should be carried so far that a man, however exalted, should invoke the Creator with such arrogant familiarity. The reference to "our old God up there" seemed in wretched taste, and that the German people did not resent it proved, of course, their pagan depravity. Unfortunately for the value of this criticism, however, the kaiser's words had no such meaning as was attributed to them. His religious faith is one of the passions of his life, and his pious veneration for sacred things a habit founded upon deep conviction. What he really said was, "Our ancient God on high will give us the victory"; and, whatever may be thought of his theory, the most bitter opponent cannot justly complain of his phraseology.

But these examples of error in regard to German ideas are trifling compared to a misconception which is even more baseless. If we were asked to name the one thing most hurtful to the German cause, we should hesitate whether to cite the violation of Belgium's neutrality, the sack of Louvain or the phrase "German culture."

The prominence of German "Kultur" in the controversy is due to its persistent emphasis by all spokesmen for that side. The kaiser exhorts his troops to defend the fatherland and "Kultur." It was Teutonic "Kultur" that was in peril from Russian barbarism, necessitating an invasion of Belgium. The imperial chancellor used it in his oration to the reichstag, and it appears in all the manifestos of statesmen, diplomats, soldiers, journalists, university professors and other advocates for the empire. German "Kultur," we have been instructed, is the

very soul of Teutonic civilization, the uplifting force in Europe, the one thing needful to regenerate the world.

Now, to most non-Germans this apparent claim to the possession of an exclusive "culture" was at first merely amusing. Students of the glories of genius in art, music, literature and science which are the heritage of the Latin and Celtic and Anglo-Saxon peoples found the solemn assumption of Teutonic superiority quite exhilarating. But in time the word became an irritation.

"Confound your 'culture'!" said the exasperated world. "Some of us had scholarship and polish and spiritual enlightenment when you were barbarians, and we have works of genius which tower above your best productions like mountain peaks above a plain. Moreover, we do not observe in your social habits, your politics or your international relations any impressive signs of a special refinement which we might profitably adopt."

Hence it became a habit among Germany's critics to fling her "culture" in her teeth. The most inexpert controversialist could make a telling point by inquiring whether the repudiation of treaties and the burning of cities were evidences of German "culture" in operation. Yet all this is lamentably unjust. Germany has not arrogated to herself the possession of the highest "culture." Her "Kultur" is something quite apart from the popular meaning given to the term used to express it in English. Culture, in the narrow sense in which most of us use it, implies development of the mind, refinement of the sensibilities, enlargement of the spiritual vision, encouragement of lofty aspirations. "Kultur," on the contrary, is intensely practical and materialistic; it is an all-embracing term for advanced civilization.

When the German speaks of "Kultur" he means not only scholarship and artistic genius, but all the developments in governmental, social and economic betterment.

He includes expert and honest municipal rule; scientific efficiency in industry, education and military training; high standards of service in public utilities; conservation of natural resources; effective measures of public sanitation; an aggressive commercial policy; the amelioration of poverty and the elimination of uneconomic living conditions; old-age pensions, industrial insurance and a thousand other results of German thoroughness in dealing with the problems of existence.

"Kultur" means not only achievements in the arts and sciences, but in everyday progress; it embraces not only poems and symphonies, but dirigible airships, sanitary tenements and scientific sewage disposal. It covers the whole range of German civilization. It is for this that the German people are fighting. Rightly or wrongly, they are possessed with the idea that other nations have plotted to destroy it, and they have proved themselves ready for any sacrifice to preserve it.

Humanity may properly deplore and resent the theory that this "Kultur," magnificent as it is, justifies the ignoring of treaties as "scraps of paper" and efforts to impose it upon free nations by force of arms. But it must be conceded that the cause is not so trifling as generally supposed. How much Germany has suffered from the world-wide misconception of her favorite word it would be impossible to estimate. But our judgment is that she might profitably exchange her whole fleet of armored Zeppelins for a plan that would blot out the fatally misunderstood term "culture" from her propaganda and from the memory of mankind.

THE DOPESTER

December 1, 1914.

HIS title will not be found in the dictionary, nor his occupation listed in the city directory. His name appears on no office door, adorns no letterheads. Yet he is a member of a profession which counts its votaries among all classes and all nations, and his outgivings enlist the study of attentive millions. All human activities, enterprises and achievements come within the ken of the dopester in one of his many guises, and are subject to his expert analysis. He is a cold-blooded calculator, a trained observer of probabilities, a deductive reasoner from cause to effect. He correlates the known elements in a problem, and from them evolves ingenious forecasts. The field of his endeavors embraces not only human affairs, but the lower orders of creation and the manifestations of nature. His title is a product of the language of the racetrack. His charts of "past performances" were named "dope sheets," and his interpretation thereof made him the "dopester." The financial writer, with his lists of quotations, and the weather man, with his isothermal mysteries, are dopesters in their degree.

But we are concerned here with the dopester who measures the capacity of the human machine, individually or in the mass, and deduces therefrom the probabilities of success or failure in a specific performance. Without him, it is to be feared, the institution of sport would lose its appeal.

The sporting expert has been quite overshadowed in interest, however, by a brother scientist—the dopester of the European war. The intricate entanglement of human forces in the mighty conflict and the almost endless combination of elements gave him an unusual chance to exercise his genius. He was active long before the event, in books and pamphlets and magazine articles, predicting the course of the war, the exact disposition of contestants and the inevitable development of each phase. The dean of this prophetic school was unquestionably General Bernhardi; and any one who has studied his forecasts must concede that he was a very paragon of dopesters, touching the main events of the struggle. But we have it in mind to speak, rather, of the military dopesters whose confident predictions enlivened the opening of the war. Long study and experience had made them familiar with all the organizations and units, and they were ready with unlimited instruction as to coming events. Some of their findings may now be examined with interest and profit.

An English dopester more noted as a novelist than a tactician pointed out with convincing detail, for example, that the German army was “about twenty years behind the requirements of contemporary conditions.” He conceded its wonderful efficiency and discipline, but found it wholly lacking in flexibility and driving initiative. “I venture to prophesy,” he said, “that within three months the French tricolor will be over the Rhine.” That was written on August 4, and the antiquated German army is still several leagues on the wrong side of that historic river. Other experts painstakingly argued that the German hosts must fail in the real test because they were untried; all the theatrical maneuvers, carried out with such precision, were worthless preparation. Yet the sweep across Belgium and

down to the gates of Paris will remain for generations, perhaps, the finest feat of sheer forceful efficiency in the history of arms. The French soldier, on the contrary, was pictured as nimble and quick witted in the field and almost irresistible in attack, but certain to collapse under the strain of retreat or long defense. And the retreat to the Marne showed him a master of the most wearing task a soldier can face. The Russian army was a monstrous joke among the experts. It had no stamina, no intelligence, no strategy, no means of quick mobilization. But it is the only one that has put foot on German soil; and it still presents a problem more ominous for Germany than the mighty forces in the west.

It is really pathetic to read now the early accounts of that barrier of "impregnable" fortresses that was to mock at German invasion of France. Not one has come under the assault of the great Krupp engines without being reduced to melancholy ruins. The bayonet, we used to read, was as obsolete a weapon as the crossbow; no human being would ever live long enough in a modern battle to use it. Yet men have been found by tens of thousands with wit enough to dodge death across hell-swept spaces and courage enough to dash with their bayonets against machine guns vomiting destruction.

Was there any military dopester who did not hold as a cardinal article of his faith a belief in the absolute supremacy of Great Britain on the sea? Her preponderance in ships and guns was obvious; but beyond this she had such superiority in seamanship, strategy and marksmanship that the naval operation must be one long succession of British triumphs. Yet to date the German losses at sea total 75,000 tons; the British losses, 156,000 tons. The encounter near Helgoland narrowly missed being a victory for the kaiser; the

battle off the coast of Chile was distinctly a vindication of German strategy; and with deadly reiteration Britannia's rule of the waves is being challenged by the stiletto-like thrusts of German "Unterseeboote." The dopesters themselves are hopelessly divided even now upon the relative merits of dreadnoughts and submarines. The security of Britain's sea commerce answers those who have said that the battleship is worthless, while the astounding feats of the under-water cruiser show that this type of craft has possibilities its critics derided.

As for the Zeppelin, the battleship of the air, it still mocks at those who predicted that this war would be won from the clouds. On the other hand, if a fleet of dirigibles does lay London in ruins, there will be just as many dopesters discredited, for whole battalions of experts have demonstrated mathematically that the Zeppelin is an utterly fantastic and impossible device. The aeroplane, again, has yielded its contradictions. Almost with one accord the dopesters declared that the French would produce the most daring and efficient pilots. They had the mechanical genius, the poetic temperament, the high spirit of daredevil adventure which alone could fit men for such perilous work. The accounts are not yet complete, but the general impression is that the British flying corps has won the honors of the air.

Now, why is it that the keenest experts, with all possible data before them, have so often been at fault in their predictions? The question is not without a philosophic interest. The fatal defect of the system of the dopester is that he bases his conclusions upon past performances. He gives too little weight to the element of human progress, man's immeasurable capacity for improvement, for higher expressions of his ability, courage and genius.

The sporting experts, observing a baseball team almost flawless in its work, could not conceive of one excelling it; so the engineers who built those stupendous fortresses held them to be impregnable. Having put all the experience of centuries into the construction of mighty walls of adamantine concrete and cupolas of massive steel, they knew as a mathematical certainty that no gun existed which could penetrate the defense. But it did exist—in the brain of a German. And when it became a reality the most modern fortress became an anachronism. German strategists, knowing with scientific accuracy the colossal force of their war machine, could not realize that the French were capable of tenacious defense, as well as impetuous attack. The British airman, under stress, has shown skill and audacity of which he was never suspected; and the despised Russian moujik has become a real terror. The sublime confidence of the British in their navy was justified—until German science exerted its genius. England finds that the methods of Drake and Rodney and Nelson will no longer serve, and that yesterday's triumph of the shipyard is today's victim of a newer idea.

The prophet who sees finality in any human activity lacks understanding of the past as well as vision to penetrate the future. The mind of man has not reached its highest possible development, and it is impossible to conceive of a time when it will. So long as there are mysteries of life to be solved and great tasks to be performed, it will strive and achieve. Just as this conflict has defied the plausible predictions of experts, so the next will reveal marvels of destructive genius now undreamed of; until one day it will be found that the race has reached a new stage of unfolding intelligence, and that war itself is obsolete, to the astonishment, very likely, of the dopesters of that age.

A NEW ASSAULT ON BELGIUM

December 4, 1914.

DURING the splendid outpouring of Philadelphia's generosity in behalf of famine-stricken Belgium we received a letter—anonymous, of course—bitterly denouncing this newspaper's editorial attitude on the war. Only one paragraph was worthy of preservation, because it struck a new note. Said the writer:

Why print all that slush about the Belgians, when you know, in spite of English lies, that they got what they deserved? If they are hungry, it is because they joined with Germany's enemies. * * *

At the time we regarded this singular utterance as a mere manifestation of rancor, due, in part, to the continued ill success of the German armies. But we have learned since that it was a symptom of one of the most remarkable changes of thought that have taken place since the war began. Three months ago the German attitude toward Belgium, despite the sanguinary struggle, was marked by a certain formal chivalry. It was "necessary," according to the military code, to use the most ruthless methods of warfare; but these measures were adopted, it was said, with regret, and Belgium's heroic stand for her national integrity, while a costly mistake, was acknowledged to be just. The fullest possible reparation has been publicly pledged by the imperial chancellor.

When it became clear, however, that Belgian resistance had wrecked the plan for a swift conquest of France, and particularly when the German retreat from Paris

became a definite fact, there was a marked change. Belgium was denounced as an unscrupulous enemy, a nation unworthy of any fate but to be subjugated by brute force. A deliberate campaign was undertaken not only to discredit her self-sacrificing patriotism, but to blacken her fame in the eyes of the world.

The German government has supplied the keynote for this chorus of defamation by issuing official statements charging that the Belgian government conspired with Great Britain to land British troops in Belgium in 1906 and with France to admit her forces to attack Germany. All the spokesmen for "Kultur," from Dr. Bernhard Dernburg to the industrious writers of letters to the newspapers, ring the changes upon this theme with ever-increasing virulence.

"Belgian neutrality was a myth," says one. "It was one sided, a threat against Germany," says another. "Belgium wanted war; she was a secret ally of England and France," cries a third. German newspapers jeeringly ask why those two countries do not feed the victims of their "perfidy." They denounce Belgium as a dishonorable foe, that has earned the utmost rigors of humiliating conquest. With astounding hardihood, the representatives of imperialism now picture prostrate Belgium as the aggressor, and Germany as the victim of cruel injury.

This propaganda is so widespread and so determined that there is no doubt of its official inspiration. With characteristic efficiency, the German government and people have set out to destroy the image of heroism and sacrifice that exists in the minds of men, and to substitute therefor an image of craft and dishonor. Germany is not yet through with crushed and bleeding Belgium. The flinging of bombs on sleeping homes, the leveling of cities, the exaction of vast tribute, the in-

fiction of alien military rule, the driving of a million men and women and children into exile, the seizure of all food supplies from a destitute people—these things are not enough. Belgium's martyrdom must be mocked; she must be covered with reproach; she must be branded, in all her helplessness and despair, as a strumpet among the nations. In the face of this campaign of calumny it becomes necessary to restate the facts. Happily, the records are plain, and are not to be obscured or distorted by all the sophistries of eloquent advocates. With as little editorial comment as possible, we shall set down once more the record which in its main points is familiar to Americans.

During the Middle Ages and until the early part of the nineteenth century Belgium was the battlefield of all the contending nations of central Europe, and a dozen times the country was divided, reunited and passed from one alien rule to another. It was held at various times by Burgundy, by Austria, by Spain, by Austria again and by France. After the fall of Napoleon it was incorporated with Holland. The union was intensely unpopular, and in 1830 the Belgians won their independence by revolution. Thereupon "perpetual neutrality" was imposed upon Belgium, not only by her own desire, but by formal treaty of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. On June 26, 1831, these Powers signed a treaty providing:

Belgium shall form a perpetually neutral State. The five Powers guarantee her that perpetual neutrality, as well as the integrity and inviolability of her territory.

By just reciprocity Belgium shall be held to observe this same neutrality toward all the other States, and to make no attack on their tranquillity, whilst always preserving the right to defend herself against any foreign aggression.

The guarantee of neutrality was distinct and unequivocal, as was the obligation of Belgium to observe the condition. But eight years later the solemn pact was renewed. Holland then for the first time recognized Belgium's independence, and a new treaty between the two countries was signed on January 23, 1839, providing:

Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. She is obligated to preserve this neutrality against all the other States.

Here was stated in still clearer terms the duty of Belgium not only to observe neutrality, but to "preserve" it—to defend it. And once more the treaty was placed under the solemn, formal guarantee of Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. Belgian neutrality, in the joint keeping of herself and of the great Powers, was not seriously questioned for more than thirty years. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 raised the first fears; but Great Britain procured from each of the belligerents a formal engagement not to trespass upon Belgian territory. Moreover, the Belgian minister in Berlin obtained this positive assurance from Bismarck, reaffirming the old treaties:

BERLIN, July 22, 1870.—In confirmation of my verbal assurances, I have the honor to give in writing a declaration which, in view of the treaties in force, is quite superfluous, that the Confederation of the North and its allies will respect the neutrality of Belgium, on the understanding, of course, that it is respected by the other belligerents.

Belgium herself was so scrupulously careful in observing her obligations that she forbade her people to supply arms and ammunition to either belligerent, as they had a legal right to do; and she further refused to permit France even to send her wounded troops homeward across Belgian territory. The first assault upon her neutrality was made by Germany, one of the signatories to the treaties of 1831 and 1839. On August 2

last, without the slightest warning, she delivered to Belgium an ultimatum demanding passage for her armies across Belgium in order to attack France. This, which would have made Belgium an ally of Germany against France, and would have been an utter betrayal by Belgium of her obligations to preserve neutrality, was described by Germany as "an attitude of friendly neutrality." The alternative she offered was war, followed by annexation. Belgium's reply, destined to become one of the noted documents of history, refuted the invention that France was preparing to invade her territory, and said:

Moreover, if the country's neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium would fulfill her international duties, and her army would oppose a most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, perpetuate Belgium's independence and neutrality under the guarantee of the Powers, and especially under the guarantee of the government of his majesty the king of Prussia (the kaiser).

Belgium has always faithfully observed her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no opportunity to maintain her neutrality and to cause it to be respected by others.

The attack upon her independence with which Germany menaces her is a flagrant violation of the law of nations. The Belgian government, by accepting the propositions mentioned, would sacrifice its national honor and betray at the same time its duty toward Europe. Conscious of the role which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilized world, it refuses to believe that its independence can be preserved only at the price of a betrayal of its neutrality.

Belgium's refusal to believe that Germany was capable of violating a thrice-pledged word was answered by the assault on Liege, the beginning of a war of conquest carried out with unexampled ruthlessness. But there is in the record a formal acknowledgment from Germany which mocks at all the subtle efforts of her

advocates to justify her course. Addressing the reichstag on August 4, the imperial chancellor said:

Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already penetrated into Belgium. This is against the law of nations. France was ready to invade Belgium; so we were compelled to override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavor to make good.

It was the same high official who expressed the German view with even greater clearness when he denounced the action of Great Britain in going to war “just for a word—neutrality; just for a scrap of paper.” Those who are now defaming Belgium as a plotter against Germany make two allegations. The first is that used by the chancellor—that “France was ready to invade Belgium.” The utter mendacity of this plea is shown by two facts. First, France offered five army corps to Belgium to defend her neutrality, after the German ultimatum had been given, but Belgium answered:

We are sincerely grateful to the French government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers.

Second, it is a matter of record that France was so little prepared to invade Belgium that it took her more than ten days to get her troops into the country. The other defense offered by the German government is that in 1906 military representatives of the British government tentatively discussed with the Belgian authorities arrangements for landing a British expedition in Belgium in case her neutrality should be attacked.

If such action was taken, of course, it reflects credit upon both governments; for it shows that Britain was ready to make sacrifices to defend the neutrality she had sworn to uphold, while Germany was ready to repu-

diate her solemn word in order to violate that neutrality. And how well prepared Germany was for her perfidious action is revealed in the existence of elaborate railway lines traversing the sparsely populated territory near the Belgian border, with immense yards at the very frontier designed for the handling of troop trains and no other purpose whatsoever. The invasion of Belgium was not an enterprise suddenly forced upon Germany by any menace from France or England. It was an act long before calculated and prepared for with deliberate purpose and minute efficiency.

In the face of this record, German advocates express plaintive surprise that throughout the world there is much hostility to their cause. The fact is that when the imperial troops crossed the Belgian frontier Germany placed herself morally in the position of an international burglar—a measure which would seem to require an extreme skill to justify. To a certain extent, the desperate nature of the expedient was mitigated by the straightforward expressions of regret and pledges of reparation. But now these have been repudiated; and Germany is engaged in an organized campaign to defame the victim she wronged. This is an offense far blacker than the invasion. Struck down under the plea of “military necessity,” Belgium is to be robbed even of her good name. The very corpse of the murdered nation is to be dishonored and mutilated.

Fortunately, the effort has to meet a well-informed public opinion. Americans will listen to arguments in behalf of autocracy, Pan-Germanism, militarism and the right of German defense against Russian pressure and British domination. But as regards Belgium the case is closed, and will not be reopened except to make the verdict against her despoiler more severe.

COURAGE IN WAR

December 8, 1914.

A CONSTANT theme in the discussion of the war is its dreadful pre-eminence in sanguinary horror. The mind is appalled by the hellish power of the engines of destruction. It is a favorite device of imaginative description to picture the struggle as between monstrous, inhuman, soulless machines. The human element appears only in the harrowing scenes of suffering and death; the men seem but dumb victims of mechanical devastation. In modern war, we are told, there is no romance, no inspiring glamour of heroism; all is somber and sodden and revolting—a mere question of which side can sacrifice the greatest weight in flesh and blood.

All this is depressingly true, yet it is only half the truth. The more we study the grimly reticent reports from the battlefields the more we are persuaded that the most striking products of the war are not the ingenuities of destructive weapons, but the demonstrations of that physical, mental and spiritual quality which we call courage. The marvel is not that man has so multiplied and enlarged the instruments of death, but that his dauntless spirit still defies the calculated terrors of scientific slaughter. In a vague way, most of us had come to regard physical courage, particularly of the type required in war, as an attribute which modern peoples had failed to inherit from their valorous ancestors. Our softer civilization, it was held, could not breed heroes

like those of other times, who went into battle with shouts of exultation and braved death with unflinching hardihood.

The very highest conception we have of fortitude takes its name from the ancient Spartans. When we think of intrepidity in war we picture the three hundred spearmen in the pass of Thermopylae; the Grecian infantry, with its bristling ranks massed for indomitable defense; the soldiers of the Caesars crushing barbarian hosts by their iron onslaught; mail-clad Crusaders slashing a path through the Saracen hosts to the gates of Jerusalem; the furious combats of Moor and Spaniard, Turk and Christian; the dashing troops of Louis the Magnificent, of Frederick and Gustavus Adolphus, of Napoleon and Wellington, of Grant and Lee. Modern life seemed too luxurious and prosaic to give play to warlike vigor of body and mind. Poets who would celebrate battle deeds turned to "days of old when knights were bold." The popular author who sought to thrill us with scenes of daring rewrote Scott or Dumas—pictured champions in shining armor or plumed bravos with flashing rapiers. Our types of resolute gallantry have been the Ivanhoes and D'Artagnans of historic romance.

No doubt it was the hot fury of personal combat that fired the imagination. The primal instincts of the human mind respond eagerly to the thought of the Greek phalanx, against which wave after wave of Persian horsemen surged and broke; the Roman legions, with their twenty-four-foot spears and hurtling javelins and deadly two-edged swords; the English bowmen at Agincourt, whose flickering arrows and humming bolts broke the ranks of the enemy and opened the way for the thundering charge of the chivalry. Surely, those robust warriors of old were men of valor. How could a degenerate age hope to produce their equals? Yet we

know now that the perils they faced and the pains they endured were not to be compared with those of later battlefields. When some one—whether Roger Bacon or a Chinese philosopher does not matter—mixed some evil chemicals and made gunpowder he foreshadowed warfare in which human courage should have to rise in a swiftly ascending scale in order to sustain the accumulated horrors.

The first cannon—rude contrivances which flung rounded stones in languid curves—were hardly more deadly than the monster catapults of Assyria and Rome; but they presaged the siege guns that crumble fortresses at seven miles. The first musket was a weirdly inconsequential instrument, but it drove the knight from the field and doomed feudalism itself; for it made the foot soldier the master of the mounted aristocrat. For six centuries the genius of man has been bent upon refining and making more powerful these devices, until the carnage of a modern battle equals that of whole wars which are famous in history. The primitive fighter needed little more than a strong frame and a hardy spirit. Given these, the turbulent hand-to-hand conflict provided such excitement that there was no time for fear. Men flung themselves into battle with impetuous ardor and wielded spear or sword or ax with savage exultation. The first onslaughts needed grim courage; but after that it was a matter of instinct and endurance.

Moreover, there was no danger except when in actual contact with the enemy; the soldier fought for a few hours, then was reasonably sure of a rest. Today men live under fire day and night for weeks on end. The apex of war's horrors, as most of us conceived it, was represented in the Napoleonic battles or in the sanguinary conflicts of the civil war. Yet these were not to be compared with the operations in France and Flanders

and Poland, where men are facing with deliberation assaults so incessant and so inhuman that they might well crush out every emotion save terror.

The meager pictures that reach us from the modern battlefields suggest what supreme courage this requires. Here is no scene of inspiring color and movement, but a hideous emptiness and clamor, in which men strive and die in unseen trenches or fall before hidden death loosed upon them miles away. If they crawl from their shelters to fight, they do not meet ranks of other men, but blasts of steel from invisible engines. If they capture new ground, they do not know when mined craters will open beneath them and fling them out in tortured heaps. There is no safety, no rest, anywhere within the battle's zone. Masked behind distant hills, unseen guns shower death upon trenches miles away. The open spaces are swept by shells and the deadly hail of machine guns. Bombs and steel bolts rain unheralded from the sky. In many places those who fall wounded were better dead, for where they fall they must lie until death releases them from their torment—and after. A correspondent has touched upon this feature with grewsome suggestiveness. Next to food and ammunition, he says, the greatest need of the men in the trenches is tobacco—not alone for its soothing effect, but because it helps to stifle the charnel odors that are borne on every wind.

But it is not these grisly things alone that test the fortitude of the present-day soldier. There are the interminable days and nights in cramped, reeking trenches, often waist deep in water; the exposure to pitiless rains and icy winds; the indescribable, animal-like existence; the fever and pain and weariness of it; the intolerable suspense; the repeated shock of seeing living men torn into fragments; the deadly reiteration of blinding explosions. It is no wonder that outraged nature often suc-

cumbs and that men without a mark upon them are lifted from the rifle pits dazed, speechless and all but mad.

For the figure of heroism at sea romance points to the warrior of the ancient galley, driving his prow against the ship of his enemy, then leaping to her deck and hacking his way to victory; or salutes the seaman of a hundred years ago, working his wall-sided frigate to windward of his foe and firing his smoothbores in a gallant broadside. But what of the courage needed to patrol a fog-bound sea in a modern warship, when the waters are sown thick with mines that can rip open the plates of a dreadnought, or driven death may lurk beneath any passing wave?

Hit, and hard hit! The blow went home;
The muffled, knocking stroke—
The steam that overruns the foam—
The foam that thins to smoke—
The smoke that cloaks the deep aboil—
The deep that chokes her throes,
Till, streaked with ash and sleeked with oil,
The lukewarm whirlpools close!

Or what shall we say of youths who will lock themselves in a submarine and search a half thousand miles of sea for a chance to strike at an enemy—the chance, too, that their frail craft will be pierced and they will die horribly in their steel prison? The knight charging into the fray with leveled lance was a brave figure, upon whom poets and painters have lavished much art. But will his valor compare with the daring of the air scout in battle, dicing with death in the clouds, hunted by bursting shells, trusting his life to the faith of a motor and a few strands of wire, knowing that a chance shot may hurl him to a hideous death?

Finally, it is to be considered that the fighter of old was often a dull rogue, to whom war was a mere trade and whose careless life had made no ties. These soldiers

who are dying in Europe are men who fight for principle and who must bear into battle the anguish of knowing that if they fall there will be sheltered homes left desolate, gentle women bereaved, children made fatherless. The highest type of martial heroism is not the dashing adventurer of romance, but the mud-stained man in the trenches over yonder—the French peasant, the Belgian artisan, the German farmer or university student, the British clerk or peer or workman; men like ourselves, used to peace and order and decency, who are enduring unimaginable horrors for the sake of their ideals.

Their courage proves again that the human spirit still rises superior to any test that fate can devise. Man's genius for destruction has made great flights from the flint war club to the machine gun, from the tube of Greek fire to the submarine torpedo; but not yet has it distanced his courage or produced perils that his spiritual convictions will not lead him to brave for the truth as he sees it.

THE WAR AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

December 9, 1914.

AN ACQUAINTANCE who recently conversed with David Lloyd-George in London has given us a suggestive account of the cabinet officer's bearing. It is to be expected that in this time of national trial a British statesman should show signs of care and preoccupation, but the chancellor of the exchequer revealed a mood of profound disappointment and sadness.

Because of his association with movements which have their counterpart in this country, his attitude should be interesting to thoughtful Americans. It is no misgiving as to the government's course in the war that produced this dejection. Mr. Lloyd-George is an avowed opponent of militarism and one who views war as barbarous; but he believes that his country has been summoned to make a supreme sacrifice for civilization and international honor, and is as confident of ultimate victory as he is that the cause is just. He was deeply affected, as every humane man must be, by the appalling destruction of life and the increasing burden of sorrow; yet his depression was due to still another reason. He foresees, as one of the inevitable results of the tremendous conflict, a halting of the great program of social betterment in Britain, of which he has been the inspiration and the champion. Beyond the present time of hardship and anguish he discerns barren years of helpless striving, which but for this war would have been fruitful with widespread benefits for humanity.

Efforts to reach a more equitable adjustment of the conditions of life have been made by statesmen and publicists in many countries, but it remained for this brilliant Welshman to work out in conservative England a program for the expansion of social and industrial justice that was far reaching and at the same time in harmony with the principles of democracy. He has been a member of the cabinet since 1905 and chancellor of the exchequer for six years. Charged with the chief responsibility for the fiscal policy of the empire and the duty of preparing the budgets and devising means for raising funds to meet the ever-increasing needs of the government, he has come to understand clearly that measures of social betterment require ample revenues. And now, with many such projects under way and others ready to be launched, the country is plunged into a war which is costing the people \$5,000,000 a day; and the national debt, already burdensome, is piling up to colossal proportions.

To a man of Lloyd-George's experience it is obvious that Great Britain has entered upon an era of many years during which her problem will be one of existence rather than betterment; when the struggle for bread will absorb the energies that were being turned to the creation of a higher type of social life. He recognizes that progress of the kind to which he has devoted himself is expensive—that old-age pensions, land reform, housing improvements and insurance against sickness, unemployment, industrial accidents and occupational disease require enormous outlay; and he knows by experience that the vast sums needed can be obtained only when the nation has what is called a social surplus. In the simplest terms, all these projects, in essence, imply a scientific readjustment of the burdens of life, a more equitable distribution of wealth; they can be forwarded

only by making drafts upon the surplus; and when the surplus is swallowed up by some great cataclysm, as this war, the process necessarily stops. Our friend remarked that the chancellor seemed inexpressibly heavy hearted. This is not strange. For he realizes that the cause to which he has given his utmost devotion has been thrust aside; that the splendid enterprise which he hoped to see consummated during his tenure of office has been paralyzed, and may not be revived during his lifetime.

It must be observed that this condition is not peculiar to Great Britain. In France and in Germany and in all other countries where an awakened social sense, or some other force, had swung the pendulum toward a saner and juster system, the backward swing is remorselessly sure. Nations which are involved in or affected by the war—and that includes all—are turned perforce to the elemental needs of existence. Other desires must wait. The movement toward social readjustment was really world wide; all nations have been influenced by it in some degree. Mr. Lloyd-George did not refer to the United States in his observations upon the interruption of the movement, but he might logically have included this and every other country, however remote from the scenes of conflict. Because of a similarity in institutions and ideals, Great Britain's progress along these lines has inspired notable endeavors on this side of the ocean; and the check her advance has suffered must inevitably react here. The whole world, indeed, has been so shaken by the European upheaval that the thoughts of men are running in new channels. During recent years it had seemed that most of the deep-rooted wrongs of civilization would be abated through the processes of peaceful revolutions.

Now that rational movement has been indefinitely halted. Greater and more menacing problems confront

the nations, and all peoples are sensible of apprehension as they face impending readjustments, which may be of a nature so violent as to shake the very foundations of society. Revolutions never go backward. But not infrequently their progress is delayed by the irruption of forces which cannot be overcome or resisted. So it is to be with the social revolution in this country. Although incidental losses will be observable in the overturning of salutary laws won by aroused sentiment, the momentum of the movement is so great that many of the better-understood measures will be carried through. But a continuation of the steady advance that was under way a few months ago does not at this time seem probable.

Supporters of the cause of social and industrial justice need not fear that the case is desperate. The change is psychological rather than real. The marked recession in the force of the movement is a sympathetic reaction from a like manifestation in other countries. Beyond that point, however, the parallel ceases. Conditions here are diametrically different. Among other nations surplus wealth is being wasted, human productive energy is being destroyed, billions of value are being obliterated; here there is no such frightful devastation. Every people, it is true, must in the end pay its share of the cost of wanton annihilation of value; yet the countries at war are so largely dependent upon us for the necessities of life that extraordinary activity and great increase in demands upon our production will make this nation relatively prosperous. In other words, while their resources are being steadily and swiftly drained, that very fact must cause our surplus of wealth to accumulate. What this means in the matter of social reform we have already noted in the references to Lloyd-

George. For a more comprehensive statement we quote from "The New Democracy," by Dr. Walter E. Weyl:

It is the increasing wealth of America upon which the hope of a full democracy must be based. It is this wealth which makes democracy possible and solvent, for democracy, like civilization, costs money. It is this social surplus which gives to our democratic strivings a moral impulse and a moral sanction. * * *

Intellectual and moral progress cost money, as do steam engines and dreadnoughts. Money—though only a part—is necessary for education, sanitation, leisure and the amenities of life; for schools, universities, libraries, research institutes, art galleries, hospitals, museums, theaters, books, parks, improved houses, better factories, clothing, shelter. Our chance in America of an eventual civilization rising above the demand for daily bread and more money depends upon our wise utilization of our national resources and our national earnings. However spiritual a structure civilization is, it is nevertheless built upon wheat, pork, steel, money, wealth.

It is true, as Britain's far-seeing chancellor sadly discerns, that Great Britain must yield to other purposes the billions of surplus wealth which she planned wisely to use for achieving social progress. But the United States is destined to become more and more a creditor nation; and an increasing surplus will enable us in time to take up and carry on the work which other peoples have been compelled to abandon. Just now the whole structure of civilization is shaken, and the problem upon which the people of this nation are concentrating their minds is not how to divide prosperity, but how to get prosperity. Yet we venture to predict that this condition will be more short lived than some dejected thinkers believe. However discouraging may be the present halt, we are convinced that to this country, where democracy on a vast scale first achieved political security, the world will yet turn to study the highest manifestations of social and industrial democracy.

DEFENSE AND MILITARISM

December 11, 1914.

LAST Sunday's issue of a New York organ of the Wilson administration devoted a full page to a revelation of England's "total unpreparedness" for the war at its beginning. There was a deficiency of a hundred thousand trained soldiers. Even when recruits poured in there were no uniforms ready to clothe them, no rifles to arm them, no officers to drill them. By thousands they were sent to Salisbury Plain, and herded there during the chill autumn weather without shelter and with insufficient food. Only the iron censorship prevented the tragic truth from becoming known and wrecking the defense of the empire at the outset by creating hopeless confusion and panic.

No more vividly instructive lesson could have been devised than this well-written story, based upon facts which are now admitted to be true. Yet the same newspaper, when a widespread movement arises for a public inquiry into the state of the national defenses of the United States, leads an outcry against it as "political agitation" and denounces its advocates as jingoists and promoters of militarism.

Thus, instructed by the White House, Democratic congressmen have attempted to discredit the demand on the ground that it was first projected by Representative Gardner, of Massachusetts, and Senator Lodge, both Republicans, and therefore "notoriety-seeking politicians." It is quite likely that these gentlemen are not

insensible of the political advantage to be won by forcing the administration's hand; but the response to their agitation ought to convince any one but a sodden partisan that this question has passed out of the keeping of either Republicans or Democrats. It is the leading topic today in nearly every influential newspaper in the country, and has overshadowed the war itself as a theme of public interest. In our judgment, it is not only bad politics, but bad Americanism to try to sneer away a movement which has caused the formation of such a body as the National Security League. This organization, launched in New York ten days ago, and already forming branches throughout the country, is not made up of jingoists or militarists, but of sound, conservative business men, lawyers, publishers, bankers, university professors and publicists, many of them members of peace societies. Its announced purpose is neither to demand conscription nor urge the creation of a vast army, but to organize public opinion "for the purpose of securing the enactment by congress and other legislative bodies of the measures required for national security," and "to procure a proper inquiry on the part of the administration and of congress and to make preparations for whatever action the results of such inquiry may seem to make essential." Quite as significant of the far-reaching and serious nature of the demand was the resolution adopted by the Civic Federation, which is conservatism itself, to this effect:

The federation recommends that congress create a council of national defense, to consider, decide and report what legislation is necessary to provide for the national defense * * * and a definite, permanent policy to secure peace.

President Wilson, in his message, took the extraordinary ground that "this question has not changed its aspects because the times are not normal." But it has

certainly changed to the extent of inspiring a nationwide movement among the citizens to stimulate efficient preparation where it has been lacking. This is directly the effect of the war in Europe, and the president is talking against the winds when he demands that because of the upheaval abroad Americans should permit the vital issue of national defense to remain in the hands of bureaucratic officials and secret congressional committees. There could not be a better time to begin an inquiry than now, nor a more rational, necessary and peaceable undertaking.

In his smoothest phrases the president assures the country that it is ready to defend itself to the utmost—our “energy will know how to declare itself should occasion arise.” Unfortunately, that energy exists chiefly in his scholastic mind. Certainly it is not discoverable, to any adequate degree, in men or munitions. In order that we may not lay ourselves open to the presidential charge of being “nervous and excited,” we shall cite as witnesses men who know intimately the extent of our unpreparedness.

In a statement made a fortnight ago Major General Leonard Wood, chief of staff until April 22 last, declared that our regular mobile army forces consisted of 26,000 troops in all three branches, with 17,000 in the sea coast defense. Of the 104,000 state militiamen, not more than 60 per cent are fit for efficient service. He puts the total ready force, therefore, at 88,400—and 300,000 men would be needed to guard the 700 miles of vulnerable Atlantic coast alone. In a report to the secretary of war on April 22 last he cited “in addition to the shortage of field artillery organizations for the regular army,” a “very alarming shortage in field artillery and ammunition for the militia and volunteers,” deficiencies which, he pointed out, could not possibly be remedied after war

began. We have 800 field guns out of a requirement of 1300 and relatively few machine guns. The existing regiments in the regular army are at about half their full statutory strength, and there are no reserves whatever. "The present shortage in field artillery ammunition," ran the report, "constitutes a grave source of danger." The curse of the army, it pointed out, is its use for political purposes by congressmen. It could be made infinitely more effective if concentrated; but it is scattered in small detachments at posts from Maine to California, and each post is jealously perpetuated by the statesman who wants the votes of the civilian population it supports.

Major General Wotherspoon, who retired as chief of staff a few weeks ago, declared in his final report that the United States with its present forces could not hope to defend the Panama canal or its outlying possessions. He found the effective fighting strength of the mobile army to be 46,000 men—little more than a single European corps. The regular army is short 29 per cent of its proper complement of officers. The coast defense lacks 9442 men and the foreign detachments, 3666 men. Of the 119,000 state militiamen, says the report, only 42,600 qualified as second-class men with the rifle during the last year, and 52,000 did not fire a rifle on the practice range, while 38,000 did not spend a total of twenty-four hours in drill during the twelve months. Mr. Gardner and Mr. Lodge say they have been informed that the guns of our big fortresses fall short by a mile and a half of the range of the modern naval guns of Europe, and that the navy lacks 18,000 men. And to these statements is now to be added the testimony of the annual report of Secretary Garrison, that, when additional troops are sent to outlying possessions, the mobile home army will consist of 24,602 men—"not much more

than twice the size of the police force of New York city"—with a reserve of sixteen men.

In the face of these facts there are two schools which oppose intelligent, public inquiry and adequate preparation. The first is represented by Bishop Greer, of New York, whose views are stated by him in these rational terms:

To build up an army and navy in preparation against possible attack is to invite attack. Don't think you can secure and maintain peace by preparation for war. The way to prevent war is not to fight. If you prepare for war, it is almost inevitable that sooner or later you will have war.

The other school is represented by President Wilson, who disposes of the question by stating that "we have always found the means to defend ourselves against attack and shall find them whenever it is necessary." The demand of Americans who admire Bishop Greer's sincerity without conceding that "moral force" is an adequate defense is for rational measures of preparedness; and the demand of those who want some more substantial assurance than Mr. Wilson's phrases is for full publicity. This is all that the hated Gardner has asked; it is all that the public asks. The administration retorts that the facts are on file in department reports—which is perfectly true; but it is exactly because such reports have been filed and pigeonholed and disregarded by political, pork-hunting congressmen that citizens of sense demand an open, conclusive inquiry which shall inform the American people fully and arouse them to the needs of the time.

From the very first President Wilson laid "the cold hand of death" upon the Gardner proposal. He has disclosed two reasons for applying the customary policy of secrecy to a matter which calls for immediate publicity. First is his extravagant conception of the requirements

of what he calls neutrality, as a preparation for this government's probable part in the future mediation between the warring nations. He laboriously urged in his message that the agitation is deplorable "at this time." His second reason, announced in an official statement, is the astonishing one that publicity would be "an unwise way of handling a question which might create very unfavorable international impressions."

But the main opposition to sane investigation and measures of preparation will be fomented under the plea of anti-militarism. Such obstruction is due either to ignorance or false pretense. The American people are neither children to be frightened by a man of straw, nor fools to be deluded into slavery to force. The Army and Navy Journal recently made the blunder of arguing that "German militarism" is something that should be emulated in this country; but intelligent citizens know perfectly well that that kind of militarism is not mere defensive preparedness, but a poisonous philosophy which vitiates liberty and corrupts all the functions of government. The world is shocked to find that autocracy plus preparedness means an oppressive, provocative militarism that invites and produces war; but it is just as certain that democracy plus preparedness means security against aggression and the best guarantee of peace. It is the peace makers, not the mere peace lovers or peace hoppers, who are to be "blessed."

Those who pretend that readiness for defense in a democratic country means militarism do not know the meaning of words, much less the significance of institutions. Americans need no warning against a war-inciting worship of nation-wide military efficiency. Nor will they easily be persuaded that they should trust to an armament of "moral force" while other nations use weapons of a more penetrating kind.

GERMAN THOUGHT IN THE WAR

December 15, 1914.

AMONG the great fundamental forces operating in the world war there is one which completely overshadows all others in importance and influence—the thought, the guiding purpose, of the German nation.

What is that thought? What is the German viewpoint, the spirit which unifies and inspires the nation in its tremendous undertaking? Is there an authentic voice of the German people, whose utterance will reveal its own authority and carry its own conviction? The empire has not lacked spokesmen; the flood of current literature respecting Teuton politics is of astonishing volume. Names which a few months ago were known here only to scholars or technical experts have become household words. He is a poor disputant who cannot quote from Heinrich von Treitschke, who dominated the great Prussian school of historians; from Nietzsche, the bewildering philosopher of negation, whose influence has saturated German teaching; from Von Bernhardi, the apostle of militarism; to say nothing of Von Buelow, diplomatist; Von Gwinner, financier; Harnack and Dryander, theologians; Lamprecht and Von Schmoller, political economists; Eucken and Haeckel, scientists, and a score of other noted leaders.

But it is a curious fact that the most distinguished of these writers are quite ignored by advocates of the German cause; indeed, they are politely but firmly repudiated. It is said that Nietzsche has no considerable fol-

lowing; that General von Bernhardi is a military jingo whose extravagances were never taken seriously, and the greatest of German historians is gently dismissed by an eminent German-American in Philadelphia as "a man named Treitschke."

To get at German thought today, therefore, Americans must turn to Germany itself, to the publicists who address their countrymen and not aliens, and the newspapers which make and portray public opinion upon the issues of the war. In citing characteristic quotations, it will be our purpose to offer only enough editorial comment to serve as mortar between the bricks of German statement and argument. Making a random selection, we find Herr Basserman, leader of the National Liberals, outlining in a speech to the reichstag a popular view of the policy toward Belgium, France and the world in general:

Let us retain all the territory we already occupy, and also what we shall yet conquer and think necessary to keep. "Through bloody war to glorious victory" is our motto.

In the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* an article by a leading Berlin clergyman discusses war as a Christian duty in these terms:

Again and again we read that warlike spirit, warlike enthusiasm and warfare in general are inconsistent with the spirit and teachings of Christianity. This view is superficial. According to the Christian viewpoint, history is guided by Him who shapes the destinies of nations. For those who believe this even war is the work of God.

If this war is permitted of God, then warfare is a duty.
* * * Such a duty and such fulfillment are not only consistent with Christianity, but are demanded by Christianity.

Hermann Sudermann, the noted dramatist, assures his countrymen that "the 'alleged' violation of Belgium's neutrality has been proved to be our legitimate right," and therefore is able to urge solemnly:

German militarism can never be misused for desires to attack and to conquer, and is only thinkable as an instrument of defense.

In *Das Freie Wort*, a Frankfort review, Count von Hoensbroech argues that Belgium must not be annexed. Justice and the imperial designs would be served, he says, upon these easy terms:

All Belgian fortresses, except Antwerp, to be razed; Antwerp to have a German garrison; the Belgian monarchy to be replaced by German regents; the Belgian parliament to be restricted to economic matters; payment by Belgium of a "formidable" war indemnity and a yearly tribute; abolition of the Belgian army; cession of the Congo colony; Belgium's diplomatic affairs to be handled by German consuls and ministers.

A few weeks ago Dr. Adolf Lasson, an imperial privy councilor, wrote to a prominent Hollander a letter in which he said:

Foreigner means enemy. No one can remain neutral to the German State and people. A man who is not a German knows nothing of Germany. We are morally and intellectually superior beyond all comparison as to our organizations and institutions. * * * We Germans have no friends anywhere, because we are efficient and morally superior to all.

Major General von Disfurth, in the *Hamburg Nachrichten*, thus answers complaints against German war methods:

Frankly, we are and must be barbarians, if by this we understand those who wage war relentlessly and to the uttermost degree. We owe no explanations to any one. Every act of whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of discouraging, defeating and destroying our enemies is a brave act and a good deed. Our troops must achieve victory. What else matters?

Doctor Leonard, a member of the faculty at Heidelberg, is quoted in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* in these words:

Down with all consideration for England's so-called culture! The central nest and supreme academy for all hypocrisy

in the world, London, must be destroyed. No respect for the tombs of Shakespeare, Newton and Faraday!

Dr. Friedrich Naumann, editor of *Hilfe* (Berlin), thus frankly disposes of the neutrality issue:

Even assuming that there had been in Belgium an honorable sentiment of neutrality, the question remains whether a small individual State can have a right to stand aside from a historical process of reconstruction. * * * However friendly and sympathetic one's attitude may be toward the wishes of neutrals, one cannot, in principle, admit their right to stand aside from the general processes of centralization in the leadership of humanity. In economics we constantly see small concerns trying to remain outside the trusts. Often they succeed, often they do not. The same thing happens also in the sphere of world politics.

Maximilian Harden is called the Bernard Shaw of Germany. But while his literary agility suggests that of the Irish dramatist, his genius is of infinitely greater brilliance, and his popular influence was proved when he smashed a corrupt ring that had its headquarters in the very palace of the kaiser. Let him answer those who plead that war was forced on Germany:

Cease the pitiful attempts to excuse Germany's action. * * * Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We willed it, because we had to will it and could will it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience!

We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes! If she conquers new realms for her genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war.

Do not lapse into dreams about the "United States of Europe." * * * To the Belgians we are the arch-imp and the tenant of the pool of hell. We would remain so, even if every stone in Louvain and in Malines were replaced by its equivalent in gold.

The Deutsche Tageszeitung, in a long editorial, demands that German shall replace English as the world language, so as to end the "fearful brutalizing influences" that appear "in every land where the English language is spoken." In the vocabulary of the Berliner Tageblatt, the Japanese are "yellow Britons" and "the monkey relatives of Sir Edward Grey." The Kreuzzeitung tells its readers that British soldiers go to war "without any thought except of shillings with which to purchase whisky." Here is a glimpse of the popular mind respecting war:

We would see every monument, every picture, utterly destroyed rather than that the glorious work given to the German race should be hindered by so much as one hour's avoidable delay. The world can be revitalized, society ennobled and refined, only through the German spirit. The world must, for its own salvation, be Germanized.

From the Frankfurter Zeitung:

Belgium, uselessly tortured and befooled by meaningless treaties and promises, is done with. Its ministers are still talking of victory, and even of a greater Belgium; but these are mere words of intoxication.

It is from such passages in the common literature of the day, rather than from writings of historians and philosophers, that one may derive an idea of popular German thought. There is a concentrated fury in its expression which is very striking; it is as if the words half strangled those who seek to utter them. With characteristic efficiency the Germans have classified and named this spirit. They call it the "furor Germanicus," and exult that it is so widespread and powerful. This, far more than the ambitious designs of statesmen, is the ruling force in the war; it is this, rather than howitzers and submarines, that has withstood the might of Germany's enemies and may change the course of civilization.

NO CHRISTMAS TRUCE

December 19, 1914.

THIS is the nineteenth day of December, "in the year of our Lord" 1914. Six days more, and the Christian peoples of the world will celebrate with reverent thanksgiving the birth of the Babe of Bethlehem—Him whose advent was hailed with starry anthems heralding peace on earth, good will to men. And that sacred anniversary, whose very name is a talisman of tenderness and forgiving charity, will be the one hundred and fifty-first day of the most wanton war in history.

Does there live an enlightened human being so heartless or so heedless that this does not strike to his very soul a piercing chill of sorrow and humiliation? Is there in the record of mankind a contrast more cruel—a million anthems rising in adoration of the Prince of Peace, while across half a continent the embattled nations of Christendom are locked in murderous conflict?

It is small wonder that a spectacle of such devastating significance has inspired noble-minded men to endeavor, by even a pitifully little thing, to avert some of the shame of it. More than two months ago a movement was begun to procure, if possible, a cessation of the slaughter on Christmas day—perhaps throughout the whole week of the Nativity. The warring Powers were to be asked to silence their guns just for a few hours; to pay at least this meager honor to Him who was Brother to us all, whose life was love and whose death was devoted sacrifice. There was dramatic suggestive-

ness even in the fact that the plan originated with a Jew. From a bed of pain Rabbi H. Perez Mendes urged that all religions should seek this boon in the name of the Man of Galilee. Leaders of other faiths joined him in the advocacy. Later the Pope, as head of the world's greatest church organization, communicated his urgent wish that the holiest season of the year should be marked by a "truce of God."

The pleas failed. And, in all good will, we are glad that they did fail.

It is our confident belief that Christmas day will see a lull in the work of killing. There may be no proclamation of an armistice, no formal agreement between opposing commanders; but we totally misconceive the spirit of those brave men in the trenches if they do not feel the spell of Christmas upon them and if by tacit consent there are not intervals of peace along the battle front.

If such a truce should prevail, as a spontaneous manifestation of humane feeling and reverence, it will be an honor to the soldiers and an act of veneration for the Name which makes the day holy. A perfunctory armistice, diplomatically arranged as a concession to a religious festival, would be a blasphemous travesty upon the spirit of the day.

The world will honor the idealism of the great-hearted men who have sought to bring about this recognition of a dishonored faith. But we can conceive of no ghastlier mockery than a cynical agreement to suspend the business of slaughter for a few hours in the name of Christ, with intent to resume it at a prearranged time.

Only one thing could be more hideous than battle on the day the Babe was born; and that would be the deliberate breaking of the truce on the days when He lay helpless in His Mother's arms, a pledge of the supreme sacrifice that was to bring peace on earth.

A NOTED EXPERIMENT OF "KULTUR"

December 21, 1914.

IN THE early days of the war the impetuous dash of French armies into Alsace-Lorraine rivaled in interest the German invasion of Belgium. The pent-up passions of forty-four years drove the troops headlong into "the lost provinces," and all France was set aflame with patriotic exultation. The humiliation of 1870 was at last to be avenged, the fair lands torn from the bleeding side of the republic were to be regained. The battles of Altkirch and Muelhausen seemed more vital than the assaults on Liege and Namur.

But the German war machine's thundering advance on Paris shattered this dream of easy conquest. France was forced to halt her drive into the enemy's country and concentrate for the defense of her threatened capital. For many weeks the official bulletins reiterated monotonously, "On our right wing there is nothing to report." Within the last ten days there has been a revival of news from that quarter. We hear from Paris now of "important movements in the Vosges region" and "renewed attacks on the enemy's line of communications to Metz." Alsace-Lorraine is once more at the front in the French battle plans. That territory will become French, or France herself will expire.

The persistence of this national ambition is one of the most romantic episodes of history; and it is one of the most illuminating. Irreconcilable issues of war are

rare. Russia cherished no enmity against those who humbled her in the Crimea; Austria became a faithful ally of her Prussian conqueror; the breach between our northern and southern states was long ago healed. But for nearly half a century the loss of Alsace-Lorraine by France has remained an open wound. Yet it is as a German, rather than as a French problem, that the matter is of interest to all nations. Germany's conception of her "world mission" is now pretty well understood; the national belief in racial superiority and "instinct for empire" and the national ideal of world domination have been boldly proclaimed. As these things concern most of mankind, it is fortunate that there exists for our edification an example of the ambitious policy in operation. The full flower of Prussianism, a complete manifestation of what Teutonic Kultur can achieve abroad, is visible to all the world in Alsace-Lorraine.

It is significant that the history of the provinces is naturally divided into two periods—the 1800 years preceding and the forty-four years following the Franco-Prussian war. Originally a part of Roman Gaul, the country was overrun by the Germanic races in the fourth and fifth centuries, and remained Teuton until the seventeenth century, when France, by successive wars, won possession. Not until the revolution, however, did the people become French at heart. Then they responded eagerly to the ideals of democracy; and this bond of sympathy welded them to the French nation, despite the fact that a majority were of Teutonic blood and spoke the German tongue. In 1870 those who did not fight for France remained neutral.

In wresting the provinces from France after that war Bismarck aimed at two obvious ends—to extend the sway of the new empire and to erect a barrier against future French invasion. The Germans, moreover, pleaded

moral justification. This territory, they said, was historically, geographically and racially theirs; it had been taken by force, by force it might be justly regained; they proclaimed that they were delivering "long-lost brothers" from an unnatural domination. What the ingenious professors overlooked was that in the seventeenth century conquest was law, and subject peoples could be lost and won, sold or bartered, without their consent; while 1870 was in the midst of a new dispensation, wherein the supreme right was the right of men to be citizens, not chattels. Germany applied methods of reasoning which had been outlawed by the American and French revolutions. Because she had the power to annex lands, she conceived that she had the right and power to annex peoples. She revived in the nineteenth century the philosophy of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great, and after forty-four years is still obstinately trying to enforce it. Dr. Franz Erich Junge, a noted imperialistic writer, is one of the few who realizes the fatal defect. While justifying in every detail the German world policy, he says:

What the Germans have failed to bring about in half a century of governmental effort in Alsace-Lorraine—conciliation and amalgamation—the British have accomplished in a few years of tolerant rule in the Boer republics. No better proof of our inferiority in the art of conquest!

There was no doubt in the German mind that the "long-lost brothers" would rapidly be absorbed; the Alsatian leaning toward French ideals of self-government would disappear, of course, when the people had been taught the blessings of Teutonic Kultur. No device of governmental efficiency was left untried to hasten the Germanization of the inhabitants. The German language was made official and its teaching decreed as compulsory. The provincial government was made German in every detail—executive, legislative and judicial. The

courts, the police power and the schools were administered by imperial authority. These characteristic methods had the results which any but German statesmen might have foreseen. In 1872 Bismarck demanded that the people declare themselves either German citizens or French; more than 150,000 chose France, and of these, 50,000 moved across the border. Bismarck, not displeased, flooded the territory with Prussian and Westphalian immigrants—only to discover within a few years that they had become Alsatians. Just as the German colonists in Russia became Russians, in Switzerland became Swiss and in Bohemia became Czechs, so in Alsace-Lorraine they became Alsatians.

Prussia clung to the hope that the pressure of education and autocratic rule would make the second generation, at least, enthusiastic Germans. But today the independent spirit of the people is still unconquered, and the most implacable foes of Prussianism are the sons of the veterans of 1870 and of the immigrants planted in the country by the imperial authorities. The basic reason for this is that Alsace-Lorraine was treated as a vassal of the empire, never as an integral part of it. The twenty-five kingdoms, duchies, principalities and free cities which Bismarck welded together retained their identity. Each had its own ruler, its own parliament, its own representation in the bundesrath, the upper legislative body of the empire. With incredible lack of understanding, the government denied to Alsace-Lorraine any shadow of sovereignty. It was held in common by the states of the confederation. Its executive, the "statthalter," was named by the emperor; it had no real representation in the bundesrath; its legislature was a farce; even its internal affairs were administered from Berlin. And on the top of all these irritations was superimposed the exasperation of enforced militarism; the

liberty-loving Alsations were not only brought under conscription, but were subjected to the intolerable arrogance of Prussian garrisons and officers.

As a consequence, the country has never been free from unrest and political agitation. The people, to the intense astonishment of autocracy, have never submitted contentedly to taxation without representation. And, as every movement of protest has called forth the utmost rigors of police suppression, the government of the provinces has degenerated into a condition of unarmed revolt inflamed by petty persecution. The notorious outrage a couple of years ago at Zabern, when a Prussian lieutenant cut down with his saber a civilian cripple, and was sustained in his brutality by his superiors, was a true picture in miniature of the system. Another glimpse of it may be obtained in the fact that during the years from 1910 to 1913 no fewer than 22,000 Alsatian youths fled to France and joined her foreign legion.

In 1911 a new constitution was granted to the territory, but it was so far from satisfying the ideals of self-government that it increased the political hostility to Prussia. At the height of the agitation the kaiser disclosed the characteristic attitude of autocracy. In an address to the mayor of Strassburg, on May 13, 1912, he offered this conciliatory advice:

Listen! Up to now you have only known the good side of me; you might be able to learn the other side of me. Things cannot continue as they are. If this situation lasts, we will suppress your constitution and annex you to Prussia.

Even in Berlin the folly of this utterance was publicly discussed. A Socialist member of the reichstag made the blistering comment:

We salute the imperial words as the confession that annexation to Prussia is the heaviest punishment that one can threaten to impose upon a people. It is a punishment like hard labor in the penitentiary with loss of civil rights.

The utter failure of Germany to win Alsatian loyalty can be realized only when it is understood that the people are French only in sympathy with free institutions. Their ambition has not been to join their country to France, but merely to achieve equality with the states in the German empire, to become a self-governing unit in the confederation. But, after forty-four years under Prussian domination, Alsace-Lorraine is today more anti-German than at the beginning. The lesson is plain. German autocracy and militarism have the efficiency to create an empire; they have the power; but they have not the spirit. They know no other policy than to impose their institutions by force—no other means of education than the mailed fist.

“For its own salvation,” say the spokesmen for Teutonic imperialism, “the world must be Germanized.” An idle dream! The world knows now what the policy of enforcing German Kultur upon other peoples means; it reads the answer in Belgium, crushed and bleeding, and in Alsace-Lorraine, after half a century of Germanization still fighting for liberation. This is not the seventeenth century, but the twentieth; and there are not enough Krupp guns and Zeppelins and armies between the North Sea and the Bosphorus to impose such a monstrous anachronism upon the races of men.

THE FIRST CHRISTMAS EVE, AND THIS

December 24, 1914.

FOR nineteen centuries the thoughts of myriads of men have turned on this day to the first Christmas eve—to that starlit hillside in far-off Judea, where the wondering shepherds woke to the celestial harmony of heaven's best message to mankind. The star that hung like a silver lamp over Bethlehem has sent its beams through all the ages; the anthem of the angels has echoed down the years with unfailing music. But today the vision is dimmed. The light that has shone on the pathways of men seems all but quenched in the smoke of causeless battle; the song of the winged heralds is drowned in the hideous clamor of conflict and the moans of anguished men and grieving women.

What a Christmas dawn the world will see! Instead of peace on earth, half of the race at war; instead of a reign of Christian charity, a reign of lust and bloodshed; the nations of the earth, Christian and non-Christian, involved inextricably in a murderous rivalry of slaughter. Not since the Man of Nazareth unfolded his tremendously simple gospel to the humble fisher folk of Galilee has the day of his birth given such keenness to the sneers of the cynic and the alarms of the doubter. After nineteen hundred years of progress, when civilization has reached its highest refinement, men feel their hopes slipping from them and their hearts failing them for fear. Even the devout believer, who has clung to his

faith, perhaps through stress of soul, is conscious that never before has it been put to so severe a test.

There have always been great areas of the earth where Christianity seemed to have failed to implant itself; but heretofore it has always been possible to show that, in the broadest view, its civilizing force was gradually lifting humanity to higher levels. Today it is the Christian nations that are dishonoring the faith.

It is not strange, therefore, that many sincere Christians feel the pressure of doubting fear. During the early days of the war this was more manifest than now. The thoughtfully devout were almost crushed by the sudden collapse of civilization, the utter disregard, by the Christian nations, of the faith whose foundations are brotherhood and charity. And even though the load of despair has lifted, they feel that they have lost their serene confidence. There is little comfort for them, we think, in the assurance offered by some shallow thinkers, that this country is at peace amid world-wide war because its people have followed more closely than others the teachings of Christ. This is the emptiest of Pharisaism. We are at peace because of our happy isolation, and because, in this great land of bounty, we have never felt the grinding pressure of economic hunger. Belgium for centuries has fought with patient heroism against the economic disadvantages of overpopulation and poverty of soil, when Americans would have been driven to schemes of conquest. Belgium today is steeped to her blood-stained lips in war; but will it be said that she has been less Christian than America?

Still less attractive to reasoning men is the argument of certain moralists, that this hideous conflict is part of a plan formulated by Providence to bring about disarmament and world peace. We can conceive of nothing more insulting and illogical than to charge to

the Creator the carnival of cruelty that has resulted from man's greed and lust of power. Fundamentally, the cause of this war, as of all others in modern times, may be traced to the conflict of economic forces; and if any good comes from it, it will be through a better understanding of these interests and a readjustment of them in nearer conformity with the principles of the Christian religion. It is not Christianity that has failed, but the practice of it.

The failure does not lie with the individual Christian. His devotion to his ideals in his sphere of personal action is as high as ever it was. But this influence does not operate effectually, or even noticeably, in larger affairs. A government, in its international dealings, does not in the least reflect the Christian sentiment of its people, but the industrial and commercial philosophy of the nation. This force is all-powerful, because it controls the material welfare, the very life, of the people; and the government is merely an instrumentality which acts in direct response to the nation's commercial demands or ambitions. When we speak of Christian nations, therefore, we must exclude the governments of those nations. For what they express is merely the business philosophy that controls the activities of life; and when two or more such systems come into collision the result is war.

The present great struggle, of course, is intensified by a revival of another fundamental issue which has come down to us through the centuries—the irreconcilable conflict between autocracy and democracy. On the one side are ranged those who believe in the rule of force, the supremacy of the State, the survival of the strong, the beneficence of war, and who find their ideal in a highly efficient autocracy. Those who defend this system frankly proclaim it as the negation of Chris-

tianity, with its teachings of individualism, humility and sacrifice. On the other side the leaders stand for democracy, for the sanctity of the individual, for the idea that the true end of the State is not power, but justice.

Upon most problems of life we are unweariedly optimistic. But we are constrained to confess that it is only by analyzing the underlying forces of the war, as we have attempted to do, that we can discern any good that can result from it to compensate for its awful destruction—the waste of things beautiful, the extinction of genius, the heritage of hatred and poverty and woe that must follow. If it were not for the law which compels the worst evil to react for good, such cataclysms as this would wreck the world. It may be that the net gain, aside from the building of a surer foundation beneath democracy, will be in teaching Christians that their faith is not a personal matter. There are countless believers who obey the precepts of Christianity with scrupulous fidelity in their homes and in their dealings with their fellows. But they are unable to perceive that it fails unless it is applied to the larger activities of life and of government, and particularly to the relations between peoples.

Civilization made mighty strides forward when there was developed in man a desire for something more personal than the tribal relation—for the possession of property, a home. But the progress of the race is surely being retarded by the belief that man's religious duty ends with the correct management of his own affairs. The very essence of Christianity is that each of us is his brother's keeper; that each owes service to all mankind. Service and sacrifice, the basic principles of the Christian faith—the elevation of these, perhaps, will be the compensation for the dreadful experience through

which the world is passing. Literally, by millions men are giving up their lives in behalf of their ideals, because they believe that by so doing those who come after them will benefit.

Despite all the sorrow and suffering of the peoples at war, despite the helpless horror and sympathetic aversion of those who are spectators of the fearful conflict, there cannot fail to be derived by all a deeper realization of the truth that only those who serve mankind serve their Maker. Not until this lesson has been learned, whether through war or through means less drastic, will the material activities of human life and the policies of governments be brought into harmony with the teachings of the Founder of Christianity, which are the principles of true democracy. The thought we have tried to convey is expressed with forceful clearness by the Outlook:

The church has regarded Christianity as a purely personal experience; hardly a law for society; not at all a law for international relations.

Some countries are more Christian than others, but none has consistently applied Christian precepts in its relations with other countries. Everywhere in the world there are men and women who carry the Christ spirit into their personal dealings, but the nations in their dealings with each other are still largely pagan.

Bernhardism has been tried, and Europe is a charnel house and suspicion poisons the air of the world. Everything has been tried except Christianity, and everything has failed. Why not try Christianity?

The thought will make small headway while the world is cowering in the shadow of an almost universal war. But a time is conceivable when it will prevail, and when Christmas day will dawn upon a race redeemed from the power of a philosophy which mocks at the message whose golden melody has come down to us from that far-off midnight in Bethlehem of Judea.

“THE GUILT OF BELGIUM”

December 30, 1914.

IT IS an evidence, we suppose, of that admirable efficiency which marks the Teutonic character that Germany is still making relentless war upon Belgium—not only against the army, but against the people; not only to destroy the nation's independence, but to blast the good name it has won by heroic sacrifice. Were it not for the testimony of Louvain and of the huge war levies extorted from the famine-stricken country, it would be incredible that a civilized government should deliberately seek to traduce a people whom it had already wronged and robbed. Not satisfied with bloody conquest, Germany is determined to strip her victim even of honor—would brand her as guilty of broken faith, the very offense to which Germany herself has officially confessed. The persistence of this campaign makes it necessary to keep the record straight before the American people.

The present attack started a couple of months ago with the announcement that the invaders, rummaging through government papers in Brussels, had found documents proving that “Belgium violated her own neutrality” in 1906 by agreeing to the landing of British troops in case of war. For weeks this odious charge was trumpeted to the world, with all the offensive comment that enmity could invent. Having exhausted the resources of unsupported slander, Germany has at last published the documents—they appeared in *The North American* on December 20—with an adroit elucidation

by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, special publicity agent of Germany in this country. We have such a high regard for the character and attainments of this accomplished statesman that we like to think he found his task distasteful and performed it only from a sense of patriotism. For the truth is that nothing more revolting in its cold-blooded injustice was ever perpetrated in international controversy.

The assault upon Belgium so shocked humanity that even the courageous declaration of the imperial chancellor, that it had been committed under the stress of necessity and that reparation would be made, did not appease the outraged opinion of the world. But the studied effort to heap insult upon injury will make Belgium's cause more than ever the cause of civilization. As a fact, no greater service to the wronged nation could have been done than the publication of these records, with the cunningly distorted interpretation that accompanies them.

To understand the case it is necessary to state again the admitted facts. Belgium was declared a "perpetually neutral state" in 1839, the treaty being solemnly guaranteed by Prussia, Austria, Russia, Great Britain and France; and it was reaffirmed in 1870, England obtaining from both France and Germany formal assurance that neither would violate Belgian territory. In addition, Bismarck gave Belgium a written engagement to the same effect, although he protested that it was "superfluous, in view of the treaties already in effect." Then, as always, Belgium scrupulously observed her part of the compact, even forbidding wounded French soldiers to be carried across her territory.

Germany's first act in the present war was to repudiate her doubly sworn word, by demanding free passage for her armies across Belgium to attack France and by

meeting refusal with war. Belgium, so true to the letter and spirit of her obligations that she even forbade France to send her reinforcements, devoted herself to the sacrifice of thousands of lives to maintain her integrity. Utterly without hope of repelling the invasion, she did not hesitate to pay this price to preserve the national honor which is now malignantly assailed.

Upon the facts here stated there is no controversy. The German government confessed frankly that it was committing a “wrong” and was “violating the law of nations,” and pleaded only “military necessity” for its action. The outburst of condemnation that followed the crime, however, caused this defensive attitude to be abandoned; and the “secret documents” provided a pretense for completing the crushing of Belgium by denouncing her as a dishonorable plotter against Germany’s security. The first document was the report of a Belgian general to the minister of war, in 1906, upon a conference held with the British military attache, in which the latter had outlined plans for the landing of troops in Belgium in certain contingencies which we shall note presently. The second was a memorandum of a like conference in 1912, between the Belgian chief of staff and the British attache at that time, the purport of the conversation being the same. We defer quoting from the papers in order to quote Doctor Dernburg’s damaging charges based upon them. He says:

They (the documents) show that plans had been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne (in 1906). * * *

When Colonel Bridges, in conversation with the Belgian chief of staff (in 1912), said that England was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that they would land as soon as any European conflict should break out, General Jungblut protested that for such a step the permission of Belgium was necessary. The cool reply

was that the English knew it, but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough to protect herself, England would land troops any way. * * *

The guilt of the Belgian government consists, first, in making and concerting plans with the English and French governments as to what steps to take in case of war. * *

* Secondly, that Belgium did not try to insure her independence in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This shows the one-sidedness of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the display of all Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

When one thinks of the ruined cities and famine-haunted people of Belgium, of the sufferings endured by that nation to keep inviolate its pledged word, it is difficult to characterize adequately the malignant craft of this charge. The very documents produced in its support, confidential as they were, recorded in plain terms Belgium's absolute determination to stand by her obligations of neutrality—not only against Germany, but against France or England or any other country—and they as plainly reveal Germany as the sole menace to that neutrality, just as the event proved. Yet Doctor Dernburg has the audacity to cite these memoranda as evidence of what he calls Belgium's "guilt"! In the hope, no doubt, that Americans would read his preface and ignore the documents themselves, he deliberately suppresses paragraphs which prove Belgium's scrupulous insistence upon her neutrality and Great Britain's steady recognition thereof. "Plans had been concerted," he says, "to invade Belgium" in 1906. Here he accuses the British of plotting and the Belgians of consenting to a violation of the treaty of neutrality. He says, further:

The imperial chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character.

Doctor Dernburg makes his outrageous charge in the face of the following explicit passages in the papers:

Colonel Barnardiston (the British attache) referred to the anxieties of the general staff of his country with regard to the general political situation and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for. * * *

The landing of the English troops would take place on the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais. *The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.*

These provisos, carefully avoided by the German publicity agent, prove that the projected British “invasion” was to take place only in the event of and following a German invasion. The arrangement was as creditable to Great Britain—a guarantor of the neutrality treaty—as the unprovoked assault last August by Germany was dishonorable. The “guilt” of Belgium consisted in consulting the neighbors as to what should be done in case of an expected incursion by a burglar. The event shows that the precaution was eminently justified, and that Britain’s offense lay not in plans of aggression, but in unpreparedness to fulfill her obligations to defend the neutrality she had guaranteed. Exactly the same condition applies to the 1912 memorandum. Belgium therein gave notice that even to save her territory she would not yield to a British landing made without her consent. And that landing, also, was to be made only in case Germany had first forsworn her pledged word and had violated the neutrality for which she was in part responsible. The third Dernburg paragraph we have quoted almost answers itself. The government that would speak of “the guilt of Belgium” all but forfeits its place in the family of nations.

Germany’s intention to invade Belgium instantly on the outbreak of war had been proclaimed and advertised

and boasted for years in the published works of her military strategists. If Belgium had not "concerted plans" with Britain and France to defend herself, she would have been guilty of supreme folly; and if Great Britain had not prepared for action to follow a German assault upon Belgium, she would have been false to her pledged word. The complaint that Belgium did not "approach" Germany in the same manner is surely the very acme of irony, for she had already received notice that Germany would tear up the "scrap of paper" to which her imperial pledge had been given, and would invoke "necessity, which knows no law."

But abstract arguments and documentary evidence alike can be put aside when the world examines the actual events. No advocacy can explain away the facts that Belgium was true to her neutrality; that France did not violate it; that Great Britain did not, and that Germany did; that German armies had been for two months over-running Belgium before a French or British detachment set foot on the violated territory.

"Only our prompt action at Liege," says Doctor Dernburg with astounding hardihood, "prevented the English landing and invading Belgium." Evidently he thinks Americans never saw a map of Belgium; the taking of Liege could not possibly interfere with a British invasion—as a fact, the city has been held by the Germans for months, yet the landing of British troops has never been interfered with. Equally deceptive is the generality that "all Belgium's fortresses are on the eastern frontier." Namur is near the border of France, and could not possibly menace a German army unless that army had penetrated one-third way across Belgium. Doctor Dernburg is more himself when he frankly states that "the Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that Germany demanded that the Belgian

force should fight with the Germans against the French and English." This was the true German conception of neutrality and of the "scrap of paper" to which her imperial word was attached.

We have given this much space to a renewed discussion of the Belgian question because it is, to Americans, the vital issue of the war. It embraces rights and principles which are fundamental to every nation's security and the very permanence of civilization. And most neutrals will give small heed to German pleas about "Russian barbarism," "French revenge" or "British greed" while the corpse of Belgium's murdered nationality appeals for justice. The violation of that country was a moral, a legal and an international offense for which there can be no excuse and no palliation. It was a barbarous wrong, defiance to civilization, an act of perfidy without parallel in history, because it was committed in an age when the obligations of honor and decency are stronger than at any other period of human development. There are issues of the war the responsibility for which must be shared with Germany by other countries. But concerning Belgium her guilt is unique and undivided. And it will grow more odious with every effort she makes to shift it to her victim, though she produces documents enough to choke the Kiel canal.

GERMANY AND DEMOCRACY

January 1, 1915.

A MARKED change in tactics by the advocates of Germany is one of the most interesting and instructive features of the political side of the war. By temperament and training the Germans are adept in controversy; their efforts needed only a better cause to win a notable success.

Striking evidence of their keenness and adaptability is found in their recent shift of position. There is no longer any serious effort to represent German imperialism as akin to the American plan of government. The ablest writers are now declaring frankly that the two systems are fundamentally different, and are seeking to show the superiority of the former. In the early days of the war the strongest emphasis was laid upon the argument that German and American ideals of liberty and government differed only in form. With characteristic insight, the German advocates discerned that if this theory were accepted it would go far toward winning American sympathy. British writers, with mistaken zeal, harped upon "ties of blood" and "the bond of a common language"; only recently have they realized that the support which the allies have gained in this country is based upon no sentiment of this kind, but upon a belief that their cause is just and that they represent democracy in a war against autocracy.

It must be put to the credit of Prof. Hugo Munsterberg, who started the pro-German campaign here, that

he did not attempt to palter with facts in this regard. He boldly declared that between the German and American systems there was a great gulf fixed. He derided the idea that the emperor is a sort of president chosen for life, and showed that while in America the State exists for the services of the people, in Germany the individual's highest purpose is to serve the State. Some other writers followed his lead, and Americans were startled to find their German fellow-citizens acclaiming the imperial system as the only rational method of government. "The whole German people," wrote one of them in this country, "are unanimous in the opinion that the monarchical form of government, with great authority and strongly centralized, is the best for them." Others, however, took the opposite line of reasoning, and for months there were unremitting efforts to demonstrate that German autocracy was different from American democracy merely in externals; that it provided greater efficiency without in the least restricting liberty. One able advocate wrote:

While the kaiser orders and directs affairs in his name, he does so only on behalf of the German people and as their representative. He "reigns" by reason of the will of a far greater majority of the people of his country than any president of the United States.

Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, in his first articles, was more emphatic:

The German empire is a union composed of all the States which formerly belonged to the German federation, with the exception of Austro-Hungary. There is a great similarity with the constitution of the United States, which is also a union of a number of independent States. * * *

The kaiser may not declare war without the consent of the bundesrath, representing the single States. * * * This is a much greater check than the control placed by the constitution of the United States on the president, who of all great rulers of the earth concentrates in himself the greatest

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power. * * * The German people are represented as directly and democratically in their government as the American people are in theirs.

The facts, of course, refute the polite representation of Prussianism as a superior form of Americanism. The reichstag, corresponding to our house of representatives, is elected by popular vote, but its powers are limited to a remarkable degree. It can reject a bill presented by the government, but in such case it may be summarily dismissed by the bundesrath, or upper chamber, with consent of the kaiser; and this has been done more than once. The executive head of the empire is, of course, the kaiser—"independent," as Professor Munsterberg says, "of the will of individuals and of any election." His chief administrator is the chancellor, who is responsible to the emperor alone, and not to the people. After these two the real governing power is lodged in the bundesrath, made up of 58 members appointed by the kings, princes and grand dukes ruling the various States, and not at all by the people of those States. The kaiser, as king of Prussia, names 17 of the 58 members, and most of the others are named by his royal relatives. And this body, which sits in secret, has complete control of the reichstag, with power to veto its measures and dissolve its sittings at will. This is the summary made by Price Collier, who was the best-informed American upon German affairs:

There is no such thing in Germany as democratic or representative government. But this fact cannot be proclaimed too often, since in other countries it is continually assumed that this is the case. Germany today is no more democratic than was Turkey twenty years ago.

The striking change we have mentioned appears in the writings of the foremost German advocates at this time. They have dropped the attempt to persuade Americans that the system is democratic or that any

considerable number of the people favor democratic institutions. Even Doctor Dernburg permits himself now to laud the imperialistic regime. The other day he cited Germany's social reform as evidence that "the central purpose of the government has been directed to true democratic ends"; but, of course, he meant what is called "monarchical socialism"—that is, the granting of measures of social justice by autocracy in order to strengthen its own power. He was more frank when he said:

The supreme discipline of the German forces has its deepest root in the thoroughly imparted idea that a nation can be strong only when it responds obediently to constituted authority. You may call this militarism if you will, but it lies at the very foundation of that efficiency which has taught the world how to make the individual subordinate his own habits and his own selfish interests to the strength and success of the social whole (the State).

But the most intelligible and most representative exposition of the German idea is set forth by Dr. Franz Erich Junge in a recent number of the Outlook. This writer has a high standing both in his own country and here. Commenting upon the fact that Americans have criticised the German people because "they have failed to live up to the standard of humanity set by America," he says:

There can be no doubt that it is profitable, or, at least, instructive, to talk freely about the range of democracy in theory; and no harm is done if the aspects of constitutions and the prospects of arbitration are fully discussed in academic debates. But it is a reflection upon the intelligence of trained observers, native as well as foreign, to speak seriously of the effectiveness of popular government in practice.

We all know the fallacy of government by numbers, and refuse to adopt it in factory or business. But, while the Germans admit the providence of enlightened leadership, even in the administration of the commonwealth, where it is most needed, the Americans deny the proof of eminent con-

trol, because it is wiser, or more diplomatic, to maintain the illusion of "the powers of the people." I do not know whether our frankness is stupid or your disavowal hypocritical. But I do know why your sense of liberty does not appeal to our sense of freedom.

With uncompromising bluntness, Doctor Junge points to the fact that the power of plutocracy in America is as real as the power of autocracy in Germany, and remarks cynically that under any form of government "it is always a select portion of the people who decide the great issues of national policy." But he makes no pretense that the two systems are alike:

Evidently there is a deep-seated difference in our respective ideals. The one is the more national, the other, more cosmopolitan; the one culminates in self-control, the other, in character. The test of manhood of the German is to die for an idea, of the American, to live for it.

It is not a case of petty variation. It is the irreconcilable antagonism of the two conceptions of life, which have ever fought and are still fighting for the mastery in the world's civilization, assuming different aspects under different circumstances. Hence, what is desirable in America is not of necessity desirable in Germany, and vice versa.

This elucidation is valuable because it is true—between German and American ideals there is "irreconcilable antagonism." Americans apply to European affairs their own standards—the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution. Measured by these, German imperialism, for all its magnificent efficiency, is hopelessly repellent to American democracy. Dr. David Starr Jordan has expressed the conflict in two sentences:

The Germany of today is an anachronism; her scientific ideals are of the twentieth century; her political ideals hark back to the sixteenth. A great nation which its own people do not control is a nation without a government; it is a derelict on the international sea—a danger to its neighbors, a greater danger to itself.

A SINGULAR FEATURE OF GERMAN HISTORY

January 5, 1915.

ONE of the earliest predictions made concerning the war was that it would result in a revolution in Germany; that imperialism, militarism and autocracy would be submerged beneath the tides of an awakened democracy. It was a plausible theory, and still has its hopeful supporters. They will be likely to reject the opinion expressed two days ago in the *Pall Mall Gazette*:

The *New York Times* speculates on the possibility of a German revolution under the impetus of disaster. Prophecy is hazardous, but nothing in German history discloses either the initiative or the capacity to bring such a movement to fruition. Germany has always had her political shape and her political thought imposed upon her by strong wills and strong hands.

Many who are familiar with world history will resent so harsh a sneer. They know that the very cradle of human liberty was in the historic land of Germany. Let us quote just a few sentences from Price Collier, the ablest American commentator upon German affairs:

The republicanism of Europe and America had its roots in ancient Teutonic civilization. "The most civilized nations of modern Europe," says Gibbon, "issued from the woods of Germany; and in the rude institutions of those barbarians we may still distinguish the original principles of our present laws and manners." Rome welcomed later the barbarians not only as citizens and consuls, but as emperors; and their descendants rule the world.

The love of independent self-government, born of the geographical necessities of the situation, stamped itself upon these people so indelibly that Englishmen and Americans bear the seal to this day. The pivotal fact to be remembered is that these German tribes saved Europe by their love of liberty and by their virility from the decadence of an orientalized Rome. Great Britain, Germany and the United States are descended from "those barbarians who issued from the woods of Germany."

There it was that the essence of democracy was distilled.

* * * Out of this furnace came constitutional government in England and republican government in America.

With such a record before us, it would seem the limit of absurdity and injustice to say that the German people of modern times are incapable of freeing themselves from autocracy. But the singular fact is that history declares the theory, up to this time, to be true. For three centuries the peoples of all the earth—except the Germans—have been struggling toward democracy. Literally, every nation worthy of the name—excepting Germany—has had its revolts and revolutions, its overturning of dynasties and tyrannical governments. The German people alone have been satisfied. A French writer, Henri Davray, recently dismissed the speculation as to a German revolution in these words:

It is a mistake to distinguish between the kaiser and the military caste on the one hand and the German people on the other hand. A people has the rulers whom it deserves. The whole history of the German people demonstrates that it is in the German character to submit always to autocratic authority.

Nearly all peoples at one time or another have had their uprisings, their insurrections, their revolutions or their civil wars. But never has the German people had the courage to put an end to the tyrannical and despotic authority whose yoke it accepts.

Plainly, there is some racial animosity in these caustic phrases; but it will be instructive to search out

how much of truth there is behind them. Glancing at the record of the last 300 years, we find that every other country in Europe, all of America and half of Asia have had their great, impulsive movement toward democracy, but that in Germany the liberal institutions which do exist have been handed down by an autocracy which thereby has perpetuated its own power. There has never been in that country a successful revolution, and no apparent desire for one. The history of Germany is a history of great sovereigns, great generals, great writers and philosophers; but there is in it no great liberator. The birthplace of religious and intellectual freedom, the cradle of the race that has carried democracy to the ends of the earth, it has itself never known political freedom. It can commemorate a Leipsic and a Sadowa, but not a Lexington or a Yorktown.

The power of the Hohenzollern dynasty was really founded by the Great Elector, Frederick William of Brandenburg (1640-1688), whose son Frederick was first king of Prussia (1701-1713), and was succeeded by Frederick William I (1713-1740). Let us see what Europe was doing while the first of these sovereigns was creating a state, the second feebly living out his term and the third was winning immortality by collecting regiments of giant grenadiers.

In 1640 Portugal threw off the yoke of Spain, which it had worn for sixty years. Two years later began the great civil war in England, which was to last until, seven years later, a despotic king was put to death by the people whose rights he had invaded. In 1688 the British spirit of freedom, inherited from Teutonic ancestors, drove the last of the wayward Stuarts from the throne. It was this revolution, which reduced the power of the State in behalf of individual liberty and self-government, and not the French revolution, which extended the power

of the State by destroying aristocratic privileges, that was the true forerunner of the American revolution. But it had no echo in Germany.

Passing over one of Poland's many revolts—in 1706 she forced her Saxon king to abdicate—we glance at the reign of Frederick the Great (1740-1786). Russia had a dynastic revolution, the reactionary Peter III being dethroned by Catherine II, whose vigorous sway introduced western civilization, promoted commerce, founded schools and granted religious liberty. In 1772 the people of Sweden, led by Gustavus III, crushed the power of the arrogant nobles and established constitutionalism. The enlightened despotism of Frederick lifted Prussia to the rank of the first military power in Europe. He performed prodigies for the material and intellectual advancement of the kingdom; but its people gave no response to the epoch-making summons of the American revolution. In the year he died the patient Dutch dethroned an aristocratic monarch. The reigns of Frederick William II, III and IV covered three-quarters of a century, 1786-1861. Yet only once during this, perhaps the most restless period in the history of politics, did the people of Prussia and the other German States reveal signs of discontent with the rigorous rule imposed upon them.

In 1787 Belgium freed herself from Austria and set up a republic, although three years later she accepted the old system, modified by a constitution. A little later came the cataclysm of the French revolution; and while it caused some aspirations in Germany toward freedom, its excesses were so alarming that German armies were sent to support the doomed autocracy in France. Napoleon simply used the German States as counters in his titanic game of empire. He shuffled them as though they had been cards; squeezed the 300 of them into 38; bestowed crowns as though they were tips. The very

brutality of his iron sway resulted finally in arousing a martial spirit, and it was Prussian valor that at the last rose up and smote his empire to dust. Yet it is to be noted that the German people were still faithful to their royal leaders. In 1795 Poland had risen under Kosciusko, and the Netherlands had established the Batavian republic, which lasted as long as that of France. Two years later Switzerland had also followed the inspiration of the great revolution. In 1809 Sweden deposed an unsatisfactory monarch; in 1813 the Netherlands expelled the French and restored the house of Orange, and in 1814 Napoleon was overthrown; but during all this time the inhabitants of the German States remained unmoved.

It was a time of tremendous literary activity; but among all the great writers—Goethe, Kant, Schiller, Fichte, Richter and a score of others—though the world was racked with the birth-pangs of democracy, there was none to inspire his countrymen with aspirations toward political liberty. Some of the German sovereigns were absolutists, some granted constitutions; but the mass of the people remained indifferent. The few who declaimed about freedom did nothing else to achieve it. Between 1822 and 1830 Greece revived the glories of her ancient valor and won her independence from the Turk. The last-named year saw the Poles drive out the Russians, Belgium win her independence from Holland and France dismiss the last of the Bourbons. Spain indulged in a civil war in 1834, and two years later forced her sovereign to swear to maintain a violated constitution. In 1843 Greece extorted a constitution likewise from her Bavarian king.

The stormiest year of the nineteenth century was 1848, with revolutions in France, Italy, Hungary and elsewhere. Then, for the first and only time, the German people revealed a vigorous sense of political

independence. While France was dethroning Louis Philippe and setting up the second republic, Bavaria forced the abdication of her king, Baden produced a feeble revolt and Berlin a few days of barricades in the streets. The end of it all was the exile of the liberal leaders—some of whom became great Americans—and the establishment in Prussia and other States of constitutions which were merely tinged with democracy. A little later began the era of Bismarck, creator of the German empire. Its rise has been one of the wonders of the world; but no one, least of all intelligent Germans themselves, will pretend that it is democratic.

In 1852 France returned to the imperial idea. In 1860 Garibaldi began the struggle which unified Italy. In 1862 Greece deposed her Bavarian sovereign and gave the crown to a Danish prince. In 1868 Japan abolished feudalism and adopted western ideas. Between 1868 and 1874 the Spaniards changed their government three times. And 1871 saw the establishment of the French republic, that has proved its vigor against the vast armies of imperial Germany. The twentieth century, young as it is, has seen movements towards democracy in the Balkan States, in Russia, in Portugal, in Turkey and in China, two of these having become republics. But throughout all this period the German people have remained the willing subjects of a highly efficient but uncompromising autocracy.

Our historical survey has been hurried and fragmentary, but it will serve to illustrate Price Collier's words:

Germany has few traditions of freedom, having rarely won liberty as a united people, but having been beaten into national unity by her political giants or her robust sovereigns.

She has shown us that the short cut to the governing of a people by suppression and strangulation results in a dreary

development of mediocrity. She has proved again that the only safety in the world for either an individual or a nation is to be loved and respected; and in these days no one respects slavery or loves threats.

Germany takes her greatest pride today, not in the valor of her troops, but in the absolute unity of her people. There is not one of them who by a word or breath will admit that a single act of the autocracy, from Austria's criminal ultimatum to the extortion of blackmail from starving Belgium, has failed in the remotest degree in justice. From the standpoint of patriotism this is admirable; from the standpoint of civilization it is ominous. Three-fourths of the world condemns the conflict as a needless and brutal crime of misgovernment; yet in the whole German people there is no voice raised in behalf of humanity or in condemnation of the false and barbarous philosophy that exalts militarism and provokes aggressive conquest. There could hardly be more striking evidence of that habit of docility which yields veneration to autocratic power and sacrifices liberty to attain a machine-made efficiency.

The world's debt to Germany is vast; to her it owes music, philosophy, religious and intellectual emancipation. But as a nation she remains insensible to political freedom. In this day of democracy the absolute surrender of individualism to an autocratic State, so that among a whole people there is not a single variation of thought or utterance upon the mightiest and most complex problem that ever confronted the world, is a painful spectacle, from which humanity will derive no inspiration and to which it will pay no admiring tribute.

VON HINDENBURG

January 7, 1915.

WHAT is the most impressive war picture that has been published? Some would choose a charging squadron of horse, some a thundering battleship, some a bombardment. Our choice is the portrait of a man—Field Marshal von Hindenburg, commander-in-chief of the imperial German armies in the east. That face has in it for us more thrills than any battle scene. It is as rugged and massive as a granite cliff. The eyes gleam out of shaggy caverns. The great mustaches that half cover the tremendous jaws suggest forests on a mountain side. The whole countenance is that of impassive, relentless power. Beside it Kitchener's stern features look almost insipid. But it is not for his face that they are erecting statues to Von Hindenburg while he is still at the front. He won the greatest battle of the war—the greatest, some experts say, in history. Tannenberg made all Russia reel. The vast armies of the czar have not yet recovered from the shock of that unique disaster.

It is a custom, not wholly fair, to ascribe victories to commanders and to ignore their soldiers. But Tannenberg was absolutely the creation of this grim old warrior's genius. The nickname given to him years ago in derision—"Von Hindenburg of the lakes"—has become a title of honor that overshadows his rank of field marshal. The story of his triumph is one of the most curious in military annals.

Until his retirement on a pension a few years ago Von Hindenburg was the most aggressive and picturesque of German generals—tireless in his work and merciless in his warlike handling of his forces at the great annual maneuvers. His particular study was defense of the eastern frontier against the looming power of Russia. That region offered peculiar difficulties for military operations—or peculiar advantages, according to Von Hindenburg. For many miles the land is cut up with chains of lakes and sluggish natural waterways, with vast, trackless marshes intervening. To make this desolate country one colossal trap for the destruction of an invading army became an obsession with the hard-headed old general. He spent months in exploring the great swamps. He took out parties of engineers and mapped out every lake and morass, every causeway of solid earth. He maneuvered through them battalions, regiments and army corps, horse, foot and artillery. Once every year he insisted upon a great sham battle. Dividing the forces equally, he gave command of the "Russians" to the ablest strategists of the war academy and invited them to break through his lines. Invariably they found themselves figuratively engulfed. And actually the officers and men were often up to their necks in water. The jest about "Von Hindenburg of the lakes" became rather acrid.

But he never did let up. Three years ago German conservationists demanded that the Mazurian lake region be drained and reclaimed for agricultural purposes. They showed that untold millions could thus be added to the wealth of the empire. When Von Hindenburg heard of it he literally roared in protest. He besieged the reichstag, he stormed the departments, and finally carried his maps and his war plans and his furious demands to the emperor himself. He insisted that those lakes

be left just as they were. When the inevitable Russian invasion came, he shouted, they would be needed. The kaiser was finally convinced, the lakes were saved, and Von Hindenburg went back, grumbling but triumphant, to his retirement. The rest is recent history. The Russian onslaught came, and for a time threatened to roll on to Berlin. Then Von Hindenburg was summoned and put in command in East Prussia. And, like the pieces of a familiar puzzle, the moves of his long-practiced strategy of the lakes worked to their predestined end. With feints and attacks and retreats Von Hindenburg lured the Russian armies into the maze of marsh and quagmire, to which he alone held the key. And at the proper time he turned and smote them, drove them deeper and deeper into the gigantic trap, and overwhelmed them as the hosts of Pharaoh were overwhelmed in the Red Sea. Russia admitted the loss of 50,000 of her finest troops; Germany says the number was nearer 150,000.

A good deal has been heard in this war about German efficiency. But no other example appeals to us so powerfully as this tremendous feat of Von Hindenburg, who would not permit the nation to drain the Mazurian lakes because he wanted them to drown Russians in.

THE PASSING OF TURKEY

January 11, 1915.

ON OR about November 15 the kaiser telegraphed to the sultan his congratulations that the armies of Germany, Austria and Turkey were "now united to fight for the common cause of justice, freedom and right." The caliph sent a suitable reply, but the real answer has just been written in blood-stained snow in wild, lofty passes of the Caucasus mountains, where the mad adventure of a winter invasion of Russia has resulted in disastrous defeat for Turkish arms and German strategy. This decisive event on the eastern border of Europe will have no great effect upon the deadlock in the west. But it will be of interest historically as marking the beginning of the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, where for five hundred years his tyranny has been a blot upon civilization, and for a century has been the shame of a conniving statesmanship.

There could not be imagined a grimmer jest of fate—that the monstrous wrong perpetuated by enlightened governments, for their own selfish advantage and as a means of peace, should at the last overwhelm them in the most colossal war of all time. For the roots of the present conflict lie in the diplomatic intrigues which so long upheld Turkish domination in defiance of justice, morality and the rights of free people. The rise and fall of this power is one of the most illuminating passages of history. Like all other empires, it had its period of growth and its inevitable decline; but the novel feature

is that it long outlived the sentence of death because it was protected by the jealous greed of civilized nations.

The Turks, whom Germany has enlisted in the war against "Asiatic barbarism," originally were a tribe of pagans in the remote parts of Central Asia. Migrating westward in the early part of the eighth century, they came in contact with the Saracens, whose religion they adopted. Always noted for warlike vigor, they helped to check the great Mongol movement toward the west, and for their services received grants of lands in Asia Minor. Their leader, Osman, became the most powerful emir of western Asia, and in 1300 he founded the Ottoman empire upon the ruins of the Saracen civilization. For more than two hundred and fifty years thereafter the Ottoman power steadily expanded, until it held sway over Syria, Arabia, Egypt, northern Africa and vast territories in southeastern Europe. It was in 1355 that the Turkish hordes seized the European side of the strait dividing the two continents, and soon Adrianople was the capital of a Turkish province. Within a generation Macedonia, Albania, Servia, Bosnia and Thessaly had been conquered. In the fifteenth century parts of Hungary and Poland were taken, and in 1453 the irresistible hosts of the Prophet crushed the tottering Byzantine empire and made Constantinople the seat of Turkish power.

Under Solyman the Magnificent (1519-1566) the Ottoman empire reached the height of its mastery and splendor. Only the valor of the Germans, under Charles V, prevented the overrunning of central Europe. In 1571 the combined fleets of Venice and Spain turned the tide by smashing the sultan's naval power at Lepanto, and in the seventeenth century a series of unsuccessful wars on land culminated in the final rout of the Turkish forces under the walls of Vienna by Sobieski, the Pole.

The decline of Ottoman domination was slow but sure. The western races gradually recaptured much of the conquered territory, although it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that Russia had regained the southern part of her empire. Greece won her independence in 1829, after an heroic war. Russia would have broken the Moslem power in 1853-54 had not Great Britain and France come to its rescue and defeated the czar in the Crimea. Rebellions in the Turkish provinces twenty years later gave Russia another chance, and she routed the sultan's armies. But once more the great Powers intervened to save the unspeakable Turk. The treaty of San Stefano, extorted by the victor, was set aside by the treaty of Berlin (1878), and the Christian nations of Europe became the protectors of the rotten Mohammedan empire. Rumania, Servia and Montenegro were declared independent, Bulgaria was made a principality and Austria empowered to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Twenty or thirty years ago the maps still showed a vast territory in Europe as part of the Turkish empire, but it was a shadowy power, many of the provinces being free in all but name. The predominant races were gradually fused into nationalities, which steadily advanced themselves against the declining power of the sultan. In 1881 France took over Tunis, and the Powers gave Thessaly to Greece. A year later Britain occupied Egypt, and in 1885 Bulgaria annexed Roumelia. During the last fifteen years the process of disintegration has been more rapid. Bulgaria became independent in 1908, and in the same year Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, bringing so much nearer the present war. Italy seized the rich province of Tripoli. And finally the Balkan allies, in 1912, wresting themselves free from the repressive influence of the Powers, smashed

the degenerate armies of the sultan and reduced Turkish territory in Europe from 65,000 to 5000 square miles. The Ottoman empire, which had extended in Europe from the Bosphorus to the Danube, had shrunk to a strip of land around Constantinople no larger than Connecticut.

The Young Turk revolution six years ago, which was hailed by the world as an awakening of the nation from ignorance and sloth, was nothing more than a convulsive movement of a dying power. It failed hopelessly because there was no honest effort to give representation to the various races of the empire, and because the despotism of Abdul Hamid was maintained by leaders who lacked his statesmanship and whose pretense of democratic aspirations was false. Even the virility and efficiency of German influence, applied heroically during recent years, could not inject life into the moribund institution of Moslem power. The ambitious design of Pan-Germanism, to extend a sphere of Teutonic influence through Turkey and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf, was promoted with masterly skill. The kaiser won the adulation of his allies by his ceremonial visit to the tomb of Saladin, and the Turkish government and army were virtually turned over to the guidance of experts from Berlin. But the fabric was rotten, and the attempt to patch Oriental feebleness and ignorance with western efficiency only hastened the tearing apart. When the German-trained armies of Islam were routed two years ago by the hardy Balkan troops at Lule Burgas, the last excuse for Turkish domination anywhere in Europe disappeared.

For the power of the Osmanli never had any other foundation than brute force. The history of Turkey is the history of an empire founded upon the theory, which still has its exponents, that might makes right, that the

end of a State is power, and that a nation of commanding military strength has the right to impose its rule and its institutions upon others. Turkey conquered her place in Europe at a time when the rights of men and of nations were not recognized. She held it until two hundred years ago by right of fitness founded on force. When her military supremacy failed the end was sure, and she was tolerated, the scandal of the earth, only because her cunning played one jealous Power against another, and because there was not enough wisdom or decency in European statesmanship to demand an end to her worthless tyranny.

The system broke down because it was false at heart. The Turkish theory of government is a theocracy, with a human despotism masquerading as the representative on earth of God—divine right carried to its logical conclusion. It made a religion, and a false one, the overshadowing principle. It taught submission to autocracy as a duty, and inculcated a fatalism which extinguishes every human impulse toward progress. The blight of this wretched system made the history of Turkey, once her militaristic supremacy was broken, one long process of decay. While other nations advanced steadily in the use of arts and sciences, she remained sunk in the lethargy of ignorance and slavery. Her agriculture to this day is as primitive as that of ancient Arabia. Every effort to introduce western manufacturing methods failed, being met by the graft of a corrupt officialdom and the resistance of a fanatical populace. The land system had given vast wealth to the religious organization and the ruling class, while keeping the peasants in a condition of serfdom. Even in commerce the Turk was never able to compete with Jews, Greeks and Armenians.

But the Osman domination was condemned by causes more fundamental than these. In all the centuries since they came out of central Asia the Turks have never contributed anything of value to civilization, in art, literature, science, industry or government. Worse than that, they destroyed a civilization which was one of the glories of history. In the seventh century the Saracens had held sway over Syria, Palestine, Persia, Egypt and all northern Africa; they subjugated Spain, and were on their way through France when they were hurled back by Charles Martel. But to those whom they conquered they brought the finest civilization of the time. They established universities and libraries in Bagdad, Bokhara, Spain and Italy, encouraged the literature of geography and travel, and developed the science of history. During the dark ages their university at Cordova was a refuge for scholars. In architecture, medicine, astronomy and mathematics they became the teachers of the world.

From the Saracens the Turks took their worst feature, Mohammedanism, while they put the blight of their own incompetence and rapacity upon Saracen civilization. The ascendancy of the Turk marked the decline of Arabian science, art and literature. The same process has been applied to affairs of government. The Turkish power has corrupted every human activity it has touched. It has been a parasite upon mankind, and the worst crime of modern civilization is that it has permitted the evil thing to survive so long. All Europe is paying today for having perpetuated a system which defied the essential rights of humanity. The doctrine of brute force as a justification for conquest belongs to the age when the Osmanli overran the Balkan peninsula. The world will not submit to it in this enlightened day, even from Turkey's highly civilized ally.

NEUTRALITY, PEACE AND THE SELLING OF GUNS

January 13, 1915.

DISPATCHES inform us that the force at the Bethlehem steel works has been increased from 9000 to 11,000 men, and within a few months may be raised to 15,000. Most of these are making shrapnel for European armies, while a large contingent is manufacturing structural steel for bridges to replace those destroyed in France and Belgium. The total of war contracts under way is estimated at \$135,000,000. These conditions which are becoming apparent in a lesser degree in many other industries, and from the same causes, will be gratifying and encouraging to many Americans, who have been disturbed by the depression in business; on the other hand, they will be deplored by sincere and high-minded pacifists as evidence that this country is seeking wealth by promoting war and is betraying the cause of true neutrality. The facts will be cited by those who are urging a law forbidding the sale of munitions of war to belligerent nations.

This proposal is one that appeals to a large part of the population. They are impressed by the argument that the war would end if the United States cut off its supplies, and that it is rank hypocrisy for us to plead for arbitration and universal peace while supplying cannon and shells for the work of slaughter.

The North American yields to no one in its detestation of war and in its desire for peace. Moreover, it is

peculiarly sensitive to an appeal that Americans should be true to the highest ethical and moral standards, whatever the cost. But it is on these very grounds that we consider the proposed embargo to be false in law, in logic and in morals. If adopted, it would be a violation of neutrality, a gross injustice to the rights of Americans and a direct injury to the cause of peace.

The question is as old as international law and in every conflict becomes the subject of heated but quite ineffective controversy. The United States received remonstrances from Great Britain in 1793 and 1854, from France in 1796, Mexico in 1862, Chile in 1891, Venezuela in 1892 and the Orange Free State in 1901, against American shipments of arms to enemies of those countries. Germany remonstrated in 1870 against the selling of supplies to France by English firms. But such a protest invariably meets polite rejection, because it has no justification in law or custom or the strictest construction of neutrality. Answering Britain's complaint in 1793 that Americans were shipping guns to France, Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state, wrote:

(Americans) have always been free to make, vend and export arms. To suppress their callings, the only means, perhaps, of their subsistence, because war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. The law of nations respecting the rights of those at peace does not require from them such an internal derangement of their occupations.

In the same year Alexander Hamilton fixed this formula, which is still adhered to:

The purchasing in and exporting from the United States, by way of merchandise, articles commonly called contraband, being generally warlike instruments and military stores, is free to all the parties at war, and is not to be interfered with.

The same contention disposed of France's protest in 1796. Twenty-six years later the United States supreme court ruled unanimously:

No neutral state is bound by any canon of international law to prohibit the exportation of contraband articles, and the United States has not prohibited it. The sending of contraband of war from a neutral country to the belligerent port for sale as articles of commerce is unlawful only as it subjects the property to confiscation on capture by the other belligerent.

Strangely enough, the United States claimed damages from Britain, before the Geneva arbitrators in 1872, because of shipments by British firms of munitions to the Confederate States; but the plea was silenced by the words of Jefferson and Hamilton. And as late as 1907 the legality of the supplying of arms to belligerents was formally confirmed by The Hague convention, an article unanimously adopted reading:

A neutral power is not bound to prevent the exportation or the transit—for the advantage of one or other of the belligerents—of arms, munitions of war and, in general, of anything which may be of use to an army or a fleet.

The principle was emphasized by Herr Kriege, Germany's jurist at the conference, who declared that "neutral States are not bound to forbid their subjects to engage in a commerce which, from the point of view of belligerents, must be considered illicit." Moreover, on October 15 last the United States government formally reaffirmed the universal usage. The state department issued a notice which said:

It should be understood that, generally speaking, a citizen of the United States can sell to a belligerent government or its agent any article of commerce which he pleases. He is not prohibited from doing this by any rule of international law, by any treaty provisions or by any statute of the United States. It makes no difference whether the articles sold are

exclusively for war purposes, such as firearms, explosives, etc., or are foodstuffs, clothing, horses, etc., for the use of the army or navy of the belligerent.

Furthermore, a neutral government is not compelled by international law, by treaty or by statute to prevent these sales to a belligerent. Such sales by American citizens do not in the least affect the neutrality of the United States.

It is true that such articles, outside the territorial jurisdiction of a neutral nation, are subject to seizure by an enemy of the purchasing government; but it is the enemy's duty to prevent the articles reaching their destination, not the duty of the nation whose citizens have sold them.

If the enemy of the purchasing nation happens for a time to be unable to do this, that is, for him, one of the misfortunes of war; the inability, however, imposes upon the neutral government no obligation to prevent the sale.

The legality of the traffic, then, is unassailable, and is upheld by every civilized government. No principle of international law can be stretched far enough to inhibit this activity; and the proposed embargo would be distinctly repugnant to recognized principles and usages. But it would also be absolutely unneutral, a direct interference by this country in the European war. The German-American congressmen protest that their only desire is to preserve American neutrality; but the fact is that the change of policy would amount to active intervention on behalf of Germany, Austria and Turkey and against their opponents. This point is obvious. Great Britain and France, at the cost of many ships and thousands of lives, have won command of the sea. They have established by their superior strength a condition which the advocates of the embargo demand the United States shall proceed to nullify. The rights and wrongs involved in the war cannot affect this concrete fact.

The American markets for war supplies are open to all the belligerents. It is not the fault of the United States that one group is unable to transport purchases

if made; that condition is due to the other group; it has been deliberately produced by the expenditure of blood and treasure, and its success is one of the fortunes of war which no neutral nation has a right to challenge or seek to change. For the United States to forbid now the export of supplies would be, in fact, to take an active part in the war, by violating universal procedure and by taking from one side an advantage which it has won over the other side. Germany and Austria bought American war material during the early days of the war, and their enemies never dreamed of protesting. The plea of "neutrality" is raised only when these countries have lost through war the power to transport their purchases. No matter how much sympathy we might have with their misfortune, it would be an act of the most flagrant unneutrality to deprive their enemies of a right which is open to all. But The Hague convention, to which the United States was a signatory, is very explicit upon another vital point. It declares:

The rules impartially adopted by the neutral Powers shall not be altered in principle during the course of the war by one of the neutral Powers, except in the case where experience shows the necessity for such action in order to safeguard a nation's rights.

When this government, therefore, declared on August 5 its absolute neutrality and the liberty of its commerce, it opened to all the belligerents perspectives which it is no longer at liberty to close. Early in the war The North American, in an open letter to the president, suggested that this nation might be justified in severing all commercial relations with the warring Powers, in order to compel an early peace. But we cited the obvious fact that such an extraordinary act, amounting to a war measure, would have to be taken at once, if at all; that after a decisive advantage had been won by either side it would be too late. That decisive advan-

tage has been won in control of the sea, and it would be impossible now to forbid commerce in war material without taking an unwarranted part in the war.

Moreover, the embargo would deprive the American people of trade of untold value, at a time when they are already suffering severely from depression due to the war. Contraband includes not only rifles and cartridges and shrapnel, but many raw materials; as well as army clothing, shoes, blankets, shirts, saddles, tools, wagons, motortrucks and foodstuffs. Hundreds of factories and scores of thousands of American workmen depend for their existence upon the manufacture of these goods for export. It is a question how far any nation's duty to other nations or to international interest transcends its duty to its own people.

But it is not on legal and material grounds alone that the action would be indefensible. It would establish a dangerous precedent. In case of war the United States itself would depend upon other nations for its munitions. Even during the little Spanish-American war we had to buy supplies hurriedly from Germany; and it is a noteworthy fact that no word of protest was uttered by Spain, our foe; by Germany, whose sympathies were pro-Spanish, nor by Belgium, through whose neutral port of Antwerp the supplies were shipped. The proposed action, if taken, would surely lead to reprisals in kind, and in the event of war would imperil the very safety of the nation. The fact is that to destroy the jealously guarded right of neutrals to supply munitions to all belligerents alike would be a grave injustice to small countries, which when attacked must seek materials abroad, and also would encourage universal militarism. Knowing that in case of war neutral markets would be closed, every nation would be impelled to establish its own Krupp industry and to heap up vast supplies

of deadly munitions, thereby inviting a militaristic influence in the government and among the people.

This is in itself an effective answer to the plea that the proposed embargo would discourage war. Nothing would so surely lead to an increase of armaments in times of peace as the certainty that in time of war a belligerent would be unable to obtain supplies from neutral sources. Upon purely ethical grounds, it would be difficult to justify the sale of weapons and other war materials to Great Britain or France or Germany or Russia by a people professing a horror of war and a desire for universal peace. But the closing of markets would apply to all nations alike and under all conditions; and is it to be said that we would advance the cause of humanity by refusing to supply arms to Boers or Belgians or any other people resisting aggression?

The issue involved is closely allied with the principles of pacificism. Those who urge that the United States "lead the world" by taking this unheard-of, futile and inflammatory action are chiefly sympathizers with Germany; but their propaganda appeals strongly to those who imagine that the cause of universal peace would be advanced if this country were to dismantle its fleet and discourage all military preparedness. We are pacifists enough to hope and believe that some day the human race will be sufficiently civilized to forbid the sale of arms or foodstuffs or any articles of commerce whatever to belligerents. But for the United States to attempt such action alone, at the present stage of the war and in the existing state of civilization, not only would be an act grossly unneutral and warlike, but would inflict incalculable losses upon the nation and would expose it in the future to the peril of irreparable disaster.

WAR AND THE NEXT GENERATION

January 16, 1915.

IF ONE sentence may be said approximately to contain the essence of the teachings of General Friedrich von Bernhardi, it is these five words, "War is a biological necessity." Upon this foundation he erects that astonishing structure of militaristic philosophy which inspires the German government and people. We do not imply, of course, that he created the system, but he is its most lucid and persuasive interpreter. We may observe, in passing, that of all the war controversialists, we like best this noblest Roman of the militaristic legions. His soldierly bluntness of diction is agreeably bracing, and his arguments are presented with a transparent sincerity which captivates the most pacific reader. If any one could persuade us to embrace the doctrines of militarism, it would be this plain-spoken old cavalry commander, whose pen, however signal his gallantry may be, is assuredly mightier than his sword.

Repellent as his conclusions are to the American mind, most of us can agree with certain of his premises. Few will deny that war is sometimes inevitable, sometimes necessary, sometimes righteous, and that it produces some uplifting results. Religious and political freedom have been won throughout the ages by war. With the sword Cromwell gave England democracy, Garibaldi gave Italy unity, Bismarck molded the force of German nationalism. Our Civil War ended slavery, secured to us our democratic institutions and created

for us the loftiest ideals of heroism, patriotism and sacrifice. The revolution wrought during the last six months in France is as striking and as beneficial as that of a century and a quarter ago. The whole people seems reborn; the old, false standards have been swept away, and new values have arisen to challenge sacrificing effort; the spirit of the nation has been purified and ennobled.

These things may be admitted. The theory we discuss now is that which holds that war is not only inevitable, but desirable; is a benevolent dispensation of nature, a manifestation of the law of "the survival of the fittest"; a force which promotes human progress by selecting and preserving the strong among individuals and nations and advancing them over the weak, the declining and the unfit. But let General von Bernhardt state his case in his own words, now familiar to most students of current war literature:

Wherever we look in nature we find that war is a fundamental law of development. This great verity, recognized in past ages, has been convincingly demonstrated by Darwin. Nature is ruled by an unceasing struggle for existence, by the right of the stronger; and this struggle, in its apparent cruelty, brings about a selection, eliminating the weak and the unwholesome.

The struggle for existence is ruled by biological laws. It applies also to men. It is the cause of all human progress. * * * The relations among nations are dominated by an unceasing struggle for territories, power and predominance. Hence war is inevitable.

The generative importance of war lies in this, that it causes selection; and thus war becomes a biological necessity. It becomes an indispensable regulator, because without war there could be neither racial nor cultural progress. War, from the point of view of natural history and biology, is evidently necessary as an element in national development.

It is a very singular thing that this astounding theory should be so generally upheld by a nation of

scientists like the Germans. It is obviously faulty, we should say, in that it attempts to apply the insensate struggle of the lower orders of nature to the relationships of men, who have reason, will, the power to distinguish between good and evil, a sense of obligation, duty and sacrifice. But the point we wish to emphasize is that it is a philosophic deduction which is utterly refuted by the facts of history and by the very science of biology to which it appeals. War is, above all things, the inveterate contradiction of "the survival of the fittest." It is the fittest who die, the weak who survive. For generations after a great war the world pays the price in physical and mental decadence, in the loss of genius, energy and productive skill. The wiser men of all time have recognized this law. Two thousand years ago Sophocles said, "War does not of choice destroy bad men, but good men ever." "War devours the best," wrote Schiller, a German at least as profound as Von Bernhardi. Said Benjamin Franklin:

All war is bad. Some wars are worse than others. War is not paid for in wartime; the bill comes later. The seeds of destruction of any nation lie in the influences by which the best men are cut off from the work of parenthood.

Many causes contributed to the fall of Greece and of Rome, but not the least was the exhaustion caused by interminable wars, the steady decline in national vigor due to propagation of the unfit. France has paid a terrific cost in physical deterioration for the slaughter of her strongest sons in the Napoleonic era. The signs of decadence which thoughtful Englishmen have observed in their people are due not wholly to economic evils. For two centuries the nation has been bled by the demands of empire.

Never the lotus closes, never the wild fowl wake,
But a soul goes out on the East wind that died for
England's sake—

Man or woman or suckling, mother or bride or maid—
Because on the bones of the English the English flag is
stayed!

There is no American, we suppose, who believes that the great war fought in this country half a century ago cost too much for what it gave; yet it is certain that the nation is paying now, and will always pay, for the immeasurable loss of blood and brain and strength which it then suffered. We do not speak idly. The biological effects of the Civil War, in their relation to eugenics and racial progress, have been the subject of scientific inquiry. Two years ago a survey was made in counties of Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee that had suffered during the conflict. The investigators were President David Starr Jordan, of Stanford University; Professor Krehbiel, of the chair of modern history in that institution, and Prof. Harvey E. Jordan, of the chair of histology and embryology in the University of Virginia. The result of their work is outlined in "War's Aftermath," recently published. After exhaustive personal research in tracing the descendants of Southern families and inquiring into the social losses due to the exactions of the war, they drew up thirty propositions and submitted them to the criticism of Confederate officers and other men of intelligence in the South. Only a few received assent from all, but among those unanimously upheld were these:

The flower of the people went into the war at the beginning, and of these a large part died before the end.

War took the physically fit; the physically unfit remained behind.

And the judgment of the investigators, while not put forth as precise or absolutely conclusive, was as follows:

A just weighing of all the evidence leaves a decided balance in favor of grave racial hurt in consequence of the war.

Even granting that the South and the country as a whole are, relative to ante-bellum days, no poorer racially—an assumption no one can maintain in the face of the enormous waste of one million splendid souls—it is further certain that, could we have had the inspiring presence and wise counsel of these martyrs and their potential offspring, the country would now be immeasurably better off in a yet higher average of physical, mental and moral stamina.

The theoretical argument for reversed selection seems beyond question. We must decide that the war has seriously impoverished this country of its best human values.

Nearly one million men died in that conflict, most of them in the prime of manhood. Countless others who survived were crippled or shattered in health. And it was largely those who did not go to the front, because of lack of physical or spiritual vigor, who became the fathers of the succeeding generation, who determined to that extent the racial future of the nation. Can it be doubted that there was a eugenic loss here of far-reaching effect?

The present war furnishes sinister evidence of the same evil. Great Britain is proud of having sent 500,000 "picked men" to the front. Some of them will return; but the 200,000 rejected for unfitness will produce a greater proportion of the next generation. The very flower of German manhood is being flung against the batteries of the allies in the west and the bayonets of the Russians in the east. Belgium is a land of stricken women and feeble old men; and doctors declare that of the Belgian children born during the horrors of the invasion the vast majority have died in infancy or show pitiful signs of inferiority. But the victims of this war will be not alone the dead and the crippled. Its unparalleled horrors and the unbearable strain have already driven thousands of soldiers insane; and it is declared by medical observers that no man who has endured for weeks the dreadful life of the trenches

and the unending shock of explosions will ever fully regain vigorous health. Dr. Ales Hrdlicka, curator of the national museum in Washington and a noted anthropologist, said recently that the soldier in this war who is killed by bullet or shrapnel is really more fortunate than many of his comrades. He continued:

Into the war there are being sent perhaps 15,000,000 men, at least one-half of whom represent the best in the physical line which the embroiled nations have. Out of the war there will come back possibly four-fifths; but among these survivors how many will be wrecked in their physical and mental powers?

These will be the army of the chronic invalids, the rheumatics, the neurasthenics, the irritables and men suffering with incurable ailments of the intestinal tract. These alone will constitute a much greater loss, vital and economical, than all those killed.

But the injury does not stop there. These hundreds of thousands of partial wrecks will marry, in most instances, and their weaknesses are bound to tell in their progeny. These are actual conditions which confront the medical man and the anthropologist in studying the welfare of humanity. When the final accounting of human damage is made after this war there will be found no victors among the nations—only sufferers.

This supports the opinion of Doctor Jordan:

War robs a country of its fundamental asset, its best young citizenship, the potential ancestors of the "thoroughbreds" of the coming generation. The warlike nation of today is the decadent nation of tomorrow.

Mankind of the present day is already paying dearly, and will pay incalculably more, in money, in suffering and in the paralysis of civilizing and progressive movements. But this loss is trifling to that which future generations will pay, to learn from an outraged Nature that war is not a "biological necessity," but a biological crime—racial suicide by the extermination of the fittest.

WILL AMERICA MEDIATE?

January 19, 1915.

ONE of the most curious spectacles of the wartime has been the self-conscious preparation in Washington for the task of mediation, which, it seems taken for granted, is to be unanimously intrusted to this government by a world distraught. It is not too much to say that this has been the uppermost policy of the administration for the last six months. Every other problem has been subordinated, in a measure, to the naive belief that, when the turmoil and bloodshed are over, the exhausted nations will lay their battered weapons at the feet of the United States and crave the healing solace of a settlement by our altruistic statesmanship. The ambition is a worthy one, and Americans will hope for its realization. But it would do no harm to inquire whether the vision is likely to come true—whether our status among the Powers is so high, so admirable and so secure that by common consent America will be elevated to the position of arbiter for the world. No uncertainty on these points afflicts President Wilson. He is convinced that presently the naughty nations at war will come to us confessing their sins and pleading for our benevolent intervention. His peroration at Indianapolis last week voiced his expectation eloquently:

What a future is ours, my friends! Look abroad upon the troubled world! Only America at peace! Among all the great Powers of the world, only America using her great

character and strength in the interests of peace and prosperity!

Do you not think it likely that the world will some time turn to America and say: "You were right and we were wrong; you kept your heads when we lost ours. Now, in your self-possession, in your coolness, in your strength, may we not turn to you for counsel and for assistance?"

May we not look forward to the time when we shall be called blessed among the nations, because we succored the peoples of the world in their time of distress and dismay?

Such a position of supreme judicial power, it is obvious, would require a strong record—unflinching defense of humanity, ready vindication of the principles of international morality, consistent proof of courage and sagacity in statesmanship. How does America stand in these matters? Have we shown such fidelity to our obligations that we can assume as of right the functions of a judge of the nations?

It must be conceded at once that there is no question about our official neutrality. Ever since the war began the scrupulous impartiality of the administration and of the president himself has commanded admiration. Short of a condition of deafness, dumbness and paralysis, no human organism, we believe, could have maintained a more remarkable degree of impenetrable aloofness. The absolute sincerity of this position cannot be doubted, and some aspects of it have been wholly admirable. But its chief purpose avowedly has been not to guard the interests of America and of humanity, but to fit the administration for the dramatic role of mediator. Thus the question is whether the course pursued in these and other foreign relations has been such as to create commanding American influence in international affairs. We recall some patronizing approval from England on the Panama canal tolls surrender, but we still doubt that any sacrifice of American interests, "right or

wrong," could enhance our prestige abroad. American ambassadors in certain European countries have won high honor, but the service elsewhere is even now under a cloud of sordid scandal. As to Mexico, our record there has been not only a jest among the nations, but a subject of indignant protests. We find it difficult to conceive that the destinies of Europe will be committed to the judgment of a statesman whose solution of the Mexican problem is this:

Have not European nations taken as long as they wanted and spilt as much blood as they pleased in settling their affairs, and shall we deny that right to Mexico because she is weak? No, I say! It is none of my business and it is none of yours how they go about settling their government, and while I am president nobody shall interfere with them.

But the war itself has developed two factors which seem to make American mediation remote. First is the disposition of the warring Powers. The eagerness they once showed to capture favorable opinion in this country has evaporated, and the foreign press is decidedly antagonistic to suggestions of an American peace tribunal. Moreover, the fearful sacrifices the peoples at war have made are not calculated to induce them to seek outside aid. The New York Sun's cynical comment on Washington's expectancy is plausible:

The delusion fondly nourished is that the nations are draining their blood, scattering their treasure and prostrating their interests, not for the attainment of definite and sordid ends, but to furnish an opportunity for the application of academic principles wholly unrelated to their own conception of their needs.

One thing is as certain as anything can be in the future of a somewhat surprising humanity: peace will be concluded on terms fixed by the trafficking and bargaining of uncommonly hard-headed men, uninfluenced by any noticeable admixture of idealism. We gravely fear that there will be

disappointment in high places near the banks of the Potomac river.

But there is a far graver condition than here predicted. This is the failure of the administration to do its duty by protesting against the violation of the conventions of The Hague. The international conference of 1907, to which the United States was a party, adopted rules of warfare which have been utterly dishonored by various belligerents. The bombardment of undefended towns, the discharge of explosives from balloons, the levying of excessive tribute, the destruction of buildings dedicated to religion, art or science, the sowing of the open seas with mines—these and other acts were expressly forbidden. And in particular it was solemnly agreed:

The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

It may be true that protests based upon the notorious violations of the provisions first specified were not demanded, for the reason that they would require the gathering of exhaustive evidence. But the very first overt act of the war, concerning which there has never been any question or denial, was the invasion of Belgium, whose neutrality was absolutely guaranteed both by treaties and by the regulations of The Hague. Theodore Roosevelt, who as president authorized the signature of this country to the conventions, declares that the failure of the government to protest in each case was a "timid and selfish abandonment of duty," following "the cult of cowardice." We shall let him speak for himself, and shall merely express our own judgment that the silence of the administration has been culpable negli-

gence and an utter distortion of the duty of neutrality, and has well nigh destroyed the influence of this country among the Powers.

We are familiar with the defense offered for the policy of inertia. It is argued that, although the United States signed the clause defining the inviolability of neutral territory, it did not become a guarantor thereof, because of a reservation that the convention should not be construed "so as to require the United States to depart from its traditional policy of not interfering with the political questions or policy of any foreign State," etc. Further, it is represented that the convention became operative "only if all belligerents are parties," and that the neutrality clause was not ratified by Great Britain or France; hence Germany was not bound to observe it, nor the United States to protest its violation.

But these pleas are beside the mark. It was in no way the duty of the United States to challenge the invasion of Belgium or to seek to make good its guarantee by force of arms, but just as clearly it was the duty of this government to file immediately its formal protest at The Hague against that repudiation of the international compact. This is the largest and most powerful of the neutral nations. It, and it alone, was qualified to speak. No one imagines that an American protest would have halted the invasion or would have delayed by an hour the fall of Liege or Brussels or Antwerp, but it would have had an incalculable moral effect; it would have put before the world in definite form the judgment of the neutral nations upon an act of aggression, and it would have kept open the case of Belgium for adjudication by the nations of the world at the close of the war. It is our proud boast as a nation that our power is not that of armaments, but of moral dignity and national honor; the world, shaken by the storm of

a great war, looked to us to keep alight the lamp of progress, to stand firmly and impartially for the principles which must be re-established in the end if civilization is to endure. Yet when a right which we had pledged ourselves to sustain is flagrantly defied we do not so much as express an opinion, and the sacred cause of which we were one of the trustees is allowed to go by default.

But then, as if to emphasize our failure, we do finally register a protest. The rape of Belgium, the destruction of Louvain, the scattering of deadly mines in the fairways of ocean commerce—these crimes against humanity have not brought even a word of comment from Washington. But the holding up of some cargoes of copper has moved the administration to action of the most drastic kind. Let it be understood that with that protest we are in full sympathy; our only criticism is that Great Britain's interference with our lawful trade was not resisted the very first time she made an unjust stoppage of an American shipment. But it is humiliating that among all the outrages and offenses of the war, involving the fundamental rights of nations and humanity, the administration should select as the exclusive subject of protest a controversy over commercial matters. Our attitude would imply that an international compact is a mere "scrap of paper" compared to that sacred document, a bill of lading.

The injury done to our prestige is palpable. The Wilson policy has actually given to the British, whose very god is trade, an excuse to sneer at American "dollar worship." To show the hurt we have suffered we need not quote from English newspapers, although their satirical shafts are keen enough. We may take the word of an American, Edward Price Bell, London correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*:

The United States is making no real friends in this war.
* * * The general charge is that we are displaying a shameless lack of idealism, chivalry, magnanimity and courage. Britons, Frenchmen, Russians and Italians blame America for ignoring the invasion of Belgium and the violations of the conventions of The Hague, and then springing into the international arena with a protest relating exclusively to matters of trade.

The argument is that if President Wilson had protested against the violations of treaties and the principles of civilized warfare, he could have protested with vastly greater effect against the arbitrary and possibly indefensible interference with American cargoes. * * *

Every one admits that Mr. Wilson is bound to protect the neutral commerce of America as far as he can. The indictment is that we abdicated ignominiously and ran away when great questions of morals and humanity were concerned, but promptly recovered our sense of duty and our courage when the state of war threatened to reduce the profits of the copper kings and otherwise penalize America materially. * * *

Influential Germans are also inclined to speak of us with scorn. It seems that the whole of Europe is hardening against America. One cannot doubt, as matters stand, that when peace comes the United States will have no hand in making it.

The conclusion seems to us almost as overdrawn as the hopes of the fluttering statesmen in Washington. We are convinced that the United States will still have a considerable part in the readjustment of world affairs. But loyal Americans must regret a policy which has found its sole issue with the belligerents a matter of dollars and cents, while acquiescing in the dishonor and destruction of the conventions of The Hague, the only foundation for international peace that civilization has thus far been able to construct.

AMERICA AND THE HAGUE

January 22, 1915.

AN ALERT correspondent selects for contumelious rebuke the following sentence in our editorial of last Tuesday, "The eagerness they (the warring Powers) once showed to capture favorable opinion in this country has evaporated, and the foreign press is decidedly antagonistic to suggestions of an American peace tribunal." This, we are informed, is "a gratuitous invention," the evident purpose of which is "to discredit the wise neutrality of the administration"; and we are denounced for "seeking to question the title of America to act as arbiter."

Of course there is a misconception here. It is not America's title we question, so much as the probability of its being recognized by nations whose feelings are inflamed by war and whose respect, to a great degree, we have forfeited.

It was natural that in the first alarm of the great upheaval the countries involved should look with trust and friendliness to the United States. They recognized this as the greatest of the neutral Powers; they knew that its people held high ideals; they regarded it as big enough and courageous enough to be discreet without being dumb, to be neutral without being neuter. One of the leaders at The Hague conferences, a consistent advocate of peace and international justice, a scrupulous observer of treaty obligations, America was confidently expected to perform her part with fidelity—to preserve

the most exact neutrality and to act as custodian of the rights of neutrals and of civilization as a whole. There was not the remotest suggestion of a duty of intervention; but there was very clearly implied the obligation to speak when it was necessary and to keep the record straight for presentation to the court of nations that some day will sit in judgment upon the war.

But this hope, which seemed widely held, was soon extinguished. One by one the conventions of The Hague, to which the name of the United States had been signed, were torn to fragments. The nationality of Belgium was struck down; sleeping non-combatants were slain with bombs from the midnight sky; cities were laid under tribute and put to the torch; deadly mines were strewn in the ocean paths of commerce, so that peaceful merchantmen by the score were destroyed and their crews flung mangled into the sea; and even the neutral waters of this hemisphere were arrogantly invaded by the belligerents. But none of these things extorted so much as a word from the government of the United States. Argentina and the other Latin republics literally dragged it into acquiescence in a declaration of the rights of neutrals as paramount to those of belligerents; while to this day not a whisper of protest, complaint or regret has been uttered over the deliberate repudiation of agreements to which this country was a party.

Now what was the duty of the American government? The estimate of Theodore Roosevelt has some authority, since it was he who, as president, caused this country to join in the conventions that have been dishonored by the belligerents and disregarded by Washington. In the *Independent* he writes:

I took the action on the theory and with the belief that the United States intended to live up to its obligations. If I had supposed that signing these conventions meant literally

nothing beyond the expression of a pious wish, which any Power was at liberty to disregard with impunity, I would certainly not have permitted the United States to be a party to such a mischievous farce. * * *

Either The Hague conventions meant something or else they meant nothing. If, in the event of their violation, none of the signatory Powers were even to protest, then, of course, they meant nothing, and it was an act of unspeakable silliness to enter into them. If, on the other hand, they meant anything whatsoever, it was the duty of the United States, as the most powerful, or, at least, the richest and most populous neutral nation, to take action for upholding them. There is no escape from this alternative. * * *

To violate these conventions is a dreadful wrong. But it is really not quite so contemptible, it does not show such short-sighted and timid efficiency, and, above all, such selfish indifference to the cause of permanent and righteous peace, as has been shown by the United States (thanks to President Wilson and Secretary Bryan) in refusing to fulfill its solemn obligations.

Some Americans think the former president goes too far, because of a distinct reservation made that the United States should not interfere in the policies of foreign nations. And a mere protest, they say, would have been worthless; it would have to be backed up by armed force. From this view we dissent. The most extravagant reasoning could not put upon this country the burden of making war to uphold the conventions. But Colonel Roosevelt is exactly right when he charges that we defaulted when we did not file formal protest at The Hague. That course would have kept life in the international agreements which are now moribund, and would have saved the written word of the United States from becoming a mere "scrap of paper." Our particular inquiry, now, however, is as to the effect of our negligence upon American prestige and upon the part that this government is to play in restoring peace. For months the Wilson administration has been agitated by

the prospect of mediating among the Powers. Its refusal to protest against the dishonoring of the conventions of The Hague was not due, we think, to a "cult of cowardice," as Colonel Roosevelt says, but rather, to a tremulous fear lest such action might offend a belligerent and so avert the glory of acting as world arbiter.

Yet this policy of silent acquiescence in wrong has not enhanced European respect for our idealism. Germany, for example, is not one of those nations which, in President's Wilson's words, is going to "turn to America and say, 'You were right and we were wrong; may we not look to you for counsel and assistance?'" The semi-official Cologne Zeitung said recently:

Despite all friendliness toward America, Germans must recognize that America cannot be the arbitrator between Great Britain and Germany. American neutrality has been favorable, on the whole, to Great Britain, and we cannot have in America the confidence we ought to repose in an impartial arbitrator.

The Hamburger Fremdenblatt denounces the "humbug and hypocrisy of American public opinion," and adds:

In any case, the people of Germany need not bother themselves in the least about what the Americans think or say, so long as the German arms win. That is all that matters, for the American is a thorough opportunist and never has any sympathy with the side that is beaten.

There could hardly be a clearer reference to the attitude of Washington on the spoliation of Belgium. But, of course, says the hopeful American, we have a better standing with Great Britain, even though our only protest in the whole war has been about some delayed cargoes. We find one answer in an Australian imperialistic paper:

President Wilson has been intimating what he is prepared to do as a peacemaker. However, he must realize that this is a fight to a finish. We will not tolerate any third-

party enterprise. When the time comes to clear up the final tangle there will not be any need for the assistance of any peacemaker. There will be no doubt as to who has won.

The London Globe is less arrogant and more explicit:

Let us say frankly that the United States have already disqualified themselves for the assumption of judicial functions. They have seen every Hague convention to which American statesmen set their hands violated, clause by clause, and have not even protested. We do not blame them. They are judges of their own consciences and their own interests, but their silence proves they have set those interests in front of all other considerations.

More significant is the utterance of the London Chronicle, chief organ of the Liberal government:

It has been the consequence of the American attitude that The Hague conventions have not only been infringed, but killed, and killed beyond visible means of resurrection, let alone extension. No State is going to let itself in for such a deception again.

Nor is it possible to deny that the moral position of the United States has been appreciably weakened. The American note regarding contraband—a perfectly fair, legitimate and well-inspired document of which we make no complaint—would impress the world rather differently if it had been preceded by notes in other quarters regarding the violation of Belgium, massacres of non-combatants, illegal and merciless money fines, bombardment of defenseless towns and the scattering of long-lived mines in the open sea.

The humiliating fact is, not only that we have lost caste because of our failure to make good even in form our pledged word, but that, as one of the nations which laid the basis of written international law at The Hague, we have defaulted as a trustee of civilization.

HOW LONG WILL THE WAR LAST?

January 25, 1915.

A WAR incident not without significance was the shifting of the news from the front page of several newspapers the other day. The airship raid on England restored it in the next issues to the prominent position it had held for more than six months, but the spell had been broken. From the standpoint of news, the war must hereafter "show cause" why a leading place should be given to it. The feverish interest that prevailed until a few weeks ago subsided gradually when the fighting settled down to a seeming deadlock. The official reports, although they deal with scores of engagements excelling in magnitude battles noted in history, are calculated to enthrall only military experts. For months the daily question was as to which side was gaining advantage; now it is chiefly, How long will it last? We do not pretend to be learned in military science, nor to have the confidence of "high authority" connected with either side, nor to possess a prophetic faculty. We purpose simply to review some of the facts and conditions and to discuss their bearing upon the question propounded.

Just as was the case in our Civil War, in the beginning an early decision was confidently predicted. One or two big battles in Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine and a tremendous naval engagement in the North sea were to settle the matter. Both sides were equally assured. The German check at Liege was hailed as the beginning of

the collapse of the empire's military might; then the British disaster at Mons was held to mark the downfall of England, while the retreat of the French was cited as evidence of fatal weakness.

Expectations of a definite result in a short time seemed plausible at first. The thunderous sweep of the German hosts toward Paris had the appearance of finality, and the world was fully prepared for the fall of the capital. But almost within sight of the gates of the city the onrushing masses hesitated, faltered and began to recede. French and British lines stiffened at the Marne into an impregnable rampart, and within a week the invaders were retreating in their turn. Then followed the vast campaign called the battle of the Aisne; the extension of the lines northward to the sea, and the struggle that since has raged almost without cessation from the coast to the border of Switzerland. The operations along this 300-mile line resemble a gigantic siege. The clashing of great forces in the open is almost unknown; advances are made by laborious trench digging, sapping and mining. The aeroplane has eliminated the element of surprise, and the contests are decided by brute strength in guns, muscle and nerve. The reports do not tell of the movements of armies, but of regiments and companies. An advance of 150 yards at a given point is cabled around the world.

In view of this gigantic deadlock, it is interesting to recall some of the early predictions. We shall note them in chronological order. In mid-October Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, a noted French political economist, estimated the duration of the war at seven months. At the end of November "an officer of high position in General French's army" was quoted as follows:

The war will be over before June. Early in the summer Germany will be ready to make peace on the best terms she

can obtain. This prediction is purely a military one, and leaves out of consideration what terms Germany will be able to obtain and be willing to accept.

About the same time an interesting forecast, attributed to "a military authority," was published in Paris. It said:

He divides the war into six periods—two past, one present and three to come. The first was the German advance through Belgium and into France. The second was the battle of the Marne and the German retreat to the Aisne. The third is that of the fighting on the Aisne, continuing and developing into the effort to reach Calais.

The fourth period will be a German retreat and a battle on the Meuse. The fifth will be a further retreat and a battle on the Rhine. The sixth will be the march to Berlin.

He estimates that the battle for Calais will last well into December. He assigns five months to the battle of the Meuse—till about May 1, 1915. The campaign on the Rhine should last nearly twice as long—say until February, 1916. The march to Berlin and the negotiations should bring the war to an end in 1917. He assumes that the operations will be steady, with no sudden collapse of either front.

This, it will be recalled, is in harmony with Field Marshal Kitchener's estimate of a war of three years; recently he has been said to have remarked that "the war will begin in May." But while the French expert was laying out a struggle lasting until 1917, an American economic expert was telling us that it must end in a few months. Roger W. Babson said:

I care not how much the statesmen of the various nations talk about a long war, I can say authoritatively that the bankers of these nations know that it cannot be long.
* * * I have found bankers agreed that the attempt of either side to fight this war to a finish means financial bankruptcy for Europe.

It is all very well to talk about unlimited supplies of men; but the nations cannot fight without huge sums of money. The rulers of Europe have gone crazy.

Guglielmo Ferrero, the eminent Italian historian, gave his estimate as two years. He recalled the theory,

once very widely held, that the deadliness of modern weapons and the colossal size of modern armies would make wars impossible; and said that not only had this idea been refuted, but that these factors had made a quick decision impossible. "In proportion to the measure in which they have been perfected," he wrote, "armies have become less adapted to fulfill their mission." About the middle of December Hilaire Belloc, who is noted as a military writer, declared that no one could safely predict the duration of the conflict. But, he said, "it will end within three months after the allied troops have obtained a firm foothold on German soil." Early this year a letter from a French officer told of a new French army of 1,000,000 men that would go to the front in February, preparatory to a decisive movement against the Germans in March and April. "The war," he said, "will last two years, at least." The military expert whose illuminating articles appear in the New York Sun and The North American wrote on January 6:

Neither Germany nor her enemies have destroyed the military power of their opponents. So far, it is a plain draw. * * * After five months of war there is not the slightest sign to be found anywhere of immediate peace. * * * The unmistakable belief in neutral countries that Germany must ultimately lose is based on the conviction that she cannot forever match men and money with three great powers. * * *

Early in the war, Lord Kitchener fixed three years as the limit of the conflict. Today the best witnesses in Europe agree that it will be longer rather than shorter.

Thus the weight of opinion seems to be that the struggle will be long, bloody and incredibly costly. The most potent factor is that neither side shows the remotest desire for peace. Germany still manifests extreme confidence of victory, while Great Britain, France and Russia have made solemn treaty to fight until Germany

is subdued. Neither force has suffered sufficiently to make peace more attractive than the prospects of victory, however remote. No conceivable settlement now would satisfy one group or the other. Peace must await the time when one has suffered crushing loss, or when general exhaustion compels a compromise.

What, then, are the chances for a decisive victory by either side? Competent observers see no probability of such a result, unless through a sudden collapse of the fighting spirit on one side, of which there are now no indications. The amazingly stubborn contest along the western battle front certainly does not suggest it. The swift advance of the invaders during August had a decisive look, but before mid-September the invincibility of the German army had become an exploded myth. Man for man and gun for gun, the forces of France and Britain and Belgium had proved themselves the equals of the best troops of the kaiser. Paris was saved, the German march on Calais and Dunkirk was broken, and for nearly five months the hedge of steel has resisted every assault. Action in the east has been more violent, but no more final. Austria's strength has been borne down, but the Germans and Russians have alternated as victors in East Prussia and in Poland. There is no likelihood that the British and German fleets will soon be engaged. The air raids on the east coast of England are but ghastly jokes.

After nearly six months of war, Germany holds most of Belgium and a corner of France. Her colonies are gone, but her European possessions are intact, except for narrow portions of East Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine. It has been shown that she cannot break the allies' strength in the west; and while she may preserve her eastern frontier, her most brilliant victories will make no permanent impression on the hosts of Russia.

There is no reason to believe that the German armies will ever see Paris. On the other hand, to expel them from France, at the present rate of progress, would take years. And in the event of a forced retreat, the Germans have three massive lines of defense prepared from the sea to the Rhine through Belgium; while if they are thrust over the German border, the invaders will have to storm fortresses well-nigh impregnable.

From a military standpoint, therefore, it appears that Germany can be defeated only by a wearing-down process—by economic pressure and the capacity of the allies to increase their military strength while hers remains stationary. The result depends upon the supplies and the handling of money, men and food. The theory is that Germany can be defeated by impoverishment, by overwhelming numbers or by starvation, or by the pressure of all three. Some figures bearing upon these points will be enlightening.

Just a year ago a director of the Deutsche Bank issued an elaborate computation of the national wealth of Germany and other countries. Leaving Russia and Austria out of consideration, it was shown that the wealth of France was \$57,400,000,000; of Britain, \$61,125,000,000, and of Germany, \$75,000,000,000, an excess for the allies of \$43,525,000,000. The yearly incomes were computed as follows: France, \$5,000,000,000; Britain, \$8,750,000,000, and Germany, \$11,250,000,000, an annual excess for the allies of \$2,500,000,000. The cost of the war can be expressed in figures, but they are so vast as to be almost beyond comprehension. Early in October Yves Guyot, an eminent French economist, estimated the total loss to the world at \$17,600,000,000 in the first six months. France's expenditures for the first six months have totaled \$1,200,000,000. On December 10 Dr. Julius Wolf, a Berlin expert, estimated

the cost of the Austro-German armies at \$15,000,000 a day and the armies of the allies at \$22,500,000 a day, a total of \$37,500,000 each twenty-four hours. On January 1 the Berlin Vorwaerts declared the allies were spending \$24,962,000 daily, against \$21,000,000 for Germany and Austria. A careful estimate of the losses in men to January 1 shows the killed, wounded and missing of Germany and Austria to number 3,000,000, and those of France, Britain, Belgium and Russia about 3,130,000. Of those killed, the Germans and Austrians had lost 410,000 and the allies, 475,000.

These are the stupendous forces that are to be taken into account in considering how long the war can last. Much emphasis is laid upon the terrific drain upon Germany's economic resources. But it is just there that German efficiency tells, and the empire's leaders ridicule the idea that the nation can be "starved" into submission. The German press bureau in New York issued a statement recently computing a total army and recruiting strength in Germany of 12,000,000 men. Professor Usher, an American authority, insists that Germany, by making some sacrifices, can live on her own resources. Field Marshal von der Goltz said a month ago that Germany was prepared to fight "for years." Dr. Otto Appel, a German agricultural expert now in this country, declares that supplies are so efficiently managed that the people will never lack food. A week ago Lieutenant General von Falkenhayn, the chief of staff, stated that Germany is ready to fight "indefinitely."

It is clear that the political and military leaders of Germany are relentlessly determined to carry on the struggle, and that economic efficiency is a tremendous force at their command. Germany will fight until her citizens realize that the cause is hopeless. And here lies the greatest obstruction to an early peace. Of all

the peoples involved, those of Germany are the least impressionable by facts and conditions outside of their actual experience. Their patriotism, in the first place, is an exalted passion, a veritable religion, the prime teaching of which is racial superiority and the certainty of Teutonic domination.

A rigid censorship and habitual veneration for authority lead them to accept implicitly the views of the government, and the official interpretation of events is never questioned. To this day no German, so far as is known, doubts that the war was forced upon them; that the invasion and laying waste of Belgium were just measures of defense, while Turkey is defending western civilization against Asiatic barbarism; and that the German retreat from Paris was a subtle victory over the enemy. The capture of Calais is still awaited with cheerful expectancy, and the killing of a few civilians with airship bombs is hailed with joy as a terrific blow at the British empire.

Those who look for a popular German demand for peace will have to wait a long time. Public opinion is not only uninformed regarding the war, but it is disciplined; and it is inspired by a devotion to national ideals which require the surrender of all individual desires to purposes of state.

We see no indications that Germany can defeat her enemies. But so long as her armies are in Poland, in Belgium and in France and her people are self-supporting, what reason is there to expect that she will yield? If, then, her defeat depends upon a successful invasion of her territory, it is reasonably clear that we are discussing not the approaching end of the war, but its real beginning.

A CAUSE THAT WILL NOT DIE

January 29, 1915.

THE blue books and white books of European diplomacy long ago became somewhat dull reading. The murder of the Austrian archduke and the ultimatum to Servia have receded far into the past. Nearly a million men have died, a fleet of warships have been sunk, cities have been destroyed, whole provinces laid waste; and the world has greater matters to examine than fine-spun disputation as to the complex causes of the colossal crime.

But there is one early incident that lives. After more than six months of carnage, the very first act of the war—the invasion of Belgium—still challenges the attention of statesmen, scholars and jurists. The writings upon this theme alone make a considerable literature. James M. Beck has devoted to it a whole volume. Premiers have declaimed upon it; poets have celebrated it mournfully and defiantly; essayists and historians have treated it solemnly, satirically, indignantly; and it remains today the most prominent issue of the great struggle, the one inexhaustible subject of controversy.

The reason for the vitality of this question is that Belgium represented an idea; and an idea that has within it the germ of truth and justice cannot be crushed or exterminated. It is more potent than armies, will outlive empires. Though all Belgium had been made a Louvain, though of Brussels and Antwerp not one stone had been left upon another, there would still shine from

the desolation the idea that inspired the sacrifice; there would still ring in the ears of a listening world the dauntless defiance of a nation that chose death rather than dishonor, and thereby served the cause of all mankind. The subject has a fatal fascination for the advocates of Germany, both here and abroad. Let them range ever so far in the realms of Pan-Slavism, Teutonic civilization, French hatred and British greed, they are drawn back irresistibly to the corpse of Belgium and involve themselves lamentably in the coils of extenuation. A New York attorney, for example, has been driven to produce a defensive pamphlet, "War Hypocrisy Unveiled," in which he unveils the justification of Germany in this ingenious manner:

Let us suppose that your house was afire, with the only means of escape over your neighbor's roof. Would you dally over the question of the "neutrality" of your neighbor's house?

The metaphor is almost worthy of Pennypacker, who compared Belgium to a misguided pedestrian disputing the highway with automobiles. That it suggests the more accurate picture of Germany setting fire to Belgium and France under the plea of self-defense against Russia is a misfortune for which the learned counsel is to be commiserated. But Belgium, he says, "cannot complain of the war she invited," because:

The Germans delayed long enough to give assurance that her integrity and independence would be protected and reparation made for all losses. The future historian will refer to this act of Germany as a manifestation of a most sublime sense of justice, original and unique in the annals of the world.

The future historian will also inquire, perhaps, what reasons Belgium had to accept the assurance offered, in view of the fact that its performance depended upon the repudiation of a still more solemn assurance. The

idea that a broken pledge should be regarded as a recommendation to confidence in a new pledge from the same source is undoubtedly original, not to say unique, in the annals of legal disputation.

More important, but no more candid, is the recent defense put forth by the imperial chancellor, Doctor von Bethmann-Hollweg. This statesman's courageous admission at the opening of the war that Germany was committing "a great wrong" because of "necessity" has been the one noble utterance of his government during the conflict. He now rejects, however, the esteem which his frank and generous statement won and joins the chorus of detraction against Belgium. As the originator of the "scrap of paper" doctrine regarding treaties, the chancellor had attained a world-wide eminence which he resents. After six months' cogitation, he has decided that he has been a victim of misunderstanding, and that his historic phrase, far from being a cynical repudiation of international honor, was, in reality, an indictment of British hypocrisy and Belgian perfidy. He repeats the charge that Belgium had "abandoned her neutrality" by consulting with Britain as to resisting the long-threatened violation by Germany, and says:

England drew the sword only because she believed her own interests demanded it. Just for Belgian neutrality she would never have entered the war. That is what I meant when I told Sir Edward Goschen that among the reasons which had impelled England to go into the war, the Belgium neutrality treaty had for her only the value of "a scrap of paper."

We do not know the nature of the doctoral degree which the chancellor holds, but in view of his defense we sincerely hope it is not a doctorate of laws. His attempt to erase the "scrap of paper" stigma from the government which assassinated Belgian nationality and stamp it upon the country which went to war in defense

of that cause challenges admiration for its audacity rather than its wisdom. We by no means subscribe to the theory that Great Britain's foreign policy is purely altruistic, or that she is pouring out her blood and treasure solely for the sake of plundered Belgium. Nor is this fantastic idea suggested by Britain herself. If Belgium had lain several hundred miles distant instead of across a narrow channel, and if a Germanized Belgium had not meant, as Germany boasted, "a knife at the throat of England," the British government and people would possibly not have construed their guarantee of Belgium's neutrality to require resort to arms. But even in that case it would have been Germany, not England, that made the treaty "a scrap of paper," while, as the matter stands, Great Britain is incontestably in the position of upholding her part in the treaty at tremendous cost, while Germany as clearly has violated her part for her own advantage.

The fundamental inspiration of England, of course, is self-interest or self-preservation—the identical purpose which Germany pleads. But it cannot be denied that she is promoting that cause by defending a cruelly wronged nation and the sanctity of international obligations, while Germany, under the same plea, has forsworn her word and committed a monstrous assault. If it was an act of necessity, even of virtue, for Germany to violate the treaty for self-protection, it is quite out of the question for impartial observers to find guilty the country which observed and defended the treaty for the same reason.

"England ought really to cease harping on this theme of Belgian neutrality," says the exasperated chancellor. He does not yet realize that that chord vibrates to the finger of humanity and that the note of its condemnation will resound through all time.

THE BELGIANS AND THEIR KING

February 1, 1915.

IF PROF. HUGO MUNSTERBERG had not laid aside his avocation as eulogist of Germany's war policy, we should like to put to him a question in psychology. As a loyal German and an expert in the science mentioned, he might be able to explain why German statesmen and writers are so indignant against the Belgians, so rancorously hostile to them, so contemptuous toward their heroism and misery. German impatience with France and aversion toward Russia we can understand, and German loathing for Great Britain is an indulgence of which no impartial person would be willing to deprive a nation to which it gives such exquisite satisfaction. But Belgium was not a powerful rival, like France; nor a "menace to Teutonic civilization," like Russia; nor a colossal obstruction to German world empire, like England. She was peaceful, orderly, neutral, innocent of aggressive designs, asking only to be let alone.

That the vials of German wrath and contumely should be poured out upon Belgium is rather puzzling, until one recalls the proverbial teaching that it is a human failing to hate most those whom we have injured. It may be the ruins of Louvain, the rich tribute of war levies and the spectacle of a nation haunted by famine that incite German resentment. We have already noted the persistent effort to undermine the world's admiration for Belgium's brave sacrifice. Her consultation with an

English military attache as to possible measures of defense, to be adopted "only after violation of our neutrality by Germany," has been denounced as a betrayal, an "abandonment of neutrality," by the Belgian government, justly punished by invasion. But there is a more personal phase of the controversy which must appeal to many observers. This is the campaign of detraction directed against the Belgians themselves. Recently a German-American publication, the *Fatherland*, criticised the American people for sending relief ships to the starving non-combatants, on the ground that this was assisting the enemies of Germany. The Belgians are denounced for having resisted invasion; their king, despite his gallantry and devotion, is assailed as the betrayer of his people.

Sixteen years ago, with three lives between him and inheritance of the crown, Albert of Belgium lived for several months in the United States, studying American principles of government and his vocation of engineering. A book which he then wrote disclosed his intense admiration for liberal institutions; and these convictions he carried with him when unexpected deaths raised him to the throne. His simplicity of life, his democratic bearing and his tireless devotion to the economic advancement of Belgium made him a singularly useful and beloved ruler. During the war he has shown himself such a king as even democracy may honor. His determination to sacrifice his throne rather than the honor of his country evoked world-wide admiration, for he showed that he did not hesitate to pay his part of the price. From the beginning he has shared the dangers of his troops, and today is as homeless as the poorest of his subjects. In the defense of Brussels and Antwerp he was daily in the trenches, and now is in active command of the remnant of his army, which with

supreme courage is blocking the path of the Germans to Dunkirk and Calais. It is of this leader, whose heroism has been one of the most gallant spectacles of the war, that the *Hanoverscher Anzeiger*, an influential German newspaper, says:

King Albert, who is now stubbornly defending the last few square miles of his country, will some day give to a future Shakespeare material for a tragedy. It will be the tragedy of a ruler who wanted to make his little nation great and prosperous and happy, and who was shamelessly betrayed by his friends, in whose honesty and fairness he had trusted.

This reads like a confession of Germany's treaty violation; but it appears that those who "shamelessly betrayed" Belgium were not the Germans, but the French and English. The paper continues:

Albert trusted perfidious Albion; he steered his little vessel into the wake of the French ship of state, not knowing that this proud ship was being steered by foreign pilots in foreign pay into a fateful, ruinous undertow.

And then follows a column of savage sneering in this vein:

Albert, of the house of Coburg, whose scions are justly famed for their sagacity, did not develop after his kin's tradition. He proved a dilettante on the throne, for did he not light-heartedly sacrifice Belgium's neutrality—the most sacred palladium of all small nations—to vague promises? * * *

King Albert, unlike his uncle (King Leopold), was always eager to become popular, and could be sure to win the approval and good will of his people by conducting his policies "à la mode de Paris." More significant of an intimate Belgian leaning toward the western countries, however, was his ambition to make his country a sea power.

Albert always had been interested in questions of technique, commerce and social economy. It was his intention to continue the colonial policy begun by Leopold II and to develop it, though in a different direction.

If the war "had taken a different turn," says this astute German critic, "then Belgium would have become a sort of second Portugal, a vassal State, and the great British empire would have made her feel every day that she owed her existence only to England's mercy." As it is, of course, she enjoys her present felicity, and is conscious that she owes it to Germany's magnanimity. It is, however, the democracy of the Belgian king that most exasperates the Teutonic mind:

He and his people are now suffering the consequences of his ignorance. He made the fatal mistake of considering himself wiser than his uncle was. He played the crowned bourgeois. He catered to the scholars, artists and engineers. He always emphasized his democratic sentiments, which were very popular in Belgium, for that country is much behind in a sociological aspect. * * *

In his ignorance Albert, the dilettante, lent himself as the tool of the British war-makers and of the French revenge-criers. His Coburger cousin, George of England, has trapped him, and Albert may thank George for the fate into which he stumbled blindly.

With such sentiments do the leaders of German thought express their conception of international affairs and reveal themselves upon questions of government and morality. The unhappy truth is that Prussianized Germany is utterly incapable of appreciating the Belgian spirit or the Belgian king, of understanding in the remotest degree the soul of this nation she has struck down and the admiration it has stirred throughout the world. Despite all her worship of militarism and the cult of glory, Germany could not feel the thrill of these lines by an Australian:

In that Valhalla where the heroes go
A careful sentinel paced to and fro
Before the gate, burned black with battle smoke,
Whose echoes to the tread of armed men woke;
Where up the fiery stairs whose steps are spears
Came the pale heroes of the blood-stained years.

There were lean Caesars from the glory fields,
With heart that only to a sword thrust yields;
And there were generals decked in pride of rank,
Red scabbard swinging from the weary flank;
And slender youths who were the sons of kings,
And barons with their sixteen quarterings.
And while the nobles went with haughty air
The courteous sentinel questioned, "Who goes there?"
And as each came, full lustily he cried
His string of titles ere he passed inside.

And presently there was a little man,
A silent mover in the regal van.
His hand still grasped his rifle, and his eyes
Seemed blinded with the light from Paradise.
His was a humble guise, a modest air—
The sentinel held him sharply, "Who goes there?"

There were no gauds tacked to that simple name,
But every naked blade leaped out like flame,
And every blue-blooded warrior bowed his head—
"I am a Belgian"; this was all he said.

Germany cries out against her "ring of enemies."
Which of them does she imagine is the most dangerous?
Is it Russia, with her unnumbered hordes;
France, with her intrepid armies; England, with her
mighty fleet?

More powerful than any of these is that little
nation she has crushed under her weight and now
despises and maligns. It is the crime against Belgium
that will rob a German triumph of honor or fill a Ger-
man defeat with bitterness and humiliation. For the
judgment of humanity is sure, and it will be as stern
as that delivered of old against him who wronged the
helpless: "It were better for him that a millstone were
hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in
the depth of the sea."

SECRET DIPLOMACY

February 3, 1915.

IN HIS nobly phrased proclamation last September designating a day of national prayer for divine aid in hastening the end of the European war, President Wilson urged supplication that the Creator, "setting straight the things man cannot govern or alter," should rescue the millions "whom the counsels of statesmen have not been able to save from the terrible sacrifice."

The plain implication of this is that the catastrophe which has made half a continent a charnel house and has shaken the very foundations of civilization was caused by uncontrollable forces; that the warring peoples permitted themselves to be carried away by passion; that their wise leaders wrought heroically to prevent the upheaval, but that "the counsels of statesmen" were overborne by the pressure of events. This is a singular theory, and of the utmost importance, if true. We are persuaded, however, that it is based upon error, and we have such regard for President Wilson's intelligence that we believe he himself, having had several months for reflection and study of the records, would change this part of his proclamation if he had it to write over again. It is true that in some aspects the war, because of fundamental faults in the governmental systems of the European countries, was inevitable. Racial antagonisms and economic rivalries foreshadowed an eventual appeal to arms.

But, far from being retarded, the clash was accelerated by the "counsels of statesmen." The experts whose labors excited the admiration of President Wilson proved themselves pitifully incompetent; they revealed to an astonished world depths of incapacity which the most cynical observers had never imagined could exist among men professing peculiar knowledge and sagacity in international affairs. Let those who doubt this inform themselves by studying the various governmental "papers," in which are compiled the diplomatic messages exchanged during last July. They will find them melancholy reading. They will discern in virtually all of the contributions from ambassadors, ministers, chancellors and sovereigns the most amazing spirit of suspicion, provocation and almost childish hostility; the most obtuse misconceptions; the most inveterate playing at cross purposes, and, above all, a lack of poise suggestive of hysteria.

Every one of these statesmen realized that he was dealing with conditions that threatened to light the fires of the most disastrous war in history; yet except in a few instances their communications were inflammatory and their attitudes truculent. It might be too much to say that the "counsels of statesmen" could have averted forever a struggle which had its roots in irreconcilable national conflict of ideals; but assuredly they might have postponed it or limited its scope. And their failure is an indictment of the whole theory and practice of international diplomacy.

For it is to be observed that the war, in its inception, was a product of governmental enmities, not of public opinion. That is true to a certain extent of all wars, but peculiarly of this colossal struggle. Does any one imagine that the people of Austria-Hungary—millions of whom are of Serb blood—had anything to do

with the framing of the mad ultimatum to Servia? Or that the mobilization of the Russian army against Austria was ordered in response to a great popular demand? Or that the peaceful, industrious citizens of Germany voiced a great resolve that was embodied in the warlike messages from Berlin to St. Petersburg and Paris? Or that the people of France and Great Britain were determined to send armies and fleets against Germany? The questions answer themselves. The truth is that in every country, without exception, the people were plunged into war without their consent, or were involved beyond the possibility of escape virtually without their knowledge.

The "counsels of statesmen" were secret and swift, the enlightenment of the peoples fatally lag-gard. Before the storm broke no one outside of the various governmental circles expected it. Not one of the peoples concerned desired it. Even during the ominous days of July few ordinary citizens of the nations involved would have listened to a suggestion that the matters at issue could be settled only by flinging vast armies against each other and scarring half of Europe with graves. And when the declarations of war came, untold millions of those upon whom the terrific burden was to fall would have been unable to state intelligently the causes for which they were to sacrifice themselves.

Now, of course, they do know—or, at least, they believe they know. The conflict of opinion is just as sharp among the peoples as among the diplomats. The Russians are convinced that they are fighting for the holiest of causes. The Germans, with passionate unanimity, declare they are defending themselves from aggression. The French and the British peoples are consumed with the idea that they are resisting infamous designs of conquest. And all, in a measure, are

right. Each country, when involved, is, in a sense, engaged in a defensive struggle, because defeat means the infliction upon it of heavy penalties. Once a war has begun, the instincts of race, of patriotism and of self-preservation put behind it the whole force of a people's strength and conviction.

During the negotiations, however sinister they may appear, the conflict is between governmental policies; the citizens of the endangered nations feel toward one another only a surface impatience and hostility. But the fateful declarations make the peoples, as well as the governments, actual enemies. Armies are on the march, fleets are cleared for action, all communication between the belligerent countries is severed, battle maneuvers begin, blood is spilled, invasions are begun. Whether the quarrel was just or unjust, the conflict avoidable or inevitable, makes no difference whatever. War has become a reality, defense a stern necessity, and a conflict which may have been precipitated by incompetence or guile among a few men becomes the life-and-death business of unnumbered millions. The Boer war was an exception that proves the rule. It was so clearly a war of aggression that it was denounced and resisted to the very end by large numbers of the British people, and became "popular" only when a series of defeats had awakened the determination of the country to carry through a misguided enterprise. Likewise, the German people are not throwing away their lives wholly in the hope of realizing visions of world empire; they are inspired by the belief, however absurd it may be, that they were attacked by a "ring of enemies" and must fight to save themselves from slavery.

But the one indisputable fact is that wars, into which, when begun, the citizens of all countries fling themselves with ardent heroism, are not made by them,

but by their governments. The reason for this is that the one department of their public business over which they do not exercise effective control is that of foreign affairs. This is pre-eminently true of nations living under an autocratic regime, such as Austria, Russia and Germany; with those governments the management of international relations is exclusively in the hands of the ruler and his appointees; and it is customary for them to commit the most vital interests of their subjects to alliances and other arrangements, the obligations of which are quite unknown to the mass of citizens. But the system exists in a lesser but noticeable degree in all countries. Englishmen have asserted that no one outside of the highest government circles and those having the confidence of officials knew the terms that held together the Triple Entente; nor to what extent the honor of Great Britain had been pledged to her allies; nor what engagements the "counsels of statesmen" had made in the name of the empire. True, the whole problem was finally submitted to the people's representatives in parliament with admirable frankness, but by that time there was nothing left for them to do but indorse and prepare for a war of defense upon the issues made by the government.

Nor does it require a long memory to recall incidents of the same kind in American history. Only a few months ago the president of the United States was personally conducting the most delicate and dangerous negotiations with armed forces in Mexico, acting upon secret reports presented to him by private agents, and refusing even to take into his confidence the congressional committees on foreign affairs. The result was that the American people awoke one morning to find their interests and their national honor involved in war, in the making of which they had not been consulted,

through which they could derive nothing but disadvantage and from which they were extricated only by the friendly intervention of South American republics.

The obvious weakness in the universal practice of conducting foreign affairs is that custom—or superstition—forbids anything in the nature of publicity. The people of a country, in proportion to the democratization of its government, are intrusted with the details of all internal problems, and their opinion is sought through the publication from day to day of executive, legislative and judicial activities. But as soon as a matter arises touching international relations, although it may involve the most vital interests of the nation, a veil is drawn about it. The mysteries of it are held to be beyond the understanding of the common intelligence of the country and, necessarily, to be conducted by the specially endowed persons who happen at the time to be in certain positions of power. And the policy determined upon, whatever it may be, becomes sacred from that hour, demanding for its maintenance, if necessary, the sacrifice of peace, prosperity and uncounted lives. The menace of secret diplomacy has long been recognized by thoughtful men, but civilization has not yet thrown off the veneration for an ancient custom. Sir Victor Horsley, an eminent British surgeon, said recently:

To effect progress toward the establishment of arbitration two things are necessary—first, the establishment of democratic rule by the political enfranchisement of all men and women, and, second, the abolition of secret diplomacy, the chief weapon of despotism and the source of misunderstandings and war.

Dr. Charles W. Eliot, one of the most conservative Americans, has stated the case with great clearness and force:

The catastrophe proves that secret negotiations, like those habitually conducted in Europe, and alliances between

selected nations, the terms of which are secret—or, at any rate, not publicly stated—cannot avert, in the long run, outrageous war, but can only produce postponement of war or short truces.

Free institutions take the public into confidence, because all important movements of the government must rest on popular desires, needs and volitions. Autocratic institutions have no such necessity for publicity. This government secrecy as to motives, plans and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair dealing and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to force comes, one government may secure advantage by taking the other by surprise.

In an editorial in the London Daily News we find these strong words:

Can Europe ever again tolerate the appalling peril of secret diplomacy? It belongs to the traditions of autocratic and personal government; it has no place in a democratic world. And the example of the United States must become the model of the civilized world on this vital matter, if Europe is to be free from menace in the future.

The Socialists, with characteristic vigor, have already moved to make this reform part of their program. The members of the party in the United States are now preparing to vote upon a proposal, put forth by Allan L. Benson, to incorporate among the party principles a demand that foreign policies shall be framed and executed by joint committees of congress, all diplomatic communications of whatever sort to be made public on the day of their dispatch. Whatever form the judgment of the world may eventually take, secret diplomacy should be one of the errors of civilization that will not be permitted to outlive the war. It is irrational and dangerous; and if perpetuated, it will begin, during the very negotiations for peace, to sow the seeds for another harvest of inhuman strife.

WOULD YOU STOP THE WAR?

February 5, 1915.

GENERAL FEBRUARY, that grimdest of strategists, is now in full command of the European battle fronts. The imagination, already burdened by the horrors of war by land and sea, by corpse-strewn fields and blood-soaked trenches, must picture the sordid miseries of a winter campaign—the pitiless exposure, the keener sufferings of the wounded, the unspeakable wretchedness of the millions of non-combatants who are prisoners of despair in the zones of conflict. No one with a spark of humanity in his heart can contemplate the struggle without bitter sorrow and a passionate desire that it could be halted. If you had the power—you who read this—would you stop the war today? We think you would. We think we should ourselves. The world is sick with the calculated horror of it all. As men visualize the dreadful details of the picture—the mangled bodies, the splitting asunder of laden ships, the rain of explosives from the clouds, the gaunt skeletons of cities, the tears of women, the faces of children pinched with want and fear—their very souls must cry out for an end to it. And yet—what then? Let us look a little at this vision of peace.

The war, let us say, is to be stopped tonight. A silence falls along the vast battle line. League after league, in the trampled, blood-stained snow, the weary troops rest on their arms. The huge fleets disperse; the submarines glide away through the waters, to hunt

their prey no more; the winged warcraft circle to the earth and are at rest; the great siege guns still lift their muzzles to the sky, but the black lips are cold and dumb. And the glad message of peace rings like an anthem round the globe. This is the end of the fighting. But what is it that we have done?

Belgium lies prostrate and bleeding under the heel of the invader. Her people, robbed of their nationality, their liberty and their homes, are suffering cold and hunger and the cruel bitterness of aggression. A wide territory in France has been laid waste, its cities are leveled, its fields and vineyards stripped, its inhabitants scattered abroad or held as helpless hostages. Poland and East Prussia are overrun by foreign troops. If you decree an end of the war tonight, is Belgium to be sacrificed? Is all her devotion to be in vain? For the sake of a convenient peace, is her heroic sacrifice to win for her only the crushing burden of legalized conquest and enforced slavery to a triumphant imperialism? Is France to have another Alsace-Lorraine torn from her side? Is Holland to be laid under the menacing shadow of absorption by the victorious empire?

But, you say, one would not suggest stopping the war upon any such outrageous terms. Possessing the power, one would impose, of course, conditions of a just and honorable peace. It would be necessary that Belgium be restored to her people, and that they be indemnified so far as money could restore the hideous ravages of war. France must be freed of the invader and her material losses repaid. Justice must be done to Alsace-Lorraine and to Poland. There must be no looting of territory, whether in East Prussia or Austria-Hungary or the Balkan States.

Let us imagine, then, that you could impose such a peace today—it is really inconceivable while Germany

has her armies, but let us concede that it were miraculously possible—would you do it? If you did, you would perform the greatest imaginable disservice to Europe, to the cause of peace and humanity. A million men have died, whole provinces have been visited with destruction, nearly twenty billions of wealth have been consumed, the normal activities of the whole world have been checked and disrupted and must remain in uncertainty for many months to come. And all these terrific losses, when once it was discerned that they were inevitable, have been endured as a price to be paid. Now, it is to be imagined, at a wave of your wand, you halt the slaughter and devastation and—except for the ruined lands, the towering debts and the unnumbered graves—conditions are restored as they were last July.

Not a single question has been settled, not a single principle established or vindicated. Austria's demand upon Servia remains unsatisfied. Balkan ambitions of nationality are denied; Balkan intrigue still invites conflict. Franco-German distrust has not been quenched, but inflamed. British domination of the seas has been in nowise reduced. Germany's fanatical faith in her world-shadowing destiny still fires her exultant soul.

Nevertheless, you urge, militarism has been checked in its designs; the conscience of the world has said, "Thus far and no farther!" True, militarism has been checked, but for how long? Our decree of peace leaves it still dominant in Germany, more worshiped than ever for having withstood a world in arms. Autocracy is still higher exalted, the religion of valor still rules and perverts the faculties of a great people—the most determined and the most efficient on earth.

And elsewhere, how much tranquillity? Are we to imagine the hosts of Russia, aflame with patriotic and religious ardor, peacefully retiring to contemplate the

graves of their dead and the barred gates that shut her from the sea? Do you conceive the blessings of unthreatened security enwrapping Belgium, whose wounds a generation of peace will not stanch? And do you envy France, war worn and impoverished of her best blood, starting once more up the weary hill she climbed from 1870 to 1914, staggering under a colossal burden of debt, stung by the memory of futile sacrifice, ever conscious of the dark shadow of militarism across her stony path? Or England, facing for unknown years the menace of another visitation such as for the first time in her history has struck real terror to her soul?

Peace! But where? Peace on scraps of paper, peace in the masked faces of intriguing statesmen, peace in the hollow formalities of diplomatic ceremony. But in the hearts of men, in the souls of nations, bitterness, hostility, jealousies, fear, hatred and the potentiality of unending conflict. For, mark this: You stop the war today, and you stop it when every nation involved is perfectly assured that it is on the march to victory. Austria has been beaten, but not conquered. The Russians boast that they have just begun to fight. France has proved her valor against an ancient foe, and her soil will be rich for years with the blood of invaders. The British have shown such intrepidity and tenacity as the legions of Marlborough and Wellington, the sailors of Drake and Nelson, never succeeded. The Germans today are as confident of triumph as when their hosts were thundering toward the gates of Paris. Stop the war now and you stop it with all the peoples exalted with the belief that they are invincible and need only another opportunity to prove it.

This and the leaving of the causes of the war untouched could have but one effect. The struggle for supremacy in armaments would begin anew, and would

be prosecuted with feverish energy. Arsenal, shipyards and arms factories would work overtime, and every nation would prepare for the inevitable resumption of hostilities. When we in this country yearn for an instant peace we are thinking only of the frightful losses, the sufferings of soldiers and the crushing misery of the non-combatants; we lose sight of the fundamental factors in the conflict.

What is the real issue at stake? We readily recognize a conflict of races, rivalry of empires, territorial ambitions, a struggle for economic ascendancy. But at the bottom this is a war against war, against a great delusion. Half the world has been plunged into strife because of its frantic efforts to avoid it, and must continue until the monstrous cult has been buried under mounds of bodies that will be an everlasting memorial and warning of human madness. If this terrible sacrifice does not finally destroy war from the earth, then humanity is entering the darkest period of its history and civilization is revealed as a hideous failure.

Let those who talk of interrupting the war at this point consider the spirit that drives the contesting nations and measure the possibilities of creating thereby an enduring peace. To learn the mind of Germany we need not quote the familiar maxims of Von Bernhardt, though they have millions of devoted believers; we may accept the utterances of the statesmen, the scholars and the newspapers, which breathe a faith that sacrifice has only intensified. Less than a week ago the kaiser declared, "We will stay on hostile territory until the enemy is vanquished or has collapsed." Maximilian Hardin spoke for the German people when he said:

We do not stand before the judgment seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law of nations. It is Germany that strikes.

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Just as clearly Prof. Ernst Richard, of Columbia University, uttered the thought of his nation when he said a few weeks before he died:

Germany cannot lose. She will never surrender a foot of land nor an army. Every German might be killed, and yet Germany will not be defeated. German defeat would be horrible. It is impossible, unthinkable. The march of civilization would be halted and its standards dragged in the mire of dark ages.

We need not quote English leaders; the world knows that that nation has set its bulldog grip upon the purpose to fight while it has the breath of life in it. But read the solemn declaration of the premier of France in the house of deputies:

France will not sheathe the sword until she has taken vengeance for outraged right; until she has regained the provinces ravished from her by force; restored heroic Belgium to the fullness of her material life and political independence, and until militarism has been crushed. We are struggling to determine the fate of the world—against barbarity and despotism; against the system of provocations and methodical menaces which Germany called peace; against the insolent hegemony of a military caste.

Or turn to the words of Senator Baron de Constant, one of the foremost of the world's advocates of peace and a member of the tribunal of The Hague:

Even the most pacific—those who in good faith have done their duty in trying to prevent the war—all today would refuse to conclude with Prussian militarism a peace which would be only a lying truce. The present war cannot end by a pretense of peace. It must end by the crushing of German domination, or it would only have to begin anew.

The judgment of thinking Americans has been expressed by the New York World:

To restore Europe to the condition of an armed camp would not be peace. The nightmare of militarism would still hang over the nations, and every laborer in Europe—perhaps every laborer in America—would have a soldier on his back. When certain questions are submitted to the court

of cannon they must be decided by the court of cannon. Either all Europe will come under the yoke of military depotism, or all Europe will be free.

Peace now would be a mockery. The sovereignty of force would be exalted. Militarism would emerge triumphant and bring under its iron sway the peoples of all nations. The sacrifice of a million lives would have been in vain, and this war would be but the overture to a future struggle more bloody, more destructive and more cruel. Until the brazen idol of militarism is overthrown and broken in pieces there will be no rest for the races of men. And that can be accomplished only by compulsion achieved through a decisive result. In no other way can an end be made of the barbaric era of armament, not only in Germany, but in England, in France and in all the countries of the war-sick world. We cannot stop the war, and it is well that we cannot. We would not, for the sake of the civilization it has wrecked and the humanity it has crucified.

ITALY'S STRANGE POSITION

February 24, 1915

THERE are only two great Powers not involved in the war—the United States, which is determined to keep clear of the conflict, and Italy, which is equally resolved to take part. The attitude of this country is in no sense mysterious, but the position of Italy is one of the strangest developments of the whole upheaval. A member of the Triple Alliance when the war began, her first act was to declare neutrality. Still a party to that agreement, she is preparing, unless all signs are misleading, to make an attack on her allies. The reasons for this remarkable situation present an interesting subject of inquiry.

Like all other phases of the tremendous controversy, Italy's position carries the student back into history. The conquest by Napoleon left the country under the sway of a military despotism tempered by insurrection. When the French were expelled by the Allies in 1814 Austria claimed jurisdiction over the peninsula; and a year later the Congress of Vienna, after the manner of such tribunals, set up in Italy a conglomeration of kingdoms and duchies which were based solely upon dynastic reasons and had no relation whatever to the wishes of the people. The result was more than half a century of turmoil. The growing spirit of liberalism and nationalism, that received its greatest impetus under the brilliant leadership of Mazzini, in 1831, produced endless conspiracies and revolts. The great democratic

year, 1848, saw Austria expelled for a brief period, but autocracy regained nearly all that it had lost, and liberalism found its last refuge in the kingdom of Sardinia, which was later to be the nucleus of united Italy. In 1859 France aided Sardinia to overthrow Austria at Magenta and Solferino. She paid herself by annexing Savoy and Nice, but Austria relinquished her hold on Lombardy. A year later Garibaldi and the king of Sardinia undertook to free southern Italy, and in 1861 Victor Emmanuel became king of all Italy except Austrian Venetia and Papal Rome. Italy joined Prussia against Austria in 1866, and, although defeated, succeeded in recovering Venetia at the peace. After these gains the cause of united Italy could not be stayed. France defended the Papal kingdom for a few years, but her war with Germany compelled her to withdraw, and in 1871 the people of the peninsula became one nation under their own king.

By this time gratitude for France's aid against Austria had been replaced by hostility. There were three reasons for this: First, the pronounced sympathy of France for the Papal See; second, her seizure of Savoy and Nice, and, third, Italy's aspirations to acquire the ancient Roman possessions in northern Africa. Between 1870 and 1880 the territory she most coveted—Tunis—was so thoroughly colonized that it became Italian in all except name. But at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, Italy's ambitions there and elsewhere were ruthlessly ignored. Austria was encouraged to extend her dominions down the eastern shore of the Adriatic, where the population was largely Italian, and France was recognized as the heir of Tunis. Four years later she seized the vast territory. Italy was so embittered that Bismarck, the adroit originator of all these moves, was able with little difficulty to induce her to join Germany and

Austria in the Triple Alliance. No partnership could have been more unnatural—Latin with Teuton, democracy with autocracy, the promoters of a greater Italy with the country which held vast numbers of Italians in unwilling political servitude. But Italy was desperate. She feared to face France and England, the Mediterranean Powers, alone, and, moreover, felt safer with her ancient enemy, Austria, as an ally. She was too wise, however, to commit herself absolutely to the support of Germany's world ambitions. Her part in the alliance was defensive only; she was not required to assist her allies in any schemes of aggression.

Italy, therefore, provides the most conclusive evidence of the guilt of Germany and Austria in forcing the great war. In 1913, as was made known recently, Austria proposed to attack Serbia, but Italy formally gave notice that she would not take part. Again, last August, she examined all the documents in the controversy and declared herself neutral, thereby proclaiming, on behalf of one member of the Triple Alliance, that the other two were inexcusably the aggressors. At first Germany was openly bitter over the desertion, but soon her necessities impelled her to woo Italian support. It has been stated that she offered Italy Savoy and Nice and even Tunis in case of victory. These failing, she has used her utmost endeavors to keep her ally neutral.

Strong forces, however, are pushing Italy nearer and nearer to war. Chief among these is the passionate desire of a large part of the people to bring under the Italian flag the Austrian provinces on the Adriatic. This policy, known as irredentism, is based upon the theory that each nation should control contiguous territory inhabited by the same race, speaking the same language. It inspired the first Balkan war, against Turkey; the second Balkan war, among the allies, and the aim of

Servia to expand at the expense of Austria-Hungary. Italian irredentism, for years regarded as the fanatical scheme of patriotic jingoes, looks to the "redemption" of territories on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, which, it is asserted, are Italian in language and ideals and political ambitions. Since the outbreak of the war the movement has greatly increased in vigor. Its supporters declare that the quarrel with Austria is as irreconcilable as that between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine. It is true that irredentism theoretically should demand the restoration by France of Savoy and Nice, and of Malta by England. But the irredentists are willing to forego these ideas, because, they say, it is only in the Italian territories held by Austria that their countrymen are oppressed and persecuted. Despite the obligations of the Triple Alliance, therefore, Italian aid to her Teutonic partners in a war of aggression was inconceivable. The legal reasons against it were that the terms of the compact did not require it, and that Italy had not been informed in advance of Austria's ultimatum to Servia. But far stronger than these were the national reasons, the historic enmity toward Austria and the historic purpose of the Italian people to "redeem" their brethren across the Adriatic. Any move to put the army under the Teuton banners would have been a signal for revolution.

But why should not Italy remain neutral? Why should her inhabitants be forcing the government not only to desert her allies, but to join the Triple Entente? Five reasons are given. The first is sentimental—the Italians are drawn to the English and French just as strongly as they are repelled from the Germans and Austrians and the Turks. Second is the racial instinct—the crushing of France by Germany would mean subjugation of the Latins by the Teutons. Third is the

territorial ambition to which we have referred. Fourth is the instinct of self-preservation—a victorious Germany would exact a bitter price from the ally that deserted her. Last, and most powerful of all, is the fundamental antagonism between the Italian ideal of democracy and the Prussian ideal of militaristic autocracy. Thus it is that the Triple Alliance still exists on paper while ignored in fact, and that Italy insists on maintaining her “freedom of action.” The situation is strangely involved and is one that the most loyal Italians find no easy matter to justify. Guglielmo Ferrero writes:

We certainly find ourselves in one of the strangest and most paradoxical of situations, with our interests and ideals in conflict with our pledges, in a tragic struggle between national sentiment and the sentiment of honor. How difficult at once to save the country's honor, to defend its interests and not to expose it to mortal risks!

Felice Ferrero, a brother of the eminent historian and himself a noted journalist, discusses with explicit candor the probable result in an article in the Outlook:

Should Italy go to war she will take the part of the Triple Entente, not that of her late partners. Of this there can be no doubt whatever. Italian intervention in favor of Germany and Austria would not be tolerated by the masses of Italy; their sympathy for the Allies is too strong.

Opinion is divided as to the next possible move. Broadly speaking, this division has three distinct currents: First, that neutrality should be maintained regardless of events; second, that Italy should immediately join the Allies; third, the largest majority upholds the position of the government—watchful waiting. There is really no distinction between the war party and the conditional neutrality party, the issue dividing them being merely a consideration of time, whether the occasion for intervention has already or has not arisen. * * *

For her own sake, Italy cannot make a “scrap of paper” of her treaty unless the provocation is irresistible. The provocation is, notwithstanding, rapidly approaching the

irresistible. The entrance of Turkey, with its echo of rebellion in Tripolitania, has vexed Italy almost more than have the belligerent Powers. * * *

Italy cannot insist on a policy of neutrality. A successful Austria would be undisputed mistress of the Balkans and would make an end of Italian opportunity to gain the Italian provinces of Austria. Second, isolation will be the fate of Italy if she does not take sides. It is costing her \$1,500,000 a day to keep neutral. Such a burden, without hope of some political return, could hardly be borne by any country with continued equanimity.

Italian patriots can make out a moving case for the "redemption" of the provinces on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, but it is difficult, nevertheless, to see the justice of the ambition. As Herbert Adams Gibbons points out in his illuminating work, "The New Map of Europe":

Realization of the dreams of Italian irredentists would give to Italy the ports and coast line of the northern end of the Adriatic, with no hinterland, and the Slavs, Hungarians and Germans an enormous hinterland with no ports. Only thoughtless enthusiasts could advocate a change by which fifty million people would be cut off from the sea to satisfy the national aspirations of a few hundred thousand Italians.

Italy's entrance in the war will thus present a strange anomaly. It will mean the triumph of the ideals which inspire the opponents of German autocracy, but its main purpose will be territorial aggrandizement. Servia, Austria, Russia, Germany, Belgium, France and England can all plead, with some show of reason, that they were dragged unwillingly into the conflict. Italy alone will take part after long deliberation and in response to popular sentiment. Yet this does not wholly dispose of the paradox. For despite the fact that Italy will fight for spoils, it is equally true that she dare not contemplate the possibility of a final victory for Germany, and therefore goes to war for self-preservation.

RUSSIA NEARS HER GOAL

March 1, 1915

MOST striking and perhaps most pregnant of all the events of the war is the battering of western warships at the portals of the narrow channel leading to Constantinople, the last refuge of the Turk in Europe. The thunder of the guns wakes the echoes of remote antiquity and heralds movements that may change the course of future civilization. The battle recalls scenes older than history—and affects the price of bread on today's dinner table. The forty centuries that looked down from the Pyramids were no longer than the invisible ages that thrill to the roar of battle in the Dardanelles. Past and present were never brought into closer touch. Even history does not span the tale of these rocky shores; for along the Hellespont dwelt the followers of Aeneas, allies of the Trojans, who fought their legendary battles centuries before the mythical founding of ancient Rome by the descendants of their leader. Today airships circle above the strait which Xerxes crossed on his way to Thermopylae, and over which, 150 years later, Alexander led his terrible Greeks to the conquest of the east. Submarines move like shadows through the waters that closed over Leander and that knew the keels of Grecian triremes and Roman galleys.

Here centers one of the chief issues to be decided by the war—the fate of Constantinople and the Turkish empire. If the fleets of the Allies win past the forts and

mines that guard the strait and the sea of Marmora, the city of the sultan will lie at their mercy, and they will close a long chapter in the history of one of the great capitals of the world. The Byzantium of the ancients, founded nearly seven centuries before Christ, it has memories of Spartans and Greeks, Romans and Ottoman conquerors; of Lysander, Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes and Alexander. Constantine gave it his name, as capital of the Roman empire, sixteen centuries ago, and there, for more than a thousand years, was the center of the Byzantine empire. Since 1453 Constantinople has been the seat of the Commander of the Faithful. And now the guns are to say whether the Cross shall displace the Crescent and the Moslem capital become the Czari-grad of Russia's dreams.

For 200 years Russia has coveted this egress to the Mediterranean and the open seas. The empire has expanded northward to the Arctic ice, westward to the Teutonic border, eastward even to the Pacific, until its great, unwieldy bulk weights down two continents; but never has the dream faded. Control of all the vast spaces from the Baltic to the Caspian, and from the Urals to the coasts of the Yellow sea, has never satisfied the longing, the vision of a doorway to the west and the long highways of the world. Now she may realize it. Wonderfully strong and wonderfully patient, she has waited and wrought, generation after generation, but the great objective has never passed beyond her ken. Other nations think and plan in terms of years; she thinks in centuries. "Russian policy," said an English statesman, "is unaffected by the life of man or the lapse of time. It moves on, as it were, by its own impetus. It is silent, concentrated, unbroken and perpetual." And English statesmen should know best, for it was England that relentlessly barred the path of Russia to warm

water, and it is England that now, in her extremity, concedes that she can do so no longer. Three weeks ago the Russian premier, addressing the duma, gave notice that the hour of the great national ambition was drawing near. He said:

Since I last addressed you a great event has taken place. Turkey has marched with our enemy, but her resistance has already been shattered by our glorious Caucasian troops, and the radiant future of Russia on the Black sea is beginning to dawn near the walls of Constantinople.

And last Thursday Sir Edward Grey, in the British parliament, responded with a simple statement that echoed further than the guns of the fleet:

The Russian foreign minister said that the events on the Russo-Turkish frontier would bring Russia nearer to solution of the politico-economic problem bound up with her access to the sea.

With these aspirations, England is in sympathy. What form their realization will take will no doubt be settled in the terms of peace.

The utterance was designedly vague; but what the foreign secretary meant was that Great Britain, as gracefully as may be, abandons one of her historic policies, to maintain which she expended hundreds of millions of pounds and scores of thousands of lives, and perpetuated in Europe the rule of the unspeakable Turk. He meant that if the Allies win, the last remnant of Ottoman power will disappear from Europe after four centuries and a half, and that a gateway will be opened in the vast prison-house of Russian enterprise. Should the straits be forced, important results will follow in the war. Turkey's military power will be crushed, Egypt and the Caucasus will be freed from danger, and British and Russian armies will be released for service against Germany, both in the east and the west. No less important, the way will be cleared for the shipment east-

ward of the arms which Russia needs, and westward of the Russian grain for which Italy and France and Britain hunger.

But beyond these things the fall of Constantinople would involve political and economic results of far-reaching import for Russia, for Europe and the world. Russia's resistless expansion has been one of the wonders of the history of mankind. Like the flow of a lava stream, Russian influence spread north, west and south, absorbing territory from Sweden, from Poland and from Turkey, and east until the standards of the czar threatened Peking. She was seeking "warm water." It was this desire that led Peter the Great to leave the sacred city of Moscow and establish his capital on the banks of the Neva, though he had to build his palace on piles in the midst of a salt marsh. He sought "a little window looking upon Europe," and the Baltic seemed the only opening.

Down through the centuries this aim has persisted. Russia is an inexhaustible treasure house of natural riches, but they could never be adequately developed because she was shut away from the highways of the world. There were for her only six outlets—the Baltic on the west, the White sea on the north, the Black sea on the south, the Yellow sea on the east, the Adriatic on the southwest and the Persian gulf on the southeast. She tried them all. Her new capital near the Baltic was a success, but the port was closed in the winter months, and the Kiel canal made Germany mistress of the sea. Archangel grew to importance, but from October to June the harbor is locked by the inexorable ice. Successive wars against the Turks gave her access to the Black sea and made it virtually a Russian lake—but with no outlet.

With huge strides the Russian bear moved eastward across Asia, and at last Port Arthur gave her the egress she wanted, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad a transportation system to the markets of the earth. But Japan smote the great beast across the snout and took Port Arthur for herself, and the vision faded once more. To reach the Adriatic was hopeless against the force of united western Europe. A daring grasp was made for Persia, but in 1907 England forced her rival to give up that dream also. There remained only the Black sea—but at its westward gate sat the grinning Turk, defiant under the protection of all non-Slavic Europe. Every Russian ship must pass under the frowning guns of Turkish forts and show its papers to Turkish officials. At the will of the Moslem the gate might be shut. For forty years the Black sea fleet of Russia was imprisoned in that basin. All her vast wealth of field and forest and mine were virtually locked away from the world's use.

To realize the need of an ice-free port, consider that Russia has a population of 165,000,000, almost limitless resources, and two and one-half times the area of the United States; and consider such a country restricted to the use of a Montreal as a place of export. This vital need has been the inspiration of Russian policy for generations. Hemmed in on the west and south, with incredible labor she moved to the east. Beaten back there, she tried to reach the warm seas through Persia. Baffled there, she turned once more to the idea she had never lost—access to the Mediterranean, control of the gateway of the Golden Horn. The inevitable was foreseen three-quarters of a century ago by Radetzky, the great Austrian field marshal. He gave the key to the whole Eastern Question when he wrote:

Owing to her geographical position, Russia is the national and eternal enemy of Turkey. * * * Russia must there-

fore do all she can to take possession of Constantinople, for its possession alone will grant to her the necessary security and territorial completeness.

Virtually every war she has fought in Europe has had this one objective. Ten times in two hundred years she lunged toward Constantinople, and ten times she was compelled to fall back, sometimes by the military strength of Turkey and her own inefficiency, sometimes by disease in her armies, sometimes by the selfishness of the European Powers. Defeated by the Turks in 1709, Russia won some ground thirty years later with the help of Austria. The Crimea was wrested from the Turks in 1774, and the frontier carried westward to the Dniester in 1792. Further gains were made during the Napoleonic wars and in 1829, when Greece was freed from the Moslem. Once more, in 1853, Russia made an onslaught against the Turks, but England, France and Sardinia intervened, and in the bloody Crimean war saved the Mussulman throne, heaping on Russia the crowning injury of a neutralization of the Black sea, which she avenged by repudiating the instrument when the French empire fell in 1870. Her last adventure was in 1877-78, when her victorious armies dictated the treaty of San Stefano almost within sight of Constantinople. Again, however, the jealous Powers intervened. Russia was inveigled into the Congress of Berlin, where Bismarck, Disraeli and Salisbury deftly stripped her of the spoils she had won.

In 1828, 1854 and 1878, the three occasions when Russia came near to her goal, it was Great Britain that balked her. The English policy had ever been to control her route to the East through the Mediterranean, and she always feared the specter of Russian influence in India. After she obtained the Suez canal, however, her terror of Russia was allayed; and it has been clear for

twenty years that she would not again bar the way of her present ally to "warm water." Fate has given her the opportunity to make a good bargain for her complaisance. The incalculable aid given to France and Great Britain in the war has earned for Russia the support of her allies in the project of sweeping away the Turkish obstruction at the mouth of the Black sea. A pleasant salve for the wounds inflicted by the relentless Von Hindenburg in East Prussia will be this announcement that the historic desire of the Russian people is to be realized, and that perhaps the glory of another empire will be founded in ancient Byzantium.

We have tried to show that behind this there is no mere spirit of greed. Russia has all the territory she wants, far more than she needs. Yet of all the nations involved in the war, she alone has a territorial ambition that is founded on justice. The freeing of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles is to her a matter of life and death. It will mean the opening at last of that doorway which so long has shut in her vast wealth and the pouring out for the use of the world of her inexhaustible treasure of the soil. This will be an immeasurable benefit to mankind. The awakening of a commercial Russia will mean the decline of autocracy and the spread of enlightenment throughout the vast dominions of the czar. And it will in time undo the monstrous wrong inflicted upon civilization by the selfish Powers of Western Europe, which, for their own greedy ends, arrogantly barred the path of Russia to the markets of the world.

THE MYTH OF A HOLY WAR

March 8, 1915

ON BOTH sides of the rocky peninsula of Gallipoli—in the gulf of Saros and in the Dardanelles—huge warships are battering at the Turkish defenses ashore. On the very spot where the Osmanli hordes from Asia Minor captured their first European foothold in 1354 degenerate sons of those hardy warriors are feebly resisting expulsion from the western continent. The fury of the bombardment is unprecedented. The thunder of the guns that reverberates from the hill of ancient Troy rolls westward to the Aegean sea and east toward Stamboul, 200 miles way, where the Moslem government is preparing for flight back to Asia, whence it came six centuries ago. And all this titanic clamor is the echo of a dozen words spoken seventeen years ago.

On a day in 1898 the bazaars of Damascus hummed with excitement, and the narrow streets were choked with swirling crowds. An event that woke the memories of centuries long past thrilled the ancient city. A puissant pilgrim from the west, a sovereign infidel but mighty, had come with pomp and ceremony to pay honor to one of the greatest heroes of the Mohammedan faith. Through the awed but exultant throngs passed the brilliant cavalcade—the Turkish governor and his staff, regiments of Moslem troops, the august visitor in gorgeous uniform, surrounded by his glittering suite, the green flag of the Prophet waving side by side with one of the proudest standards of Europe. This was his

imperial majesty the German emperor, the new protector and counselor of Islam, the great and good friend even of the caliph himself. No wonder the city seethed with the sense of great changes impending. In solemn state the kaiser rode to the tomb of Salah-ed-Din, the illustrious Saladin who withstood the onslaughts of the Crusaders. There, in the presence of a reverent throng and surrounded by dignitaries of the Moslem faith, he placed a magnificent wreath on the tomb as a tribute from one of the most powerful of modern rulers to the greatest champion of the Prophet. And turning to the Ottoman governor, he said, "Say to the three hundred million Moslems of the world that I am their friend."

No message ever traveled swifter through the east. It passed from lip to lip in the crowded city; it sped through the bazaars and was carried by pilgrims across the desert, until it was heard in the remotest parts of northern Africa and Asia. The monarch of the mightiest of western Powers had extended his protection over the faithful and was to restore the fading glories of the caliphate. There had already been ten years of effort on the part of the German government to put the force of Islam behind her own schemes of imperial aggrandizement. Since 1888, when German financiers obtained the first concessions for a railroad in Asia Minor, and German expansionists dreamed of linking the Baltic sea with the Persian gulf and carrying the Teutonic empire across Asia, the government had sedulously cultivated its influence over Turkey. In 1889 the kaiser paid a state visit to the sultan, and never permitted the friendship then formed to be interrupted, even by the Armenian atrocities. Five days after the bloody massacre of August, 1896, Wilhelm II sent to Abdul the Damned a group photograph of the imperial family, suitably inscribed as a birthday gift. The scene at Damascus

was the picturesque and effective climax to these regal negotiations. The ceremony at the tomb of Saladin was a proclamation of the Turko-Germanic alliance that is now threatened by fleets in the Dardanelles and the Black sea.

All has been in vain. Under the spur of German demands Turkey did plunge headlong into the European war. She attacked some Russian ports in the Black sea, sent three army corps to destruction in the Caucasus, and made a pitiable effort to invade Egypt across the desert of Arabia. But the traditional valor of the Ottoman troops, despite the heroic tutelage of German officers, could not be revived; and today the last flicker of Moslem power is dying in the gusts of war that sweep toward its ancient capital. There is only one thing more shameful than a successful crime, and that is a crime that fails. Germany has played for bloody stakes, and, so far as Turkey is concerned, she has lost. She never had any illusions about the efficacy of Turkish assaults on Russia or Egypt. What she tried to accomplish—her sole hope in involving Turkey—was the incitement of a world-wide Mohammedan uprising, the horror of a holy war which would drench in blood the vast Oriental possessions of Great Britain, France and Russia, and so permit her to seize the mastery of Europe.

German intrigue in Turkey has been an inevitable part of her plan to create a great political and commercial highway from the Rhine to the Euphrates, across Austro-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey and Asia Minor. Turkey holds the bridge between Europe and Asia, for the possession of which Roman and barbarian, Christian and Saracen, have fought throughout the centuries. She also holds Asia Minor—a treasure-house of wealth to the empires of antiquity and still a mine of undeveloped

wealth. The decline of the Ottoman power, together with the traditional influence of the sultan as the head of Mohammedanism, seemed to offer a dazzling opportunity. With an effectual alliance with Turkey, Germany could threaten Great Britain in India and Egypt, France in Tunis, Algeria and Morocco, Russia in western Asia. Pan-Germanism in itself was powerful; backed by Pan-Islamism it would be irresistible. The project did not lack plausibility. The sultan, as head of the Moslem religion, theoretically had the power to loose the fanatic hordes of the Prophet upon the Christians in India, Egypt and northern Africa. There are 70,000,000 Moslems in India, 36,000,000 in Africa and 18,000,000 under the sway of the caliph himself. What would happen to the boasted might of Great Britain, France and Russia if the call went forth for a "jihad"—a holy war against the oppressors of the faithful in all lands?

The Turks, stung by the loss of their North Africa dominions to France and Italy and made desperate by the remorseless inroads of the Balkan States, yielded readily to the seductive influence of Berlin, which prevailed even after Germany had permitted her ally, Italy, to seize Tripoli. German loans financed the Ottoman government, German officers reorganized and commanded the army and navy, and German military engineers rebuilt the defenses of the capital. In all these moves the actual aim was domination of the pathway from Europe to Asia and the gateway between the Mediterranean and the Black sea. And the means that was to realize this end was a "holy war" of Mohammedanism against the rivals of Germany. This Germany has herself announced. A statement issued on November 20 by the government in Berlin declared:

From all sections of Egypt come reports of enthusiastic manifestations in favor of a holy war. The Sheikh ul-Islam

has communicated with a majority of the Mohammedan princes of Asia and Africa, who declare they will assist Turkey in a war against England.

What a holy war means has been explained by an American woman who has lived for many years among Mohammedans. In a letter to the New York Evening Post she wrote:

Germany, a nominally Christian nation, has tried to force Turkey into declaring a jihad, or holy war. This is the most treacherous act of the whole war. Perhaps your readers know what a jihad is, but I doubt very much if people who have not passed a part of their lives, at least, among Mohammedans, realize what it might mean to countless thousands of innocent creatures. A holy war means the bringing of fanatical Mohammedanism to white heat. It means that in India there would be a second and more terrible mutiny, and that throughout the whole east there would be an attempted massacre of Christians, without distinction of nationality.

Yet Germany insisted, and the holy war was proclaimed. With impressive ceremonies and in the presence of a vast throng of soldiers and civilians in Constantinople, the Sheikh ul-Islam, the ecclesiastical head of the faith, who is appointed by the sultan, read his decree summoning the faithful "to fight to the uttermost against England, France and Russia, the oppressors of Islam." Historically, a holy war is a dreadful instrument of religious fanaticism. The first one was proclaimed by Mohammed himself against his uncle—whom the Prophet genially named the Father of Ignorance—and was a sanguinary success. After this gratifying experience, the founder of the faith decreed that whenever the religion was in danger the ruling caliph should summon all its adherents to a war of extermination against the infidels.

The sacred flag summoned the Moslems to fight against the Crusaders in the Holy Land; against Janos Hunyady, the Hungarian hero, in the fifteenth century,

and against Sobieski, the Polish deliverer of Vienna, two hundred years later. The last time it was raised the victims were Mohammedans. In 1825 the grandfather of the present sultan decided to rid himself of his janizaries—those turbulent troops who had sustained the caliphate for five hundred years, but had grown too powerful for safety. He summoned them to a convenient place and had them massacred. But the virtue seems to have gone out from this pleasing emblem. A holy war is a feature of ancient times which even German efficiency cannot revive in the twentieth century. The Sheikh ul-Islam as reasonably might have called upon the winds of heaven to fight against the infidels as to command the Mohammedan world to gather round the green standard of the Prophet. As a well-informed writer in *The North American* said six months ago, "Grant that they have all the will in the world to rally to the sultan's banner, they have not the transports to carry them, the provisions to feed them or the weapons to arm them."

But there are fundamental reasons why the plan must fail. A *jehad* implies a Moslem war against Christians in defense of the faith, not against certain Christians in behalf of others. Turkey, in a despairing effort to save her place in Europe, might sacrifice an army in a hopeless attack on Russia, as a favor to her ally; but this spectacle of futility only filled Mohammedans elsewhere with shame and wrath. With one accord they repudiated the summons from the caliph. The sultan is, after all, only the head of Islam by virtue of his position. He holds Mecca, the shrine of the faithful. If that were in danger, he might appeal to the Moslems with some effect. But as the mere mouthpiece for an infidel Power like Germany he was discredited. Moreover, there never has been any solidarity in Moham-

medanism. There cannot be, for community of aims and interests is utterly lacking in the religion. The German emperor is not the first to dream of using Islam as a force for conquest, but it has always been a broken reed in the hands of those who tried to wield it.

It is strange that a government so efficient as that of Germany should have relied upon a scheme so visionary, should have stained its record with an appeal to religious fanaticism that had in it not the remotest chance of success. There are learned Oriental scholars in Germany, and any of them might have warned the government of what would result. Thousands of devout Moslems from North Africa are fighting for France, and whole army corps of Mohammedans from India are serving in the trenches for Great Britain. Egypt is indifferent to the holy war; Russia's Mohammedan subjects have declared their loyalty to the czar, and the Aga Khan, whose word is law on religious matters to millions of the faith throughout the east, has declared to his followers:

No Islamic interest was threatened in this war, and our religion was not in peril. Turkey was the trustee of Islam, and the whole world was content to let her hold our holy cities in her keeping. Now that she has shown herself a tool in German hands, she has ruined herself. She has lost her position as trustee of Islam, and evil will overtake her.

Thus the dreadful threat of a bloody religious uprising falls to the ground. Its failure saves the world from a great horror, and it also saves Germany from herself. For the government which succeeded in bringing such a calamity upon civilization would be branded as an Ishmaelite among the nations, the common enemy of mankind.

